

¹¹ Gewirth, *Self-Fulfillment*.

¹² Lynn Dobson and Andreas Follesdal, eds, *Political Theory and the European Constitution* (London and New York: Routledge), 2004.

¹⁴ A more 'Turkish' 'Europe' and a more 'European' 'Turkey' would also help to rebut the claims and the appeal of both Christian and Islamic fundamentalism, though I do not believe either of these to be prevalent in EU member states or in Turkey. It might be worth emphasising that the three goods I have set out as the parts of a public philosophy suitable for a free and peaceful pluralistic political association are precisely those that a fundamentalist of any religious persuasion would be unable to accept - and unable to accept for the same sorts of reasons, fundamentalists being much more like fundamentalists from other religions than they are like everybody else.

IT'S ALL ABOUT CULTURE WHY THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG CANNOT IMAGINE TURKEY BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE EU

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Abstract

Should Turkey become a member of the EU? This is one of the most controversial issues in German European politics. While the Social Democrats and the Green Party seem to be in favour of Turkey's integration into the EU, the Christian Democrats strongly oppose it. This paper, however, demonstrates that both sides - their contrary political preferences notwithstanding - share one central belief: Turkey does not fit into the EU for cultural reasons. As far as SPD and Greens are concerned, this belief is not made explicit, but hides between the lines. Through a close reading of two parliamentary debates on EU-enlargement the paper reconstructs how Turkey is represented as "Europe's other". Turkey is constructed as a country where culture determines politics and policies, but that this very mechanism also makes for a good description of German enlargement politics.

In the run-up to the last federal elections in Germany in 2002 the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), had a hard time agreeing upon a common challenger to Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Their fierce dispute about who should become their *Kanzlerkandidat* came to be known as the *K-question* in the German media. In fact now, two years away from the next elections, this very question has popped up again, and it is causing at least as much turmoil as the last time.

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Why I am recounting this issue to an audience interested in the relationship between the EU and Turkey? I do not want to speak here about the internal quarrels of two parties that – curiously enough – carry religion in their name. This would certainly make for an interesting topic in the context of a debate about the alleged Christian foundations of the EU and how this causes a problem for Turkey's membership aspirations. But it would probably be too easy a target. I have brought up the K-question because it bears some resemblance with the question that I want to introduce here. Like the K-question it pops up time and again and it always causes heated discussions in parliament as well as in the press. I therefore want to call it the *T-question*: Should Turkey become a member of the EU?

Though the *T-question* seems to stir up controversial debate at first glance, I argue that in fact it is not that controversial after all. While it is true that government and opposition express rather opposed preferences, they do – as will be demonstrated in this contribution – share the belief that Turkey does not really fit into the EU for cultural reasons.

But let me pin down both sides' political preferences first: At the bottom-line, the CDU and CSU, at present in the opposition, are against an integration of Turkey into the EU, at least as far as the near future is concerned. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party (Greens), which currently form the government, are basically in favour of Turkey becoming an EU-member¹. Accordingly the change of government in the autumn of 1998 did yield a policy-change with respect to the *T-question*². The former coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP had worked towards the EU denying the status of a candidate country to Turkey at the Copenhagen-summit in December 1997³. And reportedly it is due not least to the new German government of SPD and Greens, that the EU-summit in Helsinki two years later accorded this status to Turkey⁴. Moreover Germany is said to have played a crucial role at Helsinki in December 2002, when the Council agreed on the following procedure with respect to Turkey⁵: At the end of 2004 it would be decided, whether or not Turkey complied with the accession-criteria. If it did, the EU would enter into membership-negotiations "without delay".

In contrast to conventional readings I claim that there is not much of a gap between CDU/CSU and SPD/Greens as far as the *T-question* is concerned. In fact, they are much closer to each other than it appears from

their explicit political positions. But this is not because the CDU/CSU shares the view of the SPD and the Greens and has tacitly accepted that Turkey will be an EU-member, while not admitting it openly for strategic reasons. Quite the opposite: the SPD and Greens share the conservatives' cultural reservations about Turkish membership. If one takes a closer look at parliamentary speeches by deputies from the SPD and the Greens, one will find not only evidence of a cultural understanding of European, but also of an image of Turkey as inherently different from Europe. On the one hand the governing parties SPD and Greens stress the importance of giving Turkey a concrete membership-perspective – or so it seems when one only looks at the surface of their texts. But on the other hand – in the subtext of their speeches – they construct Turkey in a manner that sheds doubt on its cultural fit with the rest of Europe. And more than that: By imputing this difference to be highly problematic they construct Turkey as "Europe's other."

Various strands of theory – such as semiotics, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and hermeneutics – share the assumption of there being two layers of meaning: One is the obvious meaning, what we normally take to be true. The other layer is hidden and cannot be discovered by a hasty observer. And even the speakers themselves may only partially or not at all be aware of the meaning they create on this second layer. I may say something, but I cannot control what meanings others may infer from my statement – as we are reminded by misunderstandings almost every day. To some extent meaning is being constituted behind our backs⁶. If we accept this basic distinction between manifest and latent meaning, it becomes clear that analyses of discourse which do not try to uncover the hidden layer of meaning hardly understand the entire story. And with respect to the *T-question* the whole story certainly looks very different from the one about manifest preferences.

All the theories mentioned above are marginal within the discipline of political science. Hence it comes as no surprise that students of politics have not yet developed much interest in those hidden, at first glance invisible parts of social reality. At the same time, however, this indicates that the discipline is quite far removed from common-sense: The distinction between text and subtext can hardly be dismissed as yet another phantasm of postmodernism, because it describes fairly well how we deal with texts in

our every-day lives. We constantly and quite automatically engage in the practice of reading between the lines, trying to find out more than there is on the surface of text. Accordingly my paper tries to make use of an every-day-technique of understanding texts for the purposes of scientific interpretation. To this end it distinguishes between content and argumentation on the one hand, and style and rhetoric on the other hand. For the former I use the term text, indicating *what* is being said. For the latter I reserve the term subtext, which means *how* something is said.

In the following I will in some detail analyse two debates from the German Bundestag, in which the T-question figured very prominently. These are the sessions of December 4, 2002 and December 19, 2002, that took place immediately before and after the Helsinki-summit. The analysis will first focus on content and argumentation, hence on texts. I will then move on to the centrepiece of this paper, an analysis of subtexts and interpret the party-spanning consensus with respect to the T-question as an expression of widely shared beliefs about Turkey's otherness. From this I come to a rather sceptical conclusion as to Turkey's perspectives of becoming a member of the EU.

TEXT

CDU/CSU

The T-question received full attention by the German Bundestag on December 4, 2002, following a written proposal by the CDU/CSU entitled „Für a credible EU-offer to Turkey.“ It calls upon the government to prevent the European Council from giving a precise date for the beginning of membership-negotiations with Turkey. The CDU/CSU justifies this by arguing that it is questionable, whether a Turkish EU-membership would be compatible with the identity of Europe:

Irrespective of the question of compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, the question of Turkey's accession to the EU needs to be seen in the context of the notions of Europe's political identity (...) As an entity capable of action, the European Union has to develop a clear view about her borders and about the question of whether countries that only partially belong to Europe can become unconstrained members. Therefore (...) further commitments regarding the accession of Turkey should be avoided.⁷

Hence the proposal links the question of membership to the question of identity. Despite first specifying European identity as political, a geographic dimension is added in the very next sentence. Apparently the contours of Europe are sufficiently clear for the authors being able to state that there are some countries, which only in part belong to Europe – such as Turkey.⁸

But Europe and Turkey are different not only in terms of geography but also in terms of culture. Take the following speaker from the CDU/CSU who argues that:

We are firmly convinced that Europe is based on a common cultural and also religious heritage. Turkey does not belong to the European cultural area (...) A European Union that is unbounded geographically would destroy the European project (...) forever.⁹

Here, the boundary between Europe and Turkey is defined as a cultural and religious one. Crossing it would be fatal, because it would lead to the destruction of the European project. Hence, not only attempts to make Turkey's membership perspective more tangible, but also membership as such is rejected. Two weeks later, in the parliamentary debate shortly after the European Council, a rather revealing description of the difference between Europe and Turkey had been given:

As far as its *Weltanschauung* is concerned, the European Union is neutral. But as to its values the EU is clearly determined by the European idea of man – the latter being shaped by the Enlightenment on the one hand and Christian anthropology on the other. From this developed the understanding of an inviolable human dignity, human rights, equality of woman and man, constitutional democracy, freedom of press and finally social market economy (...) If you look around in Islamic states and in formerly Christian-formed states, you will notice that attitudes are very different: with regards to democracy, to human rights, to freedom of press and to religious freedom. So far there is no larger Islamic country that practices our order of values.¹⁰

Hence the dividing line runs between Christianity and Islam. What is particularly remarkable about this statement is the direct link between Christianity on the one hand and the central political values of the EU on the other. While the political values of the EU derive straight from Christianity, no larger Islamic state possesses features like human rights or democracy. Hence the underlying assumption and argument is that, first, the political

values of the EU result from culture (or, more precisely: from the Christian religion) and, second, that Turkey does not fulfil the accession-criteria, exactly because of her cultural characteristics that do not match with those of Europe. In this way the speaker establishes a link which is reminiscent of Theodore Lowi's famous phrase, according to which „policy determines politics“¹¹. Only that in our case Lowi would have to be re-phrased as: „culture determines policy.“ For our purposes this coupling of politics and culture is important, since it will reappear in statements from the governing parties. The SPD and the Green Party, however, link culture to politics not on the surface of texts, but in a somewhat hidden manner, in the subtext. Before trying to discover these hidden meanings, I will first turn to the governing parties' texts.

SPD/Greens

The Bundestag – with votes from the SPD and the Greens – rejects the request by the CDU/CSU¹². Speakers from the governing parties campaign for making the Turkish membership-perspective more substantial: This – they argue – would not only be in the interest of Germany,¹³ but would also be an obligation given the fact that membership had already been announced to Turkey in 1963 anyway¹⁴ and that this announcement had been confirmed at several EU-summits since.¹⁵ Therefore the EU could not possibly back down on its offer.¹⁶ Moreover, German politics should keep its "continuity".¹⁷

The CDU/CSU had so frequently put forward the question of whether a Turkish EU-membership would be compatible with the identity of Europe, that the governing parties could no longer ignore it. In their response they claimed that Turkey does belong to Europe and that its membership would therefore be consistent with Europe's identity. Three different reasons were given in favour of this position. The first was to declare cultural diversity a core characteristic of European identity and to define Islam as one of the roots of the EU:

The European Union just is not a religious denomination, but a community of values which rests upon plurality and cultural diversity: It has Christian roots, Judaic roots, but it just has Islamic roots as well.¹⁸

The second argument in favour of Turkey's Europeanness was to point to a decision by the European Council from the late 1980s, when it turned down Morocco's membership application by flatly stating that Morocco was not a European country. At the same time, however, the European Council did examine Turkey's application in a normal manner. For Markus Meckel (SPD) this is clear proof of "Turkey being a European country."¹⁹

The third and most frequently applied argument, however, is to define Europe as a historical and political rather than a geographic entity:

Europe – a great European historian once said – had never in its history been defined solely in geographic terms, but always primarily politically. You don't learn about the boundaries of Europe in geography class, but mainly in history and simply in politics.²⁰

And with a view to Turkey:

That Turkey will find its place in Europe is – because of the historical experiences and the political reality of the 21st century – possible and certainly also necessary.²¹

According to this speaker, Turkey belongs to Europe both historically and politically and these are the two main criteria for determining what Europe is. The particular argument for why a EU-accession of Turkey is compatible with European identity will now be focused on: For once because it had obviously been the government's central line of argument, but also because it is the clearest delineation from the CDU/CSU's point of view: Instead of the CDU/CSU's cultural-geographic definition of Europe the case is made for a historical-political definition. European identity is de-essentialized. Contrary to the CDU/CSU's view, European identity is not considered a natural, pre-social fact, but a political decision. Instead of arguing with the CDU/CSU about cultural characteristics of Europe and Turkey's compatibility with them, SPD and Greens do not engage in such an understanding of identity. This may be a clever debating-strategy and it certainly conforms to the current scholarly understanding of identity, where identity is widely believed to be a social construction. However, MPs from the SPD and the Greens have not succeeded in keeping up this line of argument. Time and again cultural and geographic conceptions of Europe shine through when they speak. And more than once they do mark Turkey

as culturally different. This becomes clear when taking a closer look at their speeches, i.e. by taking account of subtexts.

SUBTEXT

The current section is intended to provide a critical reading of the governing parties' line of argument. However, this will not be accomplished as may be expected, by discussing whether it is at all possible to talk about European identity without talking about geography and culture; nor by asking whether it is correct to conceive of Islam as one of Europe's roots.²² Instead, I will analyse whether speakers from the SPD and the Greens actually manage to exclude culture and geography when addressing the topic of Turkey's EU-membership. Do they succeed in conceiving of Europe without referring to culture and geography? As one can easily guess: They don't! In the following I will analyse statements by MPs from the SPD and the Greens and show, first, how and where geography sneaks in, when they speak about Turkey's application. I will, second, demonstrate that culture and religion play an important role in their arguments and, third, that the speakers at times even establish a direct link between culture and religion.

Geography

The CDU/CSU-request cited above asserts that Turkey does, only in part, belong to Europe. Speakers from the SPD and the Greens, in contrast, avoid explicit geographical boundary demarcations. However, they use metaphors which indicate that the SPD and Greens in fact are fairly close to the CDU/CSU. Turkey is variously described as a bridge, a joint or a hinge. Let us take a look at the following example:

Turkey can become (...) an important, maybe the most important bridge between continental Europe on the one side and the Eastern Mediterranean on the other side.²³

Only a few minutes after chancellor Schröder had argued against a geographic definition of Europe, he is now doing exactly that when he talks about a "continental Europe." He delineates this continent from the "Eastern Mediterranean" with Turkey being the bridge between the two. As a bridge Turkey assures the connection between the two sides. But at the same time Turkey is not part of either side, sharing with the two banks little more than

the limited space where the bridge touches the ground. Not really belonging to either side it is stuck in between. A similar "liminal position"²⁴ is attributed to Turkey by metaphors such as "hinge" and "joint."²⁵ Hence the governing parties' ideas about Europe, supposedly purely political, turn out to be quite geographical in nature when examined more closely.

Culture

Focussing on cultural aspects it becomes clear that the SPD and Greens see Turkey as leaning towards the Non-European side. As a "joint to the Islamic world" Turkey is in an in-between role. As an "enlightened Islamic hinge"²⁶ Turkey is in a liminal position, but at the same time it is characterised as an Islamic country. The Islamic aspect about Turkey gets essentialised when a speaker warns "that Turkey (...) is pushed back into the Islamic region."²⁷ Actually and originally – according to the subtext of this statement – Turkey belongs to the Islamic region, everything else being but a temporary state. The very last doubts about its cultural belongings are disposed of by calling Turkey a "large Islamic country."²⁸ In all of these statements a cultural attribute – religion – is used to characterise Turkey. According to these constructions Islam is the defining trait of Turkish culture. Islam is the key difference between Turkey and Europe. Hence European identity results from the difference to Islamic Turkey. Thus Turkey is made into Europe's Other.

This construction of cultural identity/difference contradicts the statement by Chancellor Schröder quoted above, where he pleads for a political definition of Europe. Apparently it is rather difficult to determine Europe without resorting to geographical or cultural characteristics. Every description of Turkey as an Islamic country undermines a political conceptualisation of Europe, according to which religion would be of no importance whatsoever. If, however, Turkey is called Islamic, there must be a meaning to it. If culture and religion really did not matter in ideas about Europe, Islam would not be a topic at all in the debate about Turkey's EU-membership. Since it is a big issue, however, we may assume that the perceived cultural difference of Turkey does impact the assessment of Turkey's membership application.

Culture and Politics

Alleged cultural differences turn into an almost insurmountable obstacle for EU-accession, when Islam is said to be inherently incompatible with for democracy. According to this point of view it is virtually impossible for Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, simply because Turkey is Islamic. Its culture, notably the religion exercised by the majority of its population, is insinuated to have a direct impact on Turkey's politics. It all comes down to an understanding of Turkey as a country where culture determines politics. The problem then is not so much Islam itself, but its political implications. The CDU/CSU regularly makes this kind of link between religion and politics, but it can be found in statements by the SPD and Greens as well – though in a less explicit way. Take Chancellor Schröder, for example:

There should be unity about us having a great, a common – I say: a national – interest in supporting those forces in Turkey, that want a secular Turkey in the sense of its state-founder Atatürk, and who also account for Turkey not drifting towards Islamic fundamentalism.²⁹

Two developments are found to be possible here: Either the advocates of a secularised Turkey will prevail or Turkey will drift towards fundamentalism. A viable intermediate, third way, e.g. a moderate Islamic form of rule, is considered impossible. If Turkey does not succeed in keeping its politics completely free from anything religious, fundamentalism could take over. Here a simple equation is being made: Islam = fundamentalism. The metaphor of drifting is particularly telling in this respect: Turkey is imagined to be a boat that has been taken into a dangerous (Islamic) current. It has to countersteer (to enforce secularisation), if it wants to prevent being carried away by the current. Hence Turkey does not need to actively pursue Islamic fundamentalism, since the latter will come quite automatically, if Turkey does not actively resist. This constructs Islamic fundamentalism as Turkey's natural path of development. Inversely, secularisation, which could prevent such a development, is presumed to be rather unnatural, very much a stranger to Turkey. Under the bottom-line then, Turkey is made into a potential theocracy.

While Schröder ascribes Turkey a natural tendency towards Islamic fundamentalism, his foreign minister constructs Turkey as a potential terrorist state:

Is there any large Islamic country which can follow the path towards successful modernization in accordance with the rule of law and under conditions of market-economy, yes or no? If Turkey were to manage that, it would be the most important success in the fight against international terrorism.³⁰

From this point of view, Islam is the source of international terrorism and due to that, Turkey's modernization would be an important factor in the fight against terrorism. If, in contrast, Turkey's modernization were to fail, terrorism might continue. The links made in that line of thinking come down to the following system of equations: 1) Islam = potential terrorism; 2) Turkey = Islamic; 1) and 2) leads to: 3) Turkey = potential terrorism.

This provides us with the following overall picture: On the one hand side MPs from the SPD and Greens argue for a political concept of European identity and promote the beginning of accession-negotiations with Turkey. But on the other hand they, too, define Europe in geographic as well as in cultural terms and Turkey as different in both respects: geographically outside Europe (or at its margins at best), equipped with a natural tendency towards Islamic fundamentalism and serving as a potential base for Islamic terrorism. All this sums up to Turkey being the antithesis to Europe.

As far as subtext is concerned then, one can hardly expect Turkey to be accepted into the EU. Therefore the meaning that hides between the lines runs counter to the text-superficial campaign for letting Turkey into the EU. In the subtexts a reality is constructed that stands in clear contradiction to the arguments in the texts. How is this to be explained?

COMMON BELIEFS

One possible explanation for this contradiction could be that it is but a rhetorical trick: Deputies from the SPD and Greens are actually in favour of Turkey becoming a member of the EU – just as they claim on the texts' surface. But in order to make their position more convincing, they have

developed a scenario in their subtexts, where they describe what might happen if the EU denies membership to Turkey. It is a really horrifying scenario consisting of destabilization, fundamentalism, and terrorism. This describes the alternative to EU-enlargement in such a negative way that integrating Turkey appears to be a comparatively advantageous option.

However, instead of interpreting this contradiction between text and subtext as a rhetorical strategy one could also read it as the result of contradictory, conscious and unconscious beliefs. According to this second explanation the speakers are able to communicate intentionally only on the level of text. They can control what they say, but hardly how they say it. Rather than being the result of intentional design, the horrifying scenario described above would thus be the expression of the speakers' unconscious beliefs. In principle, deputies from the SPD and Greens, too, are convinced that Turkey does not fit into the EU for cultural reasons. On a latent level they share the manifest objections of their CDU/CSU-colleagues. Consequently, there is consensus among the parties that Turkey is different from Europe, particularly with regards to culture. Exactly because this view is shared consciously (CDU/CSU) or unconsciously (SPD/Greens) by all speakers, one may conclude that we are not dealing with individual but with collective beliefs. What has been discovered in the subtexts of the enlargement discourse are widely shared beliefs about Turkey, an image of Turkey that is firmly rooted in Germany's collective memory. From this perspective then, subtext is a mirror of our common beliefs. At the same time subtext activates these very beliefs, since it calls them into memory and thus contributes to their reproduction.

This hypothesis of subtext being the mirror (and producer) of our common beliefs can be maintained even if one does not agree with my reading of subtext as something that is beyond the reach of our intentions. If one takes subtext to be something a speaker can actively use and control, a horrifying scenario will fulfil its rhetorical purpose only, if those who listen can imagine it becoming reality. Such a scenario can only be a successful rhetorical strategy if it resonates with the recipients' beliefs. Hence, the very fact that speakers regularly link Turkey's membership aspirations to a fundamentalist threat, provides evidence of the existence of corresponding beliefs – if not the speakers' beliefs, then at least those of their audience. If the notion of Turkey being culturally different was not commonly accepted, nobody in the Bundestag would ever allude to it.

CONCLUSION

While much of the current debate regarding Turkey's EU-membership is about the question of whether or not Turkey fits into the EU, my paper definitely is not a part of this debate. It does not discuss Turkey's Europeanness. In fact, I would argue that it does not matter, if 'in reality' Turkey is European, non-European, semi-European or whatever else. What is important with respect to Turkey's EU-perspectives is not what the world might 'objectively' be like, but only how the EU sees it. With respect to one EU-member state, namely Germany, this paper has shown that Turkey is found to be not 'really' European, at least not European enough for EU-membership. And since this perception of Turkey forms part of the Germans' collective belief system – we are used to seeing and hence automatically perceive Turkey as half-European at best – it is highly unlikely that this construction of Turkey will change in the near future. Even if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, this will not necessarily make a great impression on our beliefs. Common beliefs are quite stable and persistent, they lag behind political developments. And certainly they cannot be replaced as easily as governments can be. Our beliefs about Turkey have outlived the government of Helmut Kohl and they most likely will outlive the government of Gerhard Schröder, too. This is because they are deeply inscribed into our language and into the discourse about Turkey.³¹ Therefore it is not surprising at all that deputies from the SPD and the Greens speak about Turkey in a way that stands in sharp contrast to their own policy. Even Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, both eager proponents of giving Turkey a concrete membership-perspective, construct Turkey as hardly European. Like us all, they are prisoners of their (our) common beliefs. To escape such beliefs is difficult, and to replace them with new ideas and interpretations is not completely impossible, but it will certainly take a very long time. Much longer in any case than Turkey is willing to wait.

Though political scientists are usually very cautious when it comes to making predictions about the future, I would in this case dare to make one nonetheless: Turkey's full membership in the EU is not to be expected in the short- or even in the medium-term. Even if Turkey fulfils every requirement the EU makes or not, even if the German government resolutely demands

the beginning of membership-negotiations, and even if – as widely expected – the EU actually initiates negotiations with Turkey; I would nevertheless claim that it will still take a long time before Turkey is actually allowed into the EU. Turkey will not become a full EU-member until she is commonly believed to be a European country in all – or at least in all large – EU-member states.

If this prediction is correct, my hypothesis that culture determines policy would not only describe the situation in Turkey as seen by the German Bundestag: Turkey is a country, where policies are determined by culture and religion. The hypothesis would be just as true for Germany's policy: The Bundestag does construct a cultural difference between Turkey and Europe and it is exactly this perception of a cultural difference which determines its policy with respect to the T-question.

Endnotes

¹ The positions of the two other – comparatively minor – parties represented in the Bundestag, FDP and PDS, cannot be identified as easily. However, they will not be analysed in this contribution anyway.

² von Kjaw, Dietrich (2003) "Grenzen der Erweiterung. Die Türkei ist ein Teil des Projektes Europa", in: *Internationale Politik* 58: 3, 47-54, p.51; Öniş, Ziya (2000) "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations", in: *Government and Opposition* 35: 4, 463-483, pp.470-72.

³ Baun, Michael J. (2000) *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement*, Lanham, p.93; Wood, Pia Christina (1999), "Europe and Turkey: A Relationship under Fire", in: *Mediterranean Quarterly* 10: 1, 95-115, p.110f.

⁴ Baun, *ibid.*, p.130; Kramer, Heinz (2000) *A Changing Turkey: the Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington, p.200; Park, William (2000) "Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki - to Ankara?", in: *Mediterranean Politics* 5: 3, 31-53, p.36

⁵ Gültasli, Sencuk (2002) "The Copenhagen Summit: A New Era or Another 'Déjà Vu' for Turkey?", in: *Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1: 4, 93-112, pp.98-108.

⁶ Schröer, Norbert (1994) "Einleitung: Umriß einer hermeneutischen Wissenssoziologie", in: Schröer, Norbert (Ed.): *Interpretative Sozialforschung. Auf dem Wege zu einer hermeneutischen Wissenssoziologie*, Opladen, 9-25, p.10; Hitzler, Ronald/Honer, Anne (1997) "Einleitung: Hermeneutik in der deutschsprachigen Soziologie heute", in: Hitzler, Ronald/Honer, Anne (Hrsg.): *Sozialwissenschaftliche Hermeneutik. Eine Einführung*, Opladen, 7-27, p.23.

⁷ Bundestag, *parliamentary paper*, 15/126.

⁸ Cf. *parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 927 (Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU/CSU).

⁹ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 874 (Michael Glos, CDU/CSU).

¹⁰ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1200 (Peter Hintze, CDU/CSU).

¹¹ Lowi, Theodore (1972) "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice", in: *Public Administration Review* 33, 298-310.

¹² Cf. *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 920.

¹³ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 884 (Gerhard Schröder, Bundeskanzler); 15/13, p. 922 (Joschka Fischer, Bundesminister AA).

¹⁴ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 936 (Michael Roth, SPD).

¹⁵ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 885 (Schröder).

¹⁶ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 895 (Katrin Dagmar Göring-Eckardt, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen).

¹⁷ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 922 (Fischer).

¹⁸ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 936-937 (Roth); similarly *parliamentary minutes* 15/16, p. 1194 (Angelica Schwall-Düren, SPD).

¹⁹ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1215.

²⁰ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1185 (Schröder).

²¹ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1186 (Schröder).

²² *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 936-937 (Roth).

²³ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1186 (Schröder).

²⁴ Rumcilli, Bahar (2003) "Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU", in: *European Journal of International Relations* 9: 2, 213-248.

²⁵ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1193-1194 (Schwall-Düren).

²⁶ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 1194 (Schwall-Düren).

²⁷ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/16, p. 907 (Franz Müntefering, SPD).

²⁸ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 922 (Fischer).

²⁹ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 884 (Schröder).

³⁰ *Parliamentary minutes*, 15/13, p. 922 (Fischer).

³¹ The most telling example for this is the German expression 'etwas türken' (to turk something), a synonym for 'manipulating'.

ISLAM IN EUROPE AND TURKEY'S INTEGRATION TO THE EU

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Abstract

A secular state, with a party in government that is said to have moderate Islamist roots, Turkey is a significant EU candidate country at the crossroads between Europe and the Middle Eastern Muslim world. Turkey has always been a keen observer and participant in the ongoing debate on European identity and values. Such debate has often questioned the position of Islam and the future of relations with peoples of this religion in 21st century Europe. Hence, the way Islam is represented and dealt with institutionally within the European Union (EU) is of particular relevance at a time when a date has been set for Turkey to start negotiations for entry into the EU. Starting by introducing the two central themes of my research – the treatment of Islam within the EU and Muslim mobilisation within EU institutions and member states – this paper then moves on to analyse whether there is a specifically 'European approach' to Islam and, if so, how it is articulated.

INTRODUCTION

The way Islam is represented and dealt with institutionally within the European Union (EU) is of particular relevance at a time when Europe is reflecting upon its own identity and cultural roots and when a date has been set for Turkey to start negotiations for membership of the EU (3 October

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EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY: Reflections on the Prospects for Membership

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Commodity Exchanges
of Turkey



Turkish University
Association for European
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FOREWORD

Nanette NEUWAHL*
Halûk KABAALIOĞLU**

Montreal and Istanbul, 2006

The present collection of essays is a selection of TUNAECS papers (Turkish University Association for European Community Studies) given in Istanbul and published with the support of Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and Marmara University, European Community Institute with the addition of six more papers on various other issues pertaining to EU-Turkish relations.

The purpose of the book is to inform a varied audience about some of the implications of the opening of negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. The authors are academics from a variety of (European and other) countries, including Turkey. They cover the disciplines of politics, law and economics, but try to make their analysis accessible to the general public. The focus is on post-2004 debates. It addresses the issues which the authors consider most important following the decision to open accession negotiations.

The accession negotiations between the European Commission and Turkey commenced on 3 October 2005 with the screening process. The negotiations are open-ended and although the date of their conclusion is uncertain, it may be predicted that they may take about 6-7 years at the maximum.

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