

This article was downloaded by:[Bayerische Staatsbibliothek]  
On: 20 December 2007  
Access Details: [subscription number 731813820]  
Publisher: Routledge  
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954  
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



## Mediterranean Politics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:  
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713604487>

### Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership

Rainer Hülse<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Geschwister-Scholl-Institut, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

Online Publication Date: 01 November 2006

To cite this Article: Hülse, Rainer (2006) 'Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership', *Mediterranean Politics*, 11:3, 309 - 327

To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13629390600913908

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390600913908>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

*Mediterranean Politics*,  
Vol. 11, No. 3, 309–327, November 2006



## Cool Turkey: Solving the Image Problem to Secure EU Membership

RAINER HÜLSSE

Geschwister-Scholl-Institut, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany

**ABSTRACT** *According to the autumn 2005 Eurobarometer 55 per cent of the EU population perceive Turkey to be culturally too different to fit into the EU. Given that Turkey's accession to the EU will require ratification by the member states, this perception poses a problem for Turkey. This article discusses whether and how Turkey can solve its image problem. It argues that, while images are resistant to change, countries can influence how they are seen by others. For Turkey to overcome its image as the EU's cultural other, it needs to behave in a way that undermines the EU's expectations. Restrained reactions to EU decisions would challenge the image of Turkey being overly emotional. Similarly, a cultural relations policy that puts stronger emphasis on modern aspects of Turkish cultural life enables EU citizens to think of Turkey in a new way. And the 'civil society dialogue', which is part of the EU's rapprochement strategy, provides the chance for Turkey to demonstrate that it is able to critically reflect upon itself. In response to these measures, EU citizens might, albeit slowly, alter their image of Turkey and perceive of the country in terms of cultural similarity rather than difference.*

'Turkey must win the hearts and the minds of the European citizens' (José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, quoted in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 December 2004; author's translation)

Turkey has a serious problem. Only 31 per cent of EU citizens are in favour of EU membership being granted to Turkey, while 55 per cent are opposed to it (European Commission, 2005c: 31). And what must be equally troubling for Turkey is the fact that 55 per cent agree with the statement that 'the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession' (European Commission, 2005b: 162; European Commission, 2005d: 26). As they are much more difficult to overcome than economic or political differences, the (perceived) cultural differences between Turkey and the EU may turn out to be a permanent obstacle for Turkish EU membership. This article does not engage in the

---

*Correspondence Address:* Dr. Rainer Hülsse, Lehrstuhl für Internationale Politik, Geschwister-Scholl-Institut, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Oettingenstr. 67, D-80538 München, Germany.  
Email: rainer.huelsse@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

debate about whether or not there actually is a cultural gap too large for political union. In fact, I would argue that this question is irrelevant, as it is not objective difference that matters, but the subjective difference seen by the current EU members. If they find Turkey to be culturally too different to fit into the EU, Turkey will have a hard time becoming a member. Turkey's problem, to put it in a nutshell, is not so much its culture, but its image. If Turkey wants to become a member of the EU, it needs a new image. However, image is relational, it is an attribution by others. Hence Turkey can only try to influence how others perceive Turkey, but not create a new image unilaterally. Turkey will need to persuade the relevant others in this matter, namely the governments and people in the EU, that it is culturally more similar to European countries than many in the EU take it to be.

Enlargement negotiations started on 3 October 2005. However, the EU has emphasized that the negotiations are open-ended and experts agree that even if the negotiations were to be successful, they are not likely to be completed before 2015, perhaps not even before 2020. This means that Turkey will have to cope with the impact of cultural stereotypes on politics for several years to come. It even seems possible that ratification of Turkey's accession to the EU will fail because citizens in the member states are afraid of the other becoming part of the self. France has already declared to hold a public referendum to decide about Turkey's membership. But perceptions about cultural difference will matter long before ratification is due. Whatever the EU and Turkey are going to negotiate about in the years to come (be it the *acquis communautaire*, security issues, or labour mobility) it will be influenced by many in the EU seeing Turkey as culturally very different. As Thomas Diez (2004: 329) observes: 'Turkey's Europeanness continues to be questioned, both openly, and often also indirectly in discussions about political, economic and administrative criteria'. It is safe to assume that this will cause a great many problems for Turkey. The Turkish government will constantly have to prove to the people on the other side of the negotiating table that the EU need not be afraid of it. But what can the Turkish government do about this image problem? How can Turkey get rid of its role as Europe's cultural other? How can it make EU citizens think of Turkey as being one of them and not a stranger?

This article searches for answers to these questions. It argues that Turkey's predominant pattern of behaviour is detrimental to its membership ambitions: Turkey tends to react to the EU's decisions and perceptions with resentment and anger. Given the long time that Turkey has been waiting for membership, such reactions may be understandable.<sup>1</sup> But they have the effect of 'other-fulfilling prophecies', as they confirm the EU's expectations about Turkey. Turkey's emotional reactions are in line with the EU's image of the country and provide ex post legitimation for any EU decision that excludes Turkey from the EU. This is why Turkey can only succeed in realizing its membership ambitions if it manages to establish a different pattern of behaviour: Turkey needs to change from hot-blooded into *Cool Turkey*. However, moderate reactions to the EU will hardly be enough to change Turkey's image. Additional measures are needed to signify 'Europeanness': Turkey has to allow for freer participation of its civil society in the 'civil society dialogue' which is part of the EU's rapprochement strategy. Turkey also needs to

engage in a new cultural relations policy which enables EU citizens to perceive Turkey as a western country. And, above all, it will be necessary for Turkey to critically examine its past and present politics, as reflexivity has become a key ingredient in the post-war European discourse of self.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The following section looks at how citizens in the EU member states, especially in Germany, perceive Turkey. Then, I will address the question why this image poses a problem for Turkey. Next, it will be shown how Turkey's behaviour aggravates its image problem in order to then discuss what Turkey could do to solve this problem.

### Turkey's Image in the EU

This section aims at illuminating the EU's image of Turkey. I will refer to the Eurobarometer data showing that a majority of citizens in the EU finds the cultural differences too great for membership. I will not go into the statistical details, as I am interested in the overall image of Turkey and not in, for example, the reasons why 76 per cent in Austria perceive there to be an insurmountable cultural gap, but only 44 per cent in Sweden. As the Eurobarometer tells us only *that* people see a cultural misfit between the EU and Turkey, but not *how* exactly they describe this misfit, I will also report on research I have conducted on the German discourse about Turkey. This gives insight into the reasoning patterns of the othering of Turkey.

Let me begin, however, with an example from the *Guardian*. In an article on EU–Turkey relations a social worker named Helmut from Vienna is being quoted:

'I know one Turkish bloke. He's got two wives. Neither of them can speak a word of German. He beats them up. He's got two sons as well. They're terrified of him. They're just different from us. We're Christians. They're Muslims. And these Muslims are getting more and more extreme. It's time to make a choice. I'm against it.' (*Guardian*, 22 September 2004)

What Helmut is doing is a very human practice: he generalizes from his own experience. This is what we do all the time. It is in fact a necessary practice, given that we do not have direct access to anything that lies outside our 'life-worlds' (Husserl, 1986; Schütz and Luckmann, 1973). In order to make sense of the world out there, we have to draw analogies from our own worlds, from our everyday life. Even in an era where Turkey has become one of Europe's favourite tourist destinations, 'Turkey is little known and less understood' (Eralp, 2005). But this does not prevent EU citizens from having their own ideas about Turkey. And these ideas are influenced by their experiences, as was the case with Helmut's encounter with 'the stranger'.

I will argue here that Helmut's view is rather typical of the way EU citizens perceive Turkey and the Turks. The crucial part of his statement being: 'They're just different from us.' He takes this difference to be a cultural one, both with regard to lifestyles (two wives, beating them up) and to culture in general terms (Muslims). Helmut's view reflects a discourse that has developed over 500 years. The literature on European identity gives evidence of the fact that Turkey – along with Russia – has

been Europe's principal other in the past (see, among many others, Robins, 1996; Neumann, 1999; Rumelili, 2004). European identity – as any identity – has been built on difference, on what Europe is not, for example Islamic. Hence, Turkey's otherness is not only, but to a considerable extent, cultural. As Christianity is by many in the EU considered to lie at the core of European identity, it is the logical conclusion that Turkey does not and cannot belong to Europe.

That the historical construction of Turkey being Europe's other is alive and kicking had been shown in empirical studies I conducted in the past. In an analysis of the German discourse about EU enlargement I was able to reconstruct a discursive double-move: the Central and Eastern European countries, on the one hand, were constructed as one of 'us', while Turkey, on the other hand, was made Europe's other (Hülsse, 2003). This was particularly evident in the metaphors employed: while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were regularly said to be part of the European family, welcomed home to Europe and considered to be growing together with Western Europe, such inclusionary metaphors were hardly ever employed with respect to Turkey. Instead an exclusionary logic prevailed: Turkey did not belong to the European/Christian club, had to wait outside the European house and, instead of being part of Europe, was but the bridge between Europe and Islam. Moreover, Turkey was described as being on the way to Europe, as approaching the EU – also very typical of the discourse, which has long constructed Turkey as not yet European, as coming closer to Europe, without ever actually arriving (Neumann, 1998).

An analysis of two Bundestag debates from December 2002, i.e. just before and after the European Council's Helsinki summit, led to similar results (Hülsse, 2004). Delegates from the Christian parties (CDU and CSU) expressed the view that 'Europe is based on a common cultural and also religious heritage', the reason why, according to one parliamentarian, 'Turkey does not belong to the European cultural area' (Michael Glos, quoted in: *Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll* 15/13: 874; my translation). The CDU and CSU openly admitted that for them Turkey is culturally different from Europe and that this difference is an insurmountable obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. More surprising, however, was that the SPD and the Greens, too, contributed to the cultural othering of Turkey. Despite arguing in favour of giving Turkey a concrete membership perspective, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as well as former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer displayed doubts about the cultural match. They continually referred to Turkey as an Islamic country, they justified their policies of giving Turkey a prospect of membership as a means to fight Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism and thus – willingly or not connected Turkey not only to Islam, but also to fundamentalism and terrorism. Hence they seemed to share – unconsciously at least – the view that Turkey is different and constitutes a potential threat. That cultural reservations about Turkey's EU membership do not vary much across parties can be interpreted as an indication that this is a collective belief. As such they are deeply embedded in Germany's discourse about Turkey and cannot be overcome easily. This is the reason why even those in favour of Turkey's EU membership reproduce the age-old stereotypes about Turkey.

As I have not systematically analysed discourse in other EU member states, I cannot provide evidence on the patterns of reasoning in places other than Germany.<sup>2</sup> What we do know from the Eurobarometer survey, however, is that the othering of Turkey on cultural grounds in the German discourse reflects a general perception among citizens in the EU. As mentioned in the introduction, an average of 55 per cent of citizens in the EU member states finds that the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too great to allow Turkey into the EU (European Commission, 2005d: 26). Against the background of my analysis of how Germany's parliamentarians talk of Turkey, it is unsurprising that this figure is even higher in Germany, namely 71 per cent (European Commission, 2005d: 26). Indeed, it may be read as a confirmation of my claim that the othering of Turkey by German politicians reflects a collective belief in Germany. Still, Germany is not the only country opposing Turkish membership on cultural grounds. More than 60 per cent in Denmark (61 per cent), Estonia (66 per cent), Greece (67 per cent), France (63 per cent), Cyprus (71 per cent), Luxembourg (64 per cent) (all according to the spring poll, European Commission, 2005b: 162) and lastly Austria with a remarkable 78 per cent (according to the autumn poll, European Commission, 2005e: 46) agree with the statement that 'the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession' (European Commission, 2005b: 162). The latter figure indicates that Austria's fervent opposition against the start of negotiations with Turkey in the weeks before they were scheduled to begin may be interpreted as a response to public sentiments. In Austria, Turkey's image problem seems to be even greater than in Germany.

However, there are also member states where less than 50 per cent of the population agree with the above-quoted statement: Spain (44 per cent), Ireland (41 per cent), Lithuania (42 per cent), Hungary (48 per cent), the Netherlands (49 per cent), Portugal (43 per cent), Sweden (44 per cent) and, with the lowest number, the UK (41 per cent) (all according to the spring poll, European Commission, 2005b: 162). While these numbers indicate that the EU is far from united on the question of Turkey's cultural fit, they also show that even in those countries least concerned about cultural difference impeding membership, more than 40 per cent of the population share the cultural concerns.

Unfortunately, and interestingly, Eurobarometer does not pose the question about cultural fit with respect to other possible candidates.<sup>3</sup> This is unfortunate, as we cannot compare cultural concern about Turkey with Bosnia and Herzegovina or Albania, for example. That Eurobarometer raises the question only in the Turkish case is interesting, as it makes us speculate about the Commission's role in constructing this very cultural gap. One could argue that the very fact that Eurobarometer asks EU citizens to agree or disagree with the 'cultural difference too great for membership' statement, recalls and thus reconstructs the difference. People are given the possibility to declare that there is a cultural misfit impeding membership, whereas a similar perception with regard to other countries could not possibly be articulated in a Eurobarometer poll.

In sum, then, we can note that political elites in Germany and a majority of the EU population perceive Turkey to be culturally too different to fit into the EU. Given

that Turkey wants to become a member of the EU, this image of being culturally too different might be a problem for Turkey.

### **Why this Image Poses a Problem for Turkey**

In the preceding section I have demonstrated that Turkey's image in the EU is that of the cultural other. Why should this be a problem? After all, the EU has just started negotiating membership with that other. Apparently the EU is willing to integrate a country that does not belong to Europe. But despite this indicating the possibility of the EU overcoming or perhaps ignoring the cultural gap and making Turkey a member, it is far from certain that Turkey will actually become an EU member. Heather Grabbe (2004: 3), for example, claims that 'Turkey will not be allowed to join unless all the member-states are convinced that the Turks share European values'. And Thomas Diez (2005: 179) points to the fact that even if Turkey is granted membership, membership may have become so differentiated that it does not mean what it means today. Be that as it may, what I will argue in this section is that Turkey's image will continue to cause many problems even after membership negotiations have started. The image will on the one hand pose day-to-day problems during the negotiation process itself and on the other hand existential problems when it comes to ratification.

On 3 October 2005 membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey officially started. These negotiations may be expected to cause a great many day-to-day problems. Perceptions and beliefs will play a role throughout the negotiation process, regardless of whether technocrats argue about technical details or high-ranking officials negotiate over the major decisions. What those on the negotiating table think of each other will influence how they act. An EU official who sees Turkey as Europe's other will define the EU's interests differently from an EU official who cannot find much of a cultural gap. For example, progress and the speed of negotiations might depend on whether the negotiating parties trust each other or not. A negotiator who is sceptical of whether Turkey culturally matches with the rest of Europe will not be easily convinced that Turkey has actually implemented a specific measure. This is to say that Turkey will be confronted with its negative image throughout the negotiation process. It will constantly be asked to prove that – *malgré tout* – it is capable of acting like a European, an EU country. It will have to cope with scepticism on the other side of the negotiating table as to whether it is capable of acting like a European country – against its image of being culturally different from Europe. This is why Turkey's image may be expected to pose many problems during the negotiation process itself. Considering the fact that these negotiations are expected to take a minimum of 10 years, and more likely 15 years, one can easily see that Turkey would be well advised to do something about its image problem now.

At some point negotiations will come to an end. But even if the result were to be positive, i.e. the EU and Turkey agree on Turkish EU membership, the real problems would still lie ahead: accession requires ratification by all member states. The most recent EU policies of Austria, the country with the broadest public opposition against

Turkish membership, points to this not being an easy task. Even without a referendum, the Austrian parliament would most likely vote against Turkey's accession. While in past rounds of accession member states have ratified accession of new members without asking their citizens, observers expect that more than one member state will let its population decide on Turkey's membership: France has already announced that it will eventually hold a referendum on that question, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria are other likely candidates for a public poll (Grabbe, 2004: 3; Kramer, 2005: 12; see also *Economist*, 7 October 2004). And assuming that the public will not make its choice on the basis of a rational calculation of interest alone, but will be influenced by considerations of identity, by emotions, in brief, by its view of Turkey, we may expect Turkey to run into problems if it does not succeed in changing its current image before ratification of its accession is due. Turkey will have to persuade the EU public that it is no longer a stranger, but a 'normal' European country (Kramer, 2005: 5, 13). 'The Turks must prepare European public opinion for their entry' (*Economist*, 6 October 2005).

A complete change of image is extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve; modifications are more likely. At present the 'traditional' image of Turkey dominates: Turkey is seen as Europe's cultural other. As I have shown in the preceding section, many Europeans – for example the Austrian quoted in the *Guardian* and the various German politicians referred to above – perceive lifestyles in Turkey to be very backward as compared to those in Europe and they always think of Turkey as an Islamic country. And the political culture, too, is seen to be very different from Europe. The rational politics of the EU has, according to its self-perception, to cope with often overly emotional reactions by Turkish politicians. This image is resistant to change, because it is a constitutive element of European identity. Yet still, identities are not stable and eternally fixed, but are constantly debated and redefined. And hence there is room for modification, both regarding the self-image of the EU and the EU's image of Turkey. And actors can try to influence the direction these modifications take. At present, however, Turkey acts towards the EU in a way that confirms rather than changes its image.

### **How Turkey Confirms its Negative Image: An 'Other-Fulfilling Prophecy'**

Turkey has more than once been confronted with EU decisions that seemed discriminatory. Thus, one can understand the sometimes angry and disappointed reactions of Turkey. Faced with negative attitudes towards Turkish EU membership, Turkish politicians tend to reject them as wrong and insulting (Kramer, 2004: 17). However, such reactions have not helped the Turkish cause, as they have the effect of confirming the EU's prejudices and thus aggravating Turkey's image problem. In fact, they provide the EU's unwillingness to integrate Turkey with ex post legitimacy and hence take effect as an 'other-fulfilling prophecy'. Therefore, in order to be allowed to join the EU, Turkey has to learn 'to meet criticism not with prickliness and nationalist rhetoric, but with moderation and coolness' (Grabbe, 2004: 3).



Many European summits have produced outcomes that did not satisfy Turkey's expectations. When Turkey hoped to be made a candidate, that request was turned down (Luxembourg 1997); when Turkey expected to be given a date when negotiations would start, the final decision was postponed (Copenhagen 2002); when Turkey expected that negotiations would start 'without delay', it was told to wait another 10 months (Brussels 2004). And this is not even to mention the regular pre-summit difficulties when one or another EU member state questions prior decisions, trying to keep up or even bring to a halt the process of integrating Turkey. The Austrian efforts to rewrite the goals of negotiation just before the official date for beginning these negotiations is but the most recent instance of EU politics that caused considerable irritation in Turkey.

Understandably, '[t]he reaction of wounded pride is widespread' (*The Economist*, 18 December 1997). Frequently Turkey displayed its disappointment over the setbacks. Most famous perhaps is Turkey's reaction to the Luxembourg summit in 1997 (Bagci, 1999). Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz complained that the EU is erecting a 'new cultural Berlin Wall' (*Economist*, 18 December 1997). And holding Germany responsible for not granting the longed-for candidate status to Turkey, but only to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, he declared that Germany was pursuing once again a *Lebensraumpolitik* (*Economist*, 12 March 1998). German politicians, in turn, were outraged, Turkey–EU relations fell to an all-time low (Bagci, 1999). Turkey boycotted the Europe conference in spring 1998 and virtually cut off dialogue with the EU. This, in return, was criticized by the EU and judged as behaviour incompatible with European standards. The German ambassador in Ankara at the time, Hans-Joachim Vergau, said: 'The rejection of political dialogue is something very *alien* to European thinking and practice' (quoted in Bagci, 1999; emphasis added). This describes exactly the detrimental effect of Turkey's emotional reaction: it can be used by the EU as proof of Turkey's otherness or *alienness*. It thus provides ex post legitimation for the EU's action, in this case for not making Turkey a candidate country.

But there are also more recent examples of how sensitive Turkish politicians are to criticism and how this may damage Turkey's interests. In the spring of 2005 Hansjörg Kretschmer, the EU ambassador to Ankara, had observed a 'slippage' in Turkey's reforms. Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gül, returned: 'Should I, a foreign minister and a deputy head of government, respond to these accusations? Who is this Kretschmer anyway?' (quoted in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 8 March 2005; my translation; see also *Economist*, 23 March 2005). This reaction had been perceived as arrogant. And it certainly did not help Turkish interests. Kretschmer, after all, is the official representative of the EU in Turkey. What is more, Gül's statement, as well as other similar reactions by Turkish decision makers, confirm exactly the EU's image of Turkey: instead of arguing on a factual basis and in a rational manner, Turkey reacts emotionally. Decision makers in the EU report that they find it difficult to deal with their Turkish counterparts. Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor, once stated that 'nearly every talk [with members of the Turkish government] is also a therapeutic exercise' (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 December 2004; my translation).

Against this background, I would claim that the way Turkey reacts to EU decisions is detrimental to its interests. In fact, the reactions justify the EU decisions retrospectively. Politicians in the EU can point to Turkey's behaviour to argue that it was right not to make concessions. Thus, Turkey's reactions backfire. Instead of convincing the EU that Turkey deserves to be a member, it endorses the image that Turkey is too different to be part of the EU. Turkey's behaviour takes effect as an 'other-fulfilling-prophecy'.

Emotional reactions by Turkish politicians to EU decisions have contributed to Turkey's negative image. However, how political elites and populations in the EU conceive of Turkey is shaped by other events as well. Take, for example, the football world cup qualifier match between Turkey and Switzerland in the autumn of 2005, which led not only to the elimination of Turkey but also to reactions by Turkish players, coaches and spectators which outside Turkey were perceived – once again – as overly emotional and irrational (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 18 November 2005). This indicates how difficult it will be for Turkish politicians to change the country's image, as they cannot control discourse. Turkey's image abroad is also being shaped by what its football supporters, public prosecutors and media are doing. Consider, for instance, the trial of Orhan Pamuk in December 2005 for insulting Turkish identity, which in the EU has been interpreted as yet another proof of a nationalism which is alien in the Europe of today (*Economist*, 3 December 2005). Nationalism, much like emotionality, is a central aspect of the EU's image of Turkey. Even the *Economist*, a long-time supporter of Turkish membership, cannot resist the temptation to essentialize Turkish nationalism: 'A thin-skinned nationalism has long been part of the Turkish character' (*Economist*, 18 December 1998).<sup>4</sup>

Images are attribution by others. But rather than being pure invention, they are interpretations of actions and events. Hence how people in the EU conceive of Turkey is certainly connected to 'reality'. And Turkey, this section has shown, gives ample opportunity for EU citizens to see their prejudices about Turkey confirmed. A dynamic seems to be at work here which is difficult to stop: the EU's image of Turkey colours its interpretation of Turkish politics. Accordingly, the EU sees its image confirmed by its interpretation of Turkey's actions, which again will impact on how it views further Turkish actions. Turkey is trapped in its image. How can it escape?

### **How Turkey Can Overcome Its Image Problem**

Turkey's image in the EU is that of a country culturally too different to fit into the EU. In the previous section I showed how Turkey itself contributes to its image problem by confirming EU prejudices. This diminishes its chances of membership. Therefore, for Turkey to become a member of the EU an image that is more compatible with Europe would be very helpful and perhaps a prerequisite for achieving membership. However, images cannot be changed easily. Stereotypes and prejudices have developed over a long period of time; they are deeply embedded in a society's way of seeing things (see Pickering, 2001). Still, considering that even countries with far greater image problems, most notably Germany after World War

II, were able to repair their images, it should be possible for Turkey to improve its image. This section shows how. It will be suggested that, first, Turkey should develop a new pattern of relating to the EU, changing from emotional Turkey into *Cool Turkey*. It will be argued, second, that Turkey should enable alternative discourses about Turkey, making it possible for EU citizens to perceive Turkey not just as a traditional country, but also as a modern, western one. The third suggestion is to leave the ‘civil society dialogue’, initiated by the EU, truly to civil society. A fourth measure for correcting Turkey’s image problem would be to abandon a cultural relations policy that is at best public relations and at worst bare propaganda. Instead, cultural relations should, fifth, enable self-critique, establishing and institutionalizing a reflexive discourse about the country’s culture and politics.

#### *Cool Turkey*

One obvious measure for Turkey to get rid of its image problem would be to cease behaving in a way that confirms its current image. This suggestion follows logically from my argument above that Turkey frequently fulfils the EU’s prophecies about Turkey being culturally too different to fit into the EU. Instead of playing the nationalist and emotional card, Turkey would have to remain calm, even when feeling maltreated by the EU. If Turkey showed itself to be rational and considerate, even when provoked by yet another unreasonable EU demand, it would escape from the trap of confirming the EU’s opinion about how inappropriately Turkey tends to behave. *Cool Turkey* would effectively undermine the EU’s expectations. And thus the ‘other-fulfilling-prophecy’ would not come into effect. Of course, this change in the pattern of Turkey’s reaction would not lead to a change in the EU’s image of Turkey immediately. But if Turkey stayed cool consistently, the EU would eventually be forced to rethink its image of Turkey. It would come to realize that perhaps its idea of Turkey – emotional, easily offended, difficult to deal with – is incorrect. As I explained above, while perceptions do not mirror reality, reality does feed into them. If the way Turkey behaves continually contradicts the EU’s image of Turkey, the EU will eventually begin to adapt its image.

However, I have argued above that Turkish politicians are not the only ones that shape the country’s image. Restraint in dealing with the EU could be undermined if the rest of the country, for example football supporters or the media, lack coolness. And while it may be possible for the Turkish government to change its own behaviour, it is more difficult to change the country in general. In a democracy, governments can hardly prohibit the media from using nationalist rhetoric or stop football players from attacking their Swiss opponents. Still, I would hold that politics has a signalling effect. Should Turkish politics become restrained, this may also have an impact on how the country in general is perceived. The crucial point is to interrupt the negative dynamics described above and replace them with a self-reinforcing positive dynamic. Once people in the EU start to perceive Turkey as culturally similar rather than different, events that previously were interpreted as a confirmation of negative stereotypes would be subject to a normalizing discourse. That parts of the media rely on nationalist rhetoric is hardly un-European (as any

reader of British tabloids will know), nor is rude behaviour in football something unknown in the EU. It very much depends on one's image of Turkey whether one interprets such observations as an indication of difference or similarity.

### *Establishing an Alternative Discourse*

Breaking with patterns of behaviour that confirm the EU's stereotypes is essential for Turkey to solve its image problem. However, more is needed if the EU is to develop an image of Turkey that does not stand in contrast to the EU's image of what European countries ought to be like. Turkey has to supply the EU with an alternative view of Turkey. The dominant discourse on Turkey in the EU today is still very much one of cultural difference. Yet what is needed for Turkey to secure membership in the EU is a discourse that emphasizes cultural similarity instead of difference. However, discursive change cannot be implemented top-down, nor can it be controlled by the government. The Turkish government can only make offers on how the country can be seen. At present, however, the problem is that even the official Turkish self-descriptions rely on the traditional stereotypes of Turkey. Turkey, in much of its cultural relations policy, contributes to the discursive construction of a culturally different Turkey. Thus it confirms rather than challenges its own image. In order to enable people in the EU to talk and think of Turkey in a new way – as culturally similar, not different – Turkey has to supply EU citizens with a different view. This, of course, does not assure that EU citizens will adopt the new view immediately and in consequence change their image of Turkey. But a necessary first step is to make it possible for a new image to develop in principle. Put differently, only if Turkey tells them about similarities will the EU citizens be able to see less difference and more cultural sameness.

As far as tourism is concerned, Turkey is marketing a very traditional image of itself. A look at the website of Turkey's Ministry of Culture and Tourism is illuminating in this respect.<sup>5</sup> Under the heading 'culture' we find reference, among others, to 'minstrel and dervish literature', 'folk knowledge', 'folk dances' and 'costume, traditional arts and crafts, folk paintings'. Again, there is nothing wrong with presenting these parts of Turkish culture. However, with a view to changing Turkey's image abroad, more modern parts of Turkish culture should be given equal emphasis. Also, cultural events organized by Turkish embassies abroad put strong emphasis on tradition. For example, the Berlin embassy stages 'performances of Turkish *classical* music, opera, ballet as well as exhibitions of Turkish painting and sculpture' with the goal of 'conveying an idea of the *traditional* values of our culture'.<sup>6</sup> I would hold that such an approach, despite its good intentions, increases Turkey's image problem. It might help to attract tourists but it diminishes the chances for EU membership. Events such as those organized by Turkey's embassy in Berlin are part of the traditional discourse of Turkey. As such they confirm an image of Turkey which is a central obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. In order to enable an alternative image to develop, Turkey should instead consider sponsoring cultural events which emphasize the western character of urban Turkish culture, e.g. Turkish DJs and video artists. The people visiting these events would be surprised

to see how similar culture and lifestyles are. They would be confused as such impressions do not fit into their image of Turkey. The effect would thus be the same as a night-time visit to Beyoğlu for first-time visitors to Istanbul. Seeing transvestites in the *İstiklal Caddesi* is an effective challenge to any image of Turkey as being a traditional, non-western country.

This does not imply that the more traditional parts of Turkish culture need to be negated. However, they should not – or not only – be presented in their pure form, as if this is the only way traditions are lived. Rather, in Turkey as in almost any other country, traditions mix with modernity, ancient mores with urban lifestyles. And this mix is manifested in much of the work of contemporary Turkish artists, musicians, writers and film-makers. Orhan Pamuk, for example, uses traditional elements to narrate modern novels that are read all over the world. He, like many others, represents a Turkey which is many things at the same time, traditional and modern, religious and secular, Islamic and European.

Establishing an alternative discourse of Turkey is crucial for Turkey to get rid of its image problem, and thus for its EU membership. Yet results will not show immediately. Even if one pushes the image of Turkey being a western country, very similar to the rest of Europe, Europeans will not adapt their perceptions instantaneously. But only if Europeans know about modern Turkey can they begin to develop a new image. An alternative discourse is necessary, as EU citizens are otherwise simply unable to talk, to think and to perceive of Turkey differently. The third pillar of the EU's rapprochement strategy, which calls for increased societal EU/Turkey dialogue, provides a good opportunity for establishing such an alternative discourse. However, at present Turkey seems to be missing the opportunity. Its approach to the third pillar is likely to confirm rather than change Turkey's image.

### *Civil Cultural Relations*

In October 2004 the European Commission recommended 'that accession negotiations be opened' (European Commission, 2004: 9) and thus laid the ground for the European Council's decision in December of the same year to actually start negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. In the same document the Commission also developed a strategy of rapprochement, consisting of three pillars, the third of which is of interest here. It 'suggests a substantially strengthened political and cultural dialogue bringing people together from EU Member States and Turkey' (European Commission, 2004: 2). To this end '[a] number of fora should be created, bringing people together from Member States and Turkey, where concerns and perceptions can be discussed in a frank and open manner. This includes a dialogue on differences of cultures, religion' (European Commission, 2004: 8). In June 2005 the Commission specified that it intends to 'encourage a discussion on perceptions regarding everyday culture and values by the society and the State on both sides' (European Commission, 2005a: 3). In the EU's negotiating framework, finalized on 3 October 2005, the motivation for the third pillar has been expressed more clearly: its aim is 'to enhance mutual understanding... with a view to ensuring the support

of European citizens for the accession process' (European Union, 2005: 4). Apparently the EU finds that the low level of public support for Turkish membership has to do with an insufficient understanding of Turkey. In other words: the third pillar is a strategy for solving what I have called Turkey's image problem. As the third pillar provides an institutional setting for dialogue, it may indeed enable EU citizens to develop a new understanding of Turkey. In fact, observers find it 'most appropriate' (Yeşilkaya, 2005) and consider the third pillar 'the key to boosting Turkey's acceptance amongst EU citizens' (Kramer and Krauß, 2004: 4). Consequently, Turkey should more than welcome the Commission's suggestion.

While until recently the dialogue has been 'nothing more than political pie in the sky' (Kramer and Krauß, 2004: 4), a June 2005 communication has spelled out in greater detail what measures it intends to undertake to conduct that dialogue (see European Commission, 2005a). Suggested activities range from internship programmes for Turkish parliamentary assistants in the parliaments of EU members, student exchange and town twinnings to the setting up of an EU–Turkey business council. Space does not permit an in depth discussion of these activities here. However, overall they appear to have the potential of reducing Turkey's image problem, even though the usual disclaimer about the difficulties of changing images applies. One aspect, however, deserves closer attention. What was originally called 'political and social dialogue' had in the June 2005 communication of the Commission been renamed 'civil society dialogue'.<sup>7</sup> Taking into account that Turkey has a 'tendency to subject its civil society's foreign contacts to the government's scrutiny' (Kramer and Krauß, 2004: 4), this renaming may well be read as a warning to the Turkish government not to interfere and to allow for greater civil society participation (on civil society in Turkey see Kubicek, 2002; Rumford, 2001). The EU's 'civil society dialogue' provides a good opportunity for Turkey to prove its Europeaness precisely by leaving this aspect to its civil society. Hence this dialogue is important for Turkey in at least three respects: First, because it may actually contribute to changing the perceptions of the EU population about Turkey. Second, because it may strengthen Turkish civil society, which would then be evidence that Turkey has 'Europeanized'. Third, by giving the Turkish government the opportunity to prove that it no longer controls civil society activities. By not interfering, but actually leaving 'civil society dialogue' to its citizens, the Turkish government could prove its Europeaness and thus contribute to the solving of its image problem.

However, there is reason to doubt whether Turkey has understood the potential of the 'civil society dialogue' for overcoming its image problem. On the Turkish side the 'civil society dialogue' is overseen by the 'EU Communication Group' (ABIG).<sup>8</sup> This organization is basically a public relations initiative co-sponsored by the Turkish government and two large and influential pro-European business associations, TOBB and TÜSIAD. Hence ABIG is not a civil society organization, but a government initiative supported by industry organizations. Thus instead of overcoming EU citizens' prejudices about Turkey, the organization runs the risk of confirming the image of a country that tries to control civil society engagement and where civil society is often equated with private enterprises and in particular

'big business' (cf. Diez *et al.*, 2005: 9). But this is not the only problem with the way Turkey intends to carry out the 'civil society dialogue' initiated by the European Commission. What appears to be even more problematic is that Turkey – through ABIG – seems to (mis-)use the third pillar for public relations, instead of actually engaging in a dialogue.

#### *Cultural Dialogue, not Public Relations*

That Turkey interprets the 'civil society dialogue' mainly as a marketing and public relations affair is not a secret. According to minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül, ABIG's main goal is to raise publicity. Gül explains: 'In order to accomplish this [to raise publicity] we decided to set up an EU Communication Group, through which we will try to prepare the EU public opinion for the membership of Turkey in EU' (quoted in: European Commission, 2003: 38). On the website of ABIG one can read: 'What we expect and hope for is greatly improved general understanding of Turkey's case; to overcome prejudices and misconceptions.'<sup>9</sup>

However, this is not exactly what the EU intended the third pillar to be, namely to 'enhance mutual understanding' (European Union, 2005: 4). From the EU's perspective both sides need to question their perceptions of the other. And dialogue – talking and listening to the other – should nourish such a critical examination of one's perceptions. However, Gül's statement indicates that what he has in mind is a monologue rather than dialogue (on dialogue/monologue, see Pace, 2005). Instead of both sides rethinking their images, for Turkey it is only the EU that has to correct its misperceptions of Turkey. Turkey wants to use the third pillar for public relations. This is highly problematic.

Increasing publicity is a rather outdated approach to cultural relations policy. Originally cultural relations policy meant simply to present oneself, particularly one's culture, abroad. Since the early 1990s, however, the one-way, monological approach to cultural relations has been replaced by a dialogical approach – at least in the leading countries in the cultural relations field, such as the UK, France or Germany. Leaving mere self-presentation behind, the idea of cultural exchange and dialogue is now central to these countries' cultural relations policies (Harnischfeger, 2000). Cultural relations is meant not only to make them understand us better, but also to foster our understanding of them. Turkey's hanging on to old-style cultural politics may therefore have the effect of confirming an important part of the EU's image of Turkey: a country which lags behind developments in the EU. The EU perceives Turkey to be a not-yet country (Neumann, 1998) – not yet European, not yet ready for membership. Turkey's interpretation of the third pillar shows that its cultural relations policy, too, does not yet conform to the EU standard. Hence Turkey's approach to the 'civil society dialogue' – namely a public relations approach – is likely to backfire. Instead of convincing the people in the EU that Turkey is very much like them, it will be seen as yet another indication of Turkey being different. It will confirm rather than challenge the EU's image of Turkey.

But there is yet another problematic aspect about Turkey's approach to the third pillar – and it could turn out to be the one most damaging to Turkey's interests: it appears that Turkey uses the EU's civil society dialogue not only for public relations, but for propaganda.

### *Reflexivity, not Propaganda*

ABIG claims to 'provide European public opinion with regular, objective, consistent and reliable information on Turkey' and emphasizes that the information supplied on its website is 'substantial, factually based and comprehensive'.<sup>10</sup> However, looking through the website gives a very different impression. Auto-critique is virtually absent, discussions or opinions critical of Turkey are missing altogether. For example, on a section called opinions/academia we find a large collection of scholarly articles, none of which is critical of Turkish EU politics. Dialogue and critical reflection – I would hold – is something else. Still, this does not yet qualify as propaganda, but only as a somewhat unbalanced picture.

However, things look different – and indeed like propaganda – when turning to a news column on ABIG's main site, in which one finds reference to an article named 'The Truth about the Armenian Problem'. There, we read that government and opposition in Turkey are 'making attempts to prevent the use of the so-called genocide claims against Turkey and to invalidate the theses that are far from the facts'. The article quotes Justin McCarthy, presented as a US historian, as having said: 'An incident in which 80 per cent of People remain Alive is not Genocide.'<sup>11</sup> This is not commented on by ABIG. Of course, we are here dealing with a highly sensitive problem and I do not want to engage in the debate about whether or not the massacres qualify as genocide. My point is simply that having such a document on one's website is not exactly proof that ABIG takes its self-declared goal of providing 'European public opinion with regular, objective, consistent and reliable information on Turkey' very seriously. And that ABIG does not publish a single article with a different perspective on the 'Armenian problem' sheds doubt on Turkey's willingness to actually engage in a dialogue. Given that the view that one cannot talk of genocide is – put carefully – contested, publishing but one article that claims to tell the 'truth' is simply propaganda. And considering that EU public opinion is highly critical of Turkey's handling of this particular historical event, Turkey is doing a disservice to itself. Instead of demonstrating to the EU that it is willing to reflect critically on its past, it confirms the EU's stereotype of Turkey as being a stubbornly nationalistic country.

One could take this argument one step further: only if the Turks take a more self-critical approach towards their country will they be able to convince EU citizens that they are like them. According to Ulrich Beck (1994), the constant reflection of one's own practices is the key characteristic of what he calls the 'late modern societies', notably European societies. This defines what Beck terms reflexive modernity. If Turkey tries to prevent critical reflection on its past or present politics, it gives evidence of lacking this central feature of late modernity and confirms the EU's image of Turkey's otherness. And Turkey's treatment of its mass deportations and



killings of Armenians in 1915 might turn out to be the crucial test for Turkey's reflexivity and hence for its Europeanness. While most historians agree that this was genocide, Turkey sticks to its own interpretation and – until recently – has not allowed a critical discussion of its role in that conflict. This has been very damaging to Turkey's international image (*Economist*, 23 June 2005). However, there are signs that this 'taboo' (Hughes, 2004: 52) is beginning to break: despite a host of difficulties, a conference on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians was held in September 2005 in Istanbul. For the first time it was permitted to publicly challenge the official view (*Economist*, 29 September 2005). This has been applauded by the EU and we can assume that increased self-reflection on this as well as on other critical issues will help to convince the EU of Turkey being similar rather than different.

In summary, we can conclude that the 'civil society dialogue' initiated by the EU Commission has the potential for establishing a new image of Turkey. However, at present signs are that Turkey is missing out on this chance, as it misinterprets the 'civil society dialogue' as an opportunity for state propaganda, instead of making it a place for self-reflection.

### Conclusion

Turkey has been waiting for membership in what is now the European Union for more than 40 years. Studies on the relations between Turkey and the EU have explored various reasons why the EU hesitates to make Turkey a member (e.g. Müftüler-Bac, 1997; Öniş, 2000; Wood, 1999; Arikan, 2003). And most researchers agree that this cannot be explained on economic or political grounds alone. Culture seems to play an important role: the idea of a cultural gap existing between Europe on the one side and Turkey on the other is widespread in the EU. Research on German politicians' constructions of Turkey as well as the latest Eurobarometer survey clearly show that Turkey is found to be the EU's cultural other. I have argued that this image of Turkey is likely to remain a problem even now that the accession negotiations have started. For once, because it will be a constant burden for Turkish negotiators as they will perpetually have to prove that they are not as alien as their EU counterparts believe them to be. But also because Turkey's accession will eventually have to be ratified by each EU member, some of which are expected to let this be decided in referenda. Against this background, solving its image problem is crucial for Turkey to become an EU member. But how can Turkey change its image? In any case, we may expect this to be difficult, as images about self and other develop over a long period of time and make up part of a country's 'collective memory' (Halbwachs, 1980). However, such difficulties notwithstanding, I have argued that a modification of image, a slow change, may still be possible and that Turkey itself can do something about how it is perceived abroad. I have demonstrated that there are, on the one side, patterns of behaviour which are likely to aggravate Turkey's image problem – e.g. hot-blooded reactions to EU decisions or propagandistic self-presentation. But there are also, on the other side, possibilities for escaping the image trap and making the EU perceive Turkey in a

way that is no longer a hindrance to Turkish membership – e.g. by adopting a restrained mode of reacting to the EU or by allowing for truly civil and dialogic ‘civil society dialogue’. Put in a nutshell, Turkey needs to undermine the EU’s expectations about Turkey by acting in a way that challenges its old image. Over time, this will reduce the perceived cultural differences and increase the chances that citizens in the EU member states will not vote against Turkish EU membership.

### Acknowledgement

The author thanks Alexander Spencer and the two anonymous referees of *Mediterranean Politics* for their helpful comments.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Turkey’s minister of justice, Cemil Cicek, once compared EU–Turkey relations to a comedy, where as soon as one demand is met, the next is made (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 December 2004).
- <sup>2</sup> Though it is not difficult to find statements that are in line with my observations on the German discourse. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to give one example, argues that Turkey is not a European country, as it has ‘a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life’ (quoted in: *Guardian*, 29 September 2004).
- <sup>3</sup> However, Eurobarometer does collect data on rates of support for various countries’ possible accessions to the EU. Here, Turkey fares worst by far, with 55 per cent of EU citizens being opposed to Turkish membership. Only EU citizens’ opposition towards Albanian membership comes close, here 50 per cent oppose that country’s EU membership. Switzerland (13 per cent) and Norway (12 per cent) are the countries which would face least opposition should they apply for membership (European Commission, 2005c: 31).
- <sup>4</sup> The display of nationalism by the government – especially now that the AKP is ruling – may have a strategic and hence perfectly rational background: to secure the support of the Kemalists (especially in the military). Interestingly, this is often overlooked by commentators in the EU.
- <sup>5</sup> <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/Default.aspx?17A16AE30572D313D4AF1EF75F7A79681D9DD78-D03148A6E> (accessed 6 June 2006).
- <sup>6</sup> <http://www.tcberlinbe.de/de/trde/kulturbeziehungen.htm> (accessed 6 June 2006), my translation and emphasis.
- <sup>7</sup> Of course, it can be debated whether something like a civil society dialogue can be implemented top-down, here by the European Commission.
- <sup>8</sup> <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcaturi = tcm:29-145219-16&type = Overview> (accessed 6 June 2006).
- <sup>9</sup> <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/abig.asp> (accessed 6 June 2006).
- <sup>10</sup> <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/abig.asp> (accessed 6 June 2006).
- <sup>11</sup> <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/template.asp?nx = 0&id = 11570&go = The%20Truth%20About%20the%20Armenian%20Problem> (accessed 6 June 2006).

### References

- Arikan, H. (2003) *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Bagci, H. (1999) Türkische Außenpolitik nach dem Luxemburger EU-Gipfel vom Dezember 1997: Europäisch ohne Europa?, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 579–603 (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn).
- Beck, U. (1994) The reinvention of politics: towards a theory of reflexive modernization, in: U. Beck, A. Giddens & S. Lash (Eds) *Reflexive Modernization*, pp. 1–55 (Cambridge: Polity Press).

- Eralp, Y. (2005) Cultural and political dialogue between Turkey and the EU: overcoming difficulties, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 4(3). Available at <http://www.turkishpolicy.com>.
- European Commission (2003) *The Communication Strategy for Enlargement*, Progress Report No. 19, September 2003. Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/communication/pdf/report\\_september\\_2003.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/communication/pdf/report_september_2003.pdf).
- European Commission (2004) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: *Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. Brussels, COM (2004) 656 final, 6 October 2004. Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004/pdf/tr\\_recommandation\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/tr_recommandation_en.pdf).
- European Commission (2005a) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: *Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries*. Brussels, COM (2005) 290 final, 29 June 2005. Available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/civil\\_society\\_290605\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/civil_society_290605_en.pdf).
- European Commission (2005b) Eurobarometer 63: *Public Opinion in the European Union*. September 2005. Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.pdf).
- European Commission (2005c) Eurobarometer 64: *Public Opinion in the European Union: First Results*. December 2005. Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64\\_first\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf).
- European Commission (2005d) Eurobarometer 64. *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Europäischen Union. Herbst 2005. Nationaler Bericht Deutschland*, Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64\\_de\\_nat.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_de_nat.pdf).
- European Commission (2005e) Eurobarometer 64. *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Europäischen Union. Herbst 2005. Nationaler Bericht Österreich*, Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64\\_at\\_nat.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_at_nat.pdf).
- European Union (2005) *Negotiating Framework for Turkey*, Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/st20002\\_en05\\_TR\\_framedoc.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/st20002_en05_TR_framedoc.pdf).
- Diez, T. (2004) Europe's others and the return of geopolitics, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(2), pp. 319–335.
- Diez, T. (2005) Turkey, the European Union and security complexes revisited, *Mediterranean Politics*, 10(2), pp. 167–180.
- Diez, T., Agnantopoulos, A. & Kaliber, A. (2005) File: Turkey, Europeanization and civil society, *South European Society and Politics*, 10(1), pp. 1–15.
- Grabbe, H. (2004) *When Negotiations Begin: The Next Phase in EU–Turkey Relations*, Centre for European Reform, London. Available at [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay\\_turkey\\_hg\\_nov04.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_hg_nov04.pdf).
- Halbwachs, M. (1980) *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper & Row).
- Harnischfeger, H. (2000) Die auswärtige Kulturpolitik vor einem Wendepunkt, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 24/2000, pp. 3–5.
- Hughes, K. (2004) The political dynamics of Turkish accession to the EU: a European success story or the EU's most contested enlargement? *Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies*, No. 2004/9. Available at <http://lse.ac.uk/collections/europeanInstitute/pdfs/Turkey-EU%20report%20Sieps%20final.pdf>.
- Hülse, R. (2003) *Metaphern der EU-Erweiterung als Konstruktionen europäischer Identität* (Baden-Baden: Nomos).
- Hülse, R. (2004) When culture determines politics. Wie der Deutsche Bundestag die Türkei von der EU fernhält, *WeltTrends*, 12(45), pp. 135–146.
- Husserl, E. (1986) *Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt, Ausgewählte Texte II* (Ditzingen: Reclam).
- Kramer, H. (2004) Whither Turkey's EU accession? Perspectives and problems after December 2004. *AICGS Working Paper Series*, Washington DC. Available at <http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/KTurkey2.pdf>.
- Kramer, H. (2005) EU-Türkei: Vor schwierigen Beitrittsverhandlungen. *SWP-Studie*, No. S 11. Available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\\_document.php?id = 1268](http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id = 1268).

- Kramer, H. & Krauß, H.-L. (2004) The European Commission's report on Turkey. An intelligent guide. *SWP-Comments*, No. 33. Available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\\_document.php?id=1085](http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1085).
- Kubicek, P. (2002) The earthquake, civil society and political change in Turkey, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 5(2), pp. 34–47.
- Müftüler-Bac, M. (1997) *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Neumann, I. (1998) European identity, EU expansion, and the integration/exclusion nexus, *Alternatives*, 23(3), pp. 397–416.
- Neumann, I. (1999) *Uses of the Other. 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).
- Öniş, Z. (2000) Luxembourg, Helsinki, and beyond: towards an interpretation of recent Turkey-EU relations, *Government and Opposition*, 35(4), pp. 463–483.
- Pace, M. (2005) Imagining co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean relations: the role of 'dialogue', *Mediterranean Politics*, 10(3), pp. 291–312.
- Pickering, M. (2001) *Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation* (Houndmills: Palgrave).
- Robins, K. (1996) Interrupting identities: Turkey/Europe, in: S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds) *Questions of Cultural Identity*, pp. 61–86 (London: Sage).
- Rumford, C. (2001) Human rights and democratization in Turkey in the context of EU candidature, *Journal of European Area Studies*, 9(1), pp. 93–105.
- Rumelili, B. (2004) Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation, *Review of International Studies*, 30(4), pp. 27–47.
- Schütz, A. & Luckmann, Th. (1973) *The Structures of the Life-World* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press).
- Wood, P. C. (1999) Europe and Turkey: a relationship under fire, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 10(1), pp. 95–115.
- Yeşilkaya, Ö. (2005) Challenges on the path of Turkey's EU membership, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 4(3). Available at <http://www.turkshpolicy.com>.