JIRD

On the transformation of warfare: a plausibility probe of the new war thesis

Monika Heupel[a] and Bernhard Zangl[b]
[a]Social Science Research Center Berlin (SSRCB), Research Unit Transnational Conflicts and International Institutions, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany.
E-mail: heupel@wzb.eu
[b]LMU Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, Oettingenstr 67, 80538 Munich, Germany.
E-mail: Bernhard.Zangl@gsi.uni-muenchen.de

This article intends to contribute to the debate on the emergence of so-called new wars by reconstructing the new war thesis in a way that allows an empirical assessment of the plausibility of the thesis. It makes explicit the defining criteria implicit to the new war thesis which claims that a fundamental transformation of modern intra-state warfare has taken place due to the end of the Cold War. It also lays out the causal mechanisms that underpin the alleged transformation of warfare. Based on the reconstructed conceptual framework and drawing on case studies of the wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone, the article then lends support to the new war thesis. The cases demonstrate that, in the 1990s, war economies based on criminal activities became more important and triggered the fragmentation of warring parties and the economisation of their war motives. Moreover, in combination, the fragmentation of warring parties and the economisation of their war motives facilitate the application of brutal violence against civilians.
Journal of International Relations and Development (2010) **13,** 26–58.
doi:10.1057/jird.2009.31

Keywords: civil war; new wars; peace research; transformation of warfare; war economy; warlords

Introduction

Contrary to predictions of some neorealists, the end of the Cold War did not take us 'back to the future' of the great power wars (Mearsheimer 1990). The transformation from a bipolar to a multipolar distribution of power did not give rise to great power struggles of the kind that had characterised the pre-1945 era. At the same time, unlike the expectations of some Liberals, the democratisation of many states after the Cold War did not bring global peace and the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 1989). Yet, the end of the Cold War did coincide with a considerable decline in global warfare. While the incidence of

inter-state armed conflicts remained at a very low level, the stark decline in intra-state armed conflicts was striking. Initially, the number of intra-state conflicts rose from 38 in 1989 to 50 in 1991. From 1992 onwards, however, there was a severe, steady decline in intra-state conflicts, numbering 'only' 27 in 2006 (see also Human Security Centre 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007 and Marshall and Cole 2008).

While the quantitative decline in global warfare since the early 1990s is hard to deny, it is a matter of hot debate whether the end of the Cold War coincided with a qualitative transformation of warfare. Indeed, many scholars — especially in Europe — have claimed that such a transformation of modern warfare — especially intra-state warfare — has taken place (van Creveld 1991; Snow 1996; Münkler 2004; Kaldor 2006). Triggered by the end of the Cold War and facilitated by globalisation, so the argument goes, the profile of contemporary intra-state wars has undergone changes. It is asserted that so-called new wars will gradually replace the old wars of the Cold War era.[1] According to the new war thesis, new wars are characterised by fragmented actor constellations featuring many kinds of warring parties such as militias, paramilitary units, mercenaries, security companies, and privately organised self-defence units (Eppler 2002; Münkler 2004). In addition, warring parties increasingly fund warfare through criminal activities such as looting the local population, blackmailing international aid agencies and trafficking natural resources such as diamonds, timber or drugs, as was the case, for instance, in Somalia and Afghanistan (Rufin 1999). Moreover, ideological and identity-based war motives tend to be replaced by economic motives, which in fact seem to have been the dominant war motives in Sierra Leone, for example (Cooper 2002: 942). Finally, as part of their war strategies, warring factions increasingly subject the civilian population to extreme brutality, as for instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kaldor 2006).

Yet, other scholars deny the transformation of modern warfare, or at least maintain that it is by no means as obvious as commonly presumed. Rather, they argue that the profile of modern intra-state wars has not changed substantively and that, as the civil war in Lebanon has shown, diverse private actors already confronted one another as warring parties prior to the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, as exemplified by the wars in Colombia and Afghanistan, warring parties already pursued economic motives and funded warfare through criminal activities during the Cold War. And brutal violence intentionally targeting civilians was a common feature of earlier civil wars too, as the atrocities committed by Idi Amin's regime in Uganda testify. Hence, it is not warfare as such that has changed with the end of the Cold War, but the way we perceive and analyse warfare. During the Cold War, critics of the new war thesis argue, scholars focused on the Cold War aspects of intra-state wars, while other aspects were only noticed after the end of the Cold War and are

therefore perceived as new (Kalyvas 2001; Gantzel 2002; Berdal 2003; Matthies 2003; Newman 2004; Chojnacki 2006).

Conceptual clarity is the precondition of any empirical assessment. Yet, the debate on the emergence of new wars lacks conceptual clarity. The criteria that set the profiles of old and new wars apart from each other still remain somewhat unclear. Some emphasise the increase in deliberate violence against civilians or the diffusion of economic war motives as distinguishing criteria, while others point to the spread of criminal war economies or the fragmentation of warring factions. Given this inconsistency, it is hard to aggregate the results of the different empirical studies that relate to the new war thesis. Neither is there clarity with regard to the causal mechanisms through which the different criteria might reinforce each other. Moreover, the causal mechanisms that facilitate the alleged transformation of warfare remain unclear. In fact, most studies refrain from specifying in what way the end of the Cold War might have facilitated the emergence of new wars.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate by reconstructing the new war thesis in a way that allows an empirical assessment of the plausibility of the thesis. To allow for the cumulative growth of knowledge regarding the plausibility or implausibility of the thesis we set out to identify and make explicit the defining criteria implicit to the new war thesis and to lay out the causal mechanisms that underpin the alleged transformation of warfare. We then make use of the reconstructed conceptual framework to make an empirical contribution to the debate on the transformation of warfare that goes beyond offering hand-picked *illustrations*, as done so far by both advocates and critics of the new war thesis. Up to now, advocates of the new war thesis have referred to single cases which match the profile of new wars to substantiate their claims. In other words, they select cases in which they can observe the expected transformation of warfare. Mary Kaldor, for example, developed the new war thesis on the basis of a single, in-depth case study of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kaldor 2006). Mark Duffield, Erhard Eppler and Herfried Münkler, too, rely on cases which clearly reflect the profile of the alleged new wars (Duffield 2001; Eppler 2002; Münkler 2004). Those who contest the new war thesis normally proceed in a similar way. They either refer to single cases in which the profile of the new wars was already evident during the Cold War era, or show that not all wars of the post-Cold War period correspond to the new war profile (Gantzel 2002). Such illustrations have undeniably been very helpful in clarifying the new war thesis and in developing criteria for distinguishing new wars from the so-called old wars. However, by selecting cases that corroborate one's own presumption one also avoids the risk of disproving it (see also Melander *et al.* 2006).

One meaningful way of remedying these shortcomings is to rigorously *test* the new war thesis against empirical evidence. In fact, there are a number of

instructive quantitative studies. Some of these studies, however, only cover the post-Cold War era and thus cannot test claims regarding the transformation of warfare. A case in point is the study by Eck and Hultman (2007) on violence against civilians in post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. Similarly, a study by de Soysa (2002) which hints at the importance of economic war motives limits itself to the post-1989 period. Other studies cover both the Cold War and the post-Cold War period and are thus more helpful when it comes to testing the new war thesis. A study by Byman *et al.* (2001), for instance, lends some support to the claim that the funding of today's warring parties has changed. Its main finding is that funding by third states, while still significant, has decreased in importance. Similarly, a study by Harbom *et al.* (2008) provides some support to the claim that the average number of warring parties per intra-state conflict has risen.[2] By contrast, studies by Lacina (2006) and Melander *et al.* (2006) undermine the assertion that today's intra-state wars involve more violence against the civilian population than those of the past.[3] These studies have certainly helped to shed some light on the validity of the new war thesis. Yet, none of them refer specifically to the claims made by advocates of the new war thesis. For instance, while proponents of the new war thesis claim that violence against the civilian population committed by *non-state* actors has increased, the studies by Lacina (2006) and Melander *et al.* (2006) merely provide evidence that *overall* violence against civilians has not gone up. Furthermore, and most importantly, none of these studies focuses on more than one criterion with regard to which proponents of the new war thesis assert to have detected substantial changes. Consequently, they can identify neither the interplay between the different criteria nor the mechanisms through which the end of the Cold War has facilitated the alleged transformation of warfare.

Given the limitations of these endeavours to assess the new war thesis we decided to resort to a *plausibility probe* on the basis of a limited number of case studies (Eckstein 1975). In this way we can scrutinise the new war thesis against *all* the relevant criteria — and hence the complete new wars' profile — while at the same time going beyond single, hand-picked case studies. This approach not only allows us to find indications as to whether a transformation of warfare has actually taken place, but also to explore by means of process tracing the mechanisms through which the end of the Cold War might have triggered the alleged transformation of warfare. It also allows us to critically assess the dichotomy of 'old' and 'new' wars, because we can evaluate whether today's wars are — as suggested — not only new with regard to some, but rather all of these criteria at the same time. We will examine three wars — in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola — which broke out during the Cold War and continued beyond 1990. By means of in-case comparisons we examine to what extent the profile of these wars changed with the end of the Cold War

(Bennett and George 2005: 206). In addition we consider two further wars — in Somalia and Sierra Leone — which broke out after the end of the Cold War. These cases are meant to provide additional evidence for or against the new war thesis and the mechanisms that led to the transformation of warfare.

To conduct such a plausibility probe we first reconstruct the new war thesis in a way that enables us — and others — to empirically assess its plausibility. We establish criteria on the basis of which the profiles of old and new wars can be distinguished and discuss the underlying causal mechanisms that can account for the transformation of warfare with the end of the Cold War (1). We then move on to our case studies. Applying the specified criteria to the selected wars, we explore to what extent the cases correspond to the profile of new and old wars respectively. Moreover, we explore whether the cases lend support to the mechanisms held responsible for the transformation of warfare after the end of the Cold War (2). Finally, on the basis of this empirical analysis, we conclude that the new war thesis can be deemed plausible. We also argue that the cases largely lend support to the hypothesis that the end of the Cold War was the triggering factor in the transformation of warfare (3).

Distinguishing Criteria of Old and New Wars

The above-mentioned lack of conceptual clarity that hinders empirically assessing the plausibility of the new war thesis refers to two ambiguities. First, the thesis remains vague as to whether the 'counterparts' to new wars are inter-state wars or old intra-state wars. Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler, two of the major proponents of the new war thesis, developed the term 'new wars' primarily to distinguish them from classic, inter-state wars (Münkler 2004: 25; Kaldor 2006: 15–7).[4] However, the transformation from inter-state to intra-state warfare was already obvious during the Cold War era; in fact, more than 80 per cent of the wars which have taken place since 1945 have been intra-state wars.[5] Yet, Kaldor's and Münkler's explicit differentiation between new intra-state wars and old inter-state wars also implies a distinction between new and old intra-state wars (Münkler 2004: 22–3; Kaldor 2006: 103–7). This related transformation is, however, much less obvious (Chojnacki and Eberwein 2000: 11–2). We thus aim to establish whether in the post-Cold War era the classic intra-state wars increasingly play a minor role compared to the new intra-state wars and whether this is due to the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the new war thesis also remains vague as to what exactly the criteria are that distinguish old from new intra-state wars. This section therefore serves to distil from the literature what the prevalent conceptualisation of the features of old and new wars is. Based on a review of the work of proponents of the new war thesis we distinguish old and new intra-state wars by means of four criteria

relating to the warring parties, their war economy, war motives and warfare strategies. In doing so, we do not intend to establish dichotomous criteria that can serve to determine whether the selected wars are consistent with the features of the new wars or not. Rather we intend to use the criteria as gradual scales that allow us to determine *to what extent* the selected wars resemble new or old wars.

Criminalisation of war economies

As generally suggested by the new war thesis, the withdrawal of superpower military support after the end of the Cold War can be considered the fundamental trigger of the various mechanisms that led to the transformation of warfare. As the loss of superpower support motivated the warring parties to develop independent war economies often based on criminal activity (Grossmann 1999; Cooper 2001: 21), new wars differ from old wars insofar as they feature a *criminalisation of war economies* (Rufin 1999; Lock 2003; Münkler 2004: 90–8). In old intra-state wars, at least in theory, socio-revolutionaries in particular, but also conservative rebel groups, were geared to Mao's principle that the fighters represent the interests of the population, which backs them in return (Mao 1961: 34–44). In practice, however, the warring parties of the classic intra-state wars of the Cold War period were financed mainly by the superpowers, but also by other allied states. Depending on their (purported) ideological convictions, the conflict parties could frequently count on financial support either from the US or the Soviet Union. In the Guatemalan civil war, for example, the US supported the government and the Soviet Union the rebel forces, whereas in Nicaragua the Soviet Union backed the government and the US the Contra rebels (Pearce 1999).

Proponents of the new war thesis hold that the withdrawal of superpower aid after the end of the Cold War precipitated a criminalisation of war economies as the actors involved in warfare compensated this loss with independent — frequently criminal — sources of income (Grossmann 1999; Cooper 2001: 21).[6] In Sierra Leone, for instance, warlords ordered their fighters to loot the belongings of civilians (Adebajo 2002). In Southern Sudan warlords taxed and pilfered humanitarian aid (Prunier 1999: 301–4). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, militias blocked local trade to sell over-priced goods (Kaldor 2006: 52–4). And in Colombia, rebel groups have been organising abductions to exact ransom (Labrousse 1999: 324). Moreover, warring parties use criminal networks to sell natural resources on the global market (Cooper 2001). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, rebel movements relied on trade in coltan, gold, copper, diamonds and coffee (Montague 2002). In Myanmar, armed groups trafficked drugs and timber (Sherman 2003). And in the Republic of Congo a militia sold rights on the exploitation of oil reserves (Collier *et al*. 2003: 128).

Fragmentation of warring parties

Advocates of the new war thesis tend to suggest that in intra-state wars the criminalisation of war economies has led to the *fragmentation of the warring parties* (Snow 1996; Eppler 2002: 30–49; Münkler 2004: 5–31; Kaldor 2006: 96–102). In old wars, it is frequently argued, typically only a small number of warring factions confronted each other. Their combat units were hierarchically organised and which therefore displayed a high degree of internal coherence (Kaldor 2006: 100–1). As a rule, only one or a few rebel groups challenged the state, which fought back primarily with its regular armed forces, sometimes with the support of paramilitary troops. In El Salvador, for instance, the individual units of the rebel groups largely operated independently of each other, but tended to be controlled by a common leadership. They basically followed Mao Tse-Tung's dictum on guerilla warfare: 'As the fisherman controls his nets through the lead ropes, so the leader maintains contact with and control over his units' (Mao 1961: 114, 101–2).

According to the proponents of the new war thesis, new wars are usually characterised by a fragmentation of warring parties which is — at least in part — due to the criminalisation of war economies (Eppler 2002: 14; Münkler 2004: 16). The central mechanism is that a criminal war economy frequently enables individual factions to finance themselves independently, allowing them to break away from their central leadership. Thus, instead of a limited number of groups fighting each other, more and more combat units emerge, forming at most loose alliances with a low degree of cohesion.[7] These combat units range from criminal militias to foreign mercenaries, from powerful warlords to local self-defence units, and from private security companies to regular government forces or paramilitary troops (Rich 1999: 4–5). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, more than 80 mainly independent parties were involved in the war as a result of such fragmentation (Calic 1996).

Economisation of war motives

Many exponents of the new war thesis further imply that the criminalisation of war economies not only leads to the fragmentation of warring parties but also facilitates the *economisation of* their *war motives* (Münkler 2004). To be sure, some supporters of the new war thesis point rather to the increasing importance of identity-based war motives (van Creveld 1991: 157–91; Kaldor 2001: 76–86, 110), but the majority rather sees economic war motives as a distinctive feature of new wars (Chojnacki and Eberwein 2000: 20; Eppler 2002; Münkler 2004: 16–22). In their view, it was typical of the old wars that rebel groups predominantly pursued ideological motives — as in the anti-regime wars — or identity-based motives — as in the decolonialisation and secession

wars (Snow 1996). Economic motives normally played a role as well, but were less dominant. Ideologically motivated insurgents like the socio-revolutionary URNG in Guatemala for instance, aspired to establish a different form of government. In decolonisation wars such as in Algeria or secession wars, like the Eritrean war against Ethiopia, rebel movements fought for independent states with ethnically, religiously or culturally defined identities.

According to the new war thesis, in new wars ideological and identity-based war motives generally do not disappear, but increasingly merge with or are eclipsed by economic motives (Chojnacki and Eberwein 2000: 20). Implicitly, the central mechanism is that the criminalisation of war economies opens up opportunities for personal enrichment, thereby facilitating a gradual shift towards economic war motives.[8] Usually, economic motives are of less importance at the beginning of a war but gain in significance as the warring parties develop their (criminal) war economies. This does not imply that rebel groups no longer seek to topple governments and assume power, but rather that they frequently strive for power because control of the government facilitates access to economic resources (Cooper 2002: 943). Ideological and identity-based motives are often merely an ordering device or appealed to as a rhetorical device to justify warfare (Mueller 2000: 62–3; Münkler 2004: 1–2). The Sierra Leonean RUF, for instance, justified its violence with ideological motives, even though control of the country's lucrative diamond deposits had actually become one of its main goals (Hirsch 2001b: 150).

Brutalisation of warfare strategies

Finally, advocates of the new war thesis frequently argue that the criminalisation of war economies, the economisation of war motives and the fragmentation of warring parties are conducive to the *brutalisation of warfare strategies* (van Creveld 1991; Snow 1996; Waldmann 1997; Kaldor 2001, 2006: 8–11; Münkler 2004: 14–6; Turner 2006: 37–42). In this view, rebel groups of the classic intra-state wars largely pursued guerilla warfare strategies. To wear down the government they avoided major battles with the government, relying instead on small ambushes, that is, 'pinprick attacks' against government troops (Waldmann 1997). The support of the local population and provision of shelter for their combatants were absolutely vital for the success of guerilla strategies.[9] Rebels therefore had to avoid violence against the civil population so as to be able to move with ease — or 'like a fish in water' — among the population (Mao 1961; Desai and Eckstein 1990). Only government-affiliated actors resorted to violence against the civilian population, it is claimed (Kaldor 2006: 8–10). Based on so-called counterinsurgency strategies, brutal violence against civilians was meant to separate the rebels from the local population. To deter the population from supporting the rebel groups, for

instance, government-sponsored death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala systematically perpetrated atrocities against civilians (Hampson 1996: 131–2).

According to the new war thesis, since the end of the Cold War warring parties have increasingly relied on warfare strategies that entail brutal violence against the civil population. In contrast to old intra-state wars, not only government-backed forces, but also rebel groups deliberately commit violence against civilians and break taboos that used to be respected.[10] The systematic mutilations committed during the war in Sierra Leone serve as a particularly drastic example (Waldmann 1997: 492). The brutalisation of non-state actors' warfare strategies is seen as the result of three mechanisms: First, rebel groups that maintain criminal war economies and heavily rely on criminals are more likely to employ brutal warfare strategies because activities such as looting and blackmailing normally entail violence against the local population (Mueller 2000). Second, with the shift towards economic war motives the rebel groups no longer fight for the interests of the local population, which lowers their inhibitions against violence. Third, brutal violence against the local population is also facilitated by the fragmentation of rebel groups as the leadership loses the ability to control individual factions.

Summary

According to our reconstruction of the new war thesis, new wars differ from the classic civil wars in terms of the four criteria specified above which, taken together, define their respective profiles. Of course, the profiles of new and the old intra-state wars are ideal types which constitute the poles on a gradual scale which actual wars only approximate. Nevertheless, if there is some truth to the new war thesis, then post-1990 intra-state wars should rather match the above-named criteria for an ideal-type new war, while one would expect the pre-1990 intra-state wars to resemble the ideal-type of an old civil war. Moreover, if there is some truth to the new war thesis, we should also find some evidence that the transformation of warfare is primarily due to the criminalisation of the parties' war economies, facilitating the fragmentation of warring parties on the one hand and the economisation of their war motives on the other, in turn encouraging a brutalisation of the warfare strategies. We should therefore consistently find a combination of more than one criterion that sets apart new wars from old wars. With the end of the Cold War, we should not only encounter a fragmentation of warring parties *or* reliance on criminalised war economies *or* brutal warfare strategies *or* economic war motives but rather a criminalisation of war economies accompanied by the fragmentation of warring parties *and* the economisation of their war motives *as well as* the brutalisation of their strategies of warfare (Table 1).

Table 1 Ideal-type Profiles of Old and New Wars

	Old wars	*New wars*
War economies	Support from allied states; voluntary support by local population	Funding through criminal activities and exploitation of local population
Warring parties	Few, hierarchically organised rebel groups fight regular troops of state authorities	Many, scarcely coordinated private groups fight each other as well as state troops
War motives	Dominance of ideological and/or identity-based motives	Dominance of economic motives
Warfare strategies	Deliberate brutal violence against civilians only on the part of the state	Deliberate violence against civilians by all warring parties

Case Studies

With the following plausibility probe we intend to gain insight in the usefulness of our reconstruction of the new war thesis for empirical research. We also intend to examine whether in respect of the four specified criteria there has been a transformation of warfare concurrent with the end of the Cold War. At the same time, we aim to explore whether it is possible to identify the mechanisms mentioned above that triggered the transformation of warfare. The case studies we selected are the wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone. This selection was based on two considerations:

One, we have selected cases that cover both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era on the one hand and cases that only cover the post-Cold War era on the other. The three cases that had already begun during the Cold War (Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola) have been selected with a view to allow for assessing the new war thesis by means of within-case comparison, and thus facilitate an assessment of whether the profile of these wars has changed. These cases have also been selected to learn about the mechanisms through which the end of the Cold War might have triggered the transformation of warfare. By analysing two additional cases that did not break out until after the Cold War (Somalia and Sierra Leone) we hope to gain insight in whether they tend to have the same profile as wars that had already started earlier but have undergone a transformation after 1990. Furthermore, the latter two cases serve to assess whether the underlying mechanisms that might explain the transformation of warfare are at work here as well. Two, we have selected cases which differ in terms of how closely they have been associated with the new war

thesis in the post-Cold War era. Hence, we have selected cases that are either frequently cited as examples of a new war (Sierra Leone), rarely associated with the new war thesis (Cambodia) or associated with only a subset of the criteria of the new wars (Afghanistan: war economy, Angola: war motives, Somalia: warring parties). All cases are meant to provide insight in the plausibility of the new war thesis: If they tend to converge towards the new war profile, we take this as an indication of the plausibility of the thesis. Following the logic of hard case selection, this indication is particularly convincing if we find out that even the case that is rarely cited as an example of a new war (Cambodia) turns out to resemble the ideal type of a new war. If the five cases, by contrast, rather tend to display the old war profile, we take this as an indication of the implausibility of the new war thesis. Again following the logic of hard case selection, this indication is all the more convincing if the case that is frequently referred to as a new war (Sierra Leone) features the criteria of an old war. To make sure that we do not only replicate the common perception of the selected wars, we strive to rely in our analysis as much as possible on 'neutral' sources which do not explicitly position themselves in the new wars debate.[11]

Cambodia

The war in Cambodia broke out in 1979, when neighbouring Vietnam overthrew the terror regime of the Khmer Rouge and installed a socialist government. During the 1980s, the Vietnam-backed government was fought by a coalition of the Maoist Khmer Rouge, the royalist FUNCINPEC, and the republican KPLNF. Only in 1991 did the four parties involved in the conflict finally agree on a peace treaty which provided for the interim administration of the country by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yet, violence escalated anew in 1993 when the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate with the UN and the democratically elected coalition government of Prince Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen (CPP). The war ended in early 1999, after the majority of Khmer Rouge fighters had defected to the government.[12]

During the Cold War, the war in Cambodia largely matched the profile of classic intra-state wars. The *warring parties* were hierarchically organised and formed two camps. One of the camps consisted of the Cambodian government, its regular armed forces and the Vietnamese army. The other camp comprised the — albeit rather incoherent — combat forces of the exile coalition established by the Khmer Rouge, which provided most of the fighters, as well as the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF (Chandler 2000: 227–35). The four parties supplied themselves with arms predominantly through centrally managed *war economies*. The government forces were

financed by Vietnam and indirectly by the Soviet Union, whereas the exile coalition was funded openly by China and Thailand and covertly by the US. The forces of the exile coalition were, in addition, supported more or less voluntarily by the local population, as was typical of old wars, but they also siphoned off humanitarian aid delivered to the refugee camps in Thailand which they controlled (Abuza 1993: 1013; Hampson 1996: 175–8; Le Billon 2000: 786–9).[13]

Equally characteristic of the classic intra-state wars, the *war motives* pursued by the warring parties seemed to be identity-based and ideological. All three oppositional forces rejected the Vietnam-backed regime on nationalist grounds. At the same time they all had ideological war motives, albeit conflicting ones. The Khmer Rouge fought for a Maoist regime, the FUNCINPEC for a monarchy and the KPLNF for a republican regime (Hampson 1996: 173–8). In their struggle against government troops the opposition forces all applied a *warfare strategy* which matched the old-war profile. Their aim was attrition — to wear down the government through petty skirmishes and constant acts of sabotage; major battles, by contrast, were shunned. Violence was targeted against the enemy combat forces, while the civil population was largely spared (Abuza 1993: 1012–3).

With the end of the Cold War, the war in Cambodia changed fundamentally. Even before the UN peace troops had left the country in 1993, war broke out anew, this time however featuring a new war profile. The *warring parties* increasingly comprised locally organised forces. Attempts to integrate the forces of all warring parties but the Khmer Rouge into a regular, government controlled army were at best only partially successful. Many local commanders not only refused to join forces with the regular army, but also increasingly broke away from their leadership. Many of them were even able to establish control over parts of the country's territory where the government was too weak to intervene (Lechervy 1999: 188; Boyce 2002: 29). However, it was the Khmer Rouge, which now fought against the government on its own, which was most profoundly affected by this disintegration process. During the course of the 1990s the individual units of the Khmer Rouge gradually splintered off from the leadership of Pol Pot and Ta Mok. Finally, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, three of the Khmer Rouge's key figures, broke away from the leadership and aligned themselves with the government (Doyle 2001).

The disintegration of the Khmer Rouge was a consequence of the transformation of its *war economy* insofar as local supply options fostered the centrifugal forces within the movement (Heupel 2005: 72–8). The loss of support from allied states was not immediately compensated for by looting; it was only in later stages of the conflict, shortly before the Khmer Rouge disbanded, that its hardliners called upon combatants to plunder the local

population so as to be able to resume the war (Thayer 1995: 24–6). As is characteristic of new wars, however, the Khmer Rouge resorted to trafficking in natural resources.[14] In cooperation with Thai companies, they awarded concessions for cutting trees and mining gems in the territories along the Thai border which they held occupied and, with the help of members of the Thai army, developed a thriving cross-border trade in timber and precious stones (Lechervy 1999; Le Billon 2000). According to various estimates, in the early 1990s, the Khmer Rouge's annual income from timber and gem trade amounted to between 100 and 400 million US dollars (Abuza 1993: 1010; Global Witness 1995; Hazdra 1997: 192).

These profits ultimately appeared to become the paramount *war motive* of many of the Khmer Rouge's commanders. Indeed, as of 1993, the Khmer Rouge's prime interest was to maintain control of the resource-rich area bordering with Thailand. Ideological motives clearly paled in comparison to economic ones, all the more so as the exploitation of the timber and gem reserves effectively symbolised the renunciation of its previous ideal of a socialist agrarian society (Thayer 1995: 24; Lechervy 1999: 181–2). Nevertheless, the *warfare strategy* pursued by the Khmer Rouge remained quite similar to the classic guerilla strategy pursued before. To some degree still protected by the local population, they continued to evade major battles with the government's forces, relying instead on small ambushes against them (Kamm 1998: 235). Only with the Khmer Rouge's disintegration did some of their commanders regroup their fighters and resort to violence against civilians. However, many combatants disobeyed their orders, which further accelerated the Khmer Rouge's disintegration (Hayes, 1995: 21; Thayer 1995: 24–6).[15]

In sum, the war in Cambodia by and large supports the new war thesis. With the end of the Cold War, the Cambodian conflict not only increasingly resembled the new war profile (see Table 2); it was also transformed through the mechanisms specified by supporters of the new war thesis. Contrary to their expectations, however, the criminalisation of the war economy, the fragmentation of the warring parties and the economisation of war motives did not result in consistently more brutal warfare strategies.

Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan had already begun during the Cold War and carried on afterwards, which gives us the opportunity to study its potential transformation. The Afghan war erupted in 1979 in the wake of Soviet intervention and pitted Islamic rebels, the so-called Mujahedin, against the Soviet-sponsored communist government. In the light of severe losses inflicted by the Mujahedin, the Soviet Union finally withdrew its troops in 1989. The rule of the Mujahedin, which assumed power in 1992, was beset with in-fighting among different groups

Table 2 Profile of intra-state wars during and after the cold war

	Warring parties	*War economy*	*War motives*	*Warfare strategies*
(a) Profile of intra-state wars during the Cold War				
Cambodia	Mostly old	Mostly old	Old	Old
Afghanistan	Mixed	Mostly old	Old	Old
Angola	Old	Mostly old	Mixed	Old
(b) Profile of intra-state wars after the Cold War				
Cambodia	Mostly new	Mostly new	New	Mixed
Afghanistan	New	New	Mostly new	Mixed
Angola	Mostly new	New	New	Mixed
Somalia	New	New	Mostly new	New
Sierra Leone	New	Mostly new	New	New

until the radical Islamist Taliban took hold in 1996. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Taliban regime was toppled by a US-led international coalition and their Afghan supporters, an alliance of former Mujahedin who had controlled Northern Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. Since then, Hamid Karzai has led a fragile internationally-supported government in Kabul.[16]

During the Cold War, the war in Afghanistan broadly reflected the profile of a classic intra-state war. The main *warring parties* were the regular Afghan and Soviet armed forces on the one side and the Mujahedin on the other. Certainly, the Mujahedin were internally divided, but the different combat units, held together by the common struggle against Soviet occupation, still engaged in joint operations (Rubin 1995: 69–97; Marsden 1998: 27–42; Rashid 2001: 57–8, 173–4). Their cause was further promoted by a *war economy* which already included drug trafficking but still, as typical for old wars, predominantly rested on the assistance of allied states.[17] The Mujahedin were primarily supported by Pakistan, but also — through Pakistani channels — by the US and Saudi Arabia (Bergen 2001: 83–97; Schetter 2004: 110). The government, on the other hand, was mainly assisted by the Soviet Union (Dorronsoro, 1999: 131–8; Rashid 2001: 56).

There are strong indications that the parties primarily pursued ideological and identity-based *war motives*. The Mujahedin were united by a religiously but also ethnically motivated repudiation of the communist regime in Kabul and their Soviet backers, and by a desire for an independent state based on Islamic precepts (Rashid 2001: 51–2). Equally characteristic of the classic intra-state wars, the *warfare strategy* applied by the Mujahedin was to wear down the opponent through minor skirmishes rather than confront its forces in a

decisive, all-out battle. The local population was not targeted by the Mujahedin, but rather provided protection and other forms of support for their fighters. The government forces did resort to violence against civilians, however, as a means to deter them from cooperating with the Mujahedin (Bergen 2001: 67–9).

After the end of the Cold War era the war in Afghanistan approximated the new war profile in several respects, albeit to varying degrees in different post-Cold War phases. After the overthrow of the Communist government all the warring parties managed to build up a profitable *war economy*, which particularly relied on the cultivation and trafficking of opium and heroin (Rubin 1995: 117–9; Rashid 2001: 204–19; Goodhand 2004). Thus, although aid to the warring parties from allied states within and outside the region never dried up completely,[18] Afghanistan soon became the largest opium producer in the world (Dorronsoro 1999: 143–6; Rashid 2001: 204–19). The new war economy triggered the ongoing fragmentation of the *warring parties*. After the retreat of the Soviet Union and the subsequent downfall of the communist Najibullah regime in 1992, an increasing number of warring parties confronted each other (Giustozzi 2004). Against the background of the collapse of the Afghan state, rival Mujahedin groups led by warlords such as the Tajik Massud, the Usbek Dostum and the Pashtun Hekmatyar started to fight against each other but also formed changing alliances (Rubin 1995: 112–42; Marsden 1998: 37; Rashid 2001: 60, 173–5; Jones 2006: 95). As the Taliban emerged and captured Kabul in 1996, many of the warlords, while still part of the so-called Northern Alliance, had their own combat units financed by their respective war economies. This process of disintegration did not come to an end when Hamid Karzai became head of a government that was heavily supported by the international community. The Taliban and numerous warlords continued to fight the government in Kabul as well as the international forces that were supporting it (International Crisis Group 2003).

As expected by supporters of the new war thesis, after the end of the Cold War the *war motives* of the warring parties in Afghanistan also tended to alter. The erstwhile dominant ideological (i.e. religious) motives were at first substituted by identity-based motives. Rivalries surfaced, especially between Pashtuns, Usbeks and Tajiks, and were exploited by the various warlords. Yet, against the background of the emerging drug-based war economy these motives too were gradually superseded by economic motives. The warlords increasingly regarded the war as part of the 'business', as it constituted the precondition for their extensive involvement in the drug trade and other illicit economic activities (Rubin 1995: 118, 120–1). Only the Taliban seemed to abide to their religious and identity-based motives (Marsden 1998: 57–66) and to consider the drug trade as an instrument of warfare rather than the war as an instrument for pursuing their economic interests (Rashid 2001: 204–19).

Atypically for a new war, the Taliban largely refrained from pursuing a *warfare strategy* based on deliberate violence against civilians, and were therefore initially popular with the population. Yet, especially in the period immediately after the retreat of the Soviet Union, many of the warlords proceeded with brutal violence against civilians, driving the local populations from territory they intended to conquer and looting their belongings. The siege and bombardment of Kabul, resulting in the loss of countless civilian lives, illustrates this (Marsden 1998: 46; Rashid 2001: 61–2).

Overall, the war profile in Afghanistan changed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War from that of an old war to that of a new war, albeit to varying degrees in the various phases of the war after the retreat of the Soviet Union (see Table 2). As expected by the new war thesis, evidence suggests that the criminalisation of the war economy was the triggering mechanism that facilitated the fragmentation of the warring parties and the economisation of the war motives of at least some of the warring parties. Yet, this led only temporarily to the brutalisation of their warfare strategies.

Angola

In addition to the wars in Cambodia and Afghanistan, the war in Angola also allows us to assess its features both before and after the end of the Cold War. The war in Angola broke out after the country's independence from Portugal in 1975, when the rebel movement UNITA started an insurgency against the ruling MPLA government. In 1991, after the withdrawal of the two superpowers from the conflict, the two parties signed a peace agreement and approved the intervention of a UN peacekeeping force (UNAVEM II). However, the implementation of the agreement failed and the war broke out anew. The MPLA and UNITA accepted a further peace agreement in 1994 and consented to the presence of a more substantial UN force (UNAVEM III). But, again, UNITA undermined the peace process. The war ended eventually in 2002 with the military defeat of UNITA.[19]

During the Cold War, the war in Angola largely corresponded to the profile of an old war. With the MPLA and UNITA, two *warring parties* confronted each other, both of which were backed by foreign armies — the MPLA by Cuban forces and UNITA by South African forces. Both the MPLA and UNITA had centrally controlled combat units at their disposal and thus had extensive command over the centrifugal forces in their own ranks (Hampson 1996: 87–8). Furthermore, the MPLA and UNITA were able to draw on a *war economy* that was characteristic of classic intra-state wars inasmuch as they both received massive support from the two superpowers. The MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union, while UNITA — alongside more or less voluntary

support from the rural population and minor revenues from the diamond trade — was supported by the US (Luansi 2001: 204–14).

To ensure the support of the superpowers, both parties used an ideological rhetoric to justify their *war motives*. However, it remains unclear how genuine the commitments of the MPLA and UNITA to socialism and democracy respectively were (Fandrych 2001: 5). There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that besides their articulated ideological and identity-based motives — the two parties recruited supporters from distinct ethnic groups — economic motives were not irrelevant (Cilliers 2000). UNITA's campaign was characterised by typical guerilla *warfare strategies*. Its combat units largely spared civilians from violence; in fact, UNITA tried to weaken and finally defeat the MPLA through petty skirmishes and acts of sabotage. Especially during the first half of the 1980s UNITA received widespread attention from the world public when it disrupted energy supplies to the capital Luanda and other major cities for several months (Luansi 2001: 224–5).

With the end of the Cold War the main characteristics of the war in Angola rapidly converged towards a new war profile (Fandrych 2005). The termination of foreign assistance initially paved the way for the Bicesse Accords of 1991 and the deployment of UNAVEM II. Yet, the peace process soon collapsed when UNITA, but also the government, refused to send all their combatants to the demobilisation camps (Kingma 2000: 302). UNITA protracted the demobilisation process in order to win time to build up a diamond-trade based *war economy*, the revenues of which would enable it to rearm even without foreign assistance and abandon the peace process should it lose the scheduled elections (Luansi 2001: 239). Indeed, between 1992 and 1997 UNITA succeeded in gaining hold of most of Angola's rich diamond reserves in the Lunda Norte province; partly by making the fighters and workers under its control dig for diamonds, and partly by selling concessions to foreign companies. That way, UNITA managed to earn a total of 3.7 billion US dollars between 1992 and 1997, enabling it to acquire military equipment and torpedo the peace process (Le Billon 2001: 67–72; Malaquias 2001: 312).

As is characteristic of new war, in connection with UNITA's diamond-based war economy, economic *war motives* gradually gained in importance. Especially UNITA's local commanders were increasingly concerned with personal enrichment (De Beer and Gamba 2000: 89). In 1998, for instance, the war escalated anew precisely because UNITA had for years refused to surrender control of the diamond-rich regions to the government (Dietrich 2000a: 182). The significance of ethnic differences, which had been one of the war motives at the outset of the conflict, dwindled considerably. UNITA tended to invoke such differences only to divert attention from its economic motives (Fandrych 2001: 4).

The dominance of economic war motives also had an impact on UNITA's *warfare strategy*. Rather than employing conventional guerilla tactics, UNITA engaged in a conventional military campaign to seize the diamond-rich regions in Northeast Angola, and soon turned to using violence against civilians (Malaquias 2001: 313–4). To be sure, UNITA's strategy only rarely featured the extremely brutal violence typical of other new wars. Nevertheless, in particular between 1992 and 1994 when UNITA besieged and shelled cities, but also towards the end of the war, civilians were deliberately subjected to brutal violence (Luansi 2001: 301–4).[20]

Lastly, the war in Angola underwent a transformation in terms of the *warring parties*. In contrast to other rebel movements in new wars, for the most part of the 1990s UNITA did not disintegrate substantially. Owing to UNITA's hierarchical organisation, which guaranteed the leadership control of revenues from the diamonds trade, the local commanders were hardly able to operate independently (Stuvøy 2002: 80–1). Nor did the creation of the splinter group UNITA-Renovada in 1998 attract many followers (Munslow 1999: 559–60). Yet, at least in the late 1990s, in the light of UNITA's military setbacks, and as local supply gained in significance, the independence of individual commanders grew (Dietrich 2000b: 279–83; Kingma 2000: 303). At the same time, the government fostered the privatisation of the warring parties with the employment of the private security company Executive Outcomes (Dietrich 2000a: 176).

All in all, the war in Angola also underwent an essential change in the post-Cold War era. With the exception of warfare strategies, the war corresponded well with the ideal-type new war profile after 1990 (see Table 2). Also the mechanisms set out in our reconstruction of the new war thesis have largely been at play. Yet, contrary to the new war thesis it was not the criminalisation of their war economy that led to the fragmentation of UNITA but its setbacks in the war effort.

Somalia

While the wars analysed so far all started prior to the end of the Cold War and carried on after 1990, we now turn to analysing wars that only broke out towards or after the end of the Cold War, namely the wars in Somalia and Sierra Leone. The war in Somalia had broken out in 1988 when armed resistance against the ruling regime of Siad Barre intensified, but escalated in 1991 in the wake of Barre's overthrow. The warlords — in particular Ali Mahdi and Farah Aideed —, who had jointly precipitated Barre's fall, turned against each other in a battle for power in Mogadishu. Neither a US-led humanitarian intervention nor a subsequent robust UN peacekeeping mission

has been able to resolve the conflict, even less so as the fighting brought about the total collapse of the Somali state.[21]

The war in Somalia doubtlessly matches the new war profile in terms of *warring parties* (Compagnon 1998). From the outset in 1988, essentially five groups challenged Siad Barre's regime. After its fall in 1991 these groups disintegrated into dozens of rival splinter groups commandeered by different warlords (Maxted and Zegeye 1997: 81). More and more new warlords constantly surfaced, most of them leading small roaming militias of teenage combatants who marauded around the streets of Somalia (Laitin 1999: 148; Birnbaum 2002: 85–6). Besides, the numerous 'petty' warlords and their militias constantly changed alliances from one of the 16 most powerful warlords to the next. The areas controlled by the warlords gradually grew smaller and smaller. Mogadishu airport, for example, was at times under the control of four rival militias (Menkhaus 1998: 222).

Most of the warlords relied on a *war economy* characteristic of the new wars. Initially, they concentrated on looting the local population. The rural population lost its livestock, harvest and seed (Besteman 1996b: 582). In Mogadishu, even the power supply lines were pilfered, melted down and sold as copper (Birnbaum 2002: 89). Once this 'primitive' war economy proved unsustainable, the warlords turned to controlling the roads used by international aid organisations to deliver supplies to the local population (Menkhaus 2003). When stopped at street checkpoints, the aid organisations had the choice of either paying protection money or being mugged and prevented from delivering urgently needed food relief (Birnbaum 2002: 90–1, 94). Further lucrative economic activities in which warlords were involved included endeavours to extol protection money for the banana trade. The fighting between different warlords for control of Mogadishu's seaport, which was crucial for the export of the fruit, was consequently labelled the 'banana war' (Menkhaus 1998: 223).

From at least 1991 onwards, the actors involved in the war in Somalia applied a *warfare strategy* typical of new wars. The warlords deliberately used violence against civilians — men were killed, women raped — as a means to control territory and deter the civil population from supporting rival militias (Besteman 1996b: 582; Maxted and Zegeye 1997: 81–2; Laitin 1999: 148; Menkhaus 2003: 4–6). Moreover, by plundering and applying brutal violence the local population was forced into reliance on international aid (de Waal 1997). This in turn made them even more dependent on the local warlords when they threatened to cut off food supplies if the local population did not support them (Besteman 1996b: 582).[22]

With regard to *war motives*, much indicates that many warlords neither followed ideological nor identity-based motives but were rather economically motivated. After the downfall of Siad Barre, if not earlier, the warlords fought

for the economic benefits of having control over the state powers. As none of the warlords were prepared to relinquish control of Mogadishu to another warlord, fighting resumed even when it was obvious that no one would be able to seize power (Maxted and Zegeye 1997: 81; Laitin 1999: 155–60). In fact, the functioning of the war economies of the various militias depended on the continuation of the war. Yet, to rally support, the warlords frequently made use of a rhetoric that invoked traditional rivalries between Somali clans (Besteman 1996a: 128; Laitin 1999: 153).[23]

Altogether, at least since 1991, the war in Somalia has clearly exhibited a new war profile (see Table 2). In addition, the war in Somalia shows that the mechanisms that according to the new war thesis have driven the transformation of wars are at play here as well. Especially the economic war motives, the criminal war economy and fragmented constellation of the warring parties were clearly mutually beneficial and jointly facilitated the application of brutal warfare strategies.

Sierra Leone

The war in Sierra Leone erupted after the Cold War in 1991, when the RUF rebel group invaded the country from Liberia with the aim of toppling the government (Abdullah and Muana 1998). Realising that it would not be able to achieve its objective, the RUF acceded to a peace treaty in 1996. Yet, despite the presence of a small UN mission, the peace process derailed when some officers staged a coup and invited the RUF to form a joint government. ECOMOG, the military intervention force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), reinstalled the government, and in 1999 the government and the RUF signed another peace agreement. When the RUF again torpedoed the peace process, which at the time was buttressed by a substantial UN force, the United Kingdom intervened militarily to support the government. Finally, from the early 2000s on, weakened by the UK's intervention, assaults by a Guinean-backed militia and the erosion of its war economy, the RUF gradually increased its cooperation with the government and the UN presence in the country.[24]

The host of *warring parties* involved in the war in Sierra Leone indicates a new war profile. On the side of the consecutive governments, numerous actors — some of them private — successively fought alongside the regular armed forces (Gberie 2005). Initially, in the mid-1990s, the private security company Executive Outcomes and the Kamajor militia managed to weaken the RUF. Next, ECOWAS combat forces reinstalled the government after it had been deposed in a coup. Finally, in the late 1990s, British armed forces helped the government to reassert itself against the RUF (Hirsch 2001b). The RUF itself, not even a unitary actor at the outset of the conflict, also

disintegrated over time (Davies 2000: 358). During the course of the war, individual, often only loosely connected combat units emerged within the RUF and in the late 1990s even started to fight each other (Reno 1998: 128). The RUF experienced ever greater difficulties in holding together such maverick groups of jobless youths, criminals, defected soldiers like the so-called West Side Boys, and illegal diamond diggers like the so-called San San Boys (Davies 2000: 358).

Furthermore, the RUF — and to a lesser extent also many of the other private actors — relied on a *war economy* typical of new wars.[25] The RUF partly sustained itself by looting the local population in the territories which it controlled. However, its primary source of income derived from its control of Sierra Leone's most lucrative diamond regions and the trade of diamonds especially to Liberia but also to other West African countries (Davies 2000: 359–61; Cortright and Lopez 2002: 184–6; Grant 2005). In Liberia, the 'godfather of the RUF', Charles Taylor, who was elected president in 1997, fed the diamonds illegally into the global market and in return supplied the RUF with weaponry, ammunition and other equipment. All in all, according to various estimates, throughout the 1990s the RUF generated between 25 and 125 million US dollars annually from the diamond trade (Cortright and Lopez 2002: 77–91, 184–6).

Involvement in the diamond trade soon seemed to become a prime *war motive* of many RUF commanders (Gberie 2005). There are indications that the RUF did aim at ultimately resuming power at the centre, yet, the original motive — revenge on former head of state Joseph Momoh whom RUF-leader Foday Sankoh held responsible for a prison sentence he had to serve in the past — lost significance over time. The populist rhetoric, intended to attract unemployed youths, could hardly be taken seriously and merely belied the RUF's purported ideological and identity-based motives.[26] Indeed, the RUF did not really fight government corruption, nor did it push for democratisation (Hirsch 2001b: 150; Vehnaemaeki 2002: 65). The local RUF commanders were clearly primarily interested in personal enrichment and were therefore mainly concerned with controlling the diamond-rich areas and the areas through which the diamonds were transported (Hirsch 2001b: 150–1; Connaughton 2002: 249–50).

Finally, the RUF made extensive use of *warfare strategies* characteristic of new wars. The horrendous atrocities committed by RUF forces can be considered paradigmatic of the excesses to which civilians are subjected in the new wars. Under the influence of drugs, frequently under-aged RUF fighters committed massacres against the civilian population. Women and girls were raped in large numbers, bodies were defiled and countless civilians were mutilated (Human Rights Watch 2003). The regular armed forces and paramilitary groups committed war crimes against the civilian population as

well, albeit to a lesser extent than RUF fighters. In sum, tens of thousands civilians were killed and more than two million fled from their homes into safe areas within Sierra Leone and in neighbouring countries (Davies 2000: 350; Hirsch 2001a: 43–5; Gberie 2005).[27]

Overall, the war in Sierra Leone almost fully matches the new war profile (see Table 2). As regards the mechanisms which connect the different features of new wars, it seems safe to say that the shift toward economic motives among RUF fighters was facilitated by growing access to the lucrative diamond trade which also supported the fragmented constellation of warring actors.

Conclusion

The case studies indicate that our reconstruction of the new war thesis led to a useful conceptual framework to empirically assess the plausibility of the new war thesis. The criteria 'warring parties', 'war economy', 'war motives' and 'warfare strategies' turned out to be very helpful to distinguish old from new wars. Moreover, they proved to be useful to assess the degree to which a war matches the old or new war profile, hence turning the dichotomy of old and new wars into a gradual scale. Yet, we have to admit that the operationalisation of the values 'old', 'mostly old', 'mixed', 'mostly new' or 'new' with respect to each of the four specific criteria needs further specification. While this holds for all criteria, it particularly applies to the 'war motives' criterion.

What is more, the five cases examined in this article widely support the new war thesis. The case studies on the wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola demonstrate that with the end of the Cold War the profile of the three wars tended to evolve from the ideal-type old war to the ideal-type new war. Of course, none of the wars entirely corresponded to the ideal-type profile of an old war before 1990 — for instance, the composition of the warring parties in Afghanistan diverged from it — and equally, none of the wars became fully congruent with the ideal-type profile of a new war after 1990. For instance, the strategies of the actors involved in all three wars differed from the trend. Yet, the three wars show a clear shift towards the new war profile. This even applies to the war in Cambodia which is normally not cited as an example of a new war. Indeed, the three wars underwent varying degrees of change in terms of the warring factions, the war economies they relied on, the war motives they pursued and the warfare strategies they adopted. Similarly, the case studies on Somalia and Sierra Leone show that those wars in our sample which only began in the post-Cold War era also correspond to the new war profile. Again, while none of the wars meets all the criteria of the ideal-type new war profile

fully, each war nevertheless resembled this profile to a remarkably high degree. For this reason, claims that the transformation of warfare only constitutes an aging process that besets prolonged intra-state wars can be refuted. On the contrary, it appears that the intra-state wars that broke out after the end of the Cold War correspond to the ideal-type profile of new wars more closely than the wars which had already begun during the Cold War. This is particularly true in terms of warfare strategies. While in Cambodia, as well as in Afghanistan and Angola, brutal violence against the local population was only applied temporarily or after some delay, the warring parties in Sierra Leone and Somalia were obviously more willing to consistently rely on brutal violence against the local population.

Furthermore, the three case studies on wars that continued during and after the Cold War largely lend support to the causal mechanisms that explain why the end of the Cold War translated into a transformation of warfare. The transformation of the wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola illustrate most of these mechanisms very well. In all three cases major warring parties — the Khmer Rouge, the Mujahedin and UNITA — endeavoured to compensate for the loss of support from external allies after the Cold War by building up independent war economies that, for the most part, relied on criminal activity. In all three cases, access to independent revenues facilitated a shift towards economic war motives. Indeed, the lucrative war economies based on trade in precious natural resources — timber, drugs, diamonds — opened up opportunities for personal enrichment and increasingly displaced ideological reasons that had motivated warfare during the Cold War at least to a greater extent. Likewise, in all three cases, access to independent revenues over the years facilitated or stabilised the fragmentation of the warring parties: Khmer Rouge, Mujahedin and UNITA commanders who managed to generate income sources on their own were able to break away or at least become more independent from their former leadership. Yet, the wars in Cambodia and Angola also show that setbacks in the war effort may equally contribute to the fragmentation of warring parties. Moreover, the brutalisation of warfare strategies is not — as implied by the new war thesis — mainly driven by the criminalisation of war economies, the economisation of war motives and the fragmentation of warring parties. Certainly, in Cambodia as well as in Afghanistan and in Angola we see a trend towards more brutal violence against the local population. Yet, in the case of Afghanistan the systematic use of brutal violence against the local population was 'only' temporary, while in the cases of Cambodia and Angola it was more the result of setbacks the respective warring parties suffered in their war effort than connected to the criminalisation of the war economy, the fragmentation of actors and the economisation of motives.

Obviously, the case studies on the wars in Somalia and Sierra Leone, which only commenced after the end of the Cold War, can shed no light on the overall

plausibility of the mechanisms that might have driven the transformation of warfare. Yet, they can provide support for some of the causal mechanisms on which the new war thesis relies. Both cases indicate that the shift towards economic motives on the side of some of the warring parties — many RUF members in Sierra Leone and the warlords in Somalia — is related to the build-up of a lucrative war economy that facilitates personal enrichment. Both cases also demonstrate that the build-up of lucrative war economies is accompanied by a fragmented structure of the warring parties. This applies particularly to Somalia, where the warlords built up many local war economies, but also turns out to be correct in the case of Sierra Leone, where most of the warring parties financed themselves through more encompassing diamonds-based war economies. The two cases, hence, demonstrate that criminal war economies as well as economic war motives and fragmented warring party structures reinforce each other. Since this goes along with a brutal warfare strategy the two cases also lend some credit to the claim that the criminalisation of war economies, the economisation of war motives and the fragmentation of warring parties together encourage the application of brutal violence against the local population. Yet, why this mechanism is stronger in the two wars that only commenced after the Cold War than in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola — where the wars had already started during the Cold War era — is hard to explain. One may speculate that the latter conflicts, where centrally controlled warring parties relied on support from the local population and primarily fought for political reasons, left a legacy that might have prevented such a scale of violence that was witnessed in the former cases. In any case, the application of such strategies of warfare is much less consistent across cases than the other characteristics of new wars.

All in all, our case studies support the presumption that a fundamental transformation of warfare has taken place which is causally related to the end of the Cold War. The case studies suggest that the notion of old and new wars is justified, because they indicate that — possibly with the exception of the warfare strategies — the changes of the individual criteria of the transformation of warfare tend to travel together rather than separately from each other. Clearly, more qualitative as well as quantitative studies are needed to be able to draw a final conclusion as to the validity of the new war thesis. Yet, despite its limitations arising out of the restricted number of cases our analysis has proved to be fruitful. It not only produced support for the new war thesis which is interesting in its own right; it also has important theoretical and political implications, because the conditions under which new wars break out and the conditions for the successful settlement of these wars differ from old wars. The availability of lootable resources, for instance, would be a key condition for the outbreak of new wars whose parties usually depend on such resources. Yet, its impact on the outbreak of old wars, in which parties were mostly

supported either by the civil population or third states, would be much lower. There are also indications that it is more difficult to terminate and ensure durable settlement of new wars as compared to old wars. Indeed, empirical research on conflict settlement and peace-building processes suggests that it is particularly difficult to settle wars that are characterised by a large number of warring parties or large numbers of civilian casualties and refugees (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 786–7). It also suggests that it is particularly difficult to settle wars that feature warring parties with access to independent criminal war economies (e.g. Downs and Stedman 2002: 44, 57) or that predominantly fight for the sake of private enrichment (e.g. Ballentine 2003: 274–5). Failure to take such differences into account might be one of the reasons why different studies on the conditions under which intra-state wars break out (for instance, Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Brown 1997), and on the conditions for successful settlements of these wars (for example, Walter 1997; Hartzell *et al.* 2001; Peceny and Stanley 2001 and Hegre 2004), reach contradictory conclusions. It is likely that such studies would profit from differentiating between wars that feature characteristics of so-called new wars and wars that feature characteristics of so-called old wars and from avoiding generalisations across different types of war. Thus specified, these studies may also enhance our understanding of how to prevent wars from breaking out and how to settle them successfully.[28]

Notes

1 For a review of the German debate on new wars, see Brzoska (2004).
2 Yet they claim that this rise already took place in the 1970s rather than in the 1990s.
3 Similarly, a study by Valentino *et al.* (2004) finds that there has been no shift towards mass violence following the end of the Cold War. However, their study only covers violence applied by government actors.
4 We define wars as continued acts of military violence among rival combat units. For a discussion of different definitions, see Chojnacki (2006).
5 We define inter-state wars as continued acts of military violence between the regular armies of two or more states. We consider intra-state wars to be continued acts of military violence (1) between the government of a state and internal non-state actors and (2) between different internal non-state actors without government involvement. Intra-state wars also refer to wars in which a foreign state or non-state actor is involved, as long as this involvement does not lead to warfare between the regular armies of two states (for a somewhat different typology, see Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2008).
6 A study by Byman *et al.* (2001) seems to contradict this claim as it suggests that funding by third states remains important. Yet, it also finds that the relative importance of this type of funding as compared to other types of funding has gone down since the end of the Cold War.
7 A study of Harbom *et al.* (2008) shows that the average number of warring parties per conflict has risen. At the same time, however, it claims that the rise has taken place already in the 1970s and that dyadic conflict constellations are still predominant.

8 A study by de Soysa (2002) provides some support for this claim as it hints to the importance of economic war motives in intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold War era. It refers to 'greed' as a strong explanation for the outbreak of war, in fact stronger than alternative explanations based, for instance, on 'need' or 'creed'.

9 Fearon and Laitin (2003) demonstrate that insurgencies based on guerilla strategies were the dominant type of civil war after World War II.

10 The study by Eck and Hultman (2007) lends some support to this claim. It concludes that in post-Cold War conflicts non-state actors are on the whole more violent than state actors.

11 Thus, we treat sources that describe or analyse specific conflicts without relating the description or analysis to the new wars debate, as 'neutral' sources. For instance, Calic's book on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Calic 1996) would be treated as a 'neutral' source as it does not embed its discussion in the new wars debate. By contrast, we treat sources that explicitly refer to specific conflicts as new or old wars as 'biased' sources. The chapter on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Kaldor's seminal book on new wars (Kaldor 2006) would therefore be treated as a 'biased' source.

12 For historical accounts of the conflict in Cambodia, see Hampson (1996), Kamm (1998), Chandler (2000) and Doyle (2001).

13 Both the government side and the rebel forces also began to trade in precious natural resources, though not on a grand scale.

14 In 1988, Pol Pot outlined the reason behind the transformation of the Khmer Rouge's war economy as follows: 'We are spending many tens of millions of baht [Thai currency] to augment the assistance of our foreign friends, but that is still not enough and there are many shortages. It is thus imperative that we find ways to develop the natural resources that exist in our liberated and semi-liberated zones as assets to be utilised in the fight […]' (Thayer 1991: 31).

15 A Khmer Rouge commander, who defected to the government in 1995, explains: 'When we received the order to carry out the policy to attack the people and villages, I led the people into the forest to protect them, but of course then my commanders wanted to kill me' (Thayer 1995: 24).

16 For an excellent historical analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan, see Rashid (2001). See also Rubin (1995), Davis (1998), Magnus and Eden (1998), Marsden (1998) and Schetter (2004).

17 For an in-depth account of the external assistance provided to the different factions, see Rubin (1995: 34–9).

18 The Taliban were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while the remaining conflict parties relied, among others, on Iran, Russia, India and Turkey (Rubin 1995: 96–7; Rashid 2001: 39–40).

19 For historical accounts of the Angolan conflict, see Hampson (1996), Luansi (2001) and Fandrych (2001, 2005).

20 Also towards the end of the war, UNITA increasingly resorted to violence against civilians. In 2001, for example, more than 400 civilians died in an attack against a train by UNITA forces (Fandrych 2001: 16).

21 For a historical analysis of the conflict in Somalia, see Birnbaum (2002). See also Besteman (1996a), Menkhaus (1998, 2003), Abiew (1999), Laitin (1999), Delaney (2004) and Taw (2004).

22 A further strategy applied by some warlords was to incite the local population against the US peacekeeping forces by provoking the US forces into applying violence against civilians. In particular, Aideed managed to enmesh US soldiers in fights in Mogadishu in which the US soldiers found it difficult to distinguish between civilians and Aideed's fighters (Birnbaum 2002: 108–9).

23 Some scholars regard these identity-based motives as the actual cause of war. However, many warlords were not integrated into the traditional clan order.

24 For historical accounts of the conflict in Sierra Leone, see Hirsch (2001a, b), Reno (1998) and Gberie (2005).
25 Prior to the outbreak of the war, the RUF had received financial and military support from Libya (Davies 2000: 351–8).
26 Even though most combatants and supporters of the RUF belonged to the ethnic group of the Temne, ethnic affiliation did not play a significant role in the conflict (Malan *et al*. 2002: 13).
27 For a detailed analysis of the behaviour of different factions toward the Sierra Leonean population, see Humphreys and Weinstein (2006).
28 The differentiation might, for instance, pave the way for a better understanding of why the effect of peacekeeping missions on the durability of peace agreements has increased substantively since the end of the Cold War (Fortna 2004).

References

Abdullah, Ibrahim and Patrick Muana (1998) 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat', in Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas*, 172–93, Oxford: James Currey.

Abiew, Francis Kofi (1999) *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention*, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International.

Abuza, Zachary (1993) 'The Khmer Rouge Quest for Economic Independence', *Asian Survey: A Bimonthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs* 33(2): 1010–21.

Adebajo, Adekeye (2002) *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ballentine, Karen (2003) 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict', in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed & Grievance*, 259–83, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Bennett, Andrew and Alexander George (2005) 'Process Tracing and Historical Explanation', in Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, eds, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 205–33, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Berdal, Mats (2003) 'How "New" are "New Wars"? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War', *Global Governance* 9(4): 477–502.

Bergen, Peter L. (2001) *Heiliger Krieg Inc.: Osama Bin Ladens Terrornetz*, Berlin: Siedler.

Besteman, Catherine (1996a) 'Representing Violence and "Othering" Somalia', *Cultural Anthropology* 11(1): 120–33.

Besteman, Catherine (1996b) 'Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence. The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-state', *American Ethnologist* 23(3): 579–96.

Birnbaum, Michael (2002) *Krisenherd Somalia. Das Land des Terrors und der Anarchie*, München: Heyne.

Boyce, James K. (2002) *Investing in Peace. Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brzoska, Michael (2004) ' "New Wars" Discourse in Germany', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(1): 107–17.

Brown, Michael E. (1997) 'The Causes of Internal Conflict. An Overview', in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. An International Security Reader*, 3–25, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan (2001) *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Calic, Marie-Janine (1996) *Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien Herzegovina*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Chandler, David (2000) *A History of Cambodia*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Chojnacki, Sven (2006) 'Anything New or More of the Same? Wars and Military Interventions in the International System, 1946–2003', *Global Society* 20(1): 25–46.

Chojnacki, Sven and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein (2000) 'Die Kultur der Prävention: Ein Ansatz zur Zivilisierung internationaler Politik', available at http://skylla.wzberlin.de/pdf/2000/p00-301.pdf, (13 May, 2009).

Cilliers, Jakkie (2000) 'Resource Wars – a New Type of Insurgency', in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, 1–19, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Collier, Paul, Lani Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Compagnon, Daniel (1998) 'Somali Armed Units. The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & Clan-Based Factions', in Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas*, 73–90, Oxford: James Currey.

Connaughton, Richard (2002) *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cooper, Neil (2001) 'Conflict Goods: The Challenges for Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention', *International Peacekeeping* 8(3): 21–38.

Cooper, Neil (2002) 'State Collapse as Business: The Role of Conflict Trade and the Emerging Control Agenda', *Development and Change* 33(5): 935–55.

Cortright, David and George A. Lopez (2002) *Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

van Creveld, Martin (1991) *The Transformation of War*, New York: The Free Press.

Davies, Victor A.B. (2000) 'Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy', *Journal of African Economies* 9(3): 349–69.

Davis, Anthony (1998) 'How the Taliban Became a Military Force', in William Maley, ed., *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, 43–71, New York: New York University Press.

De Beer, Hannelie and Virginia Gamba (2000) 'The Arms Dilemma: Resources for Arms or Arms for Resources?', in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, 69–93, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Desai, Raj and Harry Eckstein (1990) 'Insurgency. The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion', *World Politics* 42(4): 441–66.

De Soysa, Indra (2002) 'Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, Grievance and Governance in Civil War, 1989–1999', *Journal of Conflict Research* 39(4): 395–416.

De Waal, Alex (1997) *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Delaney, Douglas E. (2004) 'Cutting, Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to Withdraw from Somalia', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15(3): 28–46.

Dietrich, Christian (2000a) 'Power Struggles in the Diamond Fields', in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, 173–93, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Dietrich, Christian (2000b) 'UNITA's Diamond Mining and Exporting Capacity', in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, 275–94, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Duffield, Mark (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books.

Dorronsoro, Gilles (1999) 'Afghanistan: Von Solidaritätsnetzwerken zu regionalen Räumen', in Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 121–54, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

Downs, George and Stephen John Stedman (2002) 'Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation', in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, 43–69, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.

Doyle, Michael W. (2001) 'Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power', in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, 89–111, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.

Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman (2007) 'One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data', *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 233–46.

Eckstein, Harry (1975) 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, *Handbook of Political Science*, 79–137, Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Eppler, Erhard (2002) *Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt? Die Privatisierung und Kommerzialisierung der Gewalt*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Fandrych, Sabine (2001) *Angola: Perspektiven nach vierzig Jahren Krieg*, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Fandrych, Sabine (2005) 'From Liberation Struggle to Proxy War, and from Warlordism to a Victor's Peace: The Role of Resources in Angolan Politics', in Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler, eds, *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 73–103, Hamburg: Institut für Afrikakunde.

Fearon, James D. and David Laitin (2003) 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

Fortna, Virgina Page (2004) 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War', *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–92.

Fukuyama, Francis (1989) 'The End of History?' *The National Interest* 16(summer): 3–18.

Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen (2002) 'Neue Kriege? Neue Kämpfer?', in Bruno Schoch, Corinna Hauswedell, Christoph Weller, Ulrich Ratsch and Reinhard Mutz, eds, *Friedensgutachten 2002*, 80–9, Hamburg: LIT.

Gberie, Lansana (2005) *A Dirty War in West Africa: The R.U.F. and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, London: Hurst.

Giustozzi, Antonio (2004) 'The Demodernization of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992–2001', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15(1): 1–18.

Global Witness (1995) 'Forests, Famine and War – The Key to Cambodia's Future', available at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00080.pdf, (14 October, 2006).

Goodhand, Jonathan (2004) 'Afghanistan in Central Asia', in Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, eds, *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation*, 45–89, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Grant, J.Andrew (2005) 'Salone's Sorrow: The Ominous Legacy of Diamonds in Sierra Leone', in Matthias Basedau and Andreas Mehler, eds, *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 251–71, Hamburg: Institut für Afrikastudien.

Grossmann, Herschel I. (1999) 'Kleptocracy and Revolutions', *Oxford Economic Papers* 51: 267–83.

Hampson, Fen Osler (1996) *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen (2007) 'Armed Conflict, 1989–2006', *Journal of Peace Research* 44(5): 623–34.

Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander and Peter Wallensteen (2008) 'Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946–2007', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(5): 697–710.

Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild (2001) 'Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables', *International Organization* 55(1): 183–208.

Hayes, Michael (1995) 'Trading Places: Khmer Rouge Weakened by Defections', *Far Eastern Economic Review* 158(3): 21–2.

Hazdra, Peter (1997) *Die UNO-Friedensoperation in Kambodscha: Vorgeschichte, Konzept, Verlauf und kritische Evaluierung des internationalen Engagements*, Frankfurt/M.: Lang.

Hegre, Håvard (2004) 'The Duration and Termination of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 243–52.

Heupel, Monika (2005) *Friedenskonsolidierung im Zeitalter der 'neuen Kriege': Der Wandel der Gewaltökonomien als Herausforderung*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Hirsch, John L. (2001a) *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hirsch, John L. (2001b) 'War in Sierra Leone', *Survival* 43(3): 145–62.

Human Rights Watch (2003) *'We'll Kill You If You Cry'. Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Security Centre (2005) *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*, University of British Columbia, Canada, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2006) 'Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 100: 429–47.

International Crisis Group (2003) 'Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation', *ICG Asia Report* 62(5): August.

Jones, Seth G. (2006) 'Afghanistan', in Seth G. Jones, ed., *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict*, 61–104, Santa Monica: RAND.

Kaldor, Mary (2001) 'New Types of Conflict', in Ruth Stanley, ed., *Gewalt und Konflikt in einer globalisierten Welt: Festschrift für Ulrich Albrecht*, 24–50, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001) ' "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?' *World Politics* 54: 99–118.

Kamm, Henry (1988) *Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land*, New York: Arcade.

Kingma, Kees (2000) 'Demobilization and Reintegration Experiences in Africa', in Nathalie Pauwels, ed., *War Force to Work Force: Global Perspectives on Demobilization and Reintegration*, 301–28, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Labrousse, Alain (1999) 'Kolumbien und Peru: politische Gewalt und Kriminalität', in Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 313–43, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

Lacina, Bethany (2006) 'Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50: 276–89.

Laitin, David D. (1999) 'Somalia, Civil War and International Intervention', in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds, *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, 146–80, New York: Columbia University Press.

Le Billon, Phillippe (2000) 'The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989–1999: War, Peace and Forest Exploitation', *Development and Change* 31: 785–805.

Le Billon, Phillippe (2001) 'Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975–2000', *African Affairs* 100: 55–80.

Lechervy, Christian (1999) 'Zur Ökonomie der kambodschanischen Kriege: Akkumulation und Dispersion', in Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 155–89, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

Lock, Peter (2003) 'From the Economics of War to Economics of Peace: The Dynamics of Shadow Globalisation and the Diffusion of Armed Violence as an Obstacle to Build Peace', *Peace and Security* 34: 31–40.

Luansi, Lukonde (2001) *Angola: Zwischen regionaler Hegemonie und nationalem Selbstmord: Die Suche nach einer Lösung*, Marburg: Tectum.

Magnus, Ralph and Naby Eden (1998) *Afghanistan, Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, New Delhi: Westview.

Malan, Mark, Phenyo Rakate and Angela McIntyre (2002) *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits The Home Straight*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Malaquias, Assis (2001) 'Diamonds are a Guerilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy', *Third World Quarterly* 22(3): 311–25.

Mao, Tse-Tung (1961) *On Guerilla Warfare*, Urbana: Dover.

Marsden, Peter (1998) *The Taliban. War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, London: Zed Books.

Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole (2008) 'Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008', *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 18(Winter): 3–21.

Matthies, Volker (2003) 'Was ist das neue an den neuen Kriegen? Einige Anmerkungen zu der Debatte über neuartige Aspekte gegenwärtiger Gewaltkonflikte', *epd-Entwicklungspolitik* (8): 21–7.

Maxted, Julia and Abebe Zegeye (1997) 'State Disintegration and Human Rights in Africa', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 38(1–2): 64–86.

Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security* 15(1): 5–56.

Melander, Erik, Magnus Öberg and Jonathan Hall (2006) 'The ''New Wars'' Debate Revisited: An Empirical Evaluation of the Atrocioiusness of ''New Wars'' ', Uppsala Peace Research Paper 9, Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University.

Menkhaus, Ken (1998) 'Somalia: Political Order in a Stateless Society', *Current History* 97(619): 220–4.

Menkhaus, Ken (2003) 'Warlords and Landlords: Non-State Actors and Humanitarian Norms in Somalia', Paper presented at the 'Curbing Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups' Conference, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia: Canada.

Montague, Dena (2002) 'Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo', *SAIS Review* 22(1): 103–18.

Mueller, John (2000) 'The Banality of ''Ethnic War'' ', *International Security* 25(1): 42–70.

Münkler, Herfried (2004) *The New Wars*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Munslow, Barry (1999) 'Angola: the Politics of Unsustainable Development', *Third World Quarterly* 20(3): 551–68.

Newman, Edward (2004) 'The ''New Wars'' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed', *Security Dialogue* 35(2): 173–89.

Pearce, Jenny (1999) 'Peace-building in the Periphery: Lessons from Central America', *Third World Quarterly* 20(1): 51–68.

Peceny, Mark and William Stanley (2001) 'Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America', *International Organization* 55(1): 149–82.

Prunier, Gérard (1999) 'Zur Ökonomie des Bürgerkrieges im Südsudan', in Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 279–311, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.

Rashid, Ahmed (2001) *Taliban: Afghanistans Gotteskrieger und der Dschihad*, München: Droemer Knaur.

Reno, William (1998) *Warlord Politics and African States*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Rich, Paul B. (1999) 'The Emergence and Significance of Warlordism in International Politics', in Paul B. Rich, ed., *Warlords in International Relations*, 1–16, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Rubin, Barnett R. (1995) *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. From Buffer State to Failed State*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rufin, Jean-Christophe (1999) 'Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten', in Francois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds, *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege* , 15–46, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.
Schetter, Conrad (2004) *Kleine Geschichte Afghanistans*, München: Beck.
Sherman, Jake (2003) 'Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires', in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed & Grievance*, 225–55, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Snow, Donald M. (1996) *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.
Stuvøy, Kirsti (2002) 'War Economy and the Social Order of Insurgencies: An Analysis of the Internal Structure of UNITA's War Economy', *Arbeitspapier* Nr.3/2002, Hamburg: Universität Hamburg — IPW, Research Unit of War, Armament and Development, available at http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/publ/ap3-02.pdf, (13 May, 2009).
Taw, Jennifer Morrison (2004) 'The Perils of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Internal Conflicts: Somalia in the 1990s', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15(2): 5–19.
Thayer, Nate (1991) 'Rubies are Rouge: Khmer War Effort Financed by Gem Finds', *Far Eastern Economic Review* 151(6): 30–1.
Thayer, Nate (1995) 'Rebels Without a Cause: Khmer Rouge Now Fighting for Survival', *Far Eastern Economic Review* 158(2): 24–6.
Turner, Bryan S. (2006) 'The Globalization of Human Rights: Violence, New Wars and Failed States', *Korea Observer* 37(1): 23–55.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2008) available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm, (13 May, 2009).
Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth and Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2004) ' "Draining the Sea": Mass Killing and Guerilla Warfare', *International Organization* 58: 375–407.
Vehnaemaeki, Mika (2002) 'Diamonds and Warlords: The Geography of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone', *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 11(1): 48–74.
Waldmann, Peter (1997) 'Bürgerkrieg – Annäherung an einen schwer fassbaren Begriff', *Leviathan* 25(4): 480–500.
Walter, Barbara (1997) 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization* 51(3): 335–64.

About the Authors

Monika Heupel obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Bremen/Germany, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Warwick/UK. She is Research Associate at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)/Germany. Before joining the WZB, she was Lecturer in International Relations at the Freie Universität Berlin. Previously, she pursued post-doctoral research at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) (Berlin), Chatham House (London/UK), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC/USA) and the United Nations University (Tokyo/Japan). From 2002 to 2005 she was Research Associate at the University of Bremen. Monika Heupel's research focuses on the implications of the emergence of transnational security threats. She is particularly interested in investigating how state and non-state actors respond

to the emergence of so-called 'new wars', transnational terrorism and cross-border proliferation networks.

Bernhard Zangl is Professor of Global Governance and Public Policy at the LMU Munich/Germany. Before joining the LMU in 2009, he was, since 2005, Professor of International Relations at the University of Bremen/Germany. He also was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schumann Center at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence/Italy (2004–2005) and a John F. Kennedy Fellow at the Center for European Studies (CES) at Harvard University in Cambridge/USA (2003–2004). In his research he focuses on questions related to global governance in international institutions in various issue areas of international relations from security to trade and from human rights to the environment. Currently he is interested in the legalisation of global governance institutions on the one hand and the transformation of modern states in the process of global governance on the other.