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The demands of disenchantment: From Nietzsche, Weber, and Troeltsch to Bultmann

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The Foundation of the Juridico-Political

Concept Formation in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber

Edited by Ian Bryan, Peter Langford and John McGarry

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136 K. Lichtblau, *Kulturkrise*, op. cit., 145.
137 RS I, 101.
138 RS I p. 240f.; see W. Schluchter, 'Zeitgemäße Unzeitgemäße', op. cit., 182ff.
139 ES, 499, MWG I/22–2, 265, ES, 506, MWG I/22–2, 273; also: H.G. Kippenberg, 'Intellektuellen-Religion', in P. Antes, and D. Panke (eds), *Die Religion von Oberschichten: Religion-Profession-Intellektualismus* (Marburg: Diagonal-Verlag, 1989), 181–201; G. Hübinger, 'Intellektuelle, Intellektualismus', in H.G. Kippenberg and M. Riesebrodt (eds), *Max Webers 'Religionssystematik'*, op. cit., 297–313. For Weber, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are, particularly given their social background, 'free of any suspicion of resentment (in Nietzsche's sense), from 'pure religious intellectualism as such', that feeds on the 'metaphysical needs of the spirit', and, so, according to Weber 'they have an inner compulsion to grasp the world as a *meaningful* cosmos'. See H. Tyrell, 'Intellektuellenreligiosität, 'Sinn'-Semantik, Brüderlichkeitsethik – Max Weber im Verhältnis zu Tolstoi und Dostojewski', in A. Sterbling and H. Zipprian (eds), *Max Weber und Osteuropa* (Hamburg: Krämer, 1997), 25–58, referring to ES, 499, MWG I/22–2, 265. On Tolstoy, see E. Hanke, *Prophet des Unmodernen*, op. cit., 168ff., reference there also to Weber's comparison of Tolstoy's 'early writings' (*War and Peace*) with Nietzsche's 'familiar analysis' in *Will to Power* (op. cit., 171, fn. 21; RS I, 562).
140 *Schopenhauer-Register von G.F. Wagner*, new edition edited by A. Hübscher (2nd edn, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1982), 272ff. (*Metaphysik*).
141 H. Tyrell, 'Intellektuellenreligiosität', op. cit., 31.

Chapter 9

The demands of disenchantment

From Nietzsche, Weber, and Troeltsch to Bultmann*

Karsten Fischer

Friedrich Nietzsche has the honour of being the first to have understood the *dialectic of enlightenment*. This was acknowledged unequivocally by no less an authority than Theodor W. Adorno who, along with Max Horkheimer, coined the now almost proverbial term. In recognizing Nietzsche's role, Adorno also defended him against the charge that he had been guilty of an anti-Enlightenment betrayal of reason: 'Nietzsche, that most consistent figure of enlightenment, did not deceive himself that sheer consistency destroys the motivation and meaning of enlightenment.'[1] But the path that leads from the '*dark* writers of the bourgeoisie'[2] to early Critical Theory included a three-way connection between Nietzsche, Freud, and Max Weber.[3] A reconstruction of this link will enable us to see essential elements of Nietzsche's culture critical interests (I.) and shed new and brighter light on Max Weber's concerns (II.). Also, in this way links to other significant thinkers, and the importance of Nietzsche's and Weber's thought for dealing with today's problems, will become clear (III.).

I. Nietzsche's dialectic of rationalization

As early as *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche expressed the insight into the dialectic of the enlightenment – acknowledged by Adorno as correct – that the pure rationalistic interpretation of the world that began with Socrates and continued into nineteenth century historicism was a history of decay:

> Let us think of a culture that has no fixed and sacred primordial site but is doomed to exhaust all possibilities and to nourish itself wretchedly on all other cultures – there we have the present age, the result of that Socratism which is bent on the destruction of myth. And now the mythless man stands eternally hungry, surrounded by all past ages, and digs and grubs for roots [. . .]. The tremendous historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture, the assembling around one of countless other cultures, the consuming desire for knowledge – what does all this point to, if not to the loss of myth, the loss of the mythical home, the mythical maternal womb? Let us ask ourselves whether the feverish and uncanny excitement of this culture is anything but the greedy seizing and

> snatching at food of a hungry man – and who would care to contribute anything to a culture that cannot be satisfied no matter how much it devours, and at whose contact the most vigorous and wholesome nourishment is changed into 'history and criticism'?[4]

For Nietzsche, the process of disenchantment is closely related to the development of the historical critical method in theology:

> For this is the way in which religions are wont to die out: under the stern, intelligent eyes of an orthodox dogmatism, the mythical premises of a religion are systematized as a sum total of historical events; one begins apprehensively to defend the credibility of the myths, while at the same time one opposes any continuation of their natural vitality and growth; the feeling for myth perishes, and its place is taken by the claim of religion to historical foundations.[5]

Nietzsche does not explicitly use the word disenchantment, which later gained prominence through Max Weber's use of the term, to designate the process of rationalization, but he often uses the word in this sense, and *enchantment* as its antonym. In doing so, he does more than merely break ground for Weber's research question and its terminology.[6] At first glance, it would also seem that, in the quotation above, Nietzsche is guilty of terminological imprecision, in so far as he uses the concepts of myth and religion in an undifferentiated way that makes them appear almost identical. But he uses two different concepts of religion. On the one hand, he diagnoses that religions are dying due to a declining feeling for myth; on the other hand, he declares that the religion that can lay claim to an historical foundation will be the victor in the processes of demythologizing and disenchantment. Thus, a closer consideration of Nietzsche's reflection reveals that it is not self-contradictory and that, in fact, it describes the dialectic of the millennial process of rationalization. First, Nietzsche views religion as the phenomenon that succeeded myth and that differs from myth through its claim to have an historical foundation. For this reason, religion overcomes myth and is the cause of its demise. Second, Nietzsche equates religion and myth when, in considering the death of the feeling for myth, he also discerns in it the deeper reason for the death of religion. In this perspective, Nietzsche makes the elements of the historical foundations of religion, which in relationship to the myth are more rational, ultimately responsible for the fact that religion also succumbs to the onslaught of the same millennial processes of growing rationalization and disenchantment. For Nietzsche, this is *the death of God* in the sense of the disenchantment of a once supreme authority and the devaluation of highest values.[7] By laying claim to historical foundations religion falls under the *rigorous rational scrutiny of an orthodox dogmatism* whose commitment to truth undermines the formerly unquestioned validity of the norms that were handed down with the mythical narrative:

> Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests? – [. . .] Scepticism regarding morality is what is decisive. The end of the moral interpretation of the world, which no longer has any sanction after it has tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism. 'Everything lacks meaning'.[8]

The only chance to arrest the expansion of nihilism lies in the human being developing further into the *overman* (*Übermensch*). But until this takes place Nietzsche sees that the readiness to act rationally and to peacefully organize life in society is threatened by the consequences of demythologizing and that society is, therefore, condemned to be attacked by barbaric regression:

> The waters of religion are ebbing away and leaving behind swamps or stagnant pools; the nations are again drawing away from one another in the most hostile fashion and long to tear one another to pieces. The sciences, pursued without any restraint and in a spirit of the blindest *laissez faire*, are shattering and dissolving all firmly held belief [. . .]. The world has never been more worldly, never poorer in love and goodness. [. . .] Everything, contemporary art and science included, serves the coming barbarism. [. . .] The tremendous coming and going of men on the great wilderness of the earth, their founding of cities and states, their wars, their restless assembling and scattering again, their confused mingling, mutual imitation, mutual outwitting and downtreading, their wailing in distress, their howls of joy in victory – all this is a continuation of animality: as though man was to be deliberately retrogressed [. . .], indeed as though nature, after having desired and worked at man for so long now drew back from him in fear and preferred to return to the unconsciousness of instinct.[9]

In Nietzsche's view, the inherent dynamic of nihilism leads to a 'powerful force of destruction: as active nihilism'.[10] And he attributes this development directly to the process of rationalization:

> If [. . .] the doctrines [. . .] of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animal – doctrines which I consider true but deadly – are thrust upon the people for another generation with the rage for instruction that has by now become normal, no one should be surprised if the people perishes of petty egoism, ossification and greed, falls apart and ceases to be a people; in its place systems of individualist egoism, brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of the non-brothers, and similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity may perhaps appear in the arena of the future.[11]

Within the space of one generation, Nietzsche feared the outbreak of a *bellum omnium contra omnes*,[12] as he formulated it with reference to Hobbes – a fear realized with the outbreak of World War I. And, again, in the epoch of totalitarianism, Nietzsche's oxymoron of the 'ethic of genocide', supposedly born of 'practical pessimism' that results from the process of rationalization,[13] became a horrible reality. Nietzsche saw no limit to the irrational lust for destruction, because the human being would rather 'will *nothingness* than not will'[14] at all.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche assiduously clung to the idea of the rational power of self-reflection as the one chance for preserving human culture from its inherent dangers. For, precisely because we can foresee the 'fall of the general world culture', 'we may be in a position to protect the future from such an end'.[15]

Therefore, Weber was not only able to follow in Nietzsche's 'footsteps' in dealing with these problems,[16] but was also able to follow the philosopher's path of unwavering hope in the potential for salvation in the process of rationalization.

II. The theory of rationalization in Max Weber's sociology of religion

In addition to Nietzsche, one can suggest a potential influence from the early work of Freud on Weber's rationalization thesis. For, in a manner that can hardly be said to be accidental, Weber's understanding of religious guilt as an integral part of 'all conduct in a civilized world'[17] indicates possible parallels with Freud's position in *Totem und Tabu* (*Totem and Taboo*), where the taboo on murder is said to derive from the ritualized remorse of the brother clan for the murder of the primal father.[18] However, at the level of sociological reflection, Weber maintains a distinct, divergent approach that indicates a significant difference from Freud's methodology of psychoanalytic diagnosis in *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (*Civilization and its Discontents*):

> Wherever the external order of the social community has turned into the culture community of the state it obviously could be maintained only by brute force, which was concerned with justice only nominally and occasionally and in any case only so far as reasons of state have permitted. This force has inevitably bred new deeds of violence against external and internal enemies; in addition, it has bred dishonest pretexts for such deeds. Hence it has signified an overt, or what must appear worse, a pharisaically veiled, absence of love. The routinized economic cosmos, and thus the rationally highest form of the provision of material goods which is indispensable for all worldly culture, has been a structure to which the absence of love is attached from the very root. All forms of activity in the structured world has [sic] appeared to be entangled in the same guilt. [. . .] Viewed in this way, all 'culture' appears as man's emancipation from the organically prescribed cycle of natural life. For this very reason culture's every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever more devastating senselessness. The advancement of cultural values, however, seems to become a senseless hustle in the service of worthless, moreover self-contradictory, and mutually antagonistic ends. The advancement of cultural values appears the more meaningless the more it is made a holy task, a 'calling'.[19]

To express, in a condensed formulation, Weber's dialectical reflections: the *rationalization* of norms, that were originally established *by taboos*, into an ethical system, during the historical course of the social and economic development that accompanied the process of cultural differentiation, has produced a number of

problems. Thus, Weber recognizes that a subliminal unease has accompanied the process of rationalization from the beginning, for it is characteristic of 'cultural beings' to be 'endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance'.[20] With the disenchantment thesis Weber explores the problem of meaning that is constitutive for the cultural process and that, over time, has become a progressively more acute problem, indeed, now to the extent that the modern world has been transformed into a *stahlhartes Gehäuse* (*iron cage* (in Talcott Parsons' translation), or *housing hard as steel* (in Peter Ghosh's translation)). The rejection of 'magical means to salvation' is the hallmark of the process in which the concept of the world becomes disenchanted. It began 'with the old Hebrew prophets [. . .] in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought' and continued until it was perfected in Calvinism.[21] Thus, disenchantment means 'the knowledge or the belief that [. . .] there are in principle no *mysterious, incalculable powers at work*, but rather that one could in principle master everything through *calculation*'.[22]

The rationalization of the conception of the world has decisive consequences:

> The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encounters the claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow *meaningfully* and ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a 'meaning' of inner-worldly occurrences. Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become *the* irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.[23]

This means: the more rational the concept of the world became, the more transcendent became the religious content, which in the beginning was entirely world-immanent.[24] In this connection, Weber comments that 'there is absolutely no "unbroken" religion working as a vital force which is not compelled at *some* point to demand the "*credo non quod, sed quia absurdum*", – the "sacrifice of the intellect"'.[25]

Weber raised the question of meaning, because he recognized that for principal reasons it was no more a pressing issue during the Enlightenment than it had been in the religious era, as long as the assumed answers to the problem enjoyed unquestioned validity and acceptance. Only with the coming of the rationalization of religion, in the process of disenchantment, does the question of meaning become acute and, at the same time, develop into a problem of civilization, because the modern world has no answer to it, which entirely has the capacity to achieve the degree and form of acceptance of religious responses:

> Abraham or any other peasant of ancient times died 'old and satiated with life', because he stood in the organic cycle of life, because his life by its very

> nature had given him at the end of his days what it had to offer, because he had no more puzzles which he wished to solve and therefore he could have enough of life. But a civilized man, who is put in the midst of the continuing enrichment of civilization with thoughts, knowledge and problems, can become 'tired of life', but not 'satiated with life'. He snatches only the tiniest part of what the life of the spirit constantly produces, and then only something provisional, rather than final; thus death is for him a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, so too is civilized life as such, for it is that which condemns death to meaninglessness through its meaningless 'progressiveness'.[26]

Here, the relationship to Nietzsche is unmistakably present, not merely in the reference to nihilism, but in the systematic argument itself. For, it was Nietzsche who had proclaimed that with the defeat of the myth in the struggle with the rational concept of the world and the process of religious disenchantment 'all goals [are] [. . .] destroyed'.[27] The relationship to Nietzsche becomes crystal clear in Weber's undisguised paraphrase of the philosopher when he writes that 'the state of having been torn away from the ethical and religious ties of conscience' constitutes the 'inner situation designated by the term "beyond good and evil"'.[28]

Thus, inspired by Nietzsche, Weber's critical concern is to determine the sociocultural consequences of the loss of value and meaning that followed upon the *death of God* and in this way to discover – so to speak – the price of rationalization.[29] For how and, most importantly, why should one act morally if one does not assume a god that sanctions one's acts? And, indeed, it was the knowledge of the death of God, and the disenchantment of the religious concept of the world, that rendered morality problematic. For this reason, the question of the meaning of life remains the crux of Weber's culture-critical concerns.

Unexpectedly, the central question of Weber's sociology of culture leads to a theory of civilization and a critique of culture, and both are indebted to similar reflections in Nietzsche that, however, the philosopher did not develop beyond a rudimentary theory of modernity. Thus, according to Weber, the 'process of disenchantment which has gone on for thousands of years'[30] is one of the prerequisites that made the inner-worldly mastery of nature possible: 'The radical elimination of magic from the world allowed no other psychological course than the practice of worldly asceticism', so that, for example, psychologically the 'character of Baptist morality' finds its purpose in the thought of silently waiting for the working of the spirit to 'overcome everything impulsive and irrational, the passions and subjective interests of the natural man'.[31] Ultimately, this '*spirit of Christian asceticism*' is the foundation for the rational conduct of life, 'on the basis of the idea of the calling', as one of 'the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism', and, indeed, 'of all modern culture'.[32] It is in this context that Weber understands the 'gradual turning away from the naïve naturalism of sex.

The reason and significance of this evolution [. . .] involve the universal rationalization and intellectualization of culture.'[33]

With this culture-critical problematization of disenchantment, in regard to the modern human being's positing of value and finding of meaning, Weber stands directly in the tradition of Nietzsche. In this way, Weber radicalizes and sharpens the focus of Freud's insight in *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (*Civilization and its Discontents*) into a discontent with existence in the modern world itself.[34] Weber was concerned with the self-destructive potential of the process of civilization that discredited itself from the perspective of those who were engaged in its creation, since its own principle of success, the ongoing progress of intellectualization, led to existential disorientation: 'The dialectic of the feeling of meaninglessness and the consequent search for meaning is a direct result of the withdrawal of myth and magic from public life.'[35]

In Weber's understanding of the Occidental process of rationalization, Nietzsche's insight into the dialectic of enlightenment, based on his discovery of the *death of God*, and the problems of value and meaning that attend it, have hardened into a fundamental sociological fact. Horst Baiers' expression of Nietzsche's insight that society is *the extended shadow of the dead God*,[36] is also valid for Weber's understanding of the problem. From the perspective of the sociology of religion, Weber's analysis of the self-destructive potential of the process of rationalization, his knowledge that increasing intellectualization is as irreversible as it is without alternative, and that, precisely because of its positive results, its effects are self-destructive, lend direct support to Nietzsche's insight into the dialectic of the enlightenment:

> The many gods of old, without their magic and therefore in the form of impersonal forces, rise up from their graves, strive for power over our lives and begin once more their eternal struggle among themselves.[37]

In Weber's view, these impersonal powers are responsible for turning the world into an *iron cage*, a situation contributed to by the inner-worldly asceticism that was a consequence of the dialectic of the process of disenchantment:

> Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism – whether finally, who knows? – has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment [sic] of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the

> attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport. No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.'[38]

Weber presents the history of Occidental rationalism, and the development of capitalism that is specific to the West, as a process of decline. For, in the course of this process – and against the promise of the Enlightenment to bring forth self-determined acts rooted solely in autonomous rationality – 'the individual, in so far as he is involved in the system of market relationships [has been compelled] to conform to capitalistic rules of action'.[39]

The negative utopia of *specialists without spirit* and *sensualists without heart* paraphrases Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in his excoriation of the *inverse cripples* for their one-sidedness.[40] Weber's particular displeasure is reserved for the arrogance of this degenerate type of modern human being who deludes himself into imagining that his characteristics are signs of 'a level of civilization never before achieved'[41] and, because he mistakes what is causing his own decline for a virtue, and, thereby, renders himself immune to criticism. This immunity to criticism is then generalized to become a particular worldview that accords itself legitimacy, and, within it, Weber sensed the conditions for a possible reversal of the Enlightenment into mythology; the process that Horkheimer and Adorno later referred to as the *dialectic of enlightenment*. Weber very clearly saw the political possibility of the return of powerful and seductive 'new prophets' and a regressive 'rebirth of old ideas and ideals', as well as the chance that a universal narcissism might emerge.[42]

At the same time, Weber's concern was directed to the equally shortsighted and regressive consequences that had been drawn from the insights of the critique of civilization. He resolutely rejected any evasion of the consequences of the irreversible process of rationalization: 'the skeleton cold hands of rational orders' and the 'stupor of the everyday world'.[43] He also opposed the attempt to take 'flight into the irrational' as a response to 'self-defeating scientific rationalization'.[44] Instead, he demanded that we confront and endure the fact that 'the fate of our age [. . .] is that the ultimate, most sublime values have withdrawn from public life'.[45]

In a warning that clearly recalls the most important demand that Nietzsche made of the *overman* (*Übermensch*), that he set values autonomously and create meaning, Weber concluded that

> [t]he fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the *meaning* of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself.[46]

Indeed, in those who hoped for 'deliverance from the rationalism and intellectualism of science'[47] by surrendering to a generalized hunting for 'experience',[48] Weber could not find anything but weakness.

Thus, in Weber, 'disenchantment is not observed as a fact or historical process but insisted upon as an ethical necessity'.[49] In this manner, Weber's sociological analysis becomes a 'philosophical pronouncement' that is

> engaged in two struggles: against those who have no sense of what is missing. This means that Weber takes the universal religions of salvation both more seriously and less seriously than the casual religiosity of the layperson and occasional churchgoer.[50]

However, it is not merely in his derivation of a moral obligation from a critique of civilization and in his diagnosis of the present that we again find a relationship between Weber and Nietzsche, but also in the particular character of the strategy to overcome the crisis and 'to find the loss of a primary source of ethical direction itself relevant for the derivation of a secondary or supplementary ethical code'.[51] This perspective, which opens the question of the ethical orientation of Weber's project, is one that, beyond its internal reconstruction, leads to its reconsideration in the work of Ernst Troeltsch.

III. The protestant ethic and the spirit of liberalism: From Weber to Troeltsch

In a manner analogous to Weber's interest in the economic ethics of the world religions and also inspired by Nietzsche's critique of culture, the Protestant theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, Weber's colleague at Heidelberg, pursued a politico-ethical interest in the role of religious ethics, especially Protestant ethics, in the development of liberalism.[52] In this regard, Troeltsch's Nietzscheanism was even more radical than Weber's, for Troeltsch followed Nietzsche in questioning the central historic-critical features of modernity that are seemingly untranscendable and therefore experienced as aporetic. Thus, Nietzsche lamented the 'tremendous historical need of our unsatisfied modern culture [. . .] that cannot be satisfied no matter how much it devours, and at whose contact the most vigorous and wholesome nourishment is changed into "history and criticism"'.[53] And Troeltsch explored the corresponding problem that 'history' requires 'a confrontation and debate with the idea of an enduring and authoritative system of values [. . .], which seems in danger of being torn to shreds and washed down the drain'.[54] This did not prevent him from raising 'the great question' of just what could be the 'role and meaning of the ethical system in the huge task of mastering and limiting the historical movement which in itself is limitless'.[55] Where Weber chose

not to subject the universal historical research perspective to a fundamental, Nietzschean critique, Troeltsch adopted a similar position in relation to ethics, which were not subjected to a Nietzschean genealogical dissection, but were sought to be reconciled with their historical nature. The extent of Troeltsch's expectations for his project becomes evident in the critique of Weber, who, as a sociologist, had dispensed with the 'construction of a universal historical context of meaning'.[56] For 'the causes of the drying up of universal history' are 'the shattering of the value ideas, of the idea of a religious or ethical overall purpose, and the complete dissolution of the European idea of humanity'.[57] For Troeltsch, this cultural crisis found expression in 'an easy going liberalism and tolerance without direction'.[58] The central feature of the crisis 'is that it acknowledges only unconnected individual solutions but recognizes no community spirit, authority, tradition, or guiding spiritual forces that transcend personal reality'.[59] This is 'the modern world's curse and agony'; for without a public spirit 'that transcends individualism' it is impossible to have a 'strong and healthy ethical forming of the stream of life'.[60]

The orientation of Troeltsch's project, beyond the sociology of Weber, was also distinguished from the simple recourse to, or relapse into, a faith in simple or dogmatic solutions. The distinctiveness of this aspect of Troeltsch's project reflected the influence of the Hegelian idea of the *principle of the modern world* which demands 'that whatever is to be recognized by everyone must be seen by everyone as entitled to such recognition'.[61] In Troeltsch's version:

> In contrast with this the essential character of modern civilisation becomes apparent. It is everywhere engaged in opposing Church civilisation and in substituting for it ideals of civilisation independently arrived at, the authority of which depends on their inherent and immediate capacity to produce conviction.[62]

Here, Troeltsch acknowledges the foundation of the West's 'great principle of political freedom', which represents 'one of the greatest and most profound accomplishments of the modern world': on the one hand, it 'guarantees the individual an inviolable sphere of personal rights in relationship to the state', and, on the other hand, it 'derives the authority of the state from the united individuals, and thus the people appear as their own rulers'.[63] Troeltsch attributed this achievement to Protestantism with the same argumentative rigour that Weber had adopted in his research devoted to economic ethics. While Lutheranism has a tendency to favour political passivity or violently inclined absolutism,[64] Calvinism is 'much more active and aggressive but also much more systematic and politic'.[65] According to Troeltsch, with its emphasis on the elements of 'social reform and [the] love of liberty' in Christian ethics, Calvinism led to 'a Christian intensification of the ideas of democracy and liberalism' and, thus, developed 'the virtues of independence, love of liberty, love of humanity, and of Christian social reform'.[66] In this regard, it was not Troeltsch's intention to simply demonstrate the role of

Calvinist Protestantism 'in producing the modern world', as Weber had previously undertaken.[67] Far more important to him than this sociological orientation to the history of ideas was the systematic and normative intention to demonstrate the compatibility of Christian ethics and political liberalism in Calvinism:[68]

> The political ethic of Christianity is therefore the impact of its ideal upon the state. The state itself arose out of the natural flux and struggle of life and produced its own idea of political ethics. Now, however, it is being influenced by the Christian idea and its inmost structure is being conditioned by it. The Christian idea modifies our conception of the origin of state power as well as our conception of the purpose of the state. It recognizes the state as a necessary and natural form of life which, by virtue of the political idea, constitutes the framework and the presupposition for all higher life. But as the religion of personhood and submission to the divine orders, Christianity introduces something new and vital into political ethics, namely, an unconditional appreciation of the person and a respectful modesty.[69]

Troeltsch, therefore, experienced with heightened intensity 'the modern world's curse and agony'[70] of the continual erosion of the binding forces of religion in the course of the process of disenchantment. In this regard, we see that, in according prominence to the problem of historicism, he shared Nietzsche's diagnosis that 'religions are wont to die out', if they apprehensively seek 'to defend the credibility of the myths', while their place is already 'taken by the claim of religion to historical foundations'.[71]

The considered reflection and response to this dilemma was undertaken by another Protestant theologian whose relationship to Nietzsche has hitherto attracted little attention, but who attempted to further develop and extend Weber's initial impetus and theoretical approach to combine sociological and philosophical analysis in the concept of disenchantment: Rudolf Bultmann.

IV. The myth is the medium or: The liberal consequences of Bultmann's existential interpretation

With his remark that Nietzsche 'understood better what Christian faith is than many a theologian and priest of his time',[72] the Protestant theologian Rudolf Bultmann not only underlined the general theological importance and the continued relevance of Nietzsche's thought; more importantly, his concordance with the philosopher extended to the critique of concrete dogmas and to the demands imposed by disenchantment. The degree to which these questions were inextricably intertwined emerges from the Nietzschean critique of the theology of sacrifice. In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche criticized the idea that God could have given 'his son for the remission of sins, as a sacrifice' as 'gruesome paganism': 'The trespass sacrifice – in its most revolting, most barbarous form at that, the sacrifice of the guiltless for the sins of the guilty!' For Nietzsche, with eschatology

and the doctrine of the resurrection 'the whole concept of "blessedness", the whole and only actuality of the evangel, is conjured away – in favour of a state after death'.[73] And the consequence of this is that any form of 'communal sense' becomes eschatologically superfluous, for it is *Christian nihilism* 'when one places life's center of gravity not in life but in the "beyond" – in nothingness – [. . .]'.[74]

Despite the paucity of direct citations and references to Nietzsche in Bultmann, it seems clear that he adopted this formulation of the problem and developed it further.[75] For Bultmann emphasized not only the decisive ethical dimension of Christianity which he distinguished, even in Early Christianity, from its mythical dimension.[76] He even agrees with Nietzsche, and seems to paraphrase him when he criticizes the theology of sacrifice:

> How can the guilt of one man be expiated by the death of another who is sinless [. . .]? What primitive notions of guilt and righteousness does this imply? And what primitive idea of God? The rationale of sacrifice in general may of course throw some light on the theory of the atonement, but even so, what a primitive mythology it is, that a divine Being should become incarnate, and atone for the sins of men through his own blood![77]

With the term mythology, a central, basic concept of Bultmann appears, and one that profoundly oriented his position towards the traces of Nietzsche's thought. For Bultmann accepts the scientific logic of modern and functionally differentiated society and seeks to prevent the Christian religion from losing its capacity to affect human existence in modernity, because it has lost the ability to transmit credible myths of transcendent powers, which, in turn, affects the notion of a biblical tradition:

> For the world-view of the Scripture is mythological and is therefore unacceptable to modern man whose thinking has been shaped by science and is therefore no longer mythological. Modern man always makes use of technical means which are the result of science. In case of illness modern man has recourse to physicians, to medical science. In case of economic and political affairs, he makes use of the results of psychological, social, economic and political sciences, and so on. Nobody reckons with direct intervention by transcendent powers.[78]

In response to the challenge and danger of attributing the *death of God* to a Nietzschean dialectic of enlightenment, Bultmann opposes his programme of demythologization in order to preserve the notion of faith from being discredited. The acceptance of Nietzsche's critique of rationalization is detached from a necessary relationship with the destruction of faith through a genealogical or historical-critical method. The mythological is rather to be rendered plausible in both purpose and content. In this regard, Bultmann proceeds through the

theoretical distinction between a mythological self-misunderstanding and the real intention of myth:

> In a naive way mythological thought objectifies the transcendent and makes it inner-worldly, and it does so, contrary to its own intention, by imagining the transcendent as something that is spatially remote and endowed with a power that is quantitatively greater than human power. In contrast to this, demythologization wants to establish the validity of the real intention of myth, namely to speak about the true nature of the human being.[79]

For Bultmann,

> the real point of myth is not to give an objective world picture; what is expressed in it, rather, is how we human beings understand ourselves in our world. Thus, myth does not want to be interpreted in cosmological terms but in anthropological terms – or, better, in existentialist terms.[80]

Bultmann's presentation of this existential-anthropological interpretation of myth indicates an affinity between this interpretative position and that of Martin Heidegger. But despite this evident influence of Heidegger's philosophy on Bultmann's interpretative approach to myth, the critical potential contained in this approach is the necessary prerequisite to undertake an Enlightenment-inspired demystification in Nietzsche's spirit with the intention of opening the path to understanding that myth is 'a viewpoint, indeed a knowledge, of the nature of human existence [. . .] which may not be the only possible understanding of human existence [. . .] but which is a possibility which ought never to lose its claim to be considered'.[81] With these words, Bultmann emphasizes that 'the myth is merely the medium by means of which something is expressed that transcends the myth and which is also important for us today'.[82]

The enduring relevant content that is transported by myth is primarily ethical and, as such, lies beyond the realm of the effect of the Enlightenment's disenchantment. 'Mythological conceptions of heaven and hell are no longer acceptable for modern men [. . .], but the idea of the transcendence of God and of evil is still significant.'[83] In this sense, Nietzsche had already articulated the '[i]rony against those who believe Christianity has been overcome by the modern natural sciences. Christian value judgments have not by any means been overcome this way. "Christ on the cross" is the most sublime symbol – even today'.[84]

It was Troeltsch's intention that the ethical potential contained in myth should contribute to a self-confident, demythologized Christian religion and, thus, lead to a reduction of the crisis of culture that had been diagnosed by Nietzsche and Weber. The process of demythologizing is the guarantee that the otherwise inescapable lack of credibility of the traditional contents of faith in the modern world can be avoided, without the necessity to save and secure the ethical potential of

myth through its doctrinal reformulation. Indeed, Bultmann emphasizes that he 'only draws the consequences inherent in Lutheranism, which of necessity, and despite all resistance, had to culminate in "liberalism"'.[105]

This statement brings the course of our theoretical and historical reconstruction to a clear conclusion. For we have seen that in the movement of thought from Nietzsche through Weber and Troeltsch to Bultmann, it was not only the nature of the disenchantment of the concept of the world that they analyzed and reflected upon in a critique of culture, but that they also elaborated on specific *demands of disenchantment* from which they articulated concrete positions and formulated their own demands – in part with regard to cultural facts and in part with regard to their own scholarly disciplines. And even if it is admittedly more difficult to place Nietzsche in the portrait gallery of the relatives of political liberalism than it is to place Weber, Troeltsch, and Bultmann, nevertheless it is true that all four of these theoreticians of rationalization chose freedom as the central organizing category for their theoretical studies of history and society – and this choice should continue to serve as the guiding orientation for further reflection on the *demands of disenchantment*.

The path of thought traced through the work of Weber, Troeltsch and Bultmann, following the guiding impetus of Nietzsche, entails that concept formation, determined by the *demands of disenchantment*, involves the attempt, beyond Weber, to rearticulate the relationship between religion and the juridico-political. The question of the juridico-political emerges, from the 1920s, in regard to the relationship between religion as an essentially private matter, and the State.[106] Preserving and consolidating this experience through a specific methodology of biblical interpretation seeks to maintain the centrality and autonomy of this experience within and against a State that is accorded the capacity both to formulate positive law and to exclusively determine all domains of social life. Here, in turn, the organizing juridico-political categories of public/private, law-ethics-morality, re-emerge in relation to the consideration of religious experience, as an ethics, within the horizon of disenchantment.

Notes

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1 T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, G. Adorno and R. Tiedemann (eds), trans. R. Hullot-Kentor (ed.) (London: The Athlone Press, 1997), 281.

2 J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*, trans. F. Lawrence (6th edn, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 106 (Chapter V).

3 See, K. Fischer, *'Verwilderte Selbsterhaltung'. Zivilisationstheoretische Kulturkritik bei Nietzsche, Freud, Weber und Adorno* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). I draw on the argument of this book in the first two sections of this paper.

4 F. Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. W. Kaufmann (ed) (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), 135–6.

5 Ibid., 75.

6 See, F. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Schriften 1870–1873', in G. Colli and M. Montinari (eds), *Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA) Vol. 1*, (2nd edn, Munich et al.: dtv/de Gruyter, 1988), 599, F. Nietzsche, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', in F. Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. W. Kaufmann (ed.) (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 368, F. Nietzsche, 'Beyond Good and Evil', in Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., 360.

7 See, F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 181–2. Not just here, in the context of the parable of 'the madman', but elsewhere too, Nietzsche's discussion of the death of God is not atheism but culture-critique, see, W. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (3rd edn, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 96–118.

8 F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 7.

9 F. Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 148, 158.

10 F. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885–1887' , in Colli and Montinari, *KSA Vol. 12*, op. cit., 125–6 (2[127]).

11 F. Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, op. cit., 112–3.

12 Ibid., 30.

13 F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, op. cit., 96.

14 F. Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals', in Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., 533.

15 F. Nietzsche, *Human, all too Human. A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. M. Faber and S. Lehmann (Lincoln et al.: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 151.

16 See, H.-P. Müller, *Max Weber. Eine Einführung in sein Werk* (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 2007), 24.

17 M. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920. Studienausgabe der Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe, Vol. I (19)*, H. Schmidt-Glintzer (ed.) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 230.

18 See, K.-S. Rehberg, 'Kultur versus Gesellschaft? Anmerkungen zu einer Streitfrage in der deutschen Soziologie', in R.M. Lepsius and J. Weiß (eds), *Kultur und Gesellschaft, René König zum 80. Geburtstag*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986, 92–115, 112 n. 67.

19 M. Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) (originally published, in English, in 1946 by Oxford University Press, New York), 355–7.

20 M. Weber, 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', in M. Weber, *Methodology of Social Sciences*, trans. E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (eds) (New Brunswick et al.: Transaction Publishers, 2011) (originally published, in English, 1949 by the Free Press of Glencoe, Ill.), 49–112, 81.

21 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 105–6, cf. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, op. cit., 193.

22 P. Lassman, I. Velody, and H. Martins (eds), *Max Weber's "Science as a Vocation"* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 13, cf. M. Weber, 'Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology', *The Sociological Quarterly* 2/22, 1981, 151–80, 179.

23 Weber, *From Max Weber*, op. cit., 350–1.
24 See, M. Weber, *Economy and Society – An outline of interpretive Sociology, Vol. I*, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 399–400, cf. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, op. cit., 232.
25 Weber, *From Max Weber*, op. cit., 352.
26 Lassman, Velody, and Martins, op. cit., 14; cf. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, op. cit., 231.
27 F. Nietzsche, 'Nachgelassene Fragmente 1882–1884', in Colli and Montinari, *KSA Vol. 10*, op. cit., 154 (4[137]).
28 M. Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*, J. Winckelmann (ed.) (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1987), 298.
29 See, A. Germer, *Wissenschaft und Leben. Max Webers Antwort auf eine Frage Friedrich Nietzsches* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 65; W. Hennis, *Max Webers Fragestellung. Studien zur Biographie des Werks* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987), p. 98 et seq.; D.J.K. Peukert, *Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), p. 12 et seq., 93.
30 Lassman, Velody, and Martins, op. cit., 14; cf. Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, op. cit., 14.
31 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, op. cit., 148–9; cf. ibid., 176–7.
32 Ibid., 180.
33 Weber, *From Max Weber*, op. cit., 344.
34 See, H.L. Kaye, 'Rationalization as Sublimation: on the Cultural Analyses of Weber and Freud', *Theory, Culture and Society* 9, 1992, 45–74 (64), L.A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage. Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 73 et seq.; T.B. Strong, 'Max Weber und Sigmund Freud: Berufung und Selbsterkenntnis', in W.J. Mommsen and W. Schwentker (eds), *Max Weber und seine Zeitgenossen* (Göttingen et al.: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), p. 640 et seq., 658.
35 J.E. Green, 'Two Meanings of Disenchantment: Sociological Condition vs. Philosophical Act – Reassessing Max Weber's Thesis of the Disenchantment of the World', *Philosophy and Theology* 17, 2005, 51–84 (58).
36 See, H. Baier, 'Die Gesellschaft – ein langer Schatten des toten Gottes. Friedrich Nietzsche und die Entstehung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der décadence', *Nietzsche-Studien* 10/11, 1981/1982, 6–33.
37 Lassman, Velody, and Martins, op. cit., 23; cf. W.J. Mommsen, 'Rationalisierung und Mythos bei Max Weber', in K.H. Bohrer (ed.), *Mythos und Moderne. Begriff und Bild einer Rekonstruktion* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1983), 382–404 (398).
38 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, op. cit., 181–2.
39 Ibid., 54.
40 See, F. Nietzsche, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', in Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, op. cit., 250.
41 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, op. cit., 182.
42 Ibid.
43 Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, op. cit., 225.
44 Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 2*, op. cit., 889.
45 Lassman, Velody, and Martins, op. cit., 30.
46 M. Weber, 'Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy', in Weber, *Methodology of Social Sciences*, op. cit., 49–112 (57).

47 Lassman, Velody, and Martins, op. cit., 17.
48 Ibid., 23.
49 Green, op. cit., 60.
50 Ibid., 66.
51 Ibid., 69. Cf. D. Henrich, *Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1952); W. Schluchter, 'Conviction and Responsibility. Max Weber on Ethics', in W. Schluchter, *The Paradoxes of Modernity. Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 48–101. The position adopted here follows Henrich and Schluchter to the extent that Weber is to be considered as attempting to forge a middle path, constituted by the a rejection of both a new synthesis of values and of a relativism of values. However, the analysis moves beyond this initial concordance, by seeking to argue that this possibility entails, in place of the internal reconstruction of Weber's sociology, its supplementation by the turn to the interpretative stance towards the Protestant theology of Troeltsch and Bultmann.
52 See, K. Fischer, *Die Zukunft einer Provokation. Religion im liberalen Staat* (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009), 143. In what follows I refer to this reconstruction.
53 F. Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', in Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., 136.
54 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Überwindung. Fünf Vorträge* (Aalen: Scientia, 1979), 3; see the reference to Nietzsche in E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme. 1. (einziges) Buch: Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie (Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 3)* (Aalen: Scientia, 1977), 139–40, 495ff.; and I. Schüssler, 'Troeltsch et Nietzsche. Réflexions critiques concernant l'image de Nietzsche chez Troeltsch', in P. Gisel (ed.), *Histoire et théologie chez Ernst Troeltsch* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1992), 101–22.
55 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Überwindung*, op. cit., 3.
56 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, op. cit., 653–4. The character of Troeltsch's theological analysis also results from his break with the Ritschlean School of theology, see C. Chalamet, 'Ernst Troeltsch's Break from Ritschl and his School', *Journal for the History of Modern Theology/Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte* 19 (2012), 34–71.
57 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, op. cit., 653–4.
58 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Überwindung*, op. cit., 47.
59 Ibid., 45.
60 Ibid., 51–2.
61 G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. A.W. Wood (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 355, § 317 addition.
62 E. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*, trans. W. Montgomery (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 17.
63 E. Troeltsch, *Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa. Gesammelte kulturphilosophische Aufsätze und Reden*, H. Baron (ed.) (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1966), 81.
64 See, E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. Vol. II*, trans. O. Wyon (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 547ff., 688–9; E. Troeltsch, 'Calvinismus und Luthertum', in E. Troeltsch, *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie. Gesammelte Schriften Vol. 4*, H. Baron (ed.) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1925), 254–61 (255); cf. E. Troeltsch, 'Die Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus', in Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*, op. cit., 188–215, 200–1.
65 E. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*, op. cit., 72.

66 E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. Vol. II*, op. cit., 688–9.

67 E. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*, op. cit., 40; cf. ibid., 138, Troeltsch's remark that the verification is in Weber: 'Weber has [. . .] completely proved his case'.

68 See, G. Pfleiderer and A. Heit (eds), *Protestantisches Ethos und moderne Kultur. Zur Aktualität von Ernst Troeltschs Protestantismusschrift*, Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2008.

69 E. Troeltsch, 'Political Ethics and Christianity (1904)', in E. Troeltsch, *Religion in History* (1991), trans. J. L. Adams and W. F. Bense, 1991, 173–210. pp. 202–3. This also marks the significant difference between Troeltsch and one of the central philosophers of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen. For Protestantism, and with it, the assertion of the primacy of the New Testament over the Old, is, for Troeltsch, the corollary of the deficient position of the Hebrew Prophets. See, Troeltsch, 'Das Ethos der hebräischen Propheten', *Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Kultur*, 6 (1916/17), 1, 1–28 and Cohen's reply, 'Der Prophetismus und die Soziologie', *Neue Jüdische Monatshefte*, 22 (1917), 652–5. On the more general question of the approach to the Hebrew Prophets, see E. Otto, 'Die hebräische Prophetie bei Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch und Hermann Cohen: Ein Diskurs im Weltkrieg zur christlich-jüdischen Kultursynthese', in W. Schluchter/F. W. Graf (eds), *Asketischer Protestantismus und der 'Geist' des modernen Kapitalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 201–54. This is then extended, by Troeltsch, in his later work of 1922, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, to Cohen's notion of messianism in history, which is subjected to a cursory analysis and swiftly rejected.

70 E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, op. cit., 51–2.

71 Supra n. 5.

72 R. Bultmann, 'Das Befremdliche des christlichen Glaubens', in R. Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vol. 3*, (4th edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), 197–212, 201; cf. most importantly F. Nietzsche, 'The Antichrist', in F. Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, op. cit., 600 ff. (aphorisms 29, 33–5), and, in this connection, H. Detering, *Der Antichrist und der Gekreuzigte. Friedrich Nietzsches letzte Texte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), A. U. Sommer, *Friedrich Nietzsche: 'Der Antichrist'. Ein historisch-philosophischer Kommentar* (Basel: Schwabe, 2000); and M. Striet, 'Vom Stigmatisierten zum Modeheiligen. Die Aktualität Friedrich Nietzsches für die christliche Theologie', *Herder Korrespondenz* 54, 2000, 523–6.

73 F. Nietzsche, 'The Antichrist', in F. Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, op. cit., 616 (aphorism 41).

74 Ibid., 618 (aphorism 43).

75 The formulation and development of this problem is initiated as part of the process of differentiation and distinctiveness of a Protestant theology in the Weimar Republic. See, on this, F. W. Graf, *Der heilige Zeitgeist. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der protestantischen Theologie in der Weimarer Republik* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011).

76 See, R. Bultmann, 'Ethische und mythische Religion im Urchristentum', *Die Christliche Welt. Wochenschrift für Gegenwartchristentum* 34, 47, 1920, 737–43.

77 R. Bultmann, *Kerygma and Myth. A Theological Debate, by Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Lohmeyer, Julius Schniewind, Helmut Thielicke, and Austin Farrer*, H. W. Bartsch (ed) (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 7.

78 R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (London: SCM Press, 1958), 36; see, R. Bultmann, 'The Christian Hope and the Problem of Demythologizing', *Expository Times* 65, 1954, 228–30, 276–8. Compare the famous formulation in R. Bultmann, *New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings*, trans. S. M. Ogden (ed.) (London: SCM Press, 1985), 5: 'It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.'

79 R. Bultmann, 'Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung' (= *Kerygma und Mythos* VI, 1, 1963, 20–7), in R. Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Vol. 4, op. cit., 128–37, 134), see, R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, op. cit., 11–85, 141–89.

80 R. Bultmann, *New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings*, op. cit., 9.

81 R. Bultmann, *The Christian Hope and the Problem of Demythologizing*, op. cit., 228–30, 276–8, 230.

82 C. Polke, 'Rudolf Bultmann: Glauben und Verstehen I–IV', in R. A. Klein, C. Polke, and M. Wendte (eds), *Hauptwerke der Systematischen Theologie. Ein Studienbuch* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2009), 285–302, 290.

83 R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, op. cit., 20.

84 F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, op. cit., 128.

85 R. Bultmann, 'In eigener Sache', in Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vol. 3*, op. cit., 178–89, 189 (originally published in 1957). It is understood that Bultmann's understanding of liberalism, and his self-understanding as a liberal, have undergone modification. His initial Wilhelmine liberalism prior to, and during, World War I, which was not, from the outset, implacably opposed to an identification with German national war aims, has then been superseded by membership of the German Democratic Party until the end of the Weimar Republic, in 1933 (on the question of political action and understanding in Bultmann, see W. Rebell, 'Glaube und politisches Handeln bei Rudolf Bultmann', *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik*, 31, 1987, 162–82; H. E. Tödt, 'Glauben und politische Einstellung bei Rudolf Bultmann. Anmerkungen zum Beitrag Walter Rebells', *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik*, 31, 1987, 183–9). The post-World War II liberalism of Bultmann, in terms of its reconstruction or reconstitution, after the fall of the National Socialist Regime, and, with it, the reanimation of the *demands of disenchantment* is reflected in the exchange of letters with Hans Jonas relating to Jonas's 1961 lecture, 'Immortality and the Modern Temper', in *Zwischen Nichts und Ewigkeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 63–72.

86 See, the discussion, for example, in Bultmann's essay of 1920, entitled 'Religion and Culture', in J. Robinson (ed.), *The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology*, Vol. 1 (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), 205–20 (original published in *Die Christliche Welt*, XXXIV, 1920, issue 27).