

# OCCASIONAL PAPERS

ERIC-VOEGELIN-ARCHIV  
LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT  
MÜNCHEN

— XX —

Eric Voegelin

Plato's Myth of the Soul



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Eric Voegelin,

Plato's Myth of the Soul

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OCCASIONAL PAPERS

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## VORWORT

Das Bemühen, Eric Voegelins *Order and History* dem vollen Verständnis zu erschließen, kann an der Vorgeschichte dieses Werkes nicht vorbeigehen. Diese aber spiegelt sich vor allem in Voegelins „History of Political Ideas“, die aber selbst wiederum eine Vielzahl von Schichtungen aufweist, die sowohl den Text als Ganzes und die Konzeption, die ihm zugrunde liegt betreffen, wie auch viele der einzelnen Teile. Fast jedes von diesen wurde im Laufe der Zeit wiederholt umgeschrieben und umgestellt, bis es schließlich jene Form angenommen hatte, in der es in den ersten drei Bänden von *Order and History* 1956 veröffentlicht wurde. Ob es nötig ist, jeder dieser Windungen und Wendungen der Werksgeschichte zu folgen, sei dahingestellt – in vieler Hinsicht ist dies nach mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert ohnehin nicht mehr möglich. Doch zumindest die größeren und großen Revisionen, über die Voegelin in seinen Korrespondenzen immer wieder berichtete, sollten – soweit dies noch möglich ist – kenntlich gemacht und in ihrer Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des Gesamttextes untersucht werden.

Grundvoraussetzung dafür ist es, die alten Textfassungen aufzuspüren und für die Forschung aufzubereiten. Damit wurde inzwischen begonnen. Ein erster wichtiger Schritt war vor einigen Jahren die Entdeckung der handschriftlichen Fassung von Teilen des vermutlich allerersten Entwurfs der „History of Political Ideas“ durch Thomas Hollweck. Die Rekonstruktion der „Introduction“, die Einblicke in die erste Konzeptfassung der „History“ vermittelt, ist inzwischen erfolgt – eine Übertragung ins Deutsche wurde im Rahmen dieser Reihe vorgelegt. Die Rekonstruktion weiterer Teile steht dagegen noch aus

aus. Auch von ihnen soll der eine oder andere nach Möglichkeit in den kommenden Jahren unter dem Sammeltitle „Materialien zur *History of Political Ideas*“ im Rahmen der *Occasional Papers* veröffentlicht werden.

Im Vorfeld der deutschen Übersetzung von *Order and History* erschien es sinnvoll, mit einem Textteil zu beginnen, der für das Gesamtwerk Voegelins und seine politische Philosophie von besonderer Bedeutung ist – mit dem Platon-Kapitel. Gerade der Vergleich dieses wahrscheinlich im Herbst 1939 geschriebenen Textes – gewissermaßen Voegelins Ur-Platon – mit dem gewaltigen Platon-Teil, der 1957 als erster Teil des dritten Bandes von *Order and History* veröffentlicht wurde und der nach Voegelins eigener Zählung schon 1953 mehr als 400 Seiten umfaßte, zeigt exemplarisch die Metamorphosen, die die einzelnen Teilen von *Order and History* im Laufe von fast zwei Jahrzehnten erfahren haben.

Textgrundlage des folgenden Platon-Essays Voegelins sind zwanzig handschriftlich beschriebene Blätter, die sich in seinem Nachlass fanden. Ihre Transkription warf durch die Kleinheit der Handschrift, enge Zeilenabstände und die schlechte Qualität der Vorlage extreme Schwierigkeiten auf. Erschwerend kam hinzu, dass die von Voegelin verwendeten englischen Übersetzungen nicht bekannt bzw. nicht verfügbar waren. Angesichts dieser schlechten Voraussetzungen war nicht zu vermeiden, dass eine Vielzahl von Textstellen entweder gar nicht oder doch nur unter erheblichem Vorbehalt (markiert durch Klammern und Fragezeichen) übertragen werden konnte. Da sie jedoch die Lesbarkeit des Textes nur unwesentlich beeinträchtigen, wiegt die Tatsache, dass der erste Platon-Text Voegelins nun wieder verfügbar ist, die kleinen Mängel voll auf. Es ist Frau von Lochner für die Geduld und

die Gewissenhaft zu danken, mit der sie sich der Übertragung dieses komplizierten Manuskripts widmete.

*Peter J. Opitz*



Eric Voegelin

Plato's Myth of the Soul

Then listen I

To the celestial Sirens' harmony  
 That sit upon the verge of folded spheres  
 And sing to those that hold the vital stress  
 And turn the ~~transient~~ <sup>eternal</sup> ~~spirits~~ <sup>spirits</sup> round  
 On which the fate of gods and men is wound.  
 Such sweet compulsion dwells in man's life,  
 To quell the danglings of Necessity  
 And keep resolutely ~~station~~ <sup>station</sup> to her law,  
 And the low world in man's weak station leave  
 After the heavenly tune." Milton

The Place of Dante in relation to Plato  
 in view of light of German Christianity in 19th century

- 1 The death of Dante had changed fundamentally the approach to the problem of politics & to the social order in the 19th century. The German pathos expressed itself rather as a desire of political and social order, being evoked by the rising and collapse of Napoleon, in the person of Goethe. These elements of the German political order which were for unity, discipline and self-sufficiency were evoked by the epistemic system which entered a public order, bearing the philosophical and political implications. But finally, not merely in the life and death of Dante became the starting point for the Platonic tradition.
- 15 In a sense, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution.
- 20 In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution.
- 25 In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution. In the 19th century, the German idealism was a reaction to the French Revolution.

## THE MYTH OF PLATO

“Then listen I  
to the celestial Sirens’ harmony  
That sit upon the nine infolded spears  
And sing to those that hold the vital shears  
And turn the adamantine spindle round  
On which the fate of Gods and men is wound.  
Such secret compulsion doth in music lie,  
To lull the daughters of Necessity  
And keep unsteady Nature to her low  
And the low world in measured motion draw  
After the heavenly tune.”

John Milton, *Arcades, 1. Song*

The Death of Socrates had changed fundamentally the approach to the problems of politics. We can discern three main lines of post-Socratic development. The Athenian pathos expresses itself in the new level of patriotism which [resents?] being swallowed up by the rising new empire of Macedonia, in the person of Demosthenes. Those elements of the Socratic philosophy which made for poverty, discipline and self-sufficiency were enclosed by the Epicurean and Cynic schools into a politic attitude, keeping the philosophers aloof from political entanglements. And finally, and most important, the life and death of Socrates became the starting point for the Platonic creation.

It is impossible to characterize this event adequately in a short way. Such comparisons as have been made \*\*\* to shed some

light on it, should be understood as comparisons which do not explain its uniqueness. It has been said that Socrates has in relation to the new religion a place similar to that of Jesus in Christianity, or Mohammed in the Islam. The point is well taken, but it should not be overlooked that Christianity developed into the sacred empire with its double head of Pope and Emperor; and that the Islam evolved the Caliphate. The historical circumstances did not favor a similar [course?] for Platonism. We may come closer to the peculiar Greek problem when we compare the relation between Socrates and the Platonic Myth to the relation between the Achaian expedition against Troy and the Homeric epic. In both cases the historic event becomes the core of the Myth which creates a community; but again, we must not overlook that the Homeric myth is an epic drawing its force from the action of the people, while the Platonic myth is dramatic drawing its force from the action of the one individual in whom the divine power of Greece came into being.

The complex of [myth?] may perhaps be disentangled best when we place ourselves right in the centre of the political problem and proceed from this center to the peripheral details. This center we have indicated already earlier as the task to look again for Greece the spirit to power. Greece is unique in its political structure because it did not arrive at an institution which was comparable to the Oriental rulership and particularly to the union of the king with the mediator of the monotheistically conceived divinity on the pleroma Ikhnatons.

The task has been formulated bluntly by Plato in his famous postulate of the philosopher-king: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet

in one and these common natures who persevere in them to the exclusion of the other are compelled to start \*\*\*, cities will never have rest from their evils, no, nor the human race, a \*\*\* and then only will this one state have a possibility of life and behold this light of day.” (Rep. 473). The central importance of this idea has been marked by Plato himself, for he placed this sentence in the exact middle of the Republic. The number of pages proceeding and following it is the same. In the political situation the alternatives mean that either a philosopher will have to acquire the political power, or a man who holds political power will have to be converted to the spirit of Platonism. The alternatives are still in suspense in the Republic, and there seems no doubt that Plato conceived the possibility that he the head of the spiritual Hellas might acquire the rulership. After the fate of Socrates this could not be done any more by importuning the people, it would have been a senseless sacrifice. A movement would have to come from the people, conferring such rulership on the one man who by the achievement of his wisdom deserved it. As the decay of the people had gone already too far, this situation did not arise. The other alternative became, therefore, increasingly important for Plato. To find the person who could, imbued with the Platonic wisdom, become the saviour of Hellas, and impose his rule upon the people, if necessary by some application of force. The attempts of Plato in this direction circled the Hellenic border [regions?].

They extended to Dion of Syracuse, to \*\*\* III. of Macedonia and to Hermias of Atarneus in Asia Minor. We have to give later a few details a [clear?] attempt; for the present it is necessary to understand that Plato tried very seriously to find powerful persons who might start the new organisation of the Greek world. The choice is interesting: \*\*\* does not figure in

it at all, for the greatest of hopes, Alkibiades, had failed. The movement of Hellenic civilization which had grown from the Asiatic and African fringes to the \*\*\* center is now \*\*\*, and the dangerous knowledge becomes again the vital region. In Sicily was the frontier against Carthage, in Macedonia and Asia Minor the frontier against Persia. In all these of the cases the ultimate aim seems to have been to create an empire powerful enough to attract the rest of the Greek world into a federation. It was decidedly a plan which [foreshadowed?] the system of the polis, and would have transformed Greece into an empire of allied city states under the leadership of a hegemonic power. The spiritual cohesion would have to be furnished by a new elite trained in the Platonic Academy.

While the aim has become pan-Hellenic, the categories for its realization are for Plato still those of the Polis. The reform has to start from a nucleus, which would become the main polis of Greece. The written work of Plato is dedicated to the creation of the image of this polis. The form used however, is not that of a treatise developing a blue-print for institutions, but the dialogue. And the dialogue is not an artistic form, as the later imitative Renaissance dialogues, which would permit the author to distribute the examinations of opinions on different persons, but a drama in which the image of the polis is evoked in the minds of the interlocutors so that in the end the participants of the dialogue are the spiritual nucleus of the new polis. The truth of a dialogue is not a thesis which might be abstracted from its contents, but the perception of the souls of the dialogi personae. It is a colloquy which may be extended over the situation of the dialogue. After it is finished, it breaks out into new dialogues between the participants and other persons. The dialogue itself is the creative effort of founding a spiritual empire which might grow over the circle of the

persons immediately involved until it becomes a movement and power. It is impossible to understand the terms of the Platonic dialogue, and particularly of the Republic, if one does not hear the undertone of expectation that its substance should overflow into the hearts of the people. The words are working for the very end in ever growing circles on an end which did not [end?]. In this respect the Platonic dialogue is a continuation of the Attic drama. But while the older drama lives on the myth of the people, celebrating the action of the heroes while the people-chorus resounds the events in the heroic sphere, the Platonic drama creates a new myth and through the new myth a new people. The heroes are already on the stage engaged in the heroic action of political foundation hoping to find their heroes in the people of Hellas.

The new myth, as we said, is not a myth of the people but a myth of the Soul destined to create a people. The myths are, therefore, the central problem of Platonism. The material of the myths is inherited. It would, however be futile to have mythographically the lines of formation connecting Plato with the past, because the materials are used and connected quite freely in order to become the instrument of expression for an entirely new content. This new content is given through the power of the Soul inherent in the life and death of Socrates and in Plato. The chosen powers of the soul are Thanatos, Eros and Dike (insufficiently translated as Death, Love and Justice).

Thanatos is the cathartic power which cures the soul of the sickness of the earth (Phaedo); life is comparable to a submarine existence with only a glimmer of another world above, and death enables the soul to live free of the denseness of the lower atmosphere; it is a convalescence from the illness and the last word of the dying Socrates to his friend is:

“Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepios”, the divine physician. Death, therefore, is not an event which makes an end to life; it is the great force which orders and adjusts the soul of the living through making it desirous of stripping itself of everything that is not noble and just. The soul is immortal, and its existence is not [dimmed?] into a period of life followed by death, but it has an earthly life and a \*\*\* life for an after \*\*\* until it is reborn in a new body.

Death is the incision which permits the readjustment of station when the earthly period has given a chance for its development. The myth at the end of the Republic shows an interesting \*\*\* concerning this point. A judgement sifts out these Souls who are increasingly bad and relegated permanently to the underworld. Those who may return to earth for further development are offered a choice of future lots according to their merit. But the lot is not given by God; every Soul makes its own choice, thus taking the responsibility for its further fate. The first part of the myth is negative, a demon to the council, particularly to \*\*\*. The second part reveals the right order forming the world, allotting its place to every soul, and giving him what is due to it. In so far as it implies the question of right distribution of good and evil, the Thanatos myth mingles already with the myth of Dike. For the moment, however, we have to observe that the Thanatos myth links the cosmic order with the order of human relations. The administration of the right order in life to the souls is part of the cosmic revelation; the fates are distributed bravely in the work of the world, in the service of Ananke (necessity) in whose lap turns the [administrative?] spindle of the universe, by her daughters, the Moires. Through Thanatos the order of society is linked to the omphalos of the cosmos. Other aspects

of this parable are brought out by the myths of the Gorgias and the Politicos.

The second power of the soul is Eros. To the desire for death and its catharsis, corresponds the erotic enthusiasm. Thanatos alone gives an orientation towards the Good by relieving the \*\*\* of the \*\*\* of appearance. Eros is the positive desire for the Good. Man has to die, and in his desire to make the best in him a perpetually living force he tries to rejuvenate himself by procreation. He has received life once through his birth, and he wishes to continue it through rebirth in his children. Those, in whom this desire expresses itself only bodily, have physical children. Those who have the spiritual desire rejuvenate themselves by procreation in the souls of young men by finding out, loving and developing the Good in them. Here we have the power which forms the world of the Platonic dialogues, the older man, Socrates, speaking to the younger and evoking in him his desire for the Good out of the sources of his own soul. The Idea of the Good thus evoked in the conversation becomes the bond of community between the participants and creates the nucleus of the new society. Eros is the suspense of the Soul between the imperfection of its present state and the perfection of the future and the drive from the one to the other. Eros is the son of fullness and poverty, and the man in search of the Good being aware of it but not yet in possession, the philosopher, is the true erotic soul. The evocative conversation, however, is only the beginning of the movement of the Soul. From the love of the young man and his spirit, the soul moves on to the love of the Idea as embodied in institutions, and finally to the mystic contemplation of the Idea itself, free of its earthly encumbrances. The ascent through enthusiasm from the evocative eroticism to the Idea itself has a function similar to

the catharsis through Thanatos. Death and Love are intimately connected as ruling powers in the person of Socrates. Eros dominates his life, because it is a life towards Death, and his Eros is powerful because living in the expectation of catharsis gives the true perspective to the incidents of life. The nobility of the Soul which compels it to follow the Good and to avoid the \*\*\* of earthly appearance in \*\*\* is the prerequisite for having the power over other men who are willing to open their souls to the love of the nobles and are attracted by it. Eros is in this respect an ordering principle for social relations. Only the noble souls are attracted to one another in the erotic evocation, while the lesser souls wish to remain indifferent. The erotic attraction of [indifference?], the power and [responsibility?] in the erotic relation creates the ranks of a spiritual hierarchy. The \*\*\* problem of [rank?] is now transformed into a practical principle for the creation of a political order. But in this aspect the power of Eros shades already off, as the power of Thanatos into the power of Dike, of Justice. This aspect of the power was revealed in the Socratic [verdict?] of Athens and his differentiation between the good and the bad judges. (Cf. for this section in Phaedo, and Symposium).

The third of the powers is Dike. We have noted already how the other two shade off in their function into the right order of society. This principle of the right order becomes now influential as the structural principle of the polis, but linking, as the other two, the polis to the cosmos. The myth of Dike is continued in the Republic. Dike is the ordering power of the Soul. Every man has in his life the chance to create the right order in his Soul, and the insight thus gained will enable him after the 1000 year period of his death to select a new life which will permit him to advance still higher. Those who have gained no insight will make a lower choice and request

another life of scant achievement. The choice determines the status in society, and then, as we said already, the cosmic impact of the dead destines the cosmion of the polis. The polis confirms the various possibilities of the human soul, and it is the function of the wise statesman, of the philosopher-king, to organize with the human material at hand the right order of the political society which corresponds to the right order of the soul. The soul is alive with conflicting forces, the purely appetitive form, the courageous spiritual element, and the thinking spirit. Men are differentiated from one another by the predominance of one of the three forces. The Soul is in its right order when the three elements are kept in the proper relationship; and the polis is kept in good order when the Soul's trinity reflects properly the three elements required by \*\*\*. The myth of the Soul is also the myth of the polis.

The mythical structure of the Platonic system is completed in the Timaios. The cosmos as a whole becomes the power field of mythical forces; it is itself a myth, a myth created by God. The cosmos is a great Soul penetrating the matter and organizing it into the world as we know it in all its stratification from the stars to the sub-human world. The Soul of Man and the Soul of the Polis are subcreations of the great Soul of the world. A trinity of Souls, each of them a mythical creation, stretches through the universe. And Man is counting his part of the myth in his own Soul and in the Soul of the polis. The creation of the polis out of the myth of the Soul receives the aspect as that part of the world myth which, under the law of the cosmos, is created by man himself. It is the part of the divine creation in which Man participates. In the symbolic language of the Greek myth we have a phrase which corresponds to the Sun-myth of Ikhnaton with its creation of the world and its permanent re-creation through the pharao and

his people. The myths of Plato are increasingly, from the earlier to the later dialogues, not myths told by Plato, but myths emanating from the Soul, doing their part in the creation of the whole mystic and [archetypal?] structure of the cosmos.

### THE EROS OF PLATO

The Laws close with a problem. In order to found the polis actually, a start has to be made in bringing together a number of men who will be fit to serve as guardians of the law and the first members of the Nocturnal Council. In addition to the ordering virtues of citizens, such men have to understand the two great principles of the play of the Soul: first, that the soul's structure and order was all \*\*\*; and second, that there is a connection between the order of the \*\*\*, of the laws and institutions. To provide for this additional education is a \*\*\* for the [longingness?] "for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to \*\*\* until the knowledge which is the [result?] of learning has found a place in the soul of each" (Laws 96[8?]). The true knowledge which makes a man a good statesman and the leader of his city is obedience to the Gods, cannot be learned from books according to a plan. True knowledge is not a matter of learning and intellect, but of character and ethical substance; it cannot be organized through memorizing a doctrine, but only through building up and forming the substance of the soul, in intercourse with men who are already in possession of knowledge. The solution in the Laws would be to attract to the founding [community?] of the city men who are able to [compare?] such knowledge – already members of the Platonic academy.

As far as the written work of Plato is concerned, we have come to an [end?]. But the written work is with Plato [exoteric?], and the \*\*\* would be essentially incomplete without a reference to the [powers?] of the soul in which ideas, and particularly the political ideas originate. In the Phaedo, Plato says, he would be a very simple person who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word should be intelligible or certain" (275) And Phaedo, arguing what other work would give the truth, [guesses?]: "from men the living word of knowledge which has a Soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image." (276). In the life of Plato situations have arisen when he had to generate his ideas in \*\*\* against misunderstanding. In the \*\*\* he reflects on Dionysius of Syracuse who was reputed to have laid down in writing knowledge which he had received from Plato. On this occasion he says that those who engage in an \*\*\* of this art cannot have \*\*\*ily understood him. He himself had never written, and never would write [on / as?] the laws of his \*\*\*, for the simple reason that it cannot be expressed in the \*\*\* or more \*\*\* subject matters. The \*\*\* knowledge will be kindled in a soul through frequent discussion and living together with him, as a light will be kindled by a spark. There would be no sense in bringing such knowledge down in writing; such writings could be understood only by those very few who would find it out themselves and the \*\*\* others would despise the revelation because they are not \*\*\* or they would, for the same reason, \*\*\* with a high and empty hope to have learned something real. Therefore, nobody who has spirit, will ever try to lay down his thoughts in letters. \*\*\* its of the work and its \*\*\* would expose it to the clear criticism of the \*\*\*. Therefore, "when there comes anything written before your eyes, [from?] \*\*\* of a legislator on laws, or on something else,

it was not th\*\*\* serious to him, if he is a serious person himself, but that will still \*\*\* as the \*\*\* place of his mind.” In the II \*\*\* written he \*\*\* Dionysius against talking and writing, “It is not just \*\*\* to write, but to learn; for what is written always comes into \*\*\* I have never written anything on it (the \*\*\* of \*\*\*) nor is there or ever will be a writing by Plato, but \*\*\* is so \*\*\* by Socrates who has \*\*\* of any \*\*\* me.”

A political community is in form as long its spiritual structure [lies?] on the souls of its leaders, transmitted from generation to generation on correspondingly \*\*\*. The [leaders?] of doctrines and other symbols which accumulate is, indeed, not \*\*\* while the soul has to be permanently \*\*\* in the men themselves. When a community is finally \*\*\* and \*\*\*, then [members?] of its institutions will carry it over by [points?] of death of the souls and may even keep it for centuries in \*\*\* [and time?] after the soul is dead when no \*\*\* breaks it down. In the Platonic situation of the founders to the [evocation?] of the community in the souls of the few, and the partition of this \*\*\* against the [criteria?] of the decay \*\*\* the \*\*\* (*Eingefügt am Rand: [membership of?]*) the willing and the \*\*\* of the \*\*\*able because a \*\*\* in touch. Every single soul counts in these beginnings. We can understand the deep \*\*\* which the lost hopes of Alkibiades count to Plato. And \*\*\* a \*\*\* of this power of the Soul in Plato’s epitaph to Dion of Syracuse, which ends with the line:

Dion, thou, who made rage with Eros my heart.

## THE POLIS OF PLATO

“This breadth of subject-matter which is a little disconcerting to an academically trained reader.”<sup>1</sup>

The myth of Plato is the key for the understanding of his political work. It has lasted through the centuries and the vast misinterpretations have not been able to kill the feelings that the human mind has reached in the “divine” Plato a height which perhaps has not been surpassed since. We have to survey now the main aspects which make the Platonic work unique and give it its permanent importance.

The first point concerns already the work as a whole. It is not a system of political theory; its primary function is the foundation of an empire under definite historical circumstances. But the foundation is laid so deep that most of the essential problems of a political system become topical at one point or another; and in this sense the Platonic work is the first great approach to a theory in the technical sense of the word. This event is assuredly accepted as a gift from heaven; all of a sudden political theory begins. As a matter of fact it is overloaded with the most complicated problems which, when unravelled shed considerable light on the process of theoretical thought. Hence it shall be understood that nothing in the topics of Plato is new. He is dealing with the political problems of his time which have undergone an immense process of oral and written discussion. Classification of the forms of government were already well known to Herodotus. The stratification of society in a working class and a non-\*\*\* ruling class \*\*\* of the Spartan institution. The evils of tyranny, oligarchy and

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<sup>1</sup> A Recent Author on Plato

democracy, were the subject-matter of discussion of every Greek statesman. The possible way of organizing a civil power through a wise arbiter who would give a new legislation to his country was exemplified in Solon. The problem of a new \*\*\* was under discussion, since the \*\*\* spheres. Neither is the “method” invented by Plato. The \*\*\* original discipline is sophistic; and sophistic is the use of knowledge for a practical political purpose.

The idea that “virtue is knowledge”, and that the Good can be known, \*\*\* and thus realized in the life of man is Socratic. What is new in Plato is the very \*\*\* of his soul and of this power the \*\*\* of a lover of \*\*\* , which had become decadent and irrelevant, under the guiding principle of mystic thought. The great work which separates the age of Plato from the age of the Sophists, the work which marks the beginning of the theory, is continued in the Laws (716D): “God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man as men currently say.”

This new formula establishes the mystic contemplation of God as the basis of the science of man not only for Greece but also for the later antiquity and for the Christian world. Theoretical achievements in political science is determined by the degree to which the scientist himself is a mystique who is able to penetrate to the a-dogmatic contemplation of Divinity, or, if he is not a mystic himself, by the degree to which his work rests on a mystic culture and the ontology developed by it. The history of political thought since Plato can be presented, if [alteration?] is posed exclusively to the theoretical elements, as the equals of mysticism, subsequent theoretical systems and the form of their decay. The Platonian mythical creation, and the subsequent [logification?] and nothing \*\*\* of Aristotle,

could have the influence on Christianity which they actually had, because Christian civilization is also based on mystic [contemplation?] and the elaboration of a view of the world which is closely related to the Greek theory.

As far as Plato and Hellas is concerned, the Platonic political and religious foundation did not succeed as did the Christian. It is not followed by more than a millennium of ramification and elaboration down to the last ruins of decay which fill our present time. Plato is a great beginning, but for Hellas also the end. Nothing was built on him by future Greek generations. Hellas has not evolved a \*\*\* theory, e.g. comparable in grandeur to the medieval of Dante. The greatness of Plato is the fullness of his [pursuits?]. Never again has there been a man who was a mystic, a theorist, and a political statesman and founder of an empire at the same time. This should be said before we touch on special points of the Platonic theory, because later centuries and lesser men were able to improve it in many details. The theory of Plato had the features of his mysticism, but it has the limitations imposed by his task as a statesman in the polis world of the 4th century, B.C.

The basic principle of Plato's political theory is the parallelism between the soul and the polis. The myth of the cosmos as a hierarchy of souls is transferred on the theoretical level into the methodological axiom that the structure of the political events corresponds to the structure of the human soul. When the one is known we possess also the key to the other. This correlation determines the composition of the Republic. The dialogue opens with a discussion of justice and of the question who is a just man; this question leads on to the thoughts of the structure of the soul as a prerequisite for the answer to the previous question to when a soul is just. The argument is then

broken off because it seems admissible to eliminate the problem of the good individual soul by analyzing first the polis, the man “written large”. This analysis is the main part of the Republic. In the end the argument reverts to the problem of justice in the individual soul, and concludes in the myth of the judgement of the dead. If we in \*\*\* find the pure [methodological contents?] this would mean that the political relations are relations between men, and that nothing can appear in them which is not determined by the nature of man. A sound political science would presuppose a well elaborated anthropology, a science of human nature in all its aspects, biological, psychological and spiritual. This rule has remained the guiding principle of political science from Plato up to this day. The great systems of politics, be they of Augustine, Thomas, Hobbes, Spinoza, or Rousseau are based on a concept of man, and are exactly as good or bad as the underlying anthropology. That new modern systems of politics are highly questionable is due to the fact that they have a very poor anthropology. The main concepts of the Platonic anthropology have already been mentioned. Man has a body and a soul. In the soul there are to be distinguished elements of \*\*\* the spiritual and the rational soul. Modern critics have correctly revealed that the science of human nature has advanced from Plato, and that today a system of political science would not be based on his anthropology. But while such criticism is justified, it should not engender any feelings of superiority. The advancement of psychological knowledge it achieves does not create out of itself an anthropological system; and the [process?] of anthropological knowledge does not grant in itself a system of politics. We noted that the detailed topics of the Platonic system were known before him, but that it required the power of the mystic to coordinate them into a system. Our present situation is in some respects similar to the

[Pythagorean?] period of the man as measure of all things. There exist brilliant detailed studies on the relation between the power of the soul and the political problems, but there exists no great political system. At least, if there should exist one, it had not come to my notice. It required more than knowledge to create a system.

What injects the order into an otherwise drastic morass of knowledge is the political and religious will of Plato. His position is summed up in book VI of the Republic (Ch. 6); There Socrates says: "Then the costly discipleship of philosophy will be but a small amount... These who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed \*\*\* philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any \*\*\* of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a man may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts – he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able to [play?] to avoid all these fierce [creatures?], and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who in the storm of dust and sleet which the thundering wind \*\*\*, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content; if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes." Adeimantos remarks that this would be a great work done, and receives the answer from Socrates-Plato: "Yes, but not the greatest, unless he finds a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a longer [growth?] and the saviour of his country, as well as of himself."

The philosopher is the would-be saviour of his country; he is also the person in whom the spirit [overshadowed?] towards God predominates; and he is Socrates-Plato himself. Out of this circumstance arises the order of the \*\*\* world not as an order empirically perceived and conceived, but as an order envisaged by the philosopher, because the principle of the order has become flesh in him at the historical moment. The order is reality in the philosopher, and it is not less real because the situation is incomplete to its unfolding into a [natural?] order of society. At the end of bk IX Socrates says that the political system “will look at the city which is \*\*\*, and take care that no disorder occurs in it.” And then Glaukon questions whether he then will be a statesman, Socrates emphatically asserts: “By the way of Egypt, he will! In the city which is his own he certainly will, though in the land of his birth, perhaps not, unless he has a divine call.” Glaukon again interjects that then he would be a ruler in the city “which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such anywhere on earth?” Whereas Socrates-Plato gives the final revelation: “In heaven there is stored up a pattern of it which he who desires may behold and beholding may set his own home in order: the political order is laid up as a pattern in heaven”, and through the mystical contemplation of it the beholder who has the “desire” fills his soul with it; the soul of the desirous contemplator becomes the earthly reality of the city. And whether it “exists or ever will exist in fact, is no matter”; for the beholder “will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.”(592). The beholder is a one-man city; he is the maker of the polis; and the growth of that nucleus into a political community adds nothing to its reality which is given to the speaker, Plato. This interpretation which Plato gives himself of the status of his polis should settle - one might think - the clever and [pestering?] debates

whether his polis is an “idea” or a “\*\*\*”, or an “utopia”, or an “ideal”, or a “program”, or a “project”, or anything else a modern interpreter may hit upon. It is the new Hellenistic polis, historically real in the soul of Plato because his is a “desirous” soul beholding the order of God in mystical contemplation, ready to blossom out into a new directly ordered Hellas. (*Eingefügt am Rand: If we would look for a modern parallel in order to undetect the power or pathos of the Platonic position we would have to think of Louis XIV \*\*\* word: "L'état c'est moi!" which does not express, as frequently misunderstood, the spirit of absolute monarchy as an institution, but the very \*\*\* of \*\*\* the mediator of the power of God which creates and permanently \*\*\* the order of the State.*)

We can understand now the implications of the axiom, that polis and soul have the same structure is not a question of analogy or parallelism. But the order of the polis is the order created out of the order of the soul; not of anybody’s soul but of the soul of the philosopher-king. And the soul of the philosopher-king is the ordering principle of the polis, because it has been transformed through the communication with the order of God into the earthly reality of that divine order. Now we have realized the point where the real limitation of the Platonic theory becomes visible: it is not a limitation due to insufficient empirical knowledge of the soul, but due to the structure of the mystic intuition. The mysticism of Socrates-Plato is not a mysticism of the soul in solitude before God. In spite of such elements in the attitude of Socrates and Plato which seem almost Christian, in spite of the catharsis through death and the conflict of appearance and essence in the soul, the Platonic soul is not Christian, it remains a Greek soul. The God of Socrates is not the God of mankind, but the \*\*\* God of Hellas. The divine order is not conceived in the classic

Christian formulas: One God in heaven, one emperor on earth; and: One universe, one Sacred Empire. The Greek polis, as it has grown historically, remains the system in whose terms the mystical insight can be \*\*\*. And the life in the polis, even the dimly ordered polis, remains the brightest earthly fulfilment of human life.

There is [elevation?] in Plato's work, there is [elevation?] of the men for whom his age has no use; but there is \*\*\*; there is nothing that \*\*\* of the romantic or \*\*\*. If our modern anthropology is synonymous to that of Plato, it is not because of our [mind?] is the \*\*\* humble, but because of the Christian intuition into the meaning of human life before God and into the resembling character of the political cosmion. Methodologically we now formulate the [shift\*\*\*?] thus: in the Platonic theory nothing can be found in the polis what cannot be found in the soul, or vice versa, nothing can be found in the soul that cannot be found in the polis; in the Christian theory nothing can be found in the spiritual community which cannot be found in the soul, but the \*\*\* of the soul cannot be found in the polis. The intimate sphere of the religious personality as a Christian discerns; it is unknown to Socrates-Plato.

The theory of the order itself, became \*\*\* in one respect a very close relation to the later Christian development. The understanding of the [world?] order through its identification with the order of the soul is with Plato by principle the same as with St. Paul. The polis of Plato is a corpus mysticum just as the Pauline community. The pneuma of Christ has in the Pauline theory the same function as the soul of the philosopher-king in the Platonic. But here the analogy of the organic order to types of the functional status of members

makes it clear that thus the [services?] in the community have to be coordinate, and that every member has to accept and know his place without \*\*\* the place of his \*\*\* in the \*\*\*. The Platonic myth that the \*\*\* of souls in the community are gifts of the Gods, and that the \*\*\* and states in the community has to be accepted as divinely ordered, is parallel by the Pauline theory of the charismata which, as parts of the pneuma of the community, determines the status of the Christians. The Platonic sophrosyne (\*\*\*) or dikaiosyne (justice) are the virtues which make the classes of the community accept their status and \*\*\* against the hierarchy; they are \*\*\*on the Pauline theory by the principle of agape (charity/love) which \*\*\* the [community?] \*\*\* Agathon and smoothes away and \*\*\*. Those parallels are not accidental; they are due to the basic idea of understanding the community as a community of the soul. The same order categories will appear clearer. The myth of a soul becomes the starting point for the foundation of a community. They disappear or become obfuscated only when the creative power is spent and the community disintegrates as we see \*\*\* today in the remnants of Christian \*\*\*.

The detailed institution of the Platonic polis, the division of labour, the community of women and children for the ruling class, the compulsory system of education, the abolition of property for the upper class, are well known. All we have to do now is to guard them against certain modern misunderstandings. The distribution of functions corresponds to the elements of the soul. He who has the \*\*\* of pneuma and \*\*\*, of \*\*\* (\*\*\*), and of \*\*\*. The requests \*\*\* are further differentiated according to their actual skills. The polis is well ordered if everybody fulfils his function to the benefit of the whole. When we give to this problem of order the system of

"division of labour" it should be well understood that it is not the same as the division of labour envisaged by Adam Smith. The theory of Smith is an economic theory dealing with the issue of [industrial?] productivity through a subdivision of working process. There is a certain overlapping with the Platonic theory because Plato, too, sees the advantage for the productivity when everybody uses his skills exclusively and leaves that for what he lacks still to the others. But this [behaviourist?] aspect is best related even for the division of labour in the class of \*\*\*. The main point is the stratification of society to the economic reunion, the defence power, and the rulership according to the [purification?], of technical skills but of the souls. The soul is the principle of order, and the Platonic philosophy could never be developed into a theory of free trade and the substitute of systems of world economics and could \*\*\* division of labour. The single human being owes his status not to his skill but his function in the soul of the polis where ordering limits have no reason for anything \*\*\* its scope.

Again, it would be highly incorrect to associate the Platonic regulation of property and family relations with what we call today communism. The mass of the people, the workers and parents are not deprived of their property, but on the contrary, all the wealth of the country is concentrated in their hands. The ruling class lives in community on the means of sustenance furnished by the [productive?] class. \*\*\* suggests individuality in the soul or makes it less \*\*\* to \*\*\* in everything in the service of the community. The untransformed of this temptation, and those who [engage?] \*\*\* are not \*\*\* to rulership, because their love and comfort make their \*\*\* unsuitable to the higher service for the state. It is the problem of his time, that makes Plato to elaborate so

insistently this point: to get the ambitious human ones out of politics to stop his destruction of the polis is his private interest, and to have an order of rulers who inject in their action by nothing but the ability of their souls and their insight into the right order of society. For the same reasons Plato demands the abolition of this family, not for the people, but for the small ruling class only. The family would be just as property, a diverting factor for the \*\*\*, and \*\*\* are, therefore, submitted to ends which \*\*\* the promotion of healthy children and their couplings in such a way that parents and children remain unknown to one another.

The educational polis, finally, permits for an early education, from 10 - 20 for all citizens on the same principle; for a higher education for the true ruling classes from 20 - 30; and a final philosophic education for the rulers from 30 - 35. It is a compulsory state education under close supervision of the rulers, because the coherence of the polis depends on the righteousness of the souls of the citizens and nothing can be left in this matter to private enterprise. The question of who belongs to any of the \*\*\* classes has to \*\*\* accordingly the one or the other of the three course of education, is roughly settled by the biological selection on the assumption that the children will inherit the gifts of their fathers. But Plato [permits / presents?] reasons for a shifting of children from one class to another, in order to eliminate misfits from \*\*\* upper class, and to draw the talents of the people into the ruling groups. In order to make the people accept the stratification as it is \*\*\* as the transfer of children from one class to another, the rulers shall employ the clearly national myth that the Gods themselves have [used?] gold in the souls of some and thus made them fit to be [rulers?], silver in the souls of others and thus made them fit to be the helpers, and

bronze + iron to the souls of the many thus making them fit to serve in this cosmionpolis. This myth is one of the most interesting features in the Platonic theory. It does not form part of the Myth of the Soul with which we have dealt in the preceding paragraph. It is a myth in the old sense, a story, applying to the people because the old myth is not quite dead. It shows that Plato plans his polis very definitely in the historical moment, and it shows at the same time to which degree Plato is \*\*\* himself by the sophistic tradition and the idea that everything owes \*\*\* for the purpose of his polis. It also foreshadows his later attitude towards man. The Republic lays all its accents on the ruling class. The myth of the soul is barely receivable only to the guardians of the polis, while the mass of the people is somewhat neglected, and the question how their ascent can be made an integral factor of the polis is [generally / severely?] touched upon \*\*\* in this myth. The later work deals extensively with the \*\*\* parable of the people; its importance may be judged when we remember that one of the reasons for the breakdown of the Ikhnaton system was the dissatisfaction of the people with a \*\*\* religion which did not take care adequately of the religious needs of the lower souls of the hierarchy. The Plato of the Republic is in somewhat the same position, in this spirit, as Ikhnaton.

The last doctrine which requires a word of caution is Plato's classification of the form of government. He gives a brilliant empirical description of the situation of Greek institutions and at the same time he is able to build the facts into his system and thinks to classify them adequately. The principle of classification is again the perfect state; the other types are \*\*\* as \*\*\* stages of dissolution of the well-ordered polis. As the ordering principle of the perfect polis is the well-ordered soul, so the [different?] forms are not characterized by their

different institutions but by the forms of decay of the soul which produces them. The perfect polis may be a kingdom or an aristocracy; it does not matter which as long as the rulers repeat the works of the philosopher-kings. The decay starts when \*\*\* and \*\*\* the \*\*\* in the souls of the rulers. The external form may still be preserved, but the petrification has begun. This state Plato calls the timocracy (\*\*\*). When the decay has reached the degree that accumulated personal wealth of themselves becomes the prerequisite for holding a public office, the state has changed to an oligarchy. When as a consequence the political community has split up into the state of the rich, and the state of the poor, the \*\*\* finds psychic \*\*\* and the class war against the rich begins, leading to the third form of decay, to the democracy. In the democracy the demagogic and shallow type will hold the power, \*\*\* of the wealthy citizens will be at the mercy of the men of the people who under the influence of the demagogues will fleece them. And finally, with the rise of a gifted demagogue who requires a stronger hold, the state will change to a tyranny. It should be understood that this classification is entirely different from our \*\*\*. Where we differentiate today democracy from aristocracy or monarchy our stress is the \*\*\* point the liberty of the individual and participation in the government and the protection of his rights. This idea of liberty is the secularized and, since the 9<sup>th</sup> century \*\*\*ized Christian idea of the freedom of the human soul in its responsibility to God. In the Platonic theory this element is lacking, as we have already pointed out. In the \*\*\* theory, however, the Greek and medieval Christian idea of states and function has partially disappeared until general liberty has become the only decisive criterion for the classification of governments. Only when someone uses their political liberty for questionable [ends?] to the extreme \*\*\* have Christians become aware that even

liberty may exhale a [touch?] of \*\*\* when the \*\*\* of the free men are \*\*\*. Thus the question of the order of the soul is reappearing. The only modern theorist who has dealt with the [problem?] of forms of government in a truly antique spirit is Montesquieu. We have to touch later on his writing on the principles which [retain?] the style of a political society.

### THE NOMOI OF PLATO

We had frequent occasions to refer to the peculiar structure of Greek politics. The Achaian revolt of the Doric invasion interrupted the Aegaeon development through activities which would have been comparable to the Egyptian and Mesopotamian. The polis world which emerged into the light of Hellenic civilization did never find the way to a pan-Hellenic \*\*\* which was spiritual and political at the same time. The pharao was, under the title of the philosopher-king, a topic of theory, but would not be realized. The discrepancy between thought moving on according to its own laws and reality and reality moving on towards its lost dissolution, is probably the most important factor which contributed to the [triumphal?] progress of Greek political thought. When the political idea \*\*\* out of a comparatively stable political situation, their growth is determined to an active extent in its capacity by the evolution of institutions. The idea is always ahead of its time, or, we may as well say, the ideas are the the [parent?] of a political community while the [institutions?] are still in the womb. But the time \*\*\* at any given historical moment will not go by at a certain measure because the idea anticipating a \*\*\* will loose its \*\*\* in the present; it will be a

[freak?] out of [content?] \*\*\* the \*\*\* effort of the \*\*\* generations. When, however, the change between the moments of the spirit and the institution has become the abyss which we encounter in Greece, decades may bring outbursts which in other civilizations are spread into a slow [education?] of as many centuries. We noted this connotation of theory already in the Age of the Sophists where all possible \*\*\* were taken \*\*\* which fill the centuries of the European natural law periods. Now we are faced with a similar problem in the development of Platonic thought. Plato has written in his old age a real great dialogue on \*\*\* the Laws. The probable date of the Republic is 372 B.C.; the Laws were perhaps not finished when Plato died in 347 B.C. In their [conception?] they may be no more than a decade apart, and they were written by the same man. But the later work marks a distinctly new phase in the history of the Myth of the Soul; it is the phase from which later Aristotle starts on his work.

The phenomenon seems to have been frequently an embarrassment to the interpreters. In itself is \*\*\* to an \*\*\* scholars that somewhat should write on systems of politics, and then [do?] it all over again. Such things should not happen. Our desire of \*\*\* with the situation which we find not in \*\*\* of political thought is, therefore, to open the \*\*\* of the \*\*\* [objection?]. Those who deal with it, find frequently the explanation that it is a kind of resignation, more realistic than the \*\*\*, a \*\*\* with the \*\*\* of the situation, \*\*\* declining power of \*\*\* and later \*\*\* the religious creature has [been?] \*\*\* and [been?] \*\*\* by the age of Plato; when a man becomes old, in the aspect, he starts believing in God! The thoughts on the religious problem have been found to be \*\*\*able and \*\*\*able, better to be present over \*\*\* silence. Plato has found to be a pious reactionary \*\*\* on people who wants to have a

little \*\*\* and on \*\*\* who doesn't \*\*\* about religion altogether. Grotesque as this criticism is, it proves at least that something has happened which becomes the misgivings of thinkers more solid than Plato \*\*\*.

Something has happened, indeed. The Laws are written by a man in his seventies, they have the style of old age, but not \*\*\* as a weakness or decline, but as that \*\*\* style of ripeness which we find in some of the present [minds?] when their vitality \*\*\* is un-broken in their later years. We have comparable phenomena in the late work of Michelangelo, in the Shakespeare of *Cymbeline*, the *Winter's Tale*, and the *Tempest*, in the late string quartets of Beethoven. The form loosens up, but it does not dissolve \*\*\*; the [frame?] is determined by a suspense \*\*\* of the \*\*\* as weak as \*\*\* of the most evils, to be found. The \*\*\* is entirely at the disposition of the creator; the process of forming is effortless; and the [evidence?] of \*\*\* and expression is so perfect, that the creator disappears behind the work. Reading the Laws is one of the most \*\*\* experiences when one \*\*\* them. This \*\*\* of Greek life contains everything from the efforts of the Troian war and the Doric [invasion?], over the failure of Sparta and the theocracy of Athens, to the effects of the known education on the \*\*\* of the Persian kings, and the \*\*\* of the \*\*\* in Egypt. Critics have marked it "rambling", but there is no clear line in it; every part and argument added serves its purpose, and the whole is the [great penetration?] of the [compound?] basis for a view of politics on the new level.

The new level can be [fixed?] best by comparisons with the earlier of the Republic. In the Republic Plato is the founder of an empire, he himself is the political philosopher-king of Hellas, and the suspense of the dialogue is here the element of

expectation that it might be the beginning of political action. The attitude is that of the [Saviour?] of his century; he is the judge of the present and the measure of the future; his demands are hard and \*\*\*; he requires discipline, acceptance and \*\*\* to his rule as the right one; like Christ he demands of his disciples to give up father and mother and to follow him. He speaks with the pride and with the [members?] of a new person. He speaks himself in his \*\*\* up [in?] Athens to his new glory. This attitude has changed entirely. Plato is not anymore in his work as the new philosopher-king. Socrates-Plato has disappeared as a speaker; his place is taken now by the anonymous Athenian Stranger: Plato has withdrawn from the work into a distance ; he is still an Athenian, but a stranger, speaking not to his city but giving advice to two other old gentlemen who can serve the foundation of a Cretan colony. He has also gained a new distance to man. In the Republic the appeal is made in a direct way; the men of his time are expected to be partners in a \*\*\* with him, even if it is the relationship of rulership and service. Now he stands aside, leading gently from afar. The change may be felt most distinctly in the new images. The typology of human souls is not so rigid as in the Republic; [and?] man is represented now as “a puppet of the Gods”, maybe their plaything, maybe created with a purpose. The Gods hold man by strings which pull this way or that way, some are made of Iron, some of other materials, and one cord is of gold, the cord of right reason. The life of man will be perfect when he follows the lead of the golden cord; and less so when he follows the \*\*\* and \*\*\* of the others. The Metal Ages of Hesiod are still \*\*\* able in the way the cord is \*\*\*, but they have undergone a mortal transformation; though the myth of the Republic (where \*\*\* is still \*\*\*) \*\*\* the \*\*\* into the structures \*\*\* of the classes, to the puppet play of the Gods gently pulling the

strings of the human soul. Perhaps this \*\*\* will also illustrate what I said earlier about the style of old age: the perfect blending of materials and forms into a new unit which is so perfect in itself that we forget the ingredients which have entered into it in a lifetime. It is also worthwhile to assume that systematically the myth in the Republic marks the crash on the earlier theory and causes the problem which is now created on the new level. For those who take an interest in the \*\*\* of the word, it is one of the most fascinating spectacles to watch this show \*\*\* process from the anthropogenic phase with its genuine aims, to the \*\*\* of souls, and, finally, to the [supplement?] of the play in every human soul.

With the change in this myth the structure of polis has to change, too. It is still a unit of the soul, and the status of the [members?] is destined by their function for the benefit of the whole. But the ruling principle is not any more the gold in the [souls?] of the guardians; the order is not sustained by the decision emanating from the divine souls. Their place is taken now by the Laws, by the Nomoi. I prefer the Greek word because law means to us primarily a legal rule; the Greek nomoi, however, mean law as well, as the rules forming the arts, language and religion. As reason is the golden cord of the soul, so the nomos is the golden cord of the polis. All depends, therefore, on the creation of the nomos in the image of divine reality; and here Plato, the statesman appears again. One step [seemed?] from the actuality of the politics, for the polis can receive the nomoi from some Gods or “from one who has knowledge of those things.” In the Republic there was still the possibility of Plato being himself the leader of his people, they would be [regimented?] under the guidance of his own divine morality. Now Plato has proved too great as that his reality would have been bearable to the people without a mediating

agency. They cannot stand the stark reality before able to accept it only through the [will?] of his nomoi. The Republic is the divine [law?] itself; here Plato speaks on the image with the [cord?] of the God who wells up his desires for the \*\*\* education, a well which presupposes on his part a belief that man is capable of following it. Now, there is a new \*\*\* and a little contempt. Men are “for the most not puppets, but having some little shared reality.” (Laws 804) And when Megillos [interferes?]: “You have a low opinion of manship, Stranger”, he remarks by \*\*\* and says: “Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be described, but is worth of some consideration.” He himself is not a puppet, but the maestro who communicates with God. Then Plato marks the [procedure?] of Heraclitus, in his vision of the \*\*\* and [child moving the stars on the greene board?]; not without a metaphysical \*\*\* can one search the lines, \*\*\* a \*\*\* intimacy, when Plato speaks of “\*\*\* of the \*\*\*” who shifts the prior to the latter place or the \*\*\* [arising?] to \*\*\* their proper question.

We are now prepared to approach the crucial question of the meaning of Plato’s \*\*\* the polis of the Republic as the last, that of the Laws on the soul but \*\*\* of \*\*\*, the case is often presented as if Plato had developed two ideal states, the one so imperceptible with reality that there was no hope of realizing it, and thus another one which was never \*\*\* and better adopted to realistic requirements. This is not quite so. The two works are not independent of one another, but form a spiritual unit. The Laws would be incomprehensible without the preceding Republic. The first [concept?] is not [an?] unpractical ideal, followed by a more practicable project, but it is and \*\*\* the real polis alike the Laws derive the means how to inject as much of this same reality, and not of one another,

into the defined practice. The historically given political relations between men are for Plato \*\*\* ideal, but uses of appearance, living on such elements of order as still survive from the time of the old polis. His problem is to penetrate \*\*\* of a part of spiritual reality with the new reality of his soul, and the question is how much of the reality human beings can absorb. The maximum would be the order of the Republic; but the polis of the Republic would be “governed by Gods or Sons of Gods, one, or more than one.”(Laws 739). But man is so \*\*\*, and so incapable of standing the strains of reality, that he will not submit to the [rule?] of the Son of God, of Plato; he has to receive it in a diluted form. The \*\*\* of the \*\*\* dialogues have to look to the first “for the matter of the state, as to cling to this and to seek with all might for one which is like this.” The real state, if thus created, “will be nearest to immortality” (739). If we work for further clarification for comparable phenomena in other civilizations, we would have to refer to the Sermon on the Mount and its relation to the religious and moral guidance elements. The Sermon on the Mount corresponds to the Republic. The devoted Christian layman would refuse to follow its precepts because his followers would scoff at him; he would betray his [world?] and \*\*\*, he would [miss?] his family and probably bringing early death to himself. The Sermon on the Mount is directed to the disciples of the Son of God, such as the Republic appeals to the \*\*\* followers of the Son of God, Plato. But the [arrangement?] is not capable of following it. But no Christian would admit that the Sermon on the Mount is not the reality and core of Christian doctrine, even if he does not live in accordance with it. If the Sermon on the Mount were taken out of Christianity, its very power center, its living [form?], all that makes it an historically affective reality, would be destroyed. But the teaching of Christ was unbearable; just as

the teaching of Plato; it had to be institutionalized in the Christian order not to \*\*\* this \*\*\*; and to infuse as much of it as man would accept into human relations. The mediating of the stark reality of Jesus through the religious institution is the \*\*\* the Church. In a later century we have to count [some / more?] certainty on the deepest analysis which was ever given of this problem in the Great Inquisitor of Dostojewsky. We may thus arrive at a \*\*\* for the Platonic [justice?]. In the Republic the Greek problem is on the \*\*\* level; the spiritual power of Plato never touches its \*\*\* in a political empire; we have referred frequently to the Hellenistic parallels. In the Laws the problem has moved to the Popal level; Plato withdraws from the critical foundation and \*\*\* [serves?] the function of the head of a church who brings down the \*\*\* (in the Republic) on which the actual political institution (the Laws) have to (be) [modelled?]; he becomes the representative of God and the religious \*\*\* the world of politics. Here we have developed the alternative to the Oriental solution (which we shortly \*\*\* the \*\*\*), the separation of (*Eingefügt am Rand:* **the**) politico-religious community with \*\*\* into the two institutions of Pope and Emperor, the Church and the Empire, and the parallel \*\*\* debating of spiritual and temporal. In the [Greek?] theory itself, the problem is continued in the Aristotelian [debating?] of praxis-theoria. In \*\*\* to the peculiar time structure of Greek political thought; I think the methodological importance of differentiating between the inner time of a thought process and the external time has now become clearer. The years of the lifetime of Plato which [somewhat?] lead from the first position to the second may be less than \*\*\*, but the inner time tension of the problem corresponds in the Christian civilization to the \*\*\* on which opens in the external time to the centuries.

While it is essential to mention the Popal level of the Platonic work in all its implications, the parallels with the Christian problem of politics should not let us forget that Plato is a Greek. It is, of course, impossible to give an adequate idea of this gigantic work in this context, but we have to touch at least at one of the other of the characteristic aspects of the polis \*\*\* themes. The general structure of [institutions?] is that of every Greek polis. There is a \*\*\*, an elected Council and a board of chief magistrates. The population is of limited size, probably around 40.000, including women, children, slaves, and foreign traders. It is divided into tribes which have their gods and rituals, just as the city as whole has its Gods. There are priests, there is an army with elected guards etc. What is Platonic in it is first, the [authentic?] soul structure of the polis which makes it a cosmic symbol. By \*\*\* tradition, the Greek theory of [music?], and the authentic school of the [democracy?] are all \*\*\* in this elaborate construction. The number of citizens \*\*\*, who each have a lot of \*\*\* it is set at 5040. The number is [desired?] because of its high \*\*\* of \*\*\*. Among its 50\*\*\* are the numbers 10 and twelve. The number has to be divisible by 12, because the people is divided into 12 tribes, and the number 12 is chosen for the tribes because of the cosmic relation which we discovered earlier. "Every [portion?] should be regarded by us as a saint gift of heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe." (Laws 771). The first [number?] which would fulfil the [condition?] of being divisible by the numbers 1 to 10 and by 12 is 2520. Plato chose 5040 because the population of the tribes has thus the number 420, which is again divisible by 12. 5040 is the first number which also fulfils this further condition. The elected Council has 360 members, 30 for each of the twelve tribes. The number of the months (12) multiplied by the number of days of the sun-months (30) thus gives the

number of days of the sun-year (360). The members of the Council do not serve all at the same time, but one twelfth of them, that is 30, each month. The number 360 is further chosen because it can be divided by 4. The population is divided into property classes, the first possessing over their land-lot once again the value of the lot, up to the fourth class which has the maximum property of four times the value of the land-lot. Now higher property is allowed. The division of 360 by 4 results in 90 council men to be elected by each of the four property classes. (*Eingefügt am Rand: The election is subdivided into two; first 180 men are chosen by each class; and then 90 of the 180 are chosen by lot.*)

The members of the house of magistrates is fixed at 37; Plato does not give any reason for it; I presume the reason is that 37 is the twelfth prime number (not counting 1 in the sense). They are chosen by a threefold [secret?] election. In a first election 300 names are elected; in the second 100 out of the 300; and in the third 37 out of the 100. We should further pay attention to the significant function of the number one, two, three, four and five, the numbers of the Pythagorean Tetractys. The indirect election of 37 Magistrates has three phases. There are 4 property classes which divided with the number 12 of the tribes gives 3. The number 5040 is in the relation 2:1 to the first number fulfilling the condition of being divisible by 1 to 10 and 12. In the election of the Council men the number elected to those already \*\*\* is in the relation 2:1. The relation of the first integers; 2:1, 3:2, 4:3 are also the mathematical relations determining the octave \*\*\*, the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup>, and thus makes the polis structure a musical symbol and \*\*\* it with cosmic harmony . This cosmic \*\*\* has to be [presented?] throughout the existence of the polis. Plato provides measures which will keep the number of citizens stable at direct \*\*\* of

population towards new colonies. The polis is created as a cosmic analogy, as a cosmion and its well-being depends on its permanent accord with the cosmic mathematical relations. In the Aristotelian politics this issue of the cosmic measure has lost its mathematical strictness and is flattened out to the idea of [autarchy?].

The members of the \*\*\* of the 37 magistrates are not called any more the “Guardians” as in the Republic, but the “Guardians of the laws”. The law becomes the orientation point for the later Platonic theory. The problem is first elaborated in the Statesman, the dialogue between the \*\*\* and the Laws, which has to be dated about 362 B.C. The \*\*\* are there divided into two classes. The first class has only one type, the perfect polis of the Republic. Its \*\*\* under the aspect of law is, that its members are the \*\*\* and give the \*\*\* law to their [community?], that they are, \*\*\*, at liberty to change it at any time in any way which the \*\*\* that they are, however, of the science of governments. “The last thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, \*\*\* him to have wisdom and royal [genes?]” (Statesman 294). When the rule of this wise king can not be subject then is the best method to adopt in a state the \*\*\* law of the perfect state and to keep it without changes. The legislator of the second polis could be under the law which they have adopted from the first and are \*\*\* to guard it (Statesman 217). (The assumption which can be found occasionally, that the polis of the Republic has no laws, seems to come close to sloppy reading of Plato. The new point is that the rulers are under the law, and not above it as in the Republic). The second polis is, though the [arche?]polis of the laws, the best parable \*\*\* of the first. This new theoretical position determines an important change in the topology of governments which in its structure is comparable

to the \*\*\* of the Hesiodian myth of the Metal Ages to the image of the puppets. In the Republic \*\*\* political steps are [determined?] as [some?] \*\*\* to \*\*\* steps of the \*\*\* of the soul. They \*\*\* one and \*\*\* the other and constitute a \*\*\* as the Myth of Hesiod. In the Statesman the forms of government which imitate the perfect polis are all on the same level; they do not follow \*\*\* from the other but are sometimes [political?]. The only \*\*\* difference between them is brought in through the possibility that the \*\*\* the laws, or this their power ambition breaks them. The first type of government is good, the second is bad. The institutional difference between them such as the \*\*\* of one, few or many, of the evil or the (*Eingefügt am Rand: \*\*\* [whether?] an understanding \*\*\* to the rule*) \*\*\* to the \*\*\* of \*\*\* which does not touch the \*\*\* or \*\*\*. This essential difference, however, is corrected by another one which demonstrates the new interest of Plato, not in the quality of the polis, but in man. The element is the second best \*\*\* to the reader of the \*\*\*, therefore on the \*\*\*; and \*\*\* to the \*\*\* or [breaking?] of the king. He \*\*\* at the pairs of: Monarchy – Tyranny, Aristocracy – Oligarchy, and the \*\*\* of Democracy. The first being the \*\*\*, the second the \*\*\* type. In the \*\*\* series he finds that monarchy is the best democracy the worst, and aristocracy a form of inter-mediate quality. The reason for the \*\*\* is a \*\*\* of human nature on the new level. There is no difference in the quality of the \*\*\*, but when there are too many of them, and the \*\*\* are too numerous and diversified, then the functioning of the government will become clumsy and its power for the good will be hampered in its affections. The same argument applies to the series of bad governments. In the tyranny the power of evil will be most concentrated and effective, in the democracy the powers will paralyze one another, so that on the whole the government is less \*\*\* for the citizen than that of a tyranny.

The regard for the nature of man, for his ability of cooperative government and for the single citizen who has to live under the different types of government. The forms of laws have changed to a spatial coordination, corresponding to the stage of the metal myth in the Republic. In the Laws the problem [finds?] other peculiar [formulas?] which correspond in its style to the golden-cord myth. The qualities are not distributed any more on different forms of government, but the second best form, the \*\*\*, has become the \*\*\* [unit?] which combines the elements, which formerly were distributed over \*\*\* forms, into one, just as the puppet-symbol combines the [contures?] of the earlier myth into the supple play of the \*\*\*, the polis is now seen as a social unit, composed of men of different qualities of character, wisdom, education, and \*\*\*, and therefore, loaded with [explosive?] forces. The [well?] \*\*\* state has to find a neutral man which prevents the formation of factions and \*\*\*. [Accordingly?] reality is, therefore, impossible „for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, namely because they are \*\*\* to have \*\*\*.“ (Laws 75[7?]). The constitution has therefore, to provide for a \*\*\* of \*\*\* of classes [according?] to their destination in \*\*\* and education. This is provided by the election of the Council in four property classes, and by the elective process itself which has to bring to the four men of distinction. The election of \*\*\* introduces \*\*\* an \*\*\* element. This differentiation of men \*\*\* to this nature realizes the true equality between them. On the other hand will the mass of the people without distinction be induced to become factions and to be a wall against an order which \*\*\* them \*\*\* to an \*\*\* the statesman has therefore to provide a \*\*\* for this \*\*\* through the election by lot. This is \*\*\* to [equality?] in the “\*\*\*”. It arises one danger, but it opens the way for another \*\*\* undergone an [information?] of the perfect strict

rule of justice. All the statesman can do is to “invoke God and fortune” that they may direct the lot in such a way that the least damage is done to the right order. The principle of proportionate equality Plato calls in this context the **\*\*\***, the principle of [mechanical?] equality the [democratic?]. In this sense he demands a mixture of monarchy and democracy for the good state. The idea of the mixed form of government is probably not an invention of Plato, but was already a current topic of the time. The **\*\*\*** particularly was, as one can see from Aristotle’s *Politics*, prepared for its **\*\*\*** balance between **\*\*\*** and democratic **\*\*\***. But here, with Plato, the argument goes back of the institution (*Eingefügt am Rand: **the class structure, and***) their [surface] to the deeper problem **\*\*\*** the [sentiments?] of a social group can be balanced in such a way that neither **\*\*\*** of the spiritual **\*\*\*** problems are explained of the lower **\*\*\*** of the mass, nor the inevitable enemies to the mass **\*\*\*** destroy the spiritual substance of a community. **\*\*\***’s theory of the **\*\*\*** and the origin of the idea of equality and justice reappear here, stripped of its **\*\*\*** extravagancy extreme **\*\*\*** reduced to its proper proportions of a **\*\*\*** problem which forces the true statesman. It has come again under discussion, the most extensive to **\*\*\***, since the **\*\*\*** of the 19th century when the crisis of democracy occupied the leading political scientists.

After the construction of the polis as a cosmic crystal, and the construction of institutions which properly balance justice and the lowness of human nature, the third great problem is the institution of religion. The saviour himself has withdrawn and the polis cannot be penetrated by the presence of his divine reality. The question now is how the structure of his mystical communication with God can be transferred into a dogma with obligatory force. Plato is the first, but not the last political

philosopher to prove the problem. The modern system which comes nearest to his treatment is the Tractatus Politicus of Spinoza with its attempt of formulating a minimum set of dogmas which leaves the liberty to [internal vacancies?] and still suffices as a functioning politico-religious community but the Platonic \*\*\* carries those dogmas: first, the belief that Gods exist; second that they care of man; third that they cannot be appeased by sacrifice and prayer (Laws 885). The discussion of the \*\*\* reads as if it were written today. Plato surveys the decay of the old myth and the scepticism of youth, the \*\*\* which have been \*\*\* in the midst of his \*\*\* by the progress of natural science, the cropping up of private religions, the religious extravagances of hysterical women etc. The laws are provided to prevent and [persist?] any of these against the dogma or the foundation of [private myth?]. The only religion permitted is the state religion. One of the most important points in the Platonic theory is the \*\*\* of religious disbelief as a “disease” of the mind. For the political scientist this category is [invaluable?] as a key for the understanding of political phenomena as a point of religious disintegration; we shall make enough use of it when we deal with the same political \*\*\*.

The organization of the polis is crowned by the institution of the Nocturnal Council, a [board?] consisting of the ten oldest guardians of the law, distinguished priests, the director of education, men who have been sent abroad to study foreign institutions and a number of younger members selected by the elders who serve chiefly as informants on the life and problems of the city. The most important function of this Council, which meets daily between dawn and sunrise, is that of a spiritual court, who passes judgement on offenses against the creed and the \*\*\* laws. Disbelievers in the Gods are

confined for five years in a reformatory where they receive only the visits of members of the Nocturnal Council who will attempt to influence and \*\*\* them to religious insight. When the five years \*\*\* have proved ineffective they will be sentenced to death. The Council and the \*\*\* with it imposes complete the polis as a politico-religious unit, and the term theocracy or \*\*\* state may be used to characterize it adequately.

This last institution has aroused the particular [wrath?] of liberal historians who think that everything is in perfect order when the \*\*\* [beauty?] of \*\*\*, if [Athens?] [will?] the \*\*\* [man?], Socrates, by law the sole [response?] that he is great, but become \*\*\* when shall \*\*\* to a five year \*\*\* which \*\*\* gives up as hopeless. The liberal prejudice goes to the extreme in some cases, of [falsifying?] history by giving the impression that the Platonian laws on this point are particularly hard and \*\*\* while actually they are considerably more \*\*\* behind than the laws in \*\*\* at Athens at the time which led to the death of \*\*\*.

Again, we have to \*\*\* that the polis of the Laws, though it is a theory, is not a Christian catholic church; but still a Greek polis. The religious institution will be erected with the \*\*\* of the Delphian God, who has to \*\*\* the \*\*\* and to \*\*\* the [priests?] (Laws 759, 828). For “this the \*\*\* God who sits in the center, \*\*\* of the earth, and he is the \*\*\* of \*\*\* to \*\*\*.” (Rep. 427). The gods of the polis and the gods of the tribes have their \*\*\* and the year of the polis is cycle of religious festivals in which the city and its [parts?] express their \*\*\*. The life of the polis is a [sound?] [drama?] which must not be disturbed by \*\*\* influence. The \*\*\* of the citizens have to be kept to the higher Myth of the Soul and the \*\*\* myth of the

Gods and the people has to be \*\*\* to \*\*\* compatible with the new. This is the reason why in the Republic as well as in the Laws, Plato takes the same \*\*\* against [themes?] as the early [Ionians?]. There is the \*\*\* of the old myth, the myth of the Greek polis; \*\*\* is spent and the myth has become an empty shell. The other \*\*\* of Plato against the arts is not directed against art in the bourgeois sense of an \*\*\*, but against art as the expression of the old religious world of Hellas. The founder of the new religious \*\*\* to alienate the influences of the old which endanger his work. Let us close with the words which the magistrate of the new polis should address to a group of actors who wishes to perform in the city: "Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also \*\*\* to our ability \*\*\*."

## NACHWORT

Als ich im Wintersemester 1998 / 99 nach einem einjährigen Israel-Aufenthalt in Bonn mein Theologiestudium fortsetzte, wurde ich auf das Hauptseminar zu Eric Voegelins „Order and History“ des Politologen Prof. Dr. Dietmar Herz aufmerksam. Da mein Vater in den 60er Jahren an der Münchner Universität Voegelin gehört hatte und seit jener Zeit am Leben und Werk dieses Mannes interessiert blieb, war mir der Name seit meiner Kindheit vertraut. Dieses Hauptseminar bot mir die Möglichkeit, der Faszination, die von Eric Voegelin und seinem Werk nicht nur für meinen Vater ausging, nachzuspüren. Vielleicht ist ein solches Bemühen der *Periagogé* verwandt, die Platon in seinem Höhengleichnis dargestellt hat.

Prof. Herz fragte mich bald nach Beginn des Semesters, ob ich vielleicht Lust hätte, einige von Voegelin handschriftlich auf Englisch verfasste, frühe und bisher unveröffentlichte Texte zu Platon zu transkribieren. Neben meinen Vorbereitungen für das Hauptdiplom in Theologie versuchte ich, Voegelins Handschrift zu entziffern – in Originalgröße und ohne Lupe!

Da ich ab dem Wintersemester 1999 / 2000 in Oxford für ein Jahr Judaistik studierte, gelang es mir in einem kurzen Aufenthalt in Manchester bei Dr. Geoffrey Price, dem Verfasser einer umfassenden Voegelin-Bibliographie, die „Dechiffrierung“ ein gutes Stück weiter voranzubringen. Ohne seine ausdauernde Mithilfe würde die Übertragung sicherlich noch mehr offene Stellen aufweisen.

Prof. Dr. Peter J. Opitz erklärte sich bereit, nach fast eineinhalb Jahren dieses Projekt zu übernehmen und es der Öffentlichkeit im Rahmen der *Occasional Papers* zugänglich zu machen.

Allen den hier erwähnten Personen gebührt mein Dank. Denn ohne die zahlreichen und ständigen Ermutigungen wäre ich der Herausforderung bei der Entzifferung von Eric Voegelins Handschrift wahrscheinlich unterlegen, besonders da der zeitliche Aufwand eines solchen Projektes erheblich ist.

Zum Schluss möchte ich noch einmal meine Eltern hervorheben, die mir in unendlicher Geduld sowohl unterstützend als auch beratend immer zur Seite standen. Im Grunde geht diese Veröffentlichung auf meinen Vater zurück, dessen „edukative Vorarbeit“ und außerordentliches Wissen auf diesem Gebiet den ausschlaggebenden Impuls zu allem Weiteren gegeben hat.

*Elisabeth von Lochner*

**PETER J. OPITZ**

**VON „PLATO’S MYTH OF THE SOUL“ ZU  
„PLATO“: FORSCHUNGSNOTIZ ZUR  
ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE DES PLATON-  
TEILS IN *ORDER AND HISTORY***

„Das Platon-Kapitel ist wunderschön, von dem herrlichen Motto bis zu dem Schluß-Zitat. Alles ist prägnant, vieles öffnet neue Perspektiven. Das Verhältnis von Politeia und Nomoi ist sehr fein und überzeugend klargestellt durch den Vergleich mit dem Verhältnis von Bergpredigt und Kirche. Ich glaube nicht, dass irgend etwas Anstoß erregen könnte; die wenigen Stellen die bedenklich waren, haben Sie selbst gestrichen.“<sup>2</sup> Diese Sätze aus einem Brief von Max Mintz an Eric Voegelin vom 13. Oktober 1940 lassen erkennen, dass das Platon-Kapitel der „History of Political Ideas“, mit der Voegelin im Frühjahr 1939 begonnen hatte, im Herbst 1940 fertig vorlag. Schon Anfang August 1940 hatte Voegelin Mintz mitgeteilt, die „Griechenstücke“ seien getippt. Der Schlussteil im Brief von Mintz deutet auf eine frühere Version hin, die ihm vorgelegen hatte, inzwischen aber offenbar von Voegelin überarbeitet worden war; Andeutungen in Briefen von Mintz lassen eine solche Erstfassung für das Frühjahr 1940 vermuten.

Auch Titel und Konzept dieser ersten Fassung des Platon-Teils sind bekannt. Ein mit Kurztiteln versehener „Account of

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<sup>2</sup> Brief vom 13. Oktober 1940 von Max Mintz an Eric Voegelin

Pages“, bei dem es sich vermutlich um eine Anlage zu einem Brief Voegelins an Fritz Morstein Marx handelte, trug die Überschrift „Myth of the Soul“ und war in vier Abschnitte untergliedert: Myth – Polis – Nomoi – Eros.<sup>3</sup> Beides stimmt mit dem Text eines erheblich detaillierteren handschriftlichen Inhaltsverzeichnisses der ersten Fassung der „History“ überein, das vermutlich aus der ersten Jahreshälfte von 1939 stammt. Unter der Überschrift „The Myth of the Soul“ werden hier die vier Abschnitte auf Platon bezogen – Myth of Plato; Polis of Plato; Nomoi of Plato; Eros of Plato. Im selben zeitlichen Zusammenhang steht die hier veröffentlichte Rekonstruktion des handschriftlichen Platon-Textes. Dass sich an dieser Fassung bis zum Frühjahr 1942 nichts geändert hatte, lässt eine nun schon sehr ausführliche Gliederung der „History“ erkennen, die Voegelin am 21. Februar 1942 einem Brief an Alfred Schütz beilegte. Aber auch in den zahlreichen Korrespondenzen Voegelins fand sich bislang kein Hinweis, dass er sich in der ersten Hälfte der 40er Jahre erneut mit dem Platon-Teil beschäftigt hätte.

Das änderte sich offenbar im Spätherbst 1946. Noch im Oktober 1945 hatte Voegelin Henry B. McCurdy von der MacMillan Company, die die „History of Political Ideas“ inzwischen herausbringen wollte, berichtet, er werde die Endredaktion der beiden ersten Bände „Ancient World“ und „The Middle Ages“ im Laufe der beiden kommenden Wochen durchführen, um dann die „History“ bis Anfang 1946 abzu-

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<sup>3</sup> Der Text dieses „Account“ sowie der beiden frühen Gliederungen, auf die im folgenden Bezug genommen werden wird, finden sich in: Peter J. Opitz (Hrsg.), Zwischen Evokation und Kontemplation. Eric Voegelins „Introduction“ zur „History of Political Ideas“. Occasional Papers, XI, München: Eric Voegelin Archiv, 1999, Seite 91ff

schließen.<sup>4</sup> Doch wie schon frühere Ankündigungen ähnlicher Art, so erwies sich auch diese als verfrüht. Der Grund dafür ist einem Brief Voegelins vom 29. Januar 1947 an Professor William Y. Elliott zu entnehmen. Elliott, mit dem Voegelin seit seiner Ankunft in den USA in ständiger Verbindung stand, hatte wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass Voegelin vorübergehend akademisches Asyl an der *Harvard University* erhalten hatte und bemühte sich auch später, Voegelin in Harvard eine Professur zu verschaffen:

„I have neglected my correspondence somewhat because I was engaged in recent months in revising and, for the greater part, writing entirely new the section on Plato in my ‚History‘. After I had finished my studies on Schelling and Vico, certain problems dawned on me and I found that now I could give a sensible interpretation of the late work of Plato (Politicos, Timaios, Kritias) which usually is neglected. In particular I think I have found a solution of the Atlantis problem as a symbolism of the unconscious. I am enclosing a table of contents, reflecting the present state of the work; you will see from it that the heavy weight of the whole thing lies in the section on „Decline and Recurrence“, presenting Plato’s philosophy of history. The principle of my new interpretation is the idea that the Hellenic cycle theory corresponds functionally to our Western eschatologies.“<sup>5</sup>

Der Brief an Elliott ist in verschiedener Hinsicht von Interesse: Zunächst einmal ist ihm die Information über die grundlegende Neufassung des Platon-Teils zu entnehmen sowie die Tatsache, dass Voegelin diese Revisionsarbeiten schon in der zweiten Hälfte von 1946 begonnen hatte.<sup>6</sup> Zum anderen stellt

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<sup>4</sup> Brief vom 8. Oktober 1945 von Eric Voegelin an Henry B. McCurdy

<sup>5</sup> Brief vom 29. Januar 1947 von Eric Voegelin an William Y. Elliott

<sup>6</sup> s. dazu auch die Briefe Voegelins an Alfred von Verdross vom 31. Januar 1947, an Friedrich von Hayek vom 21. April 1947 und an Max Mintz vom Anfang 1947

dieser Brief auch sehr klar den Anlass heraus, der Voegelin zu dieser Revision veranlasst hatte – seine Studien zu Schelling und Vico. Von Interesse ist ferner, dass Voegelin auch den Sachkomplex anspricht, der seine bisherige Platon-Analyse nun erweitert: das Spätwerk Platons – und zwar nicht die *Nomoi*, die ja, wie der Brief von Mintz zeigte, schon in der ersten Fassung des Platon-Kapitels berücksichtigt worden waren, sondern die Dialoge *Politikos*, *Timaios* und *Kritias*, wobei sich als ein neuer sachlicher Schwerpunkt Platons Geschichtsphilosophie bildete.

Da der Brief an Elliott nicht aus dessen Nachlass stammt, sondern aus dem von Voegelin, ist die von Voegelin erwähnte „Table of Contents“ natürlich nicht überliefert, da es ihm nur um die Kopie des Briefes ging. Dennoch müssen wir auf die „Table of Contents“ nicht verzichten. Denn ein glücklicher Zufall fügte es, dass Voegelin auch einem Brief an Alfred Schütz, den er am 1. August 1947 schrieb, ein Inhaltsverzeichnis des „neuen Platon-Teils“ beilegte, und dieses Verzeichnis ist erhalten.<sup>7</sup> Auch Schütz hatte Voegelin von der erfolgten umfangreichen Revision berichtet:

„Die ‚History‘ geht gut weiter – wenn es auch einige Aufregung und Verzögerung gegeben hat. Angesichts der Arbeit am 3. Band ergab sich, dass der erste unzulänglich war. Ich habe seit Januar an der Revision gearbeitet, durch die er von 450 auf 700 Seiten angeschwollen ist. Und jetzt ist er fertig. Damit Sie sich irgendeine Vorstellung machen können, was ich treibe, lege ich das Inhaltsverzeichnis des neuen Platon-Teiles bei. Es ist detailliert genug, um wenigstens die Probleme erkennen zu lassen.“<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> s. Anlage, S. 58-61

<sup>8</sup> Brief vom 1. August 1947 von Eric Voegelin an Alfred Schütz

Obwohl nicht auszuschließen ist, dass Voegelin seit dem Brief an Elliott erneut Veränderungen am Text und an der Gliederung vorgenommen hatte, sprechen mehrere Anzeichen dafür, dass es sich um ein und denselben Text handelt. So bildet das Zentrum der neuen Gliederung ein langes, detailliert ausformuliertes Kapitel mit der Überschrift „Decline and Recurrence“, das sich den Abschnittsüberschriften zufolge vor allem auf die Dialoge *Timaios*, *Phaidros*, *Politikos* und *Kritias* bezieht. Soweit erkennbar, ist ansonsten weder die Einbettung des Platon-Teils in den Altertumsband der „History“ noch die Grundstruktur des Platon-Teils selbst wesentlich verändert worden. Während das Teilstück „Plato’s Myth of the Soul“ – so der nur leicht veränderte neue Titel – wie schon in den früheren Gliederungen der „History“ das dritte Kapitel bildet, gliedert sich das Kapitel selbst wiederum in vier Abschnitte, deren Überschriften – mit Ausnahme des neuen Abschnitts „Decline and Recurrence“ – eine deutliche Nähe zu denen der früheren Fassungen aufweisen.

Die Korrespondenzen Voegelins aus den nächsten Jahren enthalten keinen Hinweis auf weitere Veränderungen des Platon-Teils. Der Grund dafür ist unschwer zu erraten: Die neu gewonnenen Einsichten, die die umfassende Revision des Platon-Teils notwendig gemacht hatten, zogen nun auch Revisionen der anderen Teile des Altertumsbands nach sich. Das galt zunächst einmal für das an den Platon-Teil anschließende Aristoteles-Kapitel. Nachdem Voegelin schon im September 1947 in einem Gespräch mit McCurdy „a much longer chapter on Aristotle“<sup>9</sup> angekündigt hatte, berichtete er

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<sup>9</sup> Dieser Hinweis findet sich in Voegelins „Observations on the ‚Report on Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas‘“ (transmitted with Mr. Anderson’s letter of February 5<sup>th</sup>, 1948)

im August 1949 Aaron Gurwitsch, in dessen Wohnung in Cambridge die Voegelins die Sommermonate verbracht hatten, in den beiden vergangenen Monaten den Aristoteles-Teil überarbeitet und auf 100 Seiten erweitert zu haben.<sup>10</sup>

Als revisionsbedürftig hatte sich aber nicht nur der Aristoteles-Teil erwiesen, sondern auch jene Kapitel der „History“, die sich auf die vor-platonische bzw. auf die vor-sokratische Zeit bezogen. Die Arbeit an diesen Teilen hatte Voegelin offenbar gleich nach Fertigstellung des Aristoteles-Kapitels aufgenommen. So entschuldigte er sich bei Waldemar Gurian, der auf die Übersendung der Marx-Kapitel für die *Review of Politics* wartete, am 14. Dezember 1949 mit dem Hinweis: „I was living in the last four weeks in a state of suspended animation, neglecting all correspondence because I was engaged in re-writing the history of Hesiod and the Presocratics. Now the most is over and I hasten to send you the manuscript.“<sup>11</sup> Einen ähnlichen Tenor hatte ein Brief, den Voegelin kurz zuvor an Elliott geschickt hatte. In ihm berichtete er, dass ihn „during spring and summer“ endlich die Lösung des Problems der Kontinuität im hellenischen Denken von Hesiod bis Platon gelungen sei:

„I developed a new theory of the paradigm, permitting the most interesting new interpretations. The Hesiod which formally had ten now has fifty-four pages; and I think I have been able to solve the construction of “Theogony” and “Works and Days” to the last line. The most important immediate result: the generally assumed dependence of the myth of the metal ages on a Babylonian prototype is probably wrong; the peculiarities of the Hesiodian constructions can be

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<sup>10</sup> Brief vom 27. August 1949 von Eric Voegelin an Aaron Gurwitsch

<sup>11</sup> Brief vom 14. Dezember 1949 von Eric Voegelin an Waldemar Gurian

explained through the rules of speculative construction, without recourse or to “influences”.

Und da somit das Ende der „History“ nun wirklich in Sicht schien, verkündete Voegelin triumphierend: „The “History“ is progressing. I still hope to deliver in January; what then will happen only the publisher knows.“<sup>12</sup>

Natürlich erwies sich die Prognose auch dieses Mal als verfrüht. Nun waren es allerdings zunächst weniger neue Revisionen, die die Fertigstellung verzögerten, als ein neues Projekt: So hatte Voegelin im Frühjahr 1950 die Arbeiten an der „History“ unterbrechen müssen, um die Vorbereitungen für eine für den Sommer geplante Europareise aufzunehmen. Nach der Rückkehr aus Europa, im Herbst 1950 war es dann höchste Zeit für die Abfassung der Walgreen-Lectures, die er Anfang 1951 in Chicago halten sollte, und im Frühjahr 1951 – nach der Rückkehr aus Chicago – war er damit beschäftigt, diese Lectures für die Publikation vorzubereiten. Einen Einblick in den dichten Zeitplan jener Zeit vermittelt ein Brief an Eduard Baumgarten vom Juli 1951, in dem Voegelin die Hektik des vergangenen Jahres – er nennt es einen „Arbeitszug“ – schildert, um dann fortzufahren:

„Und dieser ganze Arbeitszug von einem Jahr unterbrach die Hauptarbeit an der großen „History of Ideas“. An der bin ich nun wieder beschäftigt, Lücken füllend und die Organisation revidierend. Eben schreibe ich das Kapitel über Homer, der bisher Widerstand leistete, da ich die Methoden zur Behandlung der „Götter“ noch nicht gefunden hatte.“<sup>13</sup>

Und nun folgt in dem langen Bericht an Baumgarten – der Kontakt zu Baumgarten war seit 1938 unterbrochen gewesen –

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<sup>12</sup> Brief vom 2. Dezember 1949 von Eric Voegelin an William Y. Elliott

<sup>13</sup> Brief vom 10 Juli 1951 von Eric Voegelin an Eduard Baumgarten

ein interessanter Rückblick, in dem Voegelin noch einmal kurz die Arbeiten an der „History“ Revue passieren lässt und dabei auch wieder auf die Entwicklung der letzten Jahre zu sprechen kommt:

„Diese „History“ selbst hat nun eine längere Geschichte. Sie war im wesentlichen 1945 abgeschlossen. Aber damals bei der Analyse von Vico und Schelling fand ich endlich die „Lösung“ eines Problems, das mich seit 1930 geplagt hatte, d.h. eine Mythentheorie, die es möglich macht, solche Erscheinungen wie Platos Mythen ohne unerklärte Reste zu interpretieren. Damals erst konnte ich dann den Timaios und Critias, sowie die Nomoi, angemessen darstellen. Das Resultat war, dass der ganze Altertum-Band über Bord ging und neu geschrieben wurde. Und diese neue Fassung machte dann das 16. und 17. Jahrhundert unmöglich, so dass dieser Teil auch neu geschrieben werden musste. Aber jetzt scheint alles zu funktionieren, wenn auch Details (wie eben der Homer) noch Schwierigkeiten technischer Natur machten.“

Würde Voegelins Brief an Baumgarten lediglich noch einmal jenen großen Werkzusammenhang darlegen, der die Fertigstellung der „History“ 1950 unterbrach sowie die große Bedeutung der bei den Arbeiten an Schelling und Vico entdeckten Mythentheorie<sup>14</sup> und die durch sie veranlasste komplette Überarbeitung des Altertum-Bandes herausstellen, so wäre der Brief schon wichtig genug. Doch er enthält noch eine Information, die seine Bedeutung noch erhöht: nämlich den Hinweis, dass sich die Arbeit an den „Walgreen-Lectures“, deren ursprünglicher Gegenstand die „Repräsentation“ war, wie Voegelin schreibt, „zu einer systematischen Geschichtsphilosophie auswuchs“. Auch hierfür waren die Anstöße vermutlich während der dreimonatigen Reise in Europa erfolgt. Die Auswertung der in Europa geführten Ge-

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<sup>14</sup> s. dazu Thomas Hollweck, *Mythos und Geschichte. Zur Genesis von Order and History*, Occasional Papers, XIX, 2000

sprache und gesammelten Materialien „(zur systematischen Geschichtsphilosophie)“, so berichtet Voegelin Baumgarten, „läuft seitdem *nebenher* und ist noch lange nicht beendet. Einiges konnte ich schon für die Lectures verwenden.“ Mit anderen Worten, und um die Information, die uns wichtig erscheint, noch einmal zu betonen: Neben der Fortsetzung der „History“, die noch immer nicht fertig war, hatte Voegelin zu jener Zeit also schon die Arbeiten an einer „systematischen Geschichtsphilosophie“ aufgenommen, deren ersten – noch skizzenhaften – Entwurf offensichtlich die „Walgreen-Lectures“ bildeten bzw. ihre schriftliche Fassung, die 1952 unter dem Titel *New Science of Politics* erschien.

Die weitere Entwicklung ist überaus komplex und in vielen Einzelheiten noch unerforscht. Soviel jedoch ist erkennbar: Die Studien zu jener „systematischen Geschichtsphilosophie“ liefen offenbar nicht isoliert *neben* den inzwischen wieder aufgenommenen Arbeiten an der „History“ her, sondern beeinflussten zunehmend auch deren Konzept. Jedenfalls liegt auf der Linie und in der Logik der soeben geschilderten Revisionen in der zweiten Hälfte der 40er Jahre, dass Voegelin sich nach deren Abschluss, vermutlich im Frühjahr 1952, daran machte, die Interpretationsprinzipien der „History“ grundlegend zu überarbeiten und damit die „Introduction“ von 1939 zu ersetzen. Entsprechende Hinweise finden sich in Briefen an Robert Heilmann und Karl Löwith.<sup>15</sup> Die Bestätigung für eine solche grundsätzliche konzeptionelle Wende der „History“ hin zu einer systematischen Geschichtsphilosophie Anfang der 50er Jahre findet sich in einem Brief Voegelins an Charles D. Anderson von der MacMillan Company vom Oktober 1953, dessen Bedeutung kaum zu überschätzen ist, kündigt Voegelin

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<sup>15</sup> s. dazu Opitz, Zwischen Kontemplation und Evokation, S. 79-81

in ihm doch nicht mehr und nicht weniger als den Abschied vom Projekt der Ideengeschichte an, an der er bislang gearbeitet hatte. Dieses Projekt, so sah Voegelin inzwischen, musste aufgrund der problematischen konzeptionellen Fundamente, auf denen es basierte, aufgegeben werden. An seine Stelle trat nun etwas anderes – nämlich eine Darstellung der „Ordnungserfahrungen und ihrer adäquaten Symbolisierung“. Dieses neue konzeptionelle Verständnis fand seinen Niederschlag sowohl in einem neuen Titel – „Order and Symbols“ – wie auch in einer neuen Gliederung des Gesamtwerks, die sich nun nicht mehr an den großen Zeitepochen, sondern an der Abfolge der wichtigsten Symbolformen orientierte. Ihm zufolge sollten sich die ersten der drei Bände mit den drei großen Symbolformen der Antike befassen: mit dem „Mythos“, der „Geschichte“ und der „Philosophie“; der zweite Band sollte die Symbolformen „Reich“ und „Christentum“ und der dritte Band die Symbolform der modernen „Gnosis“ behandeln.<sup>16</sup>

Wir brauchen in diesem Zusammenhang nicht weiter auf das neue Konzept Voegelins einzugehen, sondern können uns wieder der Entwicklung des Platon-Teils zuwenden. Denn obwohl Voegelin dem immer unruhiger werdenden Verleger versichert, dass jeder der drei Bände von „Order and Symbols“ „substantially finished“ sei, muss er zugleich doch zugeben, dass „each of them has still gaps and needs revisions in detail“. Das galt auch für den ersten Band. Die „Lücke“ betraf

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<sup>16</sup> Zur Entwicklung des Gnosis-Konzepts im Zusammenhang mit den Walgreen-Lectures s. Die Gnosis-These. Anmerkungen zu Voegelins Interpretation der westlichen Moderne, in: Eric Voegelin. Der Gottesmord. Zur Genese und Gestalt der modernen politischen Gnosis, hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Peter J. Opitz, mit einem Nachwort von Thomas Hollweck, S. 7-36, München: Fink, 1999

hier – wie er schreibt - den Israel-Abschnitt; und Revisionen waren notwendig für „certain sections in the part on Plato“. Insgesamt – und obwohl im Dezember noch eine Operation bevorstand – ist Voegelin jedoch zuversichtlich, Band 1 bis Ende Februar 1954 endgültig abschließen und beim Verlag abgeben zu können. Ein grobes Inhaltsverzeichnis des ersten Bandes, das Voegelin in seinem Brief an Anderson aufführt, ist in doppelter Hinsicht von Interesse. Es zeigt, dass der Gesamtumfang dieses Bandes inzwischen auf 1452 Manuskriptseiten angeschwollen war, der sich in fünf Teile gliederte. Den umfangreichsten Teil bildete mit 472 Seiten die Entwicklung des prä-sokratischen Denkens, dicht gefolgt vom Platon-Teil, der inzwischen einen Umfang von 410 Manuskriptseiten angenommen hatte.

INTRODUCTION	18
Part I: The Empires of the Ancient Near East	150
Part II: Israel	240
Part III: The World of the Polis	472
Part IV: Plato	410
Part V: Aristotle	162
	<hr/> 1452 p.p. MS

Der Umfang des Bandes musste für jeden Verleger ein Alptraum sein. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass dieser Band, als er endlich 1956/57 veröffentlicht wurde, in drei Teile aufgespalten worden war, von denen der erste die Symbolformen „Mythos und Offenbarung“, die beiden anderen die Symbolform „Philosophie“ behandelte. Während der erste Band offenbar noch einmal deutlich erweitert worden war, war der Platon-Teil, sieht man von einigen Umstellungen in der Abfolge der Kapitel ab – im wesentlichen unverändert geblieben.

## PART THREE: PLATO'S MYTH OF THE SOUL

### Chapter 1. The Myth of the Socratic Soul

- § 1. The Dramatic Myth of Socrates
- § 2. The Problem: Reunion of Spirit and Power
- § 3. The Myth of the Soul
  - a. Thanatos
  - b. Eros
  - c. Dike
  - d. The World Soul of the Timaeus

### Chapter 2. The Polis of the Idea

- § 1. The Origin of Political Theory in Mystical Contemplation
- § 2. The Soul and the Polis. The Anthropological Principle
- § 3. The Politico-Religious Will of Plato
- § 4. The Parable of the Cave: Withdrawal and Return
- § 5. The Institutional Order
  - a. The Division of Functions
  - b. Property and Family
  - c. Education

### Chapter 3. Decline and Recurrence

- § 1. The Decline of the Idea
  - a. The Decline of Soul and Polis
  - b. The Logic of Eschatology. The Myth of Nature
- § 2. The Egyptian Myth of the Timaeus
  - a. The Continuation of the Republic
  - b. Solon's Egyptian Story
  - c. The Truth of the Idea

- d. The Truth of the Unconscious
  - e. The Drama in Plato's Soul
  - f. The New Art of the Mystic
- Note on Corresponding Modern Problems

§ 3. The Phaedrus

- a. The Social Realization of the Idea
- b. The Realm of the Soul. Idea and Psyche
- c. The New Hierarchy of the Souls
- d. Social Disintegration. The Unrepresentative Polis and the Unrepresented Spirit
- e. The Semi-Divine Psyche

§ 4. The Statesman

- a. The Trilogy Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman
- b. The Diversion of the Theaetetus
  - aa. The Philosopher and the homo politicus
  - bb. The Order of the Idea and the Disorder of Political Society
  - cc. The Two Paradigmata. The Power of Evil
- c. The Obscuring Devices of the Statesman
- d. The Myth of the Cosmic Cycles
  - aa. The Story
  - bb. The Hierarchy of Gods. The Trinity
  - cc. The Evolution of Consciousness. The Age of Autonomous Man
  - dd. The Decline of the Myth and the Royal Savior
- e. The Royal Ruler and Political Reality
  - aa. The Untrue Political Forms
  - bb. The True Form. The logos basilikos and the Rule of Law
  - cc. The Mimetic Reality of Politics
  - dd. The Injection of True Substance. Persuasion
  - ee. The Attack on the Government of Law
  - ff. The Royal Ruler and the Royal Art

§ 5. The Timaeus. Theory of the Myth

- a. The Fragmentary Character of Timaeus and Critias
- b. The Projection of Psychic Order into the Cosmos
- c. Theory of the Myth

- aa. The Cosmic Omphalos in the Soul. The Acceptance of the Myth
- bb. Historical Untruth and Evolution of the Myth
- cc. The Freedom toward the Myth. The Platonic Art
- dd. The Freedom from the Myth. Anthropomorphic Man
- ee. The Historical Function of the Platonic Myth. Protective Hardness
- ff. Plato's Tolerance toward the Old Myth
- gg. The Freedom of the Symbolic Play
- hh. The Nature of Symbolization: Non-Objective Reality in Objective Form
- ii. The Myth of the Soul as the Philosophy of the Myth. Intelligibility
- jj. The Myth of the Cosmos. Being and Becoming
- kk. The Cosmos as Eikon. The eikos mythos
- ll. The Cosmos as Psyche. The Myth as the Truth of Incarnation
- mm. The Consubstantiality of Cosmos, Society and Individual
- d. The Time of the Cosmos. The Eikon of Eternity
- e. The Time of Tale: The Symbol of the Timeless Process of Psyche
- f. Creation. The Demiurge, Nous and Ananke
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- a. The Organization of the Republic
- b. The Embodiment of the Idea
  - aa. The Somatic Unity of the Polis
  - bb. Civil War and Hellenic Federation

- cc. The Limited Size of the Polis
- c. The Mythical Failure of Incarnation
- d. The Sequence of Political Forms
  - aa. The A-Historic Character of the Sequence
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- a. The Existential Issue
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  - aa. The Story
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- a. The End and the Beginning
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- c. "God or Some Man"

### § 4. Political Form

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- d. The Play with Cosmic Numbers

### § 5. Revelation at Noon

### §6 Paidia and Paideia

### § 7. God the Measure

*Quelle:* Anlage zu einem Brief von Eric Voegelin an Alfred Schütz vom 1. August 1947

# WILHELM FINK VERLAG

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Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Peter J. Opitz. Mit einem Nachwort von Thomas Hollweck. München, 1999

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München, 2001 (i.V.)

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Herausgegeben von Peter J. Opitz. Freiburg (Breisgau) / München, 1993

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for Eric Voegelin on his 80th birthday, January 3, 1981

ed. by Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba. Stuttgart, 1981

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52 Seiten. München, April 1996; 2. Aufl. Juni 2000

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### **Thomas Hollweck: Der Dichter als Führer?**

Dichtung und Repräsentanz in Voegelins frühen Arbeiten  
51 Seiten. 1. Auflage, München, April 1996; 2. Aufl. Juni 1999

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64 Seiten. München, April 1996; 2. Aufl. Oktober 1999

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Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Nils Winkler und

mit einem Nachwort von Peter J. Opitz

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