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**National Position Taking prior to  
EU Intergovernmental Negotiations:**

The Impact of Formal and Informal Governmental Structures  
in the Member States of the EU-15

Inauguraldisertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades  
eines Doktors der Sozialwissenschaften der Universität  
Mannheim

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Tag der Disputation: 6. November 2009

To Linda



# Preface

This book is based on a dissertation project conducted at the Mannheim Centre of European Social Research of Mannheim University. Its aim is to explain national position taking prior to international negotiation by using the formal as well as informal governmental structures of the member states of the European Union.

I first wish to thank both of my advisors, Professors Franz Urban Pappi and Paul W. Thurner. They were always available and eager to provide clear guidance, useful suggestions, and the motivation necessary to complete such a project. I am also grateful to both of them for allowing me the use of data compiled as part of the "International Negotiations and National Interministerial Coordination (INNIC)" project. Without access to this extraordinarily unique data, the accomplishment of this project would never have been possible.

The Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) generously provided an interdisciplinary research environment for my studies, along with the necessary infrastructure. I am grateful for financial support given by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), which allowed me to fully concentrate on this research. The KAS previously supported my graduate education as well as my visiting fellowship for the one-year program Master of Arts in Public Policy Analysis at Stony Brook University (SUNY), and this reliable sponsorship has been of tremendous benefit in my academic career. I would also like to thank my editors, Nicole Holzwarth and Andrew Therriault, for helpful comments and corrections with regard to language and grammar.

Lastly, special thanks go out to my family and to my girlfriend, Linda. They have provided me with unwavering support and encouragement throughout this endeavor, even when the end sometimes seemed too far away to reach.

Martin Binder, MAPP  
Mannheim, April 2010



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# 1 Introduction and Research Questions

According to Moravcsik “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states” (Moravcsik 1993: 481). This thesis focuses exactly on this precondition and explains domestic politics in the context of international negotiations. What processes are at work inside of national governments prior to international events? It is widely recognized that states are more complex than the *unitary actor assumption* may let us believe. Already Allison (1971) states that the “governmental actor is neither a unitary agent nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players”. Moreover “[g]roups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions” (Allison 1971: 164). In the subfield of international relations, many scholars still deal with governmental positions as if they were determined by a unitary national government. The question about their genesis has been largely neglected to date. This thesis will show that the assumption of national governments as unitary actors is an invalid oversimplification. So far, our knowledge about the exact structures and workflows inside of national governments are at least incomplete. Therefore this thesis has three main objectives: first, to discover the interdependencies between multiplex existing governmental structures, second, to explain national positions prior to an international conference, and third, to give an explanation for the assertiveness of national governmental actors in the process of national position taking.

Recently, terms like *core executives* (Peters et al. 2000) have often been used in the field of political science to explain structural influential subgroups inside of governments. However, this more or less vague term is very seldom explained in much detail:

“The term ‘core executive’ refers to all those organizations and procedures which coordinate central government [...]. In brief, the ‘core executive’ is the heart of the machine, covering the complex web of institutions, networks and practices” (Rhodes 1995: 12).

This thesis seeks to uncover this complex web in a comparative perspective and sets up a framework to describe the core of national governments. Based on a comparative description of national governments, it is possible to examine the processes inside of them in more detail. Filling this gap, this thesis should provide a formal basis to describe governments as multi-divisional organizations. These organizations are built up by formal and informal (or actual) structures. In general, the formal structure is usually determined by such written documents as constitutions, by-laws or standard operating procedures (SOPs) and could be described as the “blueprint for behavior” (Scott 1981: 82). Nevertheless it is uncontested that there are also informal mechanisms at work inside of organizations, especially inside of political entities. In contrast to the formal structure, the informal structure is based on “coalitions or networks of unofficial relationships which play a continuous role [...] in the coordination of tasks inside [...] of organizations” (Breton 1998: 187). These informal coalitions and relationships can be described as the self-organization of the government.

To design a comparative framework for the analysis, governments are considered as collective actors consisting of multiple national actors with certain preferences and resources available. Administrative networks of ministerial bureaucracy are considered as the main indicator of governmental structures. The preferences of the governmental actors and the allocation of resources to those actors are supposedly rather complex and jurisdictionally crosscutting. This leads very likely to a complex and diverse structure inside of the national governments. Using methods of social network analysis, such complex structures can be modeled as a whole system, despite comparing several parts of the government separately (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 297). Later on, a graph-theoretic approach and the concept of two-mode networks are used to solve the problem of formally defining governments as policy producing organizations. A graph-based network approach can be used to describe, visualize and compare the governmental structures. In addition, two-mode networks provide the possibility of including different policy areas into the model and thus being able to specify relationships between the actors and these policy areas.

In this context, governments are conceptualized methodically as networks, in contrast to the often-used metaphor of policy networks or political networks as a new form of governance in the field of political science. The following thesis shows that modeling governments as networks based on methods of (social) network analysis provides an important contribution to comparative political science.

The European Union is considered as a good laboratory for the comparative research of governmental structures. “The European Union provides a final example of the historical and theoretical limitations of conventional conceptions of the state and the benefits of embracing the agenda of unit variation” (Kahler 2002: 74). Therefore the focus of this thesis is set on the formerly fifteen national governments in the European Union (EU) and their behavior prior to an international negotiation. The question raised is whether there are any cross-national patterns of the governmental structures in the member states of the EU. The actors in the center of the administrative networks inside of the governments are the national governmental ministries, departments, and offices. The actors inside of the national governments are still considered as the key actors in the field of domestic politics with regard to international relations. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006) denote them as the most skilled actors in the process of international negotiations, and Thurner and Linhart argue that actors inside the government have a “quasi-monopoly of expert information” (Thurner and Linhart 2004b: 252). Therefore this thesis focuses on ministries and departments<sup>1</sup> as main actors inside of the European governments. It takes different types of real existing and therefore quantifiable structures between these actors into consideration: the structure of actually-perceived influence, the structure of self-organization (cooperation) and the structure of formal decision rights. The relations between and consequences of these structures are explained and discussed in detail. Are these different structures inside of the governments shadowing each other, are they independent of each other, or are they opposed to each other? A very central question is whether there are interdependencies between the planned

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<sup>1</sup>In this thesis the general term ministries and departments refer also to prime ministers’, chancellors’, and presidents’ offices, as well as to the representations of the federal states and the parliamentary committees. A detailed definition of the actors involved is given in Chapter 4.

formal structure (*blueprint*) and the informally self-organized structure.

Chapter 5 gives a broad descriptive analysis of the underlying structures. Following arguments of cost-benefit analysis, relationships between actors are considered as valuable resources in the process of national position taking, but at the same time also as costly. Relationships with other actors can be expensive to initiate and to maintain. As a result Burt (1992) suggests that selectivity in choosing relationships is important. The initiation and continuation of governmental structures often requires the allocation of resources (e.g. time, attention) which are of limited availability. Consequently these scarce resources may be invested more meaningfully in some special and narrow instances. Structures which are sensitive to scarce resources are expected to be especially selective. For example, not every opportunity to entertain informal cooperation relations is used due to opportunity cost considerations (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: 85). Another point is the allocation of certain formal rights. These rights can be seen as “a claim of a certain individual [...] against [...] other individuals” (see relative property rights in Furubotn and Richter 2005: 135). They are valuable to possess, and hence expensive to distribute. As a consequence the formal rights during national position taking are distributed rarely. The selectivity of informal network choices and formal allocation of resources can be interpreted as an indicator for the relative valuation of a link/resource at a certain point in time. The descriptive chapter ends with a statistical comparison of the multiplex governmental structures. Using advanced tools of network analysis the interdependencies of the structures are quantified.

In the second part of this thesis (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) the focus shifts to the question of whether these structural features have any impact on the national position taking inside the governments of the European Union. National position taking and signaling in foreign policy is often associated with crisis bargaining, deterrence, or military intervention (Fearon 1997; Signorino and Tahar 2006). There is only few attention paid to position taking in the substantially more complicated setting of the preparation of national policy positions while international negotiations approach. The positions taken in that context are not exclusively “yes” or “no”, “fight” or “don’t fight” decisions, but instead real policy positions on complex policy issues. The genesis of these complex national positions prior to international negotiations is one main research question of this thesis. Setting up a “domestic-political” explanation of a state’s foreign policy choices (Fearon 1998: 289), this thesis overcomes the still common assumption that national governments can be understood as unitary actors in international relations. Even if governments during negotiations are often perceived as unitary actors, it is still necessary to formulate a valid model which describes their national bargaining positions as an aggregation of the preferences of the national actors. In order to understand these domestic politics, a model of national position taking before international negotiations is set up in Chapter 6. This model considers the formal and informal governmental structures derived earlier as fundamental structures affecting the process. What are the driving forces in the process of national position taking? Kassim (2000) still identifies the premiers’ offices and the ministries of foreign affairs in a central role during the national coordination of EU policy. Heads of governments and ministries of foreign affairs have specialist and institutional support, which enables them to carry out the tasks in

defining and representing the national interest (Kassim 2000: 237). However, the author also mentions that these traditional managers of foreign policy are challenged in that position. One reason therefore is that the jurisdictionally crosscutting setting of international negotiations makes extensive national coordination necessary to reveal private information, aggregate information, justify demands, or promote consensus (Fearon 1998). In the described context, it is very unlikely that a single actor sets the national position as a policy dictator (Laver and Shepsle 1996). On the other hand, it is also very time-consuming and inefficient to decide all policy issues in the rather large body of the full cabinet. Therefore we will expect some delegation of tasks to specialized departments for reasons of capacity, competence, and collective action problems (Bergman et al. 2003: 109). The cabinet still remains as the “resolver of controversial issues” at the end of the process, however (Mackie and Hogwood 1984: 305). The national position taking will take place somewhere in between these two extremes. Overall member states in the EU usually declare a national position prior to international negotiations. Among other things, this is due to various external constraints on the national governments. Meanwhile, a wide range of policy making in the European Union is done at the supranational level. One reason to take a position on an issue is that only well-defined national positions can be defended in the negotiation process. Following that logic, it is in the self-interest of a state to declare such a position (Kassim et al. 2000). Knowing the complex governmental structures in more detail, the question is raised, whether and especially which national position a national government chooses prior to an international negotiation. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) propose a simple sequential choice model for legislative decision making. Adapting from that model, a relatively parsimonious model of national position taking prior to international negotiations (executive decision making) is derived and hypotheses to explain the national bargaining position are verbalized and tested.

In order to not only focus on the level of the member states, the point of view in the final section (Chapter 7) is changed to the individual actor. As mentioned above, it will be shown that the ministries and offices are the relevant acting units inside the national governments. Thus a third focus lies on the factors, which affect the influence of the governmental actors in determining the national positions. Why are some ministries more assertive than others when national positions are determined before an international negotiation? The traditional view would accentuate that the right of managing the external relations is more or less exclusively granted to the heads of state and the ministries of foreign affairs. However, the mentioned environment of international negotiation suggests and recent research shows, that this assumption is questionable (Thurner and Binder 2007a). An often neglected topic in studies on organizational performance is how individual actors perform compared to each other inside of the respective organization. Therefore hypotheses are formulated how certain structures and attributes affect the assertiveness or performance of governmental actors in determining the national position.

All models and the hypotheses are tested using data from the preparation of the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 (IGC 1996) of the EU, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty. This comparative data was gathered from 140 top national ministerial officials (Thurner et al. 2002; Thurner and Pappi 2009). Relying on this unique data



set, this thesis demonstrates possible application of the theoretical aspects in governmental research. The task is twofold: first, it is necessary to derive comparable governmental structures to describe the collective actor government model in more detail, and second, the consequences of these structures have to be demonstrated.

The aim of this thesis is to explain the national positions, which are declared prior to international negotiations in the European Union. This approach should also be used to gain a better understanding about the assertiveness of the national actors during this process. Even though this thesis uses a case study and focuses on national position taking inside the European Union, most of the results should be transferable to national position taking in general.

After having introduced the case study (Chapter 3) and having modeled governments as policy producing organizations based on network theory (Chapter 4), there are three important research questions remaining to be answered in Chapters 5, 6, and 7:

- Are there significant differences in the formal, actually-perceived, and self-organized structures of the governments in the European Union?
- What effects do these possible differences have on the process of national position taking prior to international negotiations?
- Which structural features determine the assertiveness of a single actor inside the governmental environment?



## 2 State of the Art in National Position Taking

Many scholars in international relations work with national policy positions declared by individual countries. There are undoubtedly a lot of interesting relationships between the preferences of the countries acting in the international arena and, for example, their strength or performance during negotiations. Schelling (1960) states already in his so-called “Schelling-conjecture” that intranational restrictions (as, for example, an explicitly declared position which is costly to revoke) strengthen the respective country, or more specifically its representative, during international negotiations. In a more recent example, Thurner and Pappi (2009) identify the relative impact of formal governmental organizations and informal communication networks on negotiation dynamics and on negotiation performance during an intergovernmental conference of the European Union. For example, one unexpected result is that domestic conflict has a positive impact on presenting a national position during international negotiations (see also Thurner and Pappi 2006).

Most of the grand theories of international relations assume exogenous preferences for the actors. If these preferences are comprehensive and span over specific sectors, as assumed by realist intergovernmentalism, or if they are issue-specific, as assumed by liberal intergovernmentalism, is of inferior interest for this thesis.<sup>2</sup> It is important that most theories in international relations consider national preferences as important. Summing up this area in a recent state of the art chapter on international relations and domestic politics, Gourevitch (2002) states: “That international relations and domestic politics interact quite profoundly no longer seems to be a controversial statement” (Gourevitch 2002: 309).

Unfortunately only a few scholars have yet asked where these positions come from and how they are determined by the countries. This section reviews recent literature trying to explain national foreign policy positions with regard to European Union decision making. In this case, the positions are typically complex policy positions, and thus well-known examples of international relations dealing with binary choices (such as conflict versus withdraw) are only partly useful. Choosing a policy option as a national position often requires the member state in the European Union to deal with multiple jurisdictionally crosscutting issues at a time, whereas most of these issues have multiple (more than two) options.

The focus of this chapter is on comparative work and not on case studies as done by Laursen (2002), Kassim et al. (2000). Even though, for example, Laursen (2002) gives an broad overview of the preference formation prior to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996, the book widely disregards the comparative aspect. However Blondel (1990) states that comparative work on national governments is inevitable: “If we are to understand better the way governments work, comparison is not only valuable: it is inevitable” (Blondel 1990: 4). Despite this realization Blondel does not succeed in bringing much light into the black box of the national executive. He himself concludes that the national executive is “one of the most elusive elements of the political process” (Blondel 1990: 272). For this reason I apply a comparative perspective to the description of national governments and the expla-

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<sup>2</sup>For a comprehensive overview of the theories of European integration see Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006).

nation of national policy positions. A last limitation for the considered work is its quantitative approach. The literature ranges from completely qualitative, sometime normative contributions (Laursen 2002; MacDonagh 1998; Tonra 1997; Laffan 1996) on one side to strictly quantitative testing of formal models (König and Hug 2006b; Thomson et al. 2006) on the other. Therefore the state of the art chapter has to be limited to the scientific work comparable to the underlying research questions as well as to the underlying research approach. The next section gives an overview of work done with regard to national position taking, specifically including work done to explain national positions in the European Union. Only literature with at least a partly empirical approach is considered.

Starting in 1971 with the classic work of Allison, the foundation for the modeling of foreign policy making as bureaucratic process is laid. Nowadays neither Allison's Model I, thinking of foreign policy as determined by the government as a homogeneous actor, nor his Model II, relying on Weber's idealistic model of bureaucracy as completely determined by formal rules, seems to be adequate. However, Allison's Model III, also known as "governmental (bureaucratic) politics paradigm" (Allison 1971: 162ff), laid out a framework which is still surprisingly modern. Allison defines foreign policy decisions as "intranational political resultants" originating from "compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence" (Allison 1971: 182). In addition to the formal structures, Allison's governmental (bureaucratic) politics approach incorporates already informal patterns of cooperation and communication as well as the unequal distribution of power inside of the national executives. All these aspects constitute the national environment in which foreign policy making takes place. The unitary actor assumption is widely challenged, and governments are conceived as a body of individual actors with own preferences and distinct possibilities to influence the foreign policy outcome. One main point of critique brought forward by Bendor and Hammond is that the approach "incorporates so many variables that it is an analytical kitchen sink" (Bendor and Hammond 1992: 318). Consequently a quantitative operationalization and application of the model was not tried for long time. But Thurner and Pappi argue recently that "using network analysis, Allison's famous 'model III' can be transformed into an empirical operational approach" (Thurner and Pappi 2009: 5). Following this direction it is also possible to define and model national governments based on this approach.

Also following this perspective, Moravcsik asks what "the fundamental determinants of national preferences" are (Moravcsik 1998: 23). National preference formation is from his point of view a necessary and important step prior to the intergovernmental negotiations he observes in the European Union. In his liberal intergovernmentalist approach, Moravcsik sees national interests as "neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerg[ing] through domestic political conflict" (Moravcsik 1993: 481). But despite his far reaching plan, it has been criticized that a

"systematic disaggregation to the set of issues which were negotiated in these conferences is [...] absent, just like the proposed 'joint metric'. Hypotheses with regard to the impact of domestic preference aggregation on the negotiations are missing just like falsifiable hypotheses" (Thurner and Pappi 2009: 24).

This thesis resolves the lack of a model of domestic preference formation for a disaggregated set of issues. Before analyzing the impacts of the domestic preference constellation on the international process, an understanding thereof is absolutely required, as Moravcsik himself demands (Moravcsik 1993: 481).

When focusing on national position taking as a case of issue-specific decision making, the next question is which actors are involved. Schneider et al. (2007) focus exactly on this (the impact of interest groups on the national decision-making process) in the case of legislative initiatives of the European Commission. They make, maybe not intentionally, an important contribution interesting to governmental decision making in general. Their *model étatism*, where only governmental actors influence the decision making process, performs best in most circumstances relative to a wide range of other models. State actors are considered as “particularly important during the decision-making phase” (Schneider et al. 2007: 447). Their conclusion goes as far as the statement that “state actors dominate the national negotiations on most issues” (Schneider et al. 2007: 455) and consequently a focus on these actors is a reasonable restriction. The main point of criticism at the work of Schneider et al. (2007) is their small number of observed member states. Their analysis is based on the National Decision-Making in the European Union data set (NDEU), which only observes preferences of the national actors in Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

The full dataset (Decision-Making in the European Union - DEU) of 66 proposals in the period from 1999-2001 contains data for all fifteen member states in the European Union. However the detailed domestic preference information is not available for all member states. Nonetheless this dataset enables Thomson et al. (2006) to study the outcomes of the 66 proposals of the European Commission based on the respective national positions. Even if the data do not allow for testing theories on national position taking, it allows to test formal rational choice theories of decision making in general at the European level. Given the international outcome and the national positions well-known theories, as for example the Expected Utility Model of Bueno de Mesquita (1994) or the Procedural Exchange Model of König and Proksch (2006) are tested and evaluated with regard to their predictiveness (Schneider et al. 2006: 300-301).

This approach, to comparatively test formal models of decision making in the context of the European Union, is remarkable. Using the same data for all models, a comparison of predictive accuracy is easily possible. But this comparison also allows to test the models against common baseline models (median voter or mean voter) and to see how much they improve already known concepts. For this reason Thatcher (2008) criticizes that most “models [discussed in the book] perform only slightly better than the baseline model based on the mean of the actors’ positions” (Thatcher 2008: 197). Consequently the more sophisticated models perform only slightly better than a very basic concept working with a unidimensional treatment of the actors’ separable preferences, the mean voter.<sup>3</sup> Keeping in mind that the mean voter and median voter solutions should not be underestimated in the research on

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<sup>3</sup>Unidimensional and separable in this setting means that each identified policy issue is treated by itself and distinct from all other issues. There is no linkage between different policy issues as, for example, in the case of exchange models.

decision making, there is second point worth to mention. Shifting back to the level of interest in this thesis, i.e. the national level, the authors do not really question their assumption of national governments as unitary actors in the context of the European Union (Schneider et al. 2006: 310). Their experts confirm the assumption of unitary actors for the European Parliament and the European Commission (Schneider et al. 2006: 310, FN 3). But is this assumption also true for the member states? Or is it due to missing knowledge about internal preferences and processes inside of the national entities, and thus oversimplifying? Despite the existing data at the national level for four member states (the above mentioned NDEU data set in Schneider et al. 2007), this data is not available for all fifteen member states, and hence the origin of the national preferences remain unclear.

Fortunately, the interdisciplinary research group Institutionalization of International Negotiation Systems at Mannheim University gathered comparative data which provide more insights at the level of the national governments. The data collection process combined documentary analysis and standardized interviews with top level bureaucrats (Thurner et al. 2002; Thurner and Pappi 2009). A detailed description of the data set, which is also used in this thesis, is given in the next chapter. Both research groups used interviews with involved top officials (experts) as principal elements to gather actors' positions. Maybe the most important difference between the DEU, respectively the NDEU data of Thomson et al. (2006) and the data of Thurner and Pappi (2009) is the amount of data that was collected. Whereas Thomson et al. (2006) focus mainly on the most preferred policy option and its respective importance, Thurner and Pappi (2009) also asked the respondents about their national and international cooperation behavior, as well as about their perception of the influence distribution inside of the national governmental system. This way a much larger data set could be created. This data set contains not only the preferences and saliences of the actors involved, but also a range of variables to describe the national executives and their intra- and transgovernmental cooperation behavior.

Based on this comprehensive and extensive data set first approaches to model the decision making process at the national level were already made. Stoiber (2003) studies the efficiency of exchange models (i.e. the *reduced form model* of Henning 2000) in predicting the national bargaining position prior to the IGC 1996 in Amsterdam. Therefore he assumes the national positions to be part of a multidimensional policy package (Stoiber 2003: 115). Stoiber (2003) expects the exchange model to predict best in the case of an underlying perfect market. He mainly uses the governmental structures to model restrictions for this expected equilibrium outcome (Stoiber 2003: 24 and 115). Although this thesis generally develops the work of Stoiber further on, some fundamental distinctions are made. This thesis is much more skeptical towards the use of exchange models in the given setting. Stoiber (2003: 242) as well as Achen (2006: 280) themselves state that the predictive performance of exchange models differs only marginally from dimension-by-dimension models, such as the median voter or mean voter. Combined with a general skepticism against the underlying assumption that about ten actors engage in exchange over 46 distinct policy issues with each around 3-4 policy options, the focus is set on the simplest solution, which is a dimension-by-dimension treatment.

Generally, there should be a stronger focus on and differentiation between the different governmental structures. Formal structures, self-organized structures, and perceived influence structures should be defined separately and compared to each other. So far the effects of their congruence on national position taking remains open. The effect of a possible deviation between the self-organized structure and the formally planned structure especially has to be answered. Further on, Thurner (2010) shows the capacity of the perceived influence structure in modeling national *core executives*, which is not done by Stoiber (2003). Lastly the new focus on the individual actor herself and her assertiveness is introduced into the analysis.

Most recently, König and Hug (2006b) depict their goal as to explain the “formation of [national] positions on the constitution” of the European Union (König and Hug 2006a: 1). Besides the elaborate but more or less separate description and discussion of the member states’ position taking in the 25 chapters, the authors make only few comparative attempts. In their conclusion they interpret a factor analysis and roughly categorize the 25 member states of the European Union into three groups (Hug and König 2006: 273). They also tried to explain the deviation of actors’ position from the national position using statistical models (OLS and tobit). However, their dependent variable is the share of deviating positions from the national position over all issues. This leads to a sample size of  $N=25$  (Hug and König 2006: 274) and makes regression techniques questionable.

In addition, König and Hug (2006b) have also a more general problem with their data. Like Schneider et al. (2007) they use expert interviews to determine the national position as well as the positions of the relevant actors. The experts in 57% of the interviews are from inside the government (König and Hug 2006b: 7). The researchers ask these experts about all ideal positions for the relevant actors involved, where relevant means that their position deviates from the national position (König and Hug 2006b: 7). This differs from the procedure of Thurner et al. (2002), who first ask about the actors involved and in a second step gather the information (especially the ideal position) about these actors. The exclusion of involved but irrelevant actors gives an reduced picture of the national executive. There is obviously a difference if two actors are involved and one of them differs in the position or if ten actors are involved and one differs in the position. Another point is the low number of missing cases (1.2%, König and Hug 2006b: 7), which may be an artefact. Experts may not indicate actors as relevant if they do not know their most preferred position. In the end König and Hug (2006b) identify 110 relevant actors in the 25 member states. Thereof 67% (73 of 110) are actors inside the government. Taking into account that the premiers’ offices and the ministries of foreign affairs are very often considered as “relevant actors” by the experts, there were (on average and based on their data) only one other governmental actor (e.g. ministry) involved in the process of national position taking prior to the European Convention (König and Hug 2006b: 7 and 261). Is this assessment of the experts right? Are there really so few governmental actors in the member states of the European Union involved in the preparation of national positions prior to international negotiations? Is there still such a dominance of the premiers’ offices and the ministries of foreign affairs during the national position taking in the area of foreign policy, as stated by König and Hug (2006b) and earlier by Kassim et al. (2000)?

Using the unique data of Thurner et al. (2002), this thesis helps to answer these questions. Among other things, the data gathered by the authors is advantageous because of the separate research step to indicate the actors involved. All involved actors with their direct and individual preference assessments are known (for more details see Chapter 3). First analyses with the data (Stoiber 2003; Thurner 2006, 2010; Thurner and Pappi 2009) already indicated a different perspective of actors involved as compared to the above mentioned literature (König and Hug 2006b; Kassim et al. 2000).

This section observed three different cases of national decision making in the context of the European Union: day-to-day legislation (Schneider et al. 2007), an intergovernmental conference (Stoiber 2003) and the new special case of a convention (König and Hug 2006b). But all have in common that the national member states can and indeed do define distinct national ideal positions with regard to the specific areas under discussion at the European level. Therefore the description of national governments and the modeling of the national position taking process is of importance for all three examples, although the case of an intergovernmental conference of the European Union is at the center of this analysis.

The formal description of the national governments and henceforth a specification of the governmental actors involved is an absolutely required step before analyzing the effects of certain executive structures on the national position taking. Consequently this thesis also provides an operable quantification to describe national governments and helps to quantify the concept of *core executives*. The term core executive was introduced to political science inter alia by Rhodes (1995). Being first used in the context of the British governmental system (Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995; Smith 1999), the term spread out fast to other countries (e.g. France, Hayward and Wright 2002). Weller et al. (1997) and Peters et al. (2000) try to assess the term in a comparative cross-country perspective, but none of the examples provide an operationalization of the core executives. Very recently Thurner (2010) and Thurner (2008) uses data about the distribution of perceived influence to model task-specific national core executives. This initial attempt is continued in this thesis.

Finally, it is important for the entire thesis that the concept of networks is used as a conceptual tool and not as a metaphor of some form of governance. “Networks have become an ubiquitous metaphor to describe too many aspects of contemporary life”, and network “has become a ‘word’ rather than a ‘concept’” (Thompson 2003: 2). Applying an approach strictly based on network analysis as concept should bring some clarity back into this field of research. Already Pappi (1987) and Pappi and Henning (1998) show that the use of network analysis is meaningful and beneficial to the analysis of political phenomena, and especially to the analysis of decision making processes.

Until now, the work on national position taking has focused too much on more or less distinct case studies of national governments and too little on the comparison of national processes. Additionally, the operationalization of models and their empirical testing using real data have been neglected. By deriving a testable and general model of national position taking, this thesis will close that gap.



## 3 The Intergovernmental Conference 1996

### 3.1 An Intergovernmental Conference as a Case of International Negotiations

In this chapter, the case of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996 of the European Union and the data used in this thesis are described. It may be rather unusual to introduce the case study and the data prior to the theoretical chapter; however, there are several reasons which make it useful to do so. Many of the network theoretic concepts and measures are relatively complicated to explain and illustrate without examples. Using an artificial example or real world examples without regard to the content of this thesis could lead to confusion. So all the data used in this thesis is based on the empirical case under consideration: national position taking prior to the IGC 1996. This makes an introduction of the data necessary at this stage. In addition, the set up of the case study shows that applied quantitative network analysis is possible in the field of political science, and is especially valuable in the area of comparative governmental research. Despite the focus on the IGC 1996, it must be emphasized that all features of the model could be easily adapted to other national entities in a similar setting, or even to governmental organizations in other settings.

The most known aspect about international negotiations, especially about intergovernmental conferences in the European Union, is the meeting of the heads of states (prime ministers and presidents) at the end of a summit. Much less known however are the processes of negotiation and coordination often going on before such a summit. In the case of the IGC 1996, meetings of the Westendorp Reflection Group (starting June 1995), the opening of conference (March 1996), and the ratification of the consolidated version of the Treaty (October 1997) are only some highlights of this process. For a complete chronological overview see Metz (1999: 219-272).

To a large degree, these processes are considered as national coordination with the goal of finding a common policy position in the given areas of interest. This is the point this thesis is especially interested in. However, the preparation takes place in an international context, where several member states try to define their positions more or less simultaneously. During this process the member states and their national actors also interact at the international level (Thurner and Binder 2009). Taking this fact also into account, this thesis focuses on one crucial part of these pre-negotiations: How do the member states figure out their national positions, which they publicize then in the international arena?

In intergovernmental conferences, topics and issues on the agenda are complex. Thurner and Linhart (2004a) argue that the complexity and the jurisdictional cross-cutting of policies lead to the assumption that coordination between different units inside the national government is necessary and that it would be unreasonable to assume that the head of government or a single ministry play the role of a policy dictator as defined by Laver and Shepsle (1996). Underlying this coordination process is an external pressure on the national government to define and signal a national position. Kassim et al. (2000) point out three main reasons why a member

state would define and publish a national position prior an international conference: First, only an existing and known position can be defended during the international negotiation. Second, there is the growing importance of EU policy making for the national policy arena, and third, to secure the national interest (e.g. in the area of the common agricultural policy). At the same time, coordination has to take place in a certain period of time, which is normally bounded by the time frame of the conference itself. The mechanism of coordination needs to be efficient because coordination could fail otherwise. As a result the member state would have the least preferable national outcome of *no national position*, and consequently only very few possibilities to influence the international outcome.

### 3.2 Relevance of the IGC 1996 in the Process of European Integration

As a case study this thesis will take a closer look at the Intergovernmental Conference of the EU 1996, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty. After the Single European Act 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht 1991, the conference was planned as the third large reform of constitutional treaties of the European Union. These intergovernmental treaties or contracts contain global goals as well as provisions or institutional arrangements. European Union constitution-building so far has been an incremental process, where member states consent to voluntarily incomplete contracts (Thurner 2006). The Maastricht Treaty has already laid out the course to the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 and thus characterizes itself as incomplete: “A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B” (Treaty on the European Union Article N (2)<sup>4</sup>).

Accordingly the agenda of the IGC 1996 was already set in part five years before the conference was held. In short, the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 was intended to revise the following aspects of the Treaty of Maastricht:

- the new structures (i.e. the concept of the three pillars: European Communities (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA))
- the new policies and competencies (CFSP and JHA)
- the modes of decision making (co-decision-making)

Due to the end of the Cold War period and the massive change in world politics in the 1990s, there was another issue on the agenda which was not foreseen: the eastern enlargement of the European Union. Many of the Eastern European countries pushed forward with their demands of membership in the European Union; this intensified the magnitude of the existing problems. It was necessary to prepare the European Union for an enlargement process, after which the number of members could raise up to 25. Effective decision making under premises of the existing rules

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<sup>4</sup>Unrevised version - 92/C 191/01.

was not conceivable. So the Amsterdam Treaty was meant to be the fulfillment of the *political union*, clarifying the issue of rebalancing power inside the European Union and especially preparing the institutions for the eastern enlargement. This made the Amsterdam Treaty a further milestone in the integration process of the European Union. Later on the Treaty of Nice (2001) brought some clarification of the procedures of the European institutions for the case of the upcoming enlargement. As the ratification of an EU constitution failed in 2004, the Amsterdam Treaty is still in large part the primary contractual foundation on which the institutions of the European Union work. The next section will introduce the data used to present the concepts and later on to test the models.

### 3.3 Study Design and Data

**Starting Point of the Conference** Along with the broad agenda defined by the Maastricht Treaty, the issues in discussion at the IGC 1996 were first structured by the so-called Westendorp Reflection Group, from June 1995 to December 1995. The Reflection Group was composed of fifteen delegates of the member states, together with one member of the European Commission and two members of the European Parliament (Laursen 2002: 4). The group was tasked with paving the way for the revision of the treaty and identifying the negotiation space. Afterward the Service Juridique of the Council of the European Union processed the roughly formulated policy issues into European Law-compatible options. In addition, the Service Juridique attached a current status quo to each of the extracted issues. The 30 resulting confidential notes with distinct policy options were sent to the national governments. In that way the agenda for the national governments was mostly exogenously determined. Bounded by the time of the conference, the national governments had to coordinate their position taking within the given time frame. Figure 1 illustrates that process. This thesis especially focuses on the interministerial coordination, which can be considered as the main process of national position taking.




Figure 1: Stylized Chronological Sequence of Negotiations (Thurner et al. 2002: 18)

The data used for the empirical analysis was gathered by the interdisciplinary research group Institutionalization of International Negotiation Systems at Mannheim University. The data collection process combined documentary analysis and standardized interviews with top level bureaucrats. The 30 confidential notes constitute the initial policy space. For the questionnaire, the notes were split into nine issue groups (IGs) containing in total 46 one-dimensional policy issues, which were mapped onto the unit interval (Thurner et al. 2002).

**Units of Investigation** To identify the relevant national actors, the researchers applied a multi-stage approach of boundary specification (Thurner et al. 2002: 22). First, all existing governmental actors were identified using the written constitutions and/or rules of internal procedures. At that time, each of the member states had at least one permanent representative in Brussels. In the next step, these representatives were asked which of the existing actors were indeed involved in the national coordination process. Involvement was described as the participation in the process in the way that the ministry “presents proposals to be included in the position finding in the respective issues under consideration” (Thurner et al. 2002: 282). This deepens the view of involvement extremely, as compared to the possibility of counting (and interviewing) all existing actors or counting only actors with deviating ideal position (König and Hug 2006b). The identified actors were interviewed using a standardized questionnaire. One part of the questionnaire contained questions about the perceived influence of the actors, wherein each identified actor was able to denote whether the other existing actors were influential. Using these answers additional actors who were mentioned as being influential were counted as involved in the process, even if they were not named by the representative of the national delegation. These actors were also included in the study.<sup>5</sup>

**Data Collection** Knowing the actors involved, the researchers used document analysis and organizational charts of the ministries to identify the actors, who were in charge of formulating the first proposal in each issue. They also identified the actors who had official access to the national process, because of shared responsibilities resulting from overlapping jurisdictions, and the actors who were in charge of managing the national coordination. Using data from Piepenschneider (1996), Griller et al. (1996), the report of the European Parliament, and the synopsis of Weidenfeld (1998), the authors identified the declared national positions and mapped them onto the same issue space, which was used for their questionnaire.

Using the standardized questionnaire, interviews were conducted with all of the actors involved ( $N=140$ ). The respondents were asked about the preferences of their department (i.e. most preferred option on each of the 46 issues) and the relative importance (salience) of the respective policy issue to the respondent. Additionally, questions about the national and transnational cooperation behavior and the perceived influence of other national actors were included. Combined with the data gathered by document analysis, unique and multifaceted data is available. These data include preferences and saliences as well as relationships (national and transnational) between the ministries and officially declared national positions. In addition, the process of data generation (snowball sampling procedure) and the boundary specification leads to a full sample of involved actors for the national position taking prior to the IGC 1996. Unless otherwise specified, the data from this project is used for all later analyses.

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<sup>5</sup>As mentioned, the standardized questionnaire includes a question about ex-post perception of influence. The full text of the question is provided in the Appendix on page xviii. An actor was included in the study if at least two other actors inside the system indicated her as influential.

## 4 Modeling Governments as Networks

### 4.1 Modeling Governments as Policy-Producing Networks

Networks have found their way into virtually each academic subfield, from computer science (e.g. the World Wide Web) and engineering (e.g. power grids) to biology (e.g. neural networks of worms). Other areas observe the collaborations of movie stars or word co-occurrence in literature. Networks are nowadays used to describe and analyze a broad range of fields (for an overview see Newman 2002: 37). A special case of network analysis is social network analysis. Following the classical introduction of Wasserman and Faust social network analysis focuses on the “relationships among social entities, and on the patterns and implications of these relationships” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 3). Many phenomena in political systems can be described by using methods of network analysis; for example, affiliations of legislators in the U.S. Congress (Fowler 2006), international commerce (Ward and Hoff 2007), or political polarization (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007), to mention only some.<sup>6</sup>

However, in political science and especially in comparative governmental research there is still plenty of room for improvement. Therefore this thesis uses a graph-based network approach to model national governmental structures inside the European Union as networks. Based thereon, it is possible to compare these structures analytically and analyze their consequences in a comparative perspective. The aim is to quantitatively describe the processes inside of national governments prior to an international negotiation. What happens inside of national governments while preparing joint national positions?

Position taking by national governments is a special case of policy production (Dixit 2000). Thus governments are policy-producing organizations, whereby policymaking and especially position taking in international negotiation is a process, rather than a static, one-time action. Following institutional economics, organizations can be decomposed into relational contracts over decision rights (Dixit 2000). These relational contracts can be modeled using social network analysis. Thurner and Binder conceive the “governmental organization as a multi-tiered network of contracts” (Thurner and Binder 2007b: 5). Using this approach, it is possible to disaggregate the government into its different types of relationships: formal, informal, supervision, communication, labor affairs networks, environmental affairs networks, and others. Networks are not understood in a metaphorical sense, but rather as a method and foundation to define and analyze national governments. The government as a multiplex network consists of a number of different one- and two-mode networks, representing the different relations between the actors themselves and between the actors and the policy areas under discussion. The detailed definitions and theoretical foundations are elaborated in section 4.3 and 4.4. Among other things, these relations can be based on formal procedures such as standard operating procedures (SOPs) or special formal rights in the process of position taking. However, aside from formal, written procedures, there are informal rules which

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<sup>6</sup>See also the web pages of recently occurred international conferences on this topic, such as the Conference on Advance Political Network Modelling (APNM 2007) or the Harvard Networks in Political Science Conference (NIPS 2008).

are not explicitly written down in contracts. In reality, it is not possible to formally determine every part of a future decision detailed in SOPs. All contracts are more or less incomplete, because of the

“(1) inability to foresee all possible contingencies, (2) the complexity of specifying rules, even for the numerous contingencies that can be foreseen, and (3) the difficulty of objectively observing and verifying contingencies so that the specified procedures may be put into action” (Dixit 2000: 20).

Thus there is also an informal structure in addition to the formal one which has to be included into the investigation.

There is an ongoing discussion about the relationship between formal and informal structures in organizations (see for example Zenger et al. 2002; Brass et al. 2004). Zenger et al. (2002) raise the question of whether the formal structure is supported or undermined by the informal structure. In their understanding, to support means that the informal structure works as a complement to the formal structure and to undermine means that the informal structure works as a substitute for the formal one. Other authors such as Brass et al. (2004) are less detailed and anticipate the informal structure to shadow the formal one. Overall there are three theoretically possible relations: either the structures are identical (shadow), independent (no systematic relation) or they undermine (substitute for) each other. In the next chapter some hypotheses related to these arguments are derived and the consequences are laid out.

In this competitive environment of a national government the position taking prior to an international conferences takes place (see Chapter 6). The government is conceived as a multiplex and multi-divisional organization whose aim is to define and declare a national position on certain policy issues. Kassim et al. (2000) point out some reasons why a member state would define and publish a national position prior to an international conference (e.g. only an existing and known position can be defended during the international negotiation). At the same time the coordination has to take place in a certain timeframe, which is normally bounded by the timeframe of the international negotiation itself. The mechanisms of national coordination need to be effective<sup>7</sup>, or otherwise the coordination could possibly fail, which is usually considered as the worst case.

To understand all structural features and processes of national position taking, it is necessary to set up a comparable and empirically-applicable framework to describe governments. Social network analysis is the methodological approach I will use.

## 4.2 Boundary Specification

Before deriving the structural relationships, some questions about the governmental systems in general have to be answered. What constitutes a governmental system in the given setting of national position taking? It is assumed that the policy agenda

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<sup>7</sup>Effectiveness is later defined and distinguished from efficiency. In short, effectiveness focuses only on goal attainment, whereas efficiency also keeps in mind the cost for this goal attainment. For a detailed differentiation of effectiveness and efficiency see also Section 5.2.

is exogenously determined and the task of the national governments is to react to that given input by defining or not defining a national position (see Chapter 3). Not defining a position is explicitly modeled as a possible decision of a member state although, it is considered undesirable. The assumption of an exogenously given policy agenda may be too restrictive for some other cases because member states can often push issues on the agenda or prevent issues from discussion. After the final report of the Reflection Group on the IGC (Westendorp Report, December 1995), however, the stage for the IGC 1996 was set. Together with the open questions postponed in the Maastricht Treaty, the Reflection Group decided which issues should be discussed and it was hardly possible to get an issue on or off the agenda after that decision (Laursen 2002: 1-8). Even if it was still possible for a member state not to define a national position or to veto any international agreement beyond the status quo, it was necessary for every member state to deal with the issues on the table. Hence the agenda for the national position taking was set exogenously.

More critical is the second question about the actors being involved in the national governmental systems. Who constitutes the governmental system? Laumann et al. (1983) call this step the boundary specification and state that “care must be given to specifying rules of inclusion for different network elements” (Laumann et al. 1983: 18). They also explicitly mention the importance of rules and theoretical foundations for the observed relationships. King et al. (1994) stress that identifying adequate units of analysis for any given research question is crucial. In this particular case, the actors involved in the process of national position taking prior to the IGC 1996 have to be identified. The question is which actors inside the member states were involved in preparing the national positions.

Following the approach of Thurner et al. (2002), it seems reasonable to consider the national ministries as relevant involved acting units. In the special type of foreign policy making (preparation for an intergovernmental conference) the ministries are still the most important gatekeeper for policy initiatives and proposals. Additionally, a transfer of national competencies toward the EU has to be formally or at least informally accepted by the cabinet. Accordingly Thurner and Binder reason, “it is worthwhile to consider ministries as relevant subunits in the preparation” (Thurner and Binder 2007a: 3) of an intergovernmental conference. Despite evidence that actors outside the government (e.g. interest groups) try to influence the process of governmental decision making prior to international negotiations (Schneider et al. 2007), they are not expected to be able to completely bypass the ministries and offices inside the governmental system. Rather, the officials within ministries are the main targets of outside actors as interest groups and other non-governmental actors can influence the process only via the governmental actors. In their data on the European Convention, König and Hug (2006b) find that “in most countries governmental actors dominated the internal coordination process” (König and Hug 2006b: 5). Generally government officials are still denoted as the most skilled actors in the process of intergovernmental conferences (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Thurner 2006). This assumption is also supported by the data in the underlying case study. To the question about the percentage of taking up external demands during national position taking versus defining the proposals autonomously, the involved ministries in the member states answered that on average more than two-

thirds of the position was determined from inside the governmental system (i.e. by the ministry itself, other ministries, or the parliament). Only the remaining one-third was determined by other actors including interest groups (6%), the electorate (5%), the party (9%), or the international level (12%)<sup>8</sup>. The data clearly point towards a dominance of the governmental actors. An additional barrier which the non-governmental actors faced in the underlying case study was the distribution of the – at that time – highly-confidential notes. These notes constituted the policy space for the discussion. It is very unlikely that such confidential notes were openly distributed to the interested actors outside the national government. Consequently the governmental actors had monopolized access to these important documents. Actors inside the governments, and especially ministries which constitute partial jurisdictions defined over and responsible for special policy domains, have a quasi-monopoly on expertise and access to confidential information. This expertise may be crucial during preparation phase. For all these reasons this thesis will focus on the actors inside the governments, including the federal states and the parliamentary EU committees if involved during the process. All ministries, offices, and committees are conceived as corporate actors, acting unitarily with single peaked preferences.

Formal and informal structures are under consideration, so counting only formally involved actors could lead to spurious results. Usually actors are identified either from outside the system (e.g. expert interviews or document analysis) or from inside the system (e.g. direct interviews with the relevant actors). To take the informal and actual structure into account, it is necessary to look inside the organization government itself. The processes inside the governments are hard to discover from outside. A reliable and valid classification of formally and informally involved actors can be achieved by combining a nominalistic approach of boundary specification with a realistic one (Thurner et al. 2002: 56). In a first step, all existing governmental subunits were identified using document analysis. After that, the heads of the national delegations were asked to indicate the involved ministries and, to ensure validity, the procedure included the self-assessment of the involved ministries (see also 3.3). This way a full sample of actors involved inside of the national governments could be attained.

### 4.3 Network Theory

To define governmental structures and hence governments as networks, a strictly theoretically based approach on networks is used. The following formal conceptualization is derived from social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In general, a network consists of nodes and links between these nodes. In the case of social networks, nodes can be associated with actors (e.g. persons, organizations or bureaucrats) and links are the relationship between them (e.g. communication, friendship or advice). In the following, national ministries or departments are considered as corporate actors, who act unitarily with a single-peaked preference function.

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<sup>8</sup>The numbers are based on data from the research project introduced above. The question can be found in the Appendix on page xviii. See also Thurner et al. (2002: 283) and Stoiber (2003: 185ff.)



The actors in the governmental systems are defined by their nationality  $i \in \{1, \dots, 15\}$  or  $\{\text{Austria}, \dots, \text{Sweden}\}$ <sup>9</sup> and their jurisdiction  $j \in \{1, \dots, 20\}$  or  $\{\text{PO}, \dots, \text{EU-C}\}$ <sup>10</sup>. The jurisdictions are considered to be equivalent across member states even though not every jurisdiction needs to exist in each member state. For example, if  $i = 1$  and  $j = 2$ , then  $\text{actor}_{i,j} = \text{actor}_{1,2}$  (short:  $a_{1,2}$ ) is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( $j = 2$ ) in Austria ( $i = 1$ ).

A relation  $R$  between two actors  $a_{i,j}$   $R$   $a_{k,l}$  is called a directed relation.  $a_{i,j}$  is the initiator and  $a_{k,l}$  the receiver of the relation.  $x_{a_{i,j}, a_{k,l}}$  is the value of the relation  $R$  and the matrix  $\mathcal{X}_R$  with elements  $x_{a_{i,j}, a_{k,l}}$  fully describes the governmental network for relation  $R$ . Focusing on one member state (i.e. fixing the first subscript) we can define for example intra-national cooperation between two ministries ( $j$  and  $l$ ) both in a national government ( $i$ ) as a relation  $a_{i,j} R_{coop} a_{i,l}$ . Figure 2 shows the matrix ( $\mathcal{X}_{R_{coop}}$  or  $\mathcal{X}_{coop}$ ) and a visualization (graph) of the intra-national cooperation inside of the government in Luxembourg.




Figure 2: Matrix and Graph of National Governmental Cooperation (Example: Luxembourg)

Using this notation each possible relation between two actors (either inside one member state or between member states) can be defined. These networks are called one-mode network, because all nodes in the network have the same mode, i.e. are from the same kind (here: ministries).

Next a formal determination of the policy space with regard to the IGC 1996 is necessary. For the case of the IGC 1996 these policy issues can be derived from the 30 confidential notes provided to the national delegations. The notes were prepared by top lawyers of the European Union in the Service Juridique based on the results of the Westendorp Reflection Group (see section 3.1). It is reasonable to state that these notes covered all of the policy issues in discussion at the conference. This way Thurner et al. “exhaustively identified the set of issues” (Thurner et al. 2002: 56) for

<sup>9</sup>At this time the fifteen member states of the European Union.

<sup>10</sup>These are the prime minister’s office (or the chancellor’s office), ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of the interior, ministry of justice, ministry of finance, ministry of economy, ministry of labor, ministry of social affairs, ministry of defense, ministry of environment, ministry of industry, ministry of trade and industry, ministry of agriculture, ministry for public order, ministry of tourism, EU secretary, president’s office, federal states and parliamentary EU committee. For a list with abbreviations see Table 18 in the Appendix.

which a position taking prior the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 was possible. A complete and detailed list of all 30 notes and the corresponding 46 issues can be found in the Appendix. For reasons of simplicity most of the data presentation is restricted to the overarching nine issue groups:

1. Fundamental Legal Questions
2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
3. Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
4. Collective decision-making within the institutional bodies of the EU
5. Balance of power between the institutional bodies of the EU
6. Transferring further competences to the TEC
  - (a) with regard to employment
  - (b) with regard to environment
  - (c) with regard to energy, civil protection, and tourism
  - (d) with regard to external economic relations

At this point only the identification of the issues under consideration is important. The definition of the exact content of the single issues (i.e. the policy options) is explained later in this chapter. In order to describe the governmental structure in the context of national position taking it is necessary to expand the concept of one-mode networks and connect actors not only with other actors, but also with policy areas. The policy issues can be seen as tasks to define a national position in that issue. During the policy formulation process inside a government, certain actors are granted special rights with regard to a given policy issue in discussion. This kind of relation does not connect two actors; it rather links an actor structurally to a policy issue or to the task of position taking in that area. Relations between two different kinds of nodes are called two-mode networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 29).

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG61	IG62	IG63	IG64
PO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MFA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MI	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
MJ	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
MF	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
MEco	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
MLab	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
MEnv	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0

Table 1: Matrix of Access Rights with regard to the Issue Groups (Example: The Netherlands)

Following the concept of two-mode networks, it is possible to link an actor with a given policy area. For example, in Table 1 the relation between an actor and an issue group denotes the right of this actor to have official access to this issue area (access right). Access is defined later on in more detail. So far, access means the possibility to participate in the official flow of information and having the right to introduce the actor's own proposals into the process. Formally the access relation can be defined as  $a_{i,j}R_{access}k$ , where  $a_{i,j}$  is an actor as defined above and  $k$  denotes the policy issue. As opposed to the former relation,  $R_{access}$  is a symmetric relation and thus not directed.

Combining the concepts of one- and two-mode networks, it is possible to describe structures between governmental actors as well as between these actors and the tasks they have to solve as position taking advances inside their government. The concept of two-mode networks can also easily be visualized in a bipartite graph (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 298). The circles in Figure 3 represent the actors inside the government and the squares the different policy areas wherein they have to find a common policy position. In this case relations between nodes are structural features of the national governments.




Figure 3: Graph of Access Rights with regard to the Issue Groups (Example: The Netherlands)

Again, the aim of this section is not to go into detailed analyses, but rather to use real world examples to clarify the theoretical concepts. Already by visual inspection it is possible to see, that a group of ministries (PO, MFA, MF and MEco) is somehow

central because they have access to most of the issues in discussion. To take a closer look, the two-mode network can be transferred into an one-mode network.<sup>11</sup> The focus is then set on co-occurrence of events (tasks) or actors. In the case here (Table 2), co-occurrence or co-membership stands for the number of shared policy areas both actors have access to (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 307ff.).

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MEnv
PO	9	9	5	3	7	6	3	2
MFA	9	9	5	3	7	6	3	2
MI	5	5	5	3	4	3	2	1
MJ	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	0
MF	7	7	4	2	7	5	3	1
MEco	6	6	3	1	5	6	3	2
MLab	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	1
MEnv	2	2	1	0	1	2	1	2

Table 2: Co-occurrence Matrix of Access Rights with regard to the Issue Groups (Example: the Netherlands)

The diagonal entries indicate to how many issue areas the actor herself has access to. For example, the Dutch Premier’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have access to all nine issue areas, whereas the Ministry of Environment (MEnv) has only access to two issue areas. This fact supports the expectation about central actors after the visual inspection and even gives a more detailed picture of them. Furthermore, the off-diagonal values do indicate the number of issue groups the two actors both have simultaneous access to and hence have possible contacts through official meetings. This example should only highlight the possibilities the use of two-mode networks in combination with one-mode networks gives in the description and analysis of governmental structures. A comparable and detailed discussion follows in Section 5.1.

In addition to structural relations between actors and policy issues, there is undoubtedly another important connection between them. Usually rational governmental actors have their own preferences, which need not resemble the national preference. On the contrary, it would be surprising if all actors inside a national government had the same position on a given policy issue. As a consequence *the national position* is the outcome of a yet unclear process of national position taking. A main goal of this thesis is to shed some light in that black box. Coleman (1986) generally states, that “outcomes of events result from motivated action by the actors” and “that actors exercise [...] control over events in such a way as to realize those outcomes they prefer” (Coleman 1986: 85).

The most preferred positions of the governmental actors need to be known and defined for the further analysis. The policy areas under consideration were identified by the 30 confidential notes described above. We assume that the governmental structure is embedded into a continuous underlying policy space, which is defined by these notes. The policy space can be divided into 46 separable one-dimensional

<sup>11</sup>This can easily be done using Ucinet (Borgatti et al. 2002) >Data >Affiliations.

policy issues  $k = \{1, \dots, 46\}$ , which all can be mapped onto the unit interval  $[0,1]$ . The mapping onto the unit interval and the determination of the discrete policy options is exemplified for one issue in the next paragraph. As example Note 4 (SN 1805/96: JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (Decision-making process: Instruments and Implementation)) is used.<sup>12</sup>

Each note typically consists of a short introduction, sometimes with references to the problem to be solved and goals to be reached:

“The revision of the procedures introduced under Title VI should be aimed at making Union action in the JHA sector more effective. It should cover preparation of decisions, the scope of the legal instruments, the actual decision-making process and implementation of the Union’s action” (Service Juridique 1996: 1).

Followed by the respective section with concrete options:

“The various ways of facilitating decision-making include the introduction of majority voting and the use of certain forms of flexibility” (Service Juridique 1996: III.).

and the identification of the status quo:

“At this stage, the decision-making process is hampered by the general requirement of unanimity” (Service Juridique 1996: III.).

At the end of each note, there are sometime optionally drafting suggestions made or additional documents provided.

For example, Note 4 (Service Juridique 1996) is split into two distinct one-dimensional issues: decision making procedures in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Democratic Control in the area of JHA. The one-dimensional issue about decision making procedures in the area of JHA is built up as follows. First all distinct options with regard to decision making procedures in the area of JHA are derived from the Note. These are in textual arrangement:

- Streamline the preparation of decisions (Service Juridique 1996: I.)
- The status quo: unanimity (Service Juridique 1996: III.)
- Introducing wider use of majority voting (qualified or augmented) for joint measures (Service Juridique 1996: III. A.)
- Introducing wider use of majority voting (2/3 of the contracting parties) for conventions (Service Juridique 1996: III. B.)
- Introducing flexibility in cases where unanimity continues (Service Juridique 1996: III. Flexibility)

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<sup>12</sup>The full text of Note 4 is printed in the Appendix.

Afterwards the options are ordered by their degree of Europeanization<sup>13</sup> and mapped with equal spacing on the unit interval. In the example the option with the least amount of integration is clearly the status quo with unanimity as a rule. This is followed by the option of streamlining the preparation, which is possible without revising the treaty. Introducing flexibility in the cases where unanimity continues is also clearly less far-reaching than introducing majority vote in Council decisions for joint measures. At the end a qualified majority for joint measures is a less extensive transfer of national sovereignty than the option majority voting for conventions with two-third of the contracting parties. Note that in the last two cases not the different majority requirements are decisive, but rather the area to which the decision making procedure is expanded. Joint measures are only defined in a common frame on which the decision making procedure is unanimity and hence they imply less transfer of competencies than conventions.




Figure 4: One-Dimensional Policy Space (Example: Decision Making Procedures Justice and Home Affairs)

Thurner et al. (2002) accentuate the validity and advantages of their research design as followed:

“Concluding, we state that by using the Council’s Secretariat’s Notes, we have been enabled to avoid open-ended interviews as well as the use of ‘subjective attribute scales’ (Keeney and Raiffa 1993: 40). EU lawyers have arrayed our data, therefore they fulfill, the assumption of, at least, an ordinal measurement of options” (Thurner et al. 2002: 34).

The confidential notes were distributed to the national delegations and hence very likely transferred to all ministries involved. Thus we can assume that the policy space is common knowledge for all actors inside the European national governments. If an actor has a most preferred policy option in an issue, this option is part of a single-peak preference function. Using the data from the standardized interviews with 140 top level national bureaucrats, the most preferred option of the actors involved could be identified. This thesis assumes an issue-by-issue assessment of the policy space by

<sup>13</sup>The concept of Europeanization has been used in various ways (Kassim 2000: 235). Here it is broadly defined as the shifting of power or competencies from the national level to the European level.

each actor. Throughout the thesis this issues under consideration are assumed to be separable, and issue linkage is not possible. Hence the actor's position with regard to one issue is independent from the actor's position with regard to another issue, and it is impossible for the actors to make binding agreements over the linkage of different issues. Each issue is treated by itself involving the respective governmental actors. Therefore the policy space can be decomposed into unidimensional issues. This restricting assumption is justified by several arguments (see Chapter 6). Also Bueno de Mesquita (1994) noted in his *Expected Utility Theory* that “unidimensionality and single peakedness need not to be viewed as such severe or simplifying conditions as to render subsequent analysis trivial” (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 73).




Figure 5: One-Dimensional Policy Space (Example: Austria and Policy Area: Decision Making Procedures Justice and Home Affairs)<sup>15</sup>

Based thereon the most preferred position of an actor $_{i,j}$  in issue  $k$  is denoted as  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$ . For each actor, the utility of the alternative policy options is a function of the distance of these options to the actor's most preferred option. The relative importance of issue  $k$  for actor $_{i,j}$  is called its salience and is denoted as  $s_{i,j,k}$  (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 68). The salience of a particular issue to an actor is an important aspect in modeling decision making processes. Selck has recently argued that

“modelers of organisational decision-making processes might be well-advised to include into the analysis a concept stating how important certain things are for the decision-makers in relation to other issues on the table. In the real world, a situation in which the actors of a game value all the issues are exactly equally is highly unlikely” (Selck 2006: 13).

<sup>15</sup>PO: Premier's Offices, MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MI: Ministry of the Interior, MJ: Ministry of Justice, NP: National Position and SQ: Status Quo

In the underlying case this data is directly measured as the *contemporaneous salience* of the actors themselves. The actors themselves thought that the issue was salient at the time they had to take the position on it and not some omniscient experts denoted an issue ex-post as important for the process or the international event. Again, the individual assessment is the focus. The national position of member state  $i$  in issue  $k$  is denoted as  $\lambda_{i,k}$ . These positions were gathered through multiple document analysis and appeared to be very reliable in previous analyses. For a cross reference to independently drawn data see (Slapin 2008: 142). The current status quo (SQ) in issue  $k$  was indicated by the Service Juridique while preparing the confidential notes and is indicated as  $SQ_k$ .

In line with this general assumption of single peaked preferences, the cases where actors have a range of ideal positions or the national position is a range (in Figure 5: MFA, MI and the national position (NP)) were handled as having their most preferred position at the mean of the range.<sup>16</sup>

This section showed that methods of social network analysis provide a wide range of tools to describe governmental structures. It is possible to describe relations between actors themselves and between actors and the underlying policy space. In the next section these relations will be theoretically specified.

#### 4.4 The Governmental Structure

Alluding to the statement of Jensen and Meckling that organizations are “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 310) this thesis first focuses on these contracting relationships. In governmental organizations, constitutions, by-laws, and standard operating procedures are the foundation of these relations. The attribute *formal relation* best describes them. Nevertheless these contracts are most of the time incomplete (Dixit 2000) and therefore other informal or actual structures are likely to emerge inside organizations such as national governments. An informal self-organized structure can help to substitute for the pitfalls of the formal structure, or in other cases actors may try to bypass the formal rules and procedures to maximize their own utility.

As discussed earlier, the governmental structure is defined using a network approach and graph-theoretical methods. Following these concepts the possible specification of the relationships between actors is manifold – literally unlimited. Consequently a theoretical foundation of the relationships is absolutely required (Pappi 1987; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Taking the identified actors into account, the government can be described as a collective actor consisting of the involved national ministries and departments. They all have to find common national policy positions prior to an intergovernmental conference. The next step is to define the attributes which describe the relationships between the actors themselves and the relationships between the actors and the tasks they have to solve best.

**Formal Structures of Decision Rights** The first focus is set on the formal relations an actor could have with regard to a task or with regard to the other actors.

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<sup>16</sup>More complicated models for these cases were tested, but did not improve the results.



In each government there is specialization along policy areas for efficiency reasons (departmentalization) and following to that, there are informational asymmetries in the system. Some ministries are more skilled and have more knowledge in certain policy area than others (“competence”, Bergman et al. 2003: 109). Further on it is not possible to design the national coordination process to be absolutely open (to include all ministries) because this would make the process inefficient (“capacity”, Bergman et al. 2003: 109). Nor is it possible to design it to be absolutely closed (include only one ministry). The assumption of ministers being policy dictators in their area (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 125) seems not applicable in the field of jurisdictionally crosscutting policy issues. The policy coordination between the involved ministries before the conference is crucial and in part formally determined. In all member states there is at least a formal allocation of some basic rights an actor can possess during the process of national position taking. These are mostly legally codified competencies. The following paragraph defines the most important formal competencies, which I will call *formal decision rights*. A decision right does not necessarily mean the right to make the decision, but rather is an actor’s formal right to be involved (to a certain degree) in the process of decision making.

Among others, Laver and Shepsle (1996: 38) and Baltz et al. (2005: 283) have pointed out that the actors who are allowed to make the first written proposals are key actors in any coordination process. With their initial preparation they frame most of the later ongoing process and they can gather special in-depth knowledge. Because of this special knowledge, advice is often sought from these actors during the subsequent process. That way they still maintain remarkable influence during the whole process. This very basic competence of making the first proposal or having the lead in the process of position taking is the first formal decision right an actor can possess.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore the aspect of official access to and participation in the national coordination processes is theoretically important. “The national policy domain is primarily determined by the network of access to trustworthy information about policy matters” (Laumann and Knoke 1989: 26). This trustworthy information is a key to exert influence on the national position taking. The more reliable information an actor can gather, the better she can assess the positions and interests of the other actors in the system and the better she can persuade them during the process. As the underlying notes, which determined the policy space were highly confidential, the aspect of access to these information becomes even more important.

A combination of the two criteria (First Proposer and Access) could be a basic formal structure of the organization government. This simple setup fits neatly in most of the situations of national position taking. At minimum it has to be specified who is allowed to make the first proposal and who is allowed to participate in the coordination process. Further on some more specific formal criteria can be evaluated.

In several governments of the European Union, the head of government is a constitutionally central figure. She sometimes has the right to set out policy guidelines in general, to dismiss and appoint civil servants, or she has the control over the cabinet agenda (Bergman et al. 2003: 183ff.). The effect of these general competencies and the evolved underlying structure should also be active in the setting of national

<sup>17</sup>As an exception more than one ministry could be responsible for formulating the first proposal.

position taking prior to international negotiation. Beside of these outstanding capacities and somewhat special to the case of an intergovernmental conference, all heads of government are negotiators at the concluding meetings. Therefore they have to act as representatives of the national governments and advocate the national position defined internally. This will lead to a prominent position during the preparation phase. The ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) is another outstanding actor to whom more scrutiny should be applied. Foreign policy – and as a part of it, international negotiations – is often considered as the primacy of the ministries of foreign affairs. In the case of the IGC 1996, the process was formally completely at the responsibility of the national MFAs (Laursen 2002: 8). Although most of the executing work was done by the permanent representatives, the impact of the MFAs on decision making should be a point of interest for the later analysis. In the following the premiers' offices and the ministries of foreign affairs are considered to be the managerial units during the process. To a certain degree they are concerned about the overall appearance of the member state as a whole. The specialized departments, on the other hand, are expected to be more focused on their specific jurisdictional area and less on the overall process. Milgrom and Roberts see it as “[t]he key role of management in organizations [...] to ensure coordination” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 114). Strengthening the aspect of managing the process all member states of the European Union implemented a temporary project management to coordinate the decision making process between the different actors involved prior to and during the IGC 1996. This temporary project management was exclusively vested in one of the managerial units. It had the ability to steer the process and therefore to highly influence the results. These results are the national positions in the first place and the negotiation results in the second place. At this point it remains open if the project management mainly focuses on the implementation of its own most preferred policy option, and how much it is also concerned with the fulfillment of the transferred responsibility of coordination. A management failure in national coordination could result in the worst case of having no distinct national position in a certain policy area. This failure would be associated with the management, and hence the management tries to support the national position taking process to avert this situation.

A similar role of management at the European level is taken by the presidency of the European Union. The bi-annually changing presidency is carried out by one member state at a time and can also be seen as a management of the intergovernmental negotiation. The member state which is on duty is definitely more involved in the national and intergovernmental process of the intergovernmental conference. Although the last two attributes (project management and presidency) seem to be special to the case of the IGC 1996, it is usually in all international negotiation necessary to manage the national as well as the international process in some way. Henceforth these structures should also exist in other cases.

The resulting dyadic structures (first proposal and access) are two-mode networks, because they measure the relationship between the actors and tasks/policy issues. The other concepts (managerial units, project management and presidency) can be understood as attributes of the respective actors without regard to the policy area. The data therefore was gathered by analyzing documents and especially

by analyzing the organizational charts of the national governments (Turner et al. 2002: 51).

**Self-organized Structures of Cooperation** Having identified the most important formal decision rights in the process of national position taking, this thesis includes further informal criteria for the description of governmental structures. In the most general terms,

“[i]nformal structures are the coalitions or networks of unofficial relationships which play a continuous role, sometimes positive and sometimes negative, in the transmission of commands, in the collection and communication of information and in the coordination of tasks inside and, at times, beyond the confines of organizations” (Breton 1998: 187).

To describe and understand the governmental organization in a broader sense than focusing on organizational charts based on constitutions and written rules of internal procedure, it is necessary to include this informal structure. The structure is informal because the governmental actors are not forced by formal rules to behave in a certain way. It is assumed that the structure behaves in a non-cooperative way. This means that actors could not make binding agreements. “[A]n agreement can be enforced only through the interests of the agreeing parties” (Morrow 1994: 76) and not by some independent third party like a court or a superior. In general, communication between actors is “an essential element of cooperative systems; it is also the limiting factor in the size of simple organizations and, therefore, a dominant factor in the structure of complex organizations” (Barnard 1966: 106). It is important that “[c]ommunication between the players could also be accomplished through moves other than formal opportunities to exchange messages. Actions may indicate the intentions of the acting player, and so speak louder than words” (Morrow 1994: 222). Hence the self-organized governmental structure can be based on informal and actual existing cooperation patterns. These patterns can also be interpreted as communication structures. Morrow calls this kind of communication “tacit communication because the players are inferring one another’s meanings from their actions” (Morrow 1994: 222). This approach opens the analysis of self-organized cooperation structures to the wide field of research on communication structures (Monge and Contractor 2003).

The informal cooperation patterns between the relevant actors inside the national governments are assumed to give at least a partial picture of their self-organization. In this step it is negligible whether the cooperation between two actors is about advice seeking, advice giving, merely about having a request with regard to a certain issue, trying to build a coalition, or anything else. Important is the fact that these communication flows can be – but do not need to be – of considerable value for one of the actors or for both of them. Brass and Burkhardt emphasize that “a mediating person may withhold or distort information in transition” (Brass and Burkhardt 1992: 195). This mediation, like most interactions between social entities, is done via some form of communication and henceforth results in the cooperation structure. Actually existing informal cooperation structures should be a good indicator of the self-organization inside of national governments. However, these structures

have some peculiarities compared to the formal structures. The formal structure is planned and controlled by the government as a whole, and the costs of the formal structure are spread out over all actors in the system, without a possibility for the individual actor to withdraw from these costs.

The self-organized structure has two outstanding characteristics. First, the structure is related to especially high opportunity costs for linkage formation. Top officials' resources as time and attention are very scarce. Thinking about an average of nine other actors involved in 46 issues, each individual actor would have to compare between nine alternatives on 46 different issues to make a complete rational choice about the best partner for cooperation with regard to a certain policy issue. For example, assuming that the given actor wants to cooperate closely with an actor having a most preferred position close to hers, she would have to gather information about all other actors with respect to the issue area under consideration. Expanding that view to all other issue areas is a very time and attention demanding task.

Second, and equally important, the choice of informal cooperation is fully at the discretion of the individual actor. No other actor can force someone to entertain an informal cooperation relation. As soon as one actor is able to stipulate such a cooperation to another actor, it is by definition no longer informal. This case would have to be captured by formal decision rights. Hence, the informal cooperation relation is an individual choice of each governmental actor.

Under these two circumstances, cost-benefit considerations should be amplified and actors are much more receptive to them as compared to the case of formal decision rights. The resulting opportunity costs for entertaining a cooperation relation are individually controlled and not at all negligible. A completely rational actor may try to choose cooperation/communication partners for each issue area separately, perhaps based on preferential similarity in the respective issue area. However, since Simon (1957) introduced the concept of "bounded rationality" it is clearly accepted that

"the capacity of human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality" (Simon 1957: 198).

Assuming that cooperation patterns are constant across issue areas is such a reasonable approximation, which can be handled by the governmental actors involved. The choice set for possible cooperation partners reduces enormously, and in settings of six to thirteen actors a reasonable informed choice about informal cooperation can be made.

To measure the extend of the actor's power inside each self-organized governmental system, a common network concept of centrality is used. Betweenness centrality is a measure to quantify the control of information by an actor. "Betweenness is useful as an index of the potential for control communication [and thus] the betweenness measure represents controlling, or in increasing the dependence of others" (Freeman 1979: 224). As the self-organized structure of cooperation is mainly determined by communication, i.e. sending and receiving information, the measure especially

takes this fact into account. Hence power is associated with control over information and not with the status or rank inside of the cooperation networks. The later is considered in the next section as actually-perceived authority structure. Based on that argument Burt especially highlights the advantages for centrally located actors bridging structural holes in a network (Burt 1992, 2004). The central actor is a broker between many other actors. She can get information that others may not get, filter unwanted information, and receive crucial information early enough. I.e. she can control the self-organized governmental structure. The common index of betweenness centrality is used to measure that concept.<sup>18</sup>

Contrary to the two-mode networks in the last section, the cooperation networks are one-mode and thus not directly comparable to the first. However, it is possible to convert them into two-mode networks using the assumption made above. The link between an actor and the issue area is than defined by the centrality of the actor inside of the complete governmental system. Consequently the resulting governmental structures are constant over the issue areas. The data was again gathered by Thurner et al. (2002) using standardized questionnaires. During the interviews the national governmental top officials were asked about enhanced cooperation with other actors during the process of national position taking.<sup>19</sup>

**Actually-Perceived Authority Structures** The third and last feature to describe and therefore analyze national governments in greater detail is based on the ex-post perceived influence of the actors involved. Ex-post means that the internal perception of influence was measured after the negotiation itself. The formal allocation of decision rights and the informal structure of self-organization introduced in the previous section gives the actors the ability to partly control the process. However, they not necessarily claim that the actor is indeed able to assert these advantages. An advantageous position in the communication structure could be contradicted by the formal allocation of decision rights and vice versa. Therefore the concept of actually-perceived authority is included as the third point of interest. Aghion and Tirole (1997) call this characteristic real authority and define it as the “effective control over decisions” (Aghion and Tirole 1997: 2). In the end, this is the benchmark at which the other structural features can be measured. Bacharach and Lawler (1980) put it that way:

“Thus, the theoretical value of concentrating on the influence network as opposed to the authority structure is that it offers a more complete, political picture of the organizational system. [...] The influence network that exists among coalitions is the emergent organizational property of primary interest to the political analysis of organizations” (Bacharach and Lawler 1980: 205).

Again the concept is not based on omniscient experts who describe authority or influence to some actors, but rather it is derived from inside the governmental system using the actors’ self-assessment of the structure. Later on it is defined formally as

<sup>18</sup>The exact definition of betweenness centrality is given in section 5.1.

<sup>19</sup>A summary of the questionnaire is printed in the Appendix on page xviii.

the degree of shared power perceptions by all actors involved in the given issue area. Already by definition a strong relationship between the formal allocation of decision rights, the power to control cooperation patterns, and the perceived influence is expected. Section 5.2 will highlight these relationships in more detail. The actually-perceived authority structure is not sensitive to individual resources. Whether an actor denotes one or ten colleagues as influential during the national position taking process does not make any difference with regard to her costs for doing so. Contrary to the self-organized cooperation structures, there is no comparable effort related to the denotation of any other actor as influential. Henceforth the actors are able to indicate an issue group-specific assessment of influence. Such a network can be described as a two-mode network (actor×issue group). For each policy area the relation between an actor and the issue can be defined as number of times the actor is denoted as influential by the other actors. But it is also possible to transfer this network into one-mode. Then the network either describes the number of times one actor denotes another actor as influential (actor×actor) or the number of actors who are denoted as influential in both issue areas (issue area×issue area). Again, the data was gathered by conducting personal interviews (Turner et al. 2002).<sup>20</sup>

Based on methods of network analysis and the measures discussed above, it is possible to define national governments in a quantitative and empirically-operable manner. Using the formal allocation of decision rights, the informally self-organized structure of coordination, and the actually-perceived influence structure, the main aspects of national governments in the European Union can be modeled.

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<sup>20</sup>The question is printed in the Appendix on page xviii.

## 5 Describing Governments as Networks

### 5.1 Description of the Governments of the EU-15

This chapter summarizes the descriptive analyses for the defined network structures. Each kind of the network structure is examined in a separate analysis. Based on the content of the relation (allocation of formal decision rights, self-organized structure and perceived influence structure), there are obviously different theoretical expectations and interpretations possible (Monge and Contractor 2003: 59).

There is a distinction between resource-sensitive and resource-independent networks. In the case of resource-sensitive networks (like the distribution of decision rights or the structure of self-organization), cost-benefit arguments come into play. A common main task of the self-organized as well as of the formal structure is to process information among governmental actors. Simon (1971) already mentioned that “in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something else” (Simon 1971: 40-41). It is rather obvious that a lot of information consumes a lot of an actor’s attention. This attention is not unlimited and Simon follows that a “wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it” (Simon 1971: 41).

Granting one of the limited decision rights to an actor or maintaining coordination relations with some other actor are costly decisions. Attention and time, which are usually very limited in top-level positions of the national governments, have to be invested for the informal coordination relation. And granting one of the decision rights to an actor leads to some (dis)advantage for the other actors inside of the governmental system. Whether the possession of a decision right is an advantage or a disadvantage is discussed in the respective section. For example, the formal duty to foster compromise could also be a disadvantage for an actor.

On the contrary, the network of perceived influence can be understood as resource-independent. It is nearly costless to denote someone else as influential – especially after the event. A strategic denotation of certain actors after the conference is not likely. Henceforth it can be assumed that the given answers of the actors involved were sincere and not biased by strategic considerations.

In general the resource-sensitive networks should be selective and efficient: selective means because not each possible tie is created and efficient because only necessary relations are created and redundant ties are not created.

“Organizations make self-interested choices among alternative organizational forms by attempting to minimize the communication, information search, and decision-making costs” (Monge and Contractor 2003: 151).

As the distribution of decision rights is clearly an organizational choice, these minimization efforts should be at work. In the case of self-organization, the individual actor is interested in minimizing her costs for informal coordination and at the same time maximizing her utility from it. Selectivity of individual network choices can be interpreted as the valuation of the link (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). *Ceteris paribus* a governmental system with only a few self-organized links indicates high

costs for these links, and vice versa, a dense self-organized structure indicates lower costs. In addition to selectivity the connectivity of the networks is of special interest in the case of the formal decision rights and the self-organization. Competing and disconnected groups in the self-organized structure can harm the national position taking process as much as a disconnected network of formal decision rights can. The latter may lead to situations where one part of the government does not know what the other part is doing. In both cases the national position taking process runs the risk of being inefficient.

In the case of resource-independent networks, the general expectations are less clear. A tendency towards hierarchical structures should become visible, because of the nature of the network. When actor A denotes influence to actor B and actor B to actor C, then it is likely that actor A also denotes influence to actor C.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the boss of my boss is also very likely my boss. This concept is called transitivity and explained later on in detail. Contrary to the self-organized coordination structure, where reciprocal links can be expected, a large number of mutual relations should be unlikely in influence networks. If actor A claims a cooperation relation with actor B, it is likely that actor B does the same with regard to actor A. However, if actor A denotes actor B as influential there is no reason why actor B should also do that with actor A.

These are very basic concepts, but as Wasserman and Faust (1994) state, “researchers frequently [forget] to study lower-order structures in their data. [...] [S]uch analyses are quite important in social network analyses” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 602). They consider the “techniques discovered and used by the early sociometricians [still as] some of the best ever developed” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 555). The descriptive section in this chapter applies appropriate methods to the different kind of networks, starting with basic concepts and advancing methodologically to state of the art methods at the end (i.e. exponential random graph modeling, Robins et al. 2007).

This chapter has two main goals. On the one hand, it should describe the data under research in this thesis. That is to describe the similarities and differences in the formal, self-organized, and perceived influence structures of the governments in the EU-15. Therefore comparative measures are derived which are used in the chapters on national position taking and assertiveness of the actors. On the other hand, several descriptive techniques to analyze governmental structures using methods of social network analysis are introduced, and hence possibilities for further research are shown.

**Formal Structures of Decision Rights** As defined above, the network of formal decision rights is a two-mode or affiliation network. For this case, Wasserman and Faust accentuate that it “becomes important to study the connectedness and reachability between actors [ministries] and events [issue groups]” (Wasserman and

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<sup>21</sup>To avoid too many subscripts in the notation the actor<sub>*i,j*</sub> (*i* = member state and *j* = ministry) defined above will be abbreviated in the following if possible. Two distinct actors, actor<sub>*i,a*</sub> and actor<sub>*i,b*</sub> in member state *i*, are denoted actor A (or A) and actor B (or B). This notation is usually detailed enough to explain most of the concepts. When necessary, the more extensive notation is applied.



Faust 1994: 317). They consider ties between actors and events as “conduits of information” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 317) and focus on the question if information originating at an event or through an actor can possibly reach any other event or actor. Whereas Wasserman and Faust focus on the pure existence of these channels, the next section also considers the distance (i.e. the length of these information channels) as important. Consider two ministries A and B which want to exchange some information. There is a difference if ministry A meets ministry B directly in a formal meeting to prepare the national position, or if ministry A only meets ministry C in a meeting, which then meets ministry B in another meeting.

For reasons of simplicity the formal decision rights (i.e. the lead in position taking, the official access, the project management and the constitutional competencies of the head of government) are aggregated for the descriptive section. All of the rights stand at least for some kind of formally defined access to the process of national position taking. During the analysis in the subsequent chapters, the disaggregated formal decision rights are used. For now the networks are dichotomized, and set to one if the actor

- prepares the first proposal,
- has formal access to the process of national position taking, or
- is responsible for the temporary project management

in the respective issue area. It takes the value of zero otherwise. In addition, premier ministers who were constitutionally involved in the process are coded one.

The section starts with some standard indicators shown in Table 3. “One of the most basic attributes of a social network is its density – essentially a count of the number of ties present” (Borgatti and Everett 1997: 253). The allocation of formal decision rights is completely at the governments’ disposal. Following transaction cost economics, governments try to minimize their cost for decision making in choosing the form of organization (Monge and Contractor 2003: 159). More actors with official access to the process of national position taking also means a harder time to get any agreement on a national position and consequently raise the cost for national coordination. On the other hand, Grabher argues, “[too] little embeddedness may expose networks to an erosion of their [...] institutions” (Grabher 1993: 25-26). In this case the national government has an interest in granting formal decision rights to most of the actors belonging to the executive. Concentrating decision rights too much bears the risk of overloading the core actors while at the same time loosening the peripheral actors from their responsibilities. Therefore a medium density is to be expected for the networks of formal allocation of decision rights in the member states of the EU-15.

Formally the density of a network is defined as number of existing relations divided by the number of possible relations. In the case of the IGC 1996, the question is, how many of the actors being involved during the national position taking process had at least one of the possible distributed formal decision rights with regard to the issue areas.

The two-mode network  $\mathcal{X}$  (actor  $\times$  issue group) represents the allocation of formal decision rights inside of each member state (dichotomized). Therefore the density is defined as

$$\Delta(\mathcal{X}) = \frac{\sum_{a=1}^M \sum_{k=1}^N f_{a,k}}{M * N}$$

where  $f_{a,k} = 1$  if actor  $a$  has one of the above defined formal decision rights with regard to issue group  $k$  and zero otherwise.  $M$  is the number of actors and  $N$  the number of issue areas (Borgatti and Everett 1997: 253).

As already mentioned above, the connectedness of the government is necessary to ensure an effective process of position taking. “The effectiveness of the group is a function of the shortest distance that any informer is from the origin of any bit of information” (Everett and Borgatti 2005: 62). The average distance between the actors and the issue groups do “quantify how far apart each pair of nodes [are from each other]” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 111). Consequently, the measure is an indication of governmental effectiveness in the sense of Everett and Borgatti (2005). For a detailed differentiation of effectiveness and efficiency see also Section 5.2 or Barnard (1966). A combination of the density and the average distance allows describing the selectivity and effectiveness of the formal networks.

Density is calculated directly on the two-mode network, whereas it is necessary to transform the two-mode network into a bipartite network  $\mathcal{X}_{bip}$ <sup>22</sup> to estimate the average distance among reachable actors. In the bipartite network, actors as well as issue areas (events) are represented as nodes (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 318). The size of the bipartite network  $\mathcal{X}_{bip}$  is equal to  $L = M + N$ , whereas  $M$  is the number of actors and  $N$  is the number of issue areas.

The average (geodesic) distance among reachable nodes<sup>23</sup> is defined as

$$\bar{d}(\mathcal{X}_{bip}) = \frac{\sum_{l=1}^{L^*} \sum_{m=1}^{L^*} d_{l,m}}{L^* * (L^* - 1)}$$

where  $l \neq m$  are nodes in the bipartite network and  $d_{l,m}$  is the geodesic distance between node  $l$  and node  $m$ ,  $L^*$  is the number of reachable nodes in the bipartite network ( $L^* = M^* + N^*$ ),  $M^*$  is the number of reachable actors, and  $N^*$  respectively the number of reachable issue areas.

The latter concept of the average distance ignores isolated nodes because the distance to an isolated node is not defined. However, information inside the governmental structures can possibly originate from each single node, whether it is an actor or an event. It is possible to think of an isolated event as a policy area in the

<sup>22</sup>The bipartite structure includes the transpose values and missing values for actor-actor and event-event relations.

<sup>23</sup>Reachable means that nodes are connected by a path with arbitrary length, i.e. nodes that are not isolated (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 128).

case under consideration. An isolated policy area also contains information which is usually not negligible for the whole system. The isolation does also not change the urgency of national position taking in that area. Thus widening the perspective and including isolated nodes is necessary. Therefore Doreian (1974) proposed a measure of distance-based cohesion which has recently being discussed by Borgatti (2006). They propose to measure distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") under a specific assumption for the case that  $d_{l,m}$  is not defined (i.e. the nodes are not connected). If  $d_{l,m}$  does not exist, it is assumed that the distance approach infinity ( $d_{l,m} \rightarrow \infty$ ) and therefore the limit of the inverse equals zero ( $\lim_{d_{l,m} \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{d_{l,m}} = 0$ ) (Borgatti 2006: 27-28). The cohesion of the complete network can be defined as

$$Comp(\mathcal{X}_{bip}) = \frac{\sum_{l=1}^L \sum_{m=1}^L \frac{1}{d_{l,m}}}{L * (L - 1)}$$

where  $l \neq m$  and  $d_{l,m}$  is defined as above,  $L$  is the number of nodes in the bipartite network ( $L = M + N$ ),  $M$  is the number of actors, and  $N$  the number of issue areas.

Essentially, distance based cohesion measures the average of the inverse distance ( $\frac{1}{d_{l,m}}$ ) for all actors and issue groups. A value of one indicates that every node is within distance one of the other nodes. The system is highly cohesive and every actor is directly connected to all issue areas. Alternatively, a value of zero indicates that all nodes are isolated.

All measures (density, average distance, and distance based cohesion) give a crude indication of the cohesiveness of the distribution of formal decision rights in the member states of the European Union. Hence we can observe the underlying formal patterns inside of these governmental systems. The network's density can be interpreted as percentage of governmental actors who have, to a varying degree, official access to the national position taking process. This degree depends on the specific decision right which enables the actor to participate in the process. As the networks are dichotomized in this section, the approach is generalized to some kind of formal access. In general, the more actors have access to the process, the more concerns need to be accounted for and the slower and less efficient the process of national position taking could be. On the other hand, a high density of the formal structure leads to a short average distance between reachable actors and thus to a high "compactness" of the governmental system. Governmental actors are well connected to each other and therefore usually know the topics in discussion in most of the other policy areas. Because the policies being discussed before an intergovernmental conference are often interdependent, this knowledge can be important. The absence of it may lead to inconsistent and opposed national positions in the different policy areas.

With regard to the formal structure of the governmental systems, Table 3 clearly shows large discrepancies between the member states of the European Union. In Ireland, on average and over all issues, one of three involved ministries had formal decision rights during the preparation of the national positions, whereas in the Netherlands, more than 60% of the actors had official access to the process, were

responsible for the project management, or were in charge of formulating the initial position. Overall, the density of the formal structures is around 50%. More precisely, this means that each actor involved into the process had on average access to half of the negotiation issues during the national position taking process. The allocation of formal decision rights is selective. It seems to be costly to grant too many ministries access to the process of position taking. Therefore most member states restrain their formal structure of decision rights for reasons of efficiency. This is due to the cost of collective decision making, which generally rise with the size of the group. “The expected costs of organizing decisions, *under any given rule*, will be less in the smaller unit than in the larger, assuming that the populations of each are roughly comparable” (Buchanan and Tullock 1965: 112).

	Density	Average Distance among Reachable Nodes	Distance-Based Cohesion ("Compactness")
Ireland	0.333	2.190	0.471
Spain	0.359	2.437	0.500
Greece	0.364	2.405	0.507
Belgium	0.380	2.362	0.515
Denmark	0.463	2.210	0.552
Great Britain	0.463	2.219	0.550
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.477</b>	<b>2.146</b>	<b>0.555</b>
Sweden	0.489	2.152	0.566
Finland	0.491	2.181	0.561
Austria	0.515	2.132	0.574
Luxembourg	0.515	2.038	0.585
France	0.537	1.857	0.546
Germany	0.574	2.000	0.602
Italy	0.587	1.958	0.612
The Netherlands	0.611	1.897	0.626

Estimations are done using UCINET version 6.138 (Borgatti et al. 2002).

Table 3: Density, Distance and Compactness of the Formal Structures of Decision Rights

There is an additional explanation for some member states with relatively high densities. During the Intergovernmental Conference 1996, four member states were successively charged with the six-month long presidency of the European Union (Italy (January–June 1996), Ireland (July–December 1996), the Netherlands (January–June 1997) and Luxembourg (July–December 1997)). These countries usually exhibit a higher degree of involvement during the IGC than the others. This involvement is reflected by a high density of formal decision rights. Even with the outstanding low density of formal decision rights in Ireland, this fact is corroborated by the densities shown in Table 3. The four countries executed the presidency have on average a denser structure than the others (0.512 versus 0.464). Together with the Franco-German axis, they have the highest degree of national involvement.

The expected opposed trend between density and average distance can be seen

in the second column of the table. The member states with a dense formal structure also have a short average distance between the nodes. Taking the interdependent issues which are under consideration in intergovernmental conferences into account, it would be meaningful to assure a connected governmental system. All of the governmental systems in the European Union have a well connected formal structure. On average, the distance between two nodes is 2.1. Taking the two-mode structure of the network into account, nearly all actors involved are – on average – connected by an issue group. If actor A wants to discuss some matter with actor B, there is an issue group where they formally have contact. This finding holds for all member states. Numbers smaller than two indicate that there is more than one possibility and numbers larger than two indicate that there is no possibility for some actors. Looking at the most extreme values, in France a ministry needs on average 1.86 steps in the formal structure to get to another node. Compared to that, a ministry in Spain needs 2.44 steps inside the Spanish governmental formal structure. This corresponds to 30% more effort for the Spanish ministry. Since every step in the formal structure costs time and attention, the related costs for information seeking rise with the distance. At the same time indirect links and information received by indirect links are less reliable and henceforth not in the interest of the actors. In the next section it could be examined if actors try to overcome these indirect formal connections by entertaining self-organized networks to bridge these not existing links.

Unfortunately, the measure of average distance accounts only for reachable nodes. However, in the real world we see that it is possible for actors to be totally disconnected from the formal structure, or for the formal structure to split off in two mutually disconnected groups. In this instance, the average distance would lead to spurious result and a focus on the distance-based cohesion is preferable. The difference between distance and cohesion inside the observed governments is rather small because the number of isolated nodes inside of the networks of formal decision rights is rather small in the underlying case. By visual inspection of the formal networks it can be seen that almost all actors involved are connected to at least one issue area (see Appendix on page i ff.). Overall, the issue groups and actors being involved in all member states are connected in some way, which leads to closed systems without formally disconnected groups inside of all national governments of the European Union. Nevertheless the distance between the actors and issue groups differs widely. Thus the availability of fast formal information channels also differs inside of the European countries. Again the question to what extent this fact is balanced by informal structures is answered in the next section.

Table 4 shows the non-relational formal decision rights (project management and power of the head of government). The respective ministries have these rights with regard to all issues in discussion. In fourteen out of fifteen member states the ministry of foreign affairs is at least partially responsible for the temporary management of the national position taking process, while the premiers' offices are only seldom on that duty. In the table, the power of the heads of government is also presented more detailed. Therefore data are derived from Bergman et al. (2003: 190). Their original index of prime ministerial constitutional power (0-15) is divided into three groups (0-5: weak 6-10: medium and 11-15: strong).

Whereas there are only few differences in the appointment of the temporary

project management, there are considerably large discrepancies with regard to the distribution of the other formal decision rights. The density of the distribution and consequently the formal cohesion of the national executive systems vary across the member states in the European Union. The chapter defining the model of national position taking (Chapter 6) will have to take these structural differences into account. But first, the next section will focus on the networks of self-organization and therefore includes the informal structures in the descriptive analysis.

	Project Management	Power of the Head of Government
Austria	PO, MFA	weak
Belgium	MFA	medium
Denmark	MFA	medium
Finland	MFA	weak
France	MFA	medium
Germany	MFA	strong
Great Britain	PO, EU-Sec	strong
Greece	MFA	medium
Ireland	MFA	medium
Italy	MFA	weak
Luxembourg	PO, MFA	medium
The Netherlands	MFA	weak
Portugal	MFA	medium <sup>24</sup>
Spain	MFA	strong
Sweden	MFA	medium

Table 4: Project Management and Competence of the Head of Government

**Self-organized Structures of Cooperation** As defined in Section 4.4 the existing cooperation patterns inside of the national governments can be seen as indicators of an underlying self-organized structure. Ministries who “cooperated particularly close in order to elaborate / bring in a joint position into the coordination process” (Turner et al. 2002: 283) can do this because of formal requirements to do so, or because they want to bypass exactly these. In the case of the self-organized structures of cooperation the amount of information control is important and not just the amount of information available. It is measured how far an actor is able to steer the information flow through it’s location in the network and not how much information an actor has. The question about the interplay between the formal and self-organized structures is more closely examined in Section 5.2. Next, the descriptive nature of the self-organized structure itself is laid down and roughly compared with the formal structure of decision rights.

As in the case of the formal structure, the description of the self-organized structure starts with the density of the observed networks. Unlike the formal networks,

<sup>24</sup>The premier’s office in Portugal was not involved in the preparation of the national position prior the IGC.

the networks here do not originate from some collective allocation of decision rights. They are voluntarily made choices of informal cooperation. It is left open if the cooperation is considered as informal information seeking or maybe as persuasive action with regard to a certain policy issue. Anyway, there is a considerably valuable flow of information between the two actors entertaining or maintaining such a cooperation. At the same time, maintaining and entertaining social relations is not free and consequently the observed networks should again be selective. The choice of informal cooperation is an individual decision, not a collective one as the formal allocation of decision rights is. This should be mirrored in overall lower densities of these structures. For each national government, the density of the one-mode network of self-organization ( $\mathcal{Z}$ ) is defined as

$$\Delta(\mathcal{Z}) = \frac{\sum_{a=1}^M \sum_{b=1}^M coop_{a,b}}{M * (M - 1)}$$

where  $coop_{a,b} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if actor } a \text{ maintains a cooperation relation with actor } b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ ,

$a \neq b$  are actors inside of the same member state and  $M$  is the number of actors inside of the respective government.

Shifting the focus to the actors' activity in informal cooperation, the "outdegree [number of choices made] could be interpreted as 'expansiveness', while the node's indegree [number of choices received] would signal its 'popularity'" (Monge and Contractor 2003: 38). Together the average number of choices made is a measure of the "tendency of actors to make 'choices'" (Monge and Contractor 2003: 38) and therefore an indication for their overall activity.

The average degree for the network  $\mathcal{Z}$  is defined as

$$\text{Average Degree}(\mathcal{Z}) = \frac{\sum_{a=1}^M \sum_{b=1}^M coop_{a,b}}{M}$$

where  $a \neq b$  are actors inside of the same member state,  $coop_{a,b}$  and  $M$  are defined as above.

There is no distinction between in- and outdegree, because at the aggregated level of the national networks the average indegree is equal to the average outdegree. Each indegree of one actor is an outdegree of another actor in the network. There are no choices made from outside of the governmental system, and it is not possible to choose an actor outside of the system. By definition the governmental system is constituted of all actors who were involved in the process of national position taking. Averaging over all these actors inside of a governmental network leads to an equal number of in- and outdegrees, and hence to an equal average. Density and average degree can be seen as an indicator of resources invested into the self-organization of the respective national government. In a cross-national perspective, this argument

holds only under the assumption of equal costs across countries for the formation of a cooperation link.

Contrary to the formal structure, the self-organized structure is directed. There is a difference between actor A who confirms the cooperation with actor B ( $A \rightarrow B$ ) or actor B who confirms the cooperation with actor A ( $B \rightarrow A$ ). Theoretically the relation between two actors (or more generally nodes) is called a dyad. This directed dyad can take one of four states:

1.  $A \rightarrow B$
2.  $B \rightarrow A$  (or  $A \leftarrow B$ )
3.  $A \leftrightarrow B$
4. no relation between A and B

The states can exclusively be described by three “isomorphism classes” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 124). As the actors A and B are interchangeable, the concept of isomorphism classes do not distinguish between case one and two. If the relation is confirmed only by one actor, it is called asymmetric (1 and 2); if both actors confirm the relation (3), the dyad is mutual or reciprocal; and if there is no relation at all, the dyad is called null (4). This distinction is obviously useless for the former case of undirected networks.

In many social networks and especially in trust-related networks, as informal cooperation, reciprocal relations are considered to be more stable than asymmetric relations. Asymmetric relations are seen as “intermediated states of relationships that are striving for a more stable equilibrium of reciprocity [...] or complete nullity (devoid of either arc)” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 510). Moreover, De Nooy et al. (2005) see symmetric ties as an indication of equality inside of social networks and consequently as a basis of stability. Another point of interest is the enforceability of informally made agreements. The cooperation relations are informal and thus there is no possibility to control them closely, make binding agreements or to punish deviant behavior. In the case of defection from informally made arrangements only the “shadow of the future” may lead to some compliance (Axelrod 1984: 124ff.). In this informal environment, mutuality of cooperation relations and thereof arising trust is even more important for long-term, stable structures.

Consequently the level of stability of the self-organized governmental system ( $\mathcal{Z}$ ) is determined by the following index of reciprocity:

$$\text{Reciprocity} = \frac{2M}{2M + A}$$

where  $M$  is the number of mutual ties in  $\mathcal{Z}$  and  $A$  is the number of asymmetric ties in  $\mathcal{Z}$ . The index only compares the number of mutual (reciprocal) ties with the number of all existing ties. There is no direct relation to the density of the structures, only to the proportion of mutual relations compared to all existing relations. This way a comparable measure across all member states is defined.

Usually the next higher level of analysis is the triad. It is considered equally important as the level of the actor itself and the dyadic level. A triad consists of



three actors (nodes) and their relations to each other. Between the three actors in a triad six relations exist ( $A \rightarrow B$ ,  $A \rightarrow C$ ,  $B \rightarrow A$ ,  $B \rightarrow C$ ,  $C \rightarrow A$ ,  $C \rightarrow B$ ) and each of these relations can be present or absent. Based on that and simple combinatorics, there exist  $2^6 = 64$  possible realizations or states for a triad. In other words, the three actors can be connected in 64 different ways. The circumstance of so many different combinations lead to the necessity of a simpler labeling scheme (called M-A-N) as proposed by Holland and Leinhardt (1970) and Davis and Leinhardt (1972). Using this scheme it is possible to deduce “sixteen isomorphism classes for the sixty-four different triad states” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 564). The summary of the classes is called a triadic census and can be used to focus on some specific constellation. The focus with regard to the self-organized structure in this thesis lies on the most prominent feature of triads, namely their transitivity. Usually transitivity describes the fact, that the friend of my friend is also my friend (i.e.  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $B \rightarrow C$  leads to a higher probability for a link  $A \rightarrow C$ ).

Remember that the expected effects are highly dependent on the content of the relationship, which is here informal national coordination. For informal transgovernmental relations, Thurner and Binder argue that “[t]ransitive relations constitute a social equilibrium state allowing for reciprocal exchange and its control. They secure the control of compliance and policy implementation” (Thurner and Binder 2009: 1). Most importantly, transitive structures achieve this social equilibrium with fewer links and consequently fewer resources than (for example) full clique-like structures. A clique is a maximal connected subgraph, i.e. all actors in a clique have links to all other actors inside of the subgraph (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 273ff.). However, Wasserman and Faust also mention that looking at political relation among individuals and with regard to ties “that are expensive to maintain (that is, those using scarce resources) [it is also] unlikely to yield transitive triples” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 598). Their expectation is based on the fact that the last link in the transitive relation ( $A \rightarrow C$ ) is superfluous, assuming that the first two links are reliable. But this last link is still associated with the possibility of control and compliance inside of networks. Taking into account the informal nature of the relation in the underlying case this possibility of control is appreciated by all actors. Henceforth it is expected that actors try to form at least transitive relations.

The index of Transitivity inside of the self-organized governmental system ( $\mathcal{Z}$ ) is defined as:

$$Transitivity = \frac{\text{Number of Transitive Triples in } \mathcal{Z}}{\text{Number of Two-Paths in } \mathcal{Z}}$$

where a two-path between two actors is the indirect connection of length two. For example, in Figure 6(a) there is a two-path from A to C (from A (via B) to C) indicated by the bold arrows. These two-paths are generally the basis of transitive relations. If in addition to that two-path, the direct link from A to C (dashed arrow) is existing, the triad would be fully transitive (030T)<sup>25</sup>. No further existing link would leave everything unchanged and the triad remains a two-path (021C). A link from C to A would result in a cyclic triad (030C).

<sup>25</sup>Purely transitive triads are 030T and 120D triads (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 567). However, in this context, all triads are counted where at least links from A to B, B to C, and A to C are existent.

To clarify the concept of transitivity and to delimit it from the concept of reciprocity Figure 6 presents a simplified example. Three actors (A, B, and C) are plotted with their existing and commonly known relations of informal cooperation (bold arrows). Informal cooperation takes place in a highly contested arena, like a national government, and cooperation is undoubtedly related to trust. Generally, an actor wants to cooperate with someone she trusts, especially if the content of the cooperation is informal and possibly bypassing formal rules and requirements. The question is whether actor A should send some important information to actor C, in other words, if she can trust actor C.

In short: Actor A trusts actor B and knows that actor B trusts actor C. If actor A concludes that she can also trust actor C, the relation between the actors would be purely transitive. However, one has to notice that the relations from A to B and from B to C are only one sided (i.e. asymmetric). A does not know if B also trusts her. If the one-sided relations are trustworthy, this setting is clearly an efficient way of self-organized coordination. But if the one-sided relations are not reliable, problems arise for the governmental actors.




Figure 6: Difference Between Efficient and Secure Triads (Example)

The more stable and secure way of informal cooperation in the described setting would be presented in Figure 6(b). Here the relations from A to B and from B to C are reciprocal. A knows that B confirms the cooperation relation (i.e. the relation is credible). To be confronted with a decision about sending crucial information to actor C, the right setting makes the decision more secure and stable. Nevertheless it is also related with a loss of efficiency. The purely transitive structure (6(a)) has two existing relations as information for the decision, whereas the full and stable structure (6(b)) has four. The possible results in reality are somewhere in between an efficient (cheap) network built mostly on transitive structures and a full (expensive) network built mostly on reciprocal structures. In terms of social network analysis Figure 6(a) resembles transitivity, whereas Figure 6(b) mirrors clique-like (reciprocal) structures. Full, clique-like structures are the most stable but also most expensive form of cooperation. Contrary transitive structures ensure only a minimum level of accountability and control, but the costs of coordinating in transitive structures is much lower.

This fact may not matter in very small settings; however the number of possible directed ties increases in quadratic fashion with the number of actors. “The complexity of relationships in any group increases with great rapidity as the number of

persons in the group increases” (Barnard 1966: 108).<sup>26</sup> Two actors have two possible ties, five actors already 20 and ten actors up to 90 possible ties. Consequently full structures can really become expensive and transitive structures indicate an efficient way of self-organization inside of a national government.

Despite of the global structures in the national executives, another important question is who controls the informal self-organized cooperation structure? And how much is it controlled at all. As the self-organized structure is not formally guided, it is possible that actors aim to control the self-organized structure in order to achieve a better outcome for themselves during the process of national position taking. Most likely this is done by influencing the informal communication of the actors. Associated with that, the question of the overall centralization of the system comes along. Are all actors equally embedded in the self-organized governmental systems, or is it perhaps controlled by few important actors? The focus in the case of the self-organized structures lies on the control of information and not on the detection of reporting structures inside of the self-organized networks. This is also resembled by the chosen measure of betweenness centrality. Reporting structures are already measured using the formal decision rights and informal hierarchies are measured later in this chapter using the actually-perceived influence structures.

The index of betweenness centrality is described as follows:

“[A]n actor is central if it lies between other actors on their geodesics, implying that to have a large ‘betweenness’ centrality, the actor must be *between* many of the actors via their geodesics” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 189).

A geodesic is the shortest path between a pair of actors in the network and thus actors with a high betweenness centrality very often lie on the shortest connection of other actors. “In return for brokering this relationship, they expect to earn a profit on their investment” (Monge and Contractor 2003: 159). Whether they really earn a profit is discussed and analyzed more closely in Chapter 7.

Wasserman and Faust (1994: 190) define the normalized betweenness centrality of an actor  $a$  as

$$C_B(a) = \frac{\sum_{b < c} \frac{g_{b,c}(a)}{g_{b,c}}}{\frac{(M^2 - 3M + 2)}{2}}$$

where  $a \neq b$  and  $a \neq c$  are actors involved inside of the same member state,  $M$  is the number of actors,  $g_{b,c}$  are all shortest paths from  $b$  to  $c$  and  $g_{b,c}(a)$  are the shortest paths  $g_{b,c}$  where actor  $a$  is included.

The normalized centrality score of actor  $a$  reflects the proportion of shortest paths between two other actors ( $b$  and  $c$ ), which have to pass through actor  $a$ . For the comparison of different network, this number is normalized by the maximum possible number of pairs not including actor  $a$ . The values range from zero to one. An actor having a betweenness centrality of one means that all indirect cooperation

<sup>26</sup>More detailed: The number of possible relations between  $M$  actors is equal to  $M * (M - 1)$  and thus approximately  $M^2$ .

efforts in the network have to pass through this actor and a score of zero means that none of the indirect relations have to pass through (see also Figure 8(b) on page 52).

The centrality itself is an attribute of each actor and thus constant across all observed policy areas. Beyond being an actor's attribute itself, the betweenness centrality also gives some indication about the overall centralization of the complete network. Many hypotheses have been postulated about the effects of centralized and decentralized governmental systems. For example "centralized organizations were more efficient for routine tasks while decentralized networks were more efficient for tasks that require creativity and collaborative problem solving" (Monge and Contractor 2003: 17). At this point, the focus is set on the centralization of the network itself, and later on in the next chapters, on the effects of the actors' centralities.

The centralization of the complete network, i.e. the system of self-organized cooperation in a member state, can be defined as follows (see Freeman (1979) and more recently Koschützki et al. (2005: 59)).  $W$  is an arbitrary measure of actor centrality and  $C_W(a^*)$  is the largest realized value of  $W$ . Then  $C_W$  is a general measure of network centralization:

$$C_W = \frac{\sum_{a=1}^g [C_W(a^*) - C_W(a)]}{n - 1}$$

For  $M$  actors, the number of dyads is theoretically determined by  $\frac{M*(M-1)}{2}$  (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 124) and the number of triads by  $\binom{M}{3} = \frac{M!}{3!(M-3)!} = \frac{1}{6} * M * (M - 1) * (M - 2)$  (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 560).

The self-organized structure is very selective and most systems are only sparsely connected through self-organized networks. Compared to the formal allocation of decision rights (average density: 48%), on average only one of four possible opportunities of cooperation is entertained in the national governmental systems of the European Union. This is a clear indication that maintaining cooperation relation is indeed costly and following actors make purposive choices of cooperation partners. An unusually high density of national cooperation patterns is present in France. The six involved ministries communicate on average with 50% of the other actors in the French national governmental system. This is not due to the relative low number of ministries being involved. In similar small governmental systems (like Luxembourg, Italy or Ireland) the density is around the overall mean.

Most likely this high involvement inside of the French government was due to some internal reasons. Shortly before the IGC 1996, Jacques Chirac won the presidential election in May 1995 and Alain Juppé, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, became Prime Minister. In addition to the Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel (SGCI), which is generally responsible for the French position in EU matters, the new Prime Minister introduced an interministerial meeting to coordinate the position taking (Deloche-Gaudez 2002: 141). This could be one reason for an unusually high density of the self-organized structure in France.

	AUT	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GrB	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NL	SPA	SWE	Average
Density	0.24	0.12	0.19	0.24	0.5	0.22	0.31	0.21	0.19	0.31	0.2	0.21	0.1	0.22	0.23
Average Degree	2.36	1.33	2.08	2.67	2.5	2.42	3.42	2.09	1.14	1.86	1	1.5	1.23	2	1.97
# Actors	11	12	12	12	6	12	12	11	7	7	6	8	13	10	10
Dyads	55	66	66	66	15	66	66	55	21	21	15	28	78	45	47
Mutual	7	4	3	9	6	8	15	9	2	6	1	4	4	5	6
Asymmetric	12	8	19	14	3	13	11	5	4	1	4	4	8	10	8
Null	36	55	44	43	6	42	40	41	15	14	10	20	66	30	33
Reciprocity	0.538	0.5	0.24	0.563	0.8	0.552	0.732	0.783	0.5	0.923	0.333	0.667	0.5	0.5	0.58
Triads	165	220	220	220	20	220	220	165	35	35	20	56	286	120	143
Transitive	31	9	22	33	8	26	71	17	2	6	2	4	7	21	19
Two-path	68	34	38	80	27	96	176	76	4	29	5	10	22	45	51
Transitivity	0.456	0.265	0.579	0.413	0.296	0.271	0.403	0.224	0.5	0.207	0.4	0.4	0.318	0.467	0.37
Betweenness Centralization	66%	82%	41%	20%	23%	67%	68%	98%	100%	100%	60%	17%	70%	51%	62%

Estimations are done using UCINET version 6.138 (Borgatti et al. 2002) except for the Betweenness Centralization.

Betweenness Centralization is estimated using VISIONE 2.3.3 (Brandes et al. 1999).

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on the Networks of Self-Organization by Member States

A less homogeneous picture is presented by the average degree of national actors. In Luxembourg, each actor has cooperation relations with one other actor on average, whereas an actor in Great Britain has relations with 3.42. Again, the differences in the size of government (Luxembourg:  $n=6$  and Great Britain  $n=12$ ) is not the primary reason for this circumstance. The Spanish government, with thirteen actors involved, is approximately the same size as the British one. However, the average actor in the Spanish government has only one-third of the national cooperation relations of her British colleagues. A reason for that could be the different valuation of the self-organized system or the different cost of linkage formation in the respective governmental system.

Proceeding with the descriptive comparison of the self-organized governmental structures, the index of reciprocity is noticeable. The index ranges from over 90% of reciprocal dyads in Italy to below 25% of reciprocal links in Denmark. This means in detail that inside the Italian government, nearly all existing relations between two actors are mutually confirmed. Compared to Denmark where only 25% of the actors confirm the self-organized coordination relation, these numbers point towards a high difference in the mutuality and consequently the stability of the self-organized structures of national governments inside the European Union. Another feature related to symmetric (or asymmetric) dyadic relations between two actors is the equality (or inequality) of individual actors inside the system. De Nooy et al. state that “[a]symmetric dyads indicate ranking” (De Nooy et al. 2005: 206). Following this, the Danish self-organized governmental system should be characterized by a high degree of inequality between actors’ ranks inside of the hierarchy, whereas the Italian system should be the opposite.

The aim of this section is not to explain the network choices in certain member states in detail, but rather to describe the similarities and differences of the self-organized governmental structures. Up to now it is possible to infer the following points for the existing informal coordination structure. The self-organization of national governments in the European Union is highly selective, and more complex measures of centrality inside of these structures need to be discussed. For this reason, it is advisable to analyze more complex configurations, such as the combinations of three actors and their respective links to each other (i.e. triads). The index of transitivity confirms the expected trend. Highly reciprocal structures have fewer transitive relations. Considering transitive relations (or transitive closure) as more efficient than purely reciprocal relations, the Danish governmental system seems to be more efficient in coordinating informally than the Italian one. But this advantage is associated with the cost of a lower stability of the self-organized relations. The index of transitivity also indicates the existence of informal hierarchies. The measure at the triadic level is better than purely focusing on the asymmetry of dyadic relations between two actors. One basic result is that there are huge differences in the self-organized structure inside the government of the European Union. Either cooperation is noticeably cheaper in some member states or the resources invested by each actor differ widely between the member states.

To have some point of comparison, Figure 7 shows the densities of the formal and the self-organized structure separated by the member states. Although the networks measure different relations, it is possible to compare their densities. In the

broadest sense density measures the percentage of links realized in a given network and is therefore independent of the kind of network (one- or two-mode), the relation measured in the network, or the size of the network.




Figure 7: Densities of the Formal and Self-Organized Governmental Structures by Member States

The self-organized structure is clearly more selective (i.e. less dense). This is basically due to the fact that each actor makes the choice of coordinating informally herself. The choice of granting decision rights, on the other hand, is more or less a collective process, where selectivity plays an inferior role. Another important matter of fact is the seeming independence of the two structures. On the first view, sparse formal structures neither lead to sparse self-organized structures nor do they lead to dense self-organized structures. Section 5.2 investigates this dependency in more detail.

Following De Nooy et al. (2005: 206-208) the measures of reciprocity and transitivity indicate also a difference in the hierarchical structure of the informal self-organization. Highly asymmetric and transitive governmental systems can be seen as hierarchical, whereas highly symmetric and less transitive systems are less hierarchical and actors are equally involved in the self-organized coordination structures. This raises questions about how to measure these informal hierarchies in more detail, and especially, how to determine the focal actor of these self-organized structures. The betweenness centrality defined earlier, and especially the centralization of the governmental system based thereon, is a possible indicator of the extent to which an actor is able to control the self-organized structure because of her position between the other actors inside of the network. In the case of coordination networks the “top of the hierarchy” is better denoted as the center of the hierarchy or network.

Betweenness centrality measures a more complex approach of centrality than asymmetric or transitive relations. It is a combination of all actors and their relations inside of the respective network at a time. For an actor it is not important how many other actors cooperate with her, rather the number of indirect communication the actor can influence is crucial. An actor may be denoted as cooperation partner of many other actors inside of the national government but at the same time not using this incoming information to steer the process of national position taking (e.g. the MFA in Denmark in Figure 8(a)). Hence the actor has a lot of information, but does not assert influence on other actors by circulating biased information further on.




Figure 8: Visualization of the Self-Organized Governmental Structures in Denmark and Italy

Figure 8 shows the two most different governmental systems with regard to the index of reciprocity. The radial layout of VISIONE (Brandes et al. 1999) shows actors with higher centrality values in the middle and the lower the centrality values are the bigger is the distance to the center of the circle. Each actor has a centrality measure, which determines its position in the graph. Combining all these actors' centralities results in the overall centralization of the network. The centralization measures for the other member states are reported in Table 5.

On the first view, Denmark (left) shows a fairly decentralized system, but still with the Ministry of Economy (MEco) as focal actor. On the other hand the Italian governmental system (right) is highly centralized with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the middle. Hence the first descriptive results earlier in this section were misleading. Although Italy has a highly symmetric structure, the expectation of De Nooy et al. (2005: 206) of a resulting decentralized system based on equality are not true. Inside the Italian self-organized governmental structure of cooperation every indirect relation between two actors is brokered by the MFA. This leads to a centrality score of one for the MFA and zero for all other actors. The direct link



between the Ministry of Interior (MI) and the Ministry of Justice (MJ) is not taken into account because the betweenness centrality only focuses on indirect relations. The overall betweenness centralization of the network is therefore equal to one (or 100%).

Contrary the self-organized system in Denmark is much more diffuse despite its asymmetric structure. It is nearly impossible to see how many two-paths are passing through which actors. However the betweenness centrality of the actors and the centralization of the system can still be estimated. There are two points of interest. First, the most central actor is the Ministry of Economy (MEco). The centrality of the MEco is 0.463 and the overall centralization of the system is 0.41. This is not only quantitatively different from the system in Italy, which has lower centrality scores for most of the actors and a higher centralization, it is also a qualitative difference. Whereas the Italian self-organized system is fully controlled by the MFA, which is often conceived as formally responsible in the area of foreign policy making, the Danish self-organized system is in large parts controlled by specialized departments (MEco and MLab). The next section will focus on these differences between formally responsible actors and informally (self-organized) central ones. The second point of interest is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Denmark. It is easy to see that, despite of the European Affairs Committee of the Parliament (EU-C), everyone has a link to the MFA. The MFA itself has only a few links to other actors and is therefore very “popular” (i.e. has a high number of incoming coordination relations), but not a broker of coordination relations between actors. Altogether, betweenness centrality resembles the control of information flows and knowledge about information structures. Being able to steer or even control these processes is a powerful position in the governmental structure. The possibility to withhold information or alternatively to strategically forward information is clearly a crucial comparative advantage over the other actors in the system. Hence the measure of interest does not resemble incoming information – this is done by the structures of formal decision rights – nor does it resemble the informal rank or status of the actor – this is done by the actually-perceived influence structures. It resembles the amount of information control an actor can assert in the informal process.

**Actually-Perceived Authority Structures** To complete the descriptive section, the perceived influence structures are scrutinized next. The actually-perceived authority structure is based on the shared influence perception of the actors inside of the governmental system. Such influence structures give a “more complete, political picture of the organizational system” (Bacharach and Lawler 1980: 205). In the case study, each actor involved was able to denote (or not denote) all other actors as “especially / outstanding influential in the process of finding the final negotiation position” with regard to each issue group (Thurner et al. 2002: 283). Self-nominations of perceived influence are meaningful in this context and the design leads to a valued network of influence perceptions. In terms of a two-mode network, the network indicates for each actor A in a national governmental system how many actors consider A as influential with regard to a specific issue area. The value ranges from zero in the case of no nominations up to the number of actors in the system. The latter is reached if all actors being involved (including A herself) denote A as

influential in the respective issue area. Again, the two-mode network (actor×issue area) can be transferred into one-mode (actor×actor). Under these circumstances the relation between actor A and actor B indicates in how many issue areas actor A is denoted influential by actor B.

The usage of measures like density or cohesion is somehow complicated in the area of influence structures. Denoting some other actors as influential is neither directly related to individual costs as in the case of the self-organized cooperation, nor is it related to collective cost as in the case of the formal allocation of decision rights. Therefore expectations about the selectivity of the networks are not meaningful to interpret. But another basic measure of network analysis, the indegree, is useful in this context (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 124-125). The indegree counts how often an actor is denoted influential by the other actors summed up over all issue areas. As the total number of actors differ between the member states a comparison is only possible within each member state and not between.

The indegree of actor  $a$  is defined as

$$Indegree(a) = \sum_{b=1}^M \sum_{k=1}^N \pi_{a,b,k}$$

where  $\pi_{a,b,k} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if actor } b \text{ denotes actor } a \text{ as influential in issue group } k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ ,

actor  $a$  and  $b$  are members of the same government,  $M$  is the number of actors inside of this government, and  $N$  the number of issue groups under consideration.

The indegree of major actors involved is printed in Table 6.<sup>27</sup> The interpretation of the table is straightforward: the Premier's Office in Austria for example has a value of 65. This means summing up the nine observed issue groups the Premier's Office in Austria was denoted 65 times as influential by the other actors inside of the Austrian government. Each involved actor can be responsible for nine nominations, one in each issue area. The maximum value in each member state (column) is printed in *italics*.

Table 6 clearly shows that in an aggregate perspective the ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) are still perceived as the most influential actors in the national systems. Only the premiers' offices can contest this role in two member states (DEN and LUX). The indegree gives a crude overview of the perceived influence structure, but does not include the overall structure (e.g. variation of total number of nominations) and does not take the different number of actors involved into account. For this reason it is not possible (at this point of the thesis) to compare, for example, the MFA in Austria (66) with the MFA in Denmark (76). There may be overall more nominations in a member state or there may be more actors involved in another.

To solve this problem and derive a comparable measure the one-mode networks are dichotomized. For each member state the average number of nominations is estimated. The new relation between actor A and actor B is set to one if actor A is more frequently denoted influential by actor B than the average number of

<sup>27</sup>Some minor actors are excluded from the table to assure a viewable version.

nominations in the respective member state (for a similar procedure see Turner 2008: 419, FN 31). Having standardized the networks this way, it is possible to focus on their structure again and compare them across the member states. In the case of influence structures, it is especially interesting if there is a hierarchical order of the perceptions. Are some actors perceived as influential in the national position taking by everybody else inside of the national executive, or are there more diffuse perceptions among the actors involved?

	AUT	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GrB	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NL	POR	SPA	SWE
PO	65	52	<b>83</b>	53	37	72	16	30	24	24	<b>51</b>	24		51	47
MFA	<b>66</b>	<b>61</b>	76	<b>78</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>44</b>	49	<b>53</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>74</b>
MI	13	13	15	27	9	25	41	17		8		15		21	
MJ	7	17	35	42	9	36	27	19	12	10	8	11		17	26
MF	11	6	11	20		34	39	9	21	15	2	15			24
MEco	9	18	37		20	56		19				24		16	
MLab		10	18	12		11	17	11	4		6	8		10	11
MSoc	8	7	6	5			13		5					6	3
MDef	4	4	6	5		9	9	8		5				8	10
MEnv	7	5	22	11		12	14	7	4		5	8		6	10
FS	11	26				26								6	
EU-C	17	6	50	40		6	15							7	18

The maximum value in each member state is printed in *italics*.

Table 6: Indegree of Actually-Perceived Authority Structure (Major Actors Involved)

The formal structure discussed earlier is intended to be hierarchical per se. On the first level it indicates, which ministries have access to the process of national position taking and on a second level it defines which ministry leads the process of position taking. Similarly, the previous section showed that the self-organized cooperation structure is also hierarchical or better centralized. Some actors are able to control the information flow during the self-coordination and consequently they are in a more central position. It remains open if the perception of influence also has an underlying hierarchical pattern. The main question therefore is whether the perceived influence structure is based on equal perception of actors or on a perceived hierarchy inside of the national governmental systems.

To examine this hierarchical structure beyond the pure comparison of member states as done in Table 6, Markov random graph models (p\*-models) are applied (Frank and Strauss 1986; Robins et al. 2007; Wasserman and Robins 2005; Snijders et al. 2006). Generally random graph models test whether the given network structures are purely random under some conditions. Therefore, a theoretical dependence graph representing the interdependencies in the network structure is defined. The model “represent hypothesis about interdependence in the form of a *dependence structure* (or *dependence graph*)” (Robins and Pattison 2005: 193) and test the given structure against this dependence graph. Wasserman and Pattison (2000) depict three major classes of such dependence graphs: Bernoulli graphs, dyadic de-

pendence distribution, and Markov random graphs ( $p^*$ ). The simplest hypothesis about the dependence structure of actors inside of a network is the complete independence of all ties. This structure is called a Bernoulli Graph and implies uniform probabilities for all links of a graph given. More complex models assume a dyadic dependence of a link, which means that links are dependent if and only if they share the same two actors. The most prominent example of dyadic dependence is the so-called  $p1$ -model (Holland and Leinhardt 1981). Going further, Markov random graphs or  $p^*$ -models assume even more complex dependence structures. “For Markov random graphs, conditional dependencies are assumed between couples who share at least one actor” (Robins and Pattison 2005: 199-200). Using these Markov random graphs, it is possible to model and test triadic underlying structures in networks. As discussed above, these structures are usually used to identify hierarchical or non-hierarchical underlying patterns. According to the Hammersley-Clifford theorem (Besag 1974) each hypothesis on the presence of specific dependencies in an observed network requires a particular specification of *sufficient statistics*. In its most general form, the  $p^*$ -model can be written as

$$Pr(X = x) = \frac{\exp\{\vartheta'z(x)\}}{\kappa(\vartheta)}$$

where  $\vartheta$  is a vector of model parameters and  $z(x)$  the vector of sufficient statistics. The function  $\kappa$  is a constant that ensures that the probability function sums up to one. Hence, the probability function depends on an exponential function of a linear combination of the sufficient statistics (Wasserman and Pattison 1996: 406). The  $p^*$ -model is implemented in the STOCNET package SIENA, which uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to estimate the parameters of the exponential random graph model (Snijders et al. 2006, 2007).

In the case of expected hierarchical structures, the important sufficient statistics are transitive triads and 3-cycles. Like the authors cited in the previous section, Monge and Contractor (2003) state that “transitivity [...] reflects a hierarchical tendency in the network” (Monge and Contractor 2003: 59). If actor A perceives actor B as influential and actor B perceives actor C as influential, transitivity expects that also actor A perceives actor C as influential. Another less strong measure for hierarchical patterns in networks are 3-cycles. 3-cycles are the opposite to transitive closure of a triad. In the case of a 3-cycle, links from  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $B \rightarrow C$  will be closed by a link from  $C \rightarrow A$ . Consequently 3-cycles are the reverse of hierarchy, because there is no single actor who is perceived as influential from the other two actors. It is a cyclic perception of influence ( $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A \dots$ ) and can be seen as indication of a decentralized structure. “In a network that perfectly reflects a hierarchy, all arcs should point up and no arc should point down from a higher rank to a lower rank” (De Nooy et al. 2005: 212). Consequently ranking or hierarchy is associated with acyclic structures.

In addition to the hierarchical pattern and contrary to the self-organized structure, there should be no tendency towards reciprocity of links, or even a negative probability for link reciprocation. If actor A perceives actor B as influential, there is neither theoretically nor intuitively a reason, *ceteris paribus*, why actor B should

perceive actor A also as influential. More precisely under the circumstance of hierarchical patterns, the opposite should be true, but could be sometimes misleading as the previous section showed.

Many p\*-models do include additional (dyadic) covariates to explain the presence of a link between two actors. However, the primary focus of this section is to explore the descriptive nature of the perceived influence networks and not to completely explain the emergence of these structures. The main concern is to analyze the presence or absence of hierarchical perceived influence structures and therefore this thesis will not include other independent variables here.

	Reciprocity	Transitivity	3-cycles	Activity	Popularity
AUT	2.0874* (1.1076)	0.3308** (0.1639)	-0.8684 (0.6418)	0.6425*** (0.151)	0.6808*** (0.114)
BEL	3.3622*** (1.1442)	0.4672*** (0.15)	-0.8946** (0.3806)	0.107 (0.2927)	0.3322* (0.1941)
DK	0.5235 (1.4048)	0.4316*** (0.1405)	-0.5095 (0.5004)	0.4207** (0.1824)	0.4758*** (0.1248)
FIN	0.1437 (0.9773)	0.0129 (0.1873)	0.7362 (0.4669)	0.4857** (0.2387)	0.5584*** (0.2028)
FRA	1.9516 (2.0373)	0.7848 (1.1553)	0.6915 (1.8793)	-0.0715 (1.7485)	-0.0557 (1.911)
GER	0.2426 (1.3543)	0.4286*** (0.1625)	-0.2642 (0.3523)	0.044 (0.3038)	0.2476 (0.1962)
GRB	1.1209 (0.8486)	0.2165 (0.1713)	-0.0281 (0.367)	0.2179 (0.2504)	0.2974 (0.2233)
GRE	0.3845 (0.8999)	0.0056 (0.1753)	0.6206 (0.44)	0.5872*** (0.1711)	0.4297 (0.2705)
IRL	no convergence				
ITA	no convergence				
LUX	no convergence				
NL	2.1282* (1.187)	-0.6451 (0.4396)	2.5631* (1.3767)	1.5226*** (0.4533)	1.1439*** (0.4355)
SPA	2.2792*** (0.8304)	0.2818** (0.1338)	-0.3762 (0.4831)	0.6061*** (0.0997)	0.62*** (0.0872)
SWE	-1.1024 (1.6831)	0.4571 (0.3687)	0.9441 (0.7844)	0.4362 (0.4319)	0.6848*** (0.1989)

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01, standard errors are in parentheses.

Model: Metropolis-Hasting (14) with convergence t-statistics for all parameters in the reported models  $\leq 0.10$ .

Table 7: Results of the ERGM-Models by Member States

Table 7 displays the results of the member state specific models. Unfortunately, the algorithm does not converge in the case of Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. This is most likely due to the small number of actors in these cases (Ireland (N=7), Italy (N=7) and Luxembourg (N=6)). For the cases where convergence could not be obtained, the new specifications introduced by Snijders et al. (2006) were tested.

However, even these did not lead to congruent results, and hence an interpretation of the structures is not possible at this point.

For the interpretation of the effects, Wasserman and Robins (2005) note that

“a substantial positive parameter estimate for a triangle (for instance) suggest that, given the number of other configurations in the observed graph, there are more triangles present than would be expected by chance” (Wasserman and Robins 2005: 153).

Following Robins et al. (2007: 204), it can be tested when the coefficients are equal zero by simply looking at the t-statistic, defined as the estimated coefficient divided by the standard error and applying a 10% significance level. The analyses show significant effects of transitivity in five out of the eleven member states where the algorithm converged.<sup>28</sup> In these member states the perceived influence structure has significantly more transitive patterns than would be expected by chance. These patterns clearly indicate a hierarchical influence perception inside of these member states. The negative effect of 3-cycles corroborates this finding only in Belgium, where the occurrence of 3-cycles and therefore a signal of equal influence perception between actors, is significantly lower than expected by chance. The Dutch government, however, is characterized by exactly these equal (cyclic) influence perceptions. This is an indication of a broadly decentralized system of perceived influence. Keeping the concepts of transitivity and (negative) 3-cycles in mind, it would be possible to quantitatively distinguish between hierarchical and non-hierarchical governmental systems in the European Union. Interestingly, in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, we see the unexpected positive effect of reciprocity. In the Netherlands, this reciprocal structure fits into the indications of decentralization of the system found above. It is however somehow contradictory to the findings about hierarchical structures in Austria, Belgium, and Spain. The structure has more reciprocal links than expected by random, and at the same time more transitive relations than expected. Most likely this is due to core-periphery structures also indicated later on by the activity and popularity effects.

The widely positive effects on differences in the activity and popularity of actors point again in the direction of hierarchical perceived influence structures. The actors inside the influence structures are characterized by asymmetric attraction of ties (popularity) as well as asymmetric efforts of initiating links (activity). “Both types lead to core-periphery network structures and indicate the emergence of [...] hierarchies” (Thurner and Binder 2009: 8). The analyses show some highly significant effects indicating hierarchical patterns in the governments of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Spain. In Germany, Greece and Sweden only weak hierarchical structures can be found, whereas in the three remaining member states none are retrieved.

Having the confidence that the amount of hierarchy in the influence perceptions vary across the member states of the European Union, in the next step an issue area-specific measure of influence perception is generated. It is possible to determine the

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<sup>28</sup>In the case of Portugal only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was indicated as involved and thus the analysis of perceived influence structures are not possible. The preparation of the Portuguese national position prior the IGC was under the complete (formal and informal) control of the MFA.

position of each actor being involved in these hierarchies. This position is compared with the actor's position in the formal structure and the actor's position in the self-organized coordination structure (see Section 5.2).

The actor's position inside the hierarchy is determined by her normalized perceived influence with regard to the specific issue area. The more actors perceive a certain actor as influential, the higher this actor is positioned in the hierarchy. The number of influence nominations of an actor in a policy area is normalized by the number of all nominations of all actors in this policy area. Hence, the score is not a merely indegree, but rather it can be interpreted as the percentage of nominations of a certain actor and therefore lies between zero and one. Unfortunately the more complex models applied did not lead to usable results for all cases, and as the main goal of this section is to compare the different governmental structures, this ordinary measure is defined.

The perceived influence of actor  $\hat{a}$  in issue group  $k$  is defined as:

$$p_{\hat{a},k} = \frac{\sum_{b=1}^M \pi_{\hat{a},b,k}}{\sum_{a=1}^M \sum_{b=1}^M \pi_{a,b,k}}$$

where  $\pi_{a,b,k}$  is defined as above,  $\hat{a}$ ,  $a$  and  $b$  are actors inside of the same national government and  $M$  is the number of actors in the respective government. Generally  $p_{a,k} \in [0, 1]$  and  $\sum_{a=1}^M p_{a,k} = 1$ .

With regard to the perceived influence networks under consideration, this measure is mainly based on the indegree and normalized for reasons of comparability across issue areas and member states. If all governmental actors involved denote only one ministry as influential with regard to a certain issue area, then this ministry has a perceived influence score of 1 (100%). Similarly, if only two ministries are denoted as influential – each by one half of the other actors involved – then both of them get 0.5 as influence score.

As the underlying networks are *perceived* influence networks – contrary to influence networks, which measure the degree to what extent actors influence other actors – the focus on the indegree (i.e. the number of nominations) with simultaneously accounting for the total number of nominations inside an issue area is a sensible measure.

## 5.2 Congruence of Formal, Self-Organized and Actually-Perceived Structures

As shown in the previous section, each part of the multiplex governmental structure has its own peculiarities, and the single governmental structures can describe important parts of the overall executive structure. However, these structures are not independent of each other. Rather they in part determine each other. The next section highlights this interplay between the different structures and thus gives a more complete picture of the government as a whole. Knowing the single structures

which determine a national governmental system and knowing their interdependence it is possible to adequately model the process of national position taking in the subsequent chapter.

In a first exploratory step, Table 8 shows the congruence of the governmental structures discussed in absolute numbers. Therefore the focus is set on the *most powerful* actors in the respective governmental networks with regard to the 46 policy issues under consideration. In the case of the formal structure this is the actor who is responsible to prepare the first proposal, in the self-organized structure it is the actor who is most central in terms of the betweenness centrality, and in the perceived influence structure it is the actor who has the highest perceived influence score.

For example, only 40.50% of all formally responsible actors in an issue area are also most central in the self-organized structure of their governmental network, whereas 87.20% of them are perceived as most influential in the process of national position taking with regard to the issues. The rows and columns do not sum up to 100% because the cells are not mutually exclusive and the table is not symmetric because the row-column value has a different meaning as the column-row value.<sup>29</sup>

	Formal	Self-Organized	Perceived Influence
Formal	–	40.50	87.20
Self-Organized	41.71	–	66.30
Perceived Influence	52.75	38.95	–

N=6440.

Table 8: Percentage of the Absolute Congruence of Governmental Structures (Most Powerful Actor)

Obviously there are some dependencies between the formal, self-organized and perceived influence structure inside of the governments of the EU. The high match of formal and perceived structures especially stands out at this point. Looking only at these absolute numbers, one would follow that the perceived and potentially real influence is widely congruent with the formal allocation of decision rights. The self-organization seems to have a considerably smaller impact on the perceived influence. Before going deeper into the analysis of these interdependencies, a theoretical foundation is necessary. The next section sets up a model and derives hypotheses to compare the multiplex governmental structures.

**Model on Structural Interdependencies Between the Multiplex Governmental Structures** In this section the model and hypotheses about the relationships between formal, self-organized and actually-perceived governmental structures are formulated. In the next chapter the consequences of these structures with regard to the national position taking are laid out. How are the allocation of formal

<sup>29</sup>The row-column value of the “Formal – Perceived Influence” indicates that 87.20% of all formally responsible actors are also perceived as most influential, without taking the total number of actors perceived most influential into account. The value of “Perceived Influence – Formal” indicates that 52.75% of all actors who were perceived most influential are at the same time formally responsible, without taking the total number of actors formally responsible into account. Consequently the numerator is identical, but the denominator of the two values is different.



decision rights, the informal self-organization, and the actually-perceived influence of actors inside the governments related with each other?

Krackhardt (1990) proposes a model for the relationships of several different structures inside of an organization. Although Krackhardt primarily focuses on the cognition of these network structures and the results thereof, the model can still be used as baseline for this case. The model in Figure 9 shows the possible and later hypothesized interplay between the structures. Theoretically each structure can be determined by the other two. However, the perception of actual influence is temporarily located after the other two structures (ex-post). First formal decision rights are distributed among the actors involved, parallel the already existing self-organized system develops further and afterwards a perceived influence structure is observed. Therefore a causal effect (directed arrow) can be hypothesized in this case, whereas in the case of H3 only the correlation (undirected arrow) should be hypothesized. It is likely that the formally important actor is also central in the self-organized system, but it is also possible that an actor who is central inside of the existing self-organized system uses this advantage to institutionalize this position by acquiring formal decision rights. Even if the self-organized structures are most likely implemented specifically for the case of the IGC 1996, it could be that the governmental actors use also long-term existing cooperation relations. Henceforth, the self-organized structure partly exist already prior to the international event and actors may be able to use these existing relations to obtain formal decision rights. In their empirical work Lazzarini et al. (2004) find “that incomplete [formal] contracts complement informal dealings” (Lazzarini et al. 2004: 290). In their view there is an informal system in the first step, which is only complemented by formal contracts if necessary.




Figure 9: Interplay of the Multiplex Governmental Structures

Before deriving the hypotheses (H1-H3) at full length, a short clarification of the terms effectiveness and efficiency is needed because the two distinct terms are often mixed together. Barnard (1966) defines effectiveness as the “accomplishment of the recognized objectives” (Barnard 1966: 55). In the setting of governmental organization, governments set up formal rules with the purpose to achieve a certain mechanism of coordination for each given task. Remember that the tasks are exogenously given to the national governments with the assignment to formulate a national position if desired. Looking at the effectiveness of the different governmental systems, the question is whether the planned structure, i.e. the allocation

of formal decision rights, leads to an informally self-organized and equivalent perceived influence structure. Therefore effectiveness describes “the degree to which the organization fulfills its purpose” (White 1999: 12). Efficiency, on the other hand, widens this approach and also includes the related cost into the concept. A system can be considered as efficient if it “achieved the greatest possible results with given opportunity costs or if it achieved a given level of results at the lowest possible opportunity costs” (Simon et al. 1950: 493).

Drucker emphasizes this difference as follows:

“Effectiveness is the foundation of success - efficiency is the minimum condition for survival after success has been achieved. Efficiency is concerned with doing things right, effectiveness is doing the right things” (Drucker 1974: 45).

Consequently effectiveness is focused on the results or the output first, whereas efficiency includes more elaborately the complete process.

As mentioned in Section 4.4, the allocation of formal decision rights and the maintenance of cooperation relations is accompanied by noticeable costs. Section 5.1 already showed that all the respective governmental networks in the EU exhibit a high degree of selectivity because of these costs. Knowing that the costs of formal and self-organized organization exist and vary considerably across member states it is necessary to include them into the analysis. However, the next step is to compare the congruence of the governmental systems without accounting for those costs of coordination and also without accounting for the different preferences of the actors inside of the system. Therefore the first focus is set on effectiveness. Does the planned allocation of formal decision rights lead to the intended results? This way the thesis tries to exploit overall structural differences in the member states of the European Union. Afterwards the focus is shifted on the process of national position taking. The effectiveness of a governmental system as well as the cost of coordination and the individual preferences are included into the model building stage in Chapter 6.

**Hypotheses** The approach to the congruence of a governmental system starts from the formal structure. The distribution of formal decision rights can be seen as the “blueprint” of the governmental system. Usually formal decision rights and the allocation of formal resources lead to a central position in the network of actually perceived influence. With regard to that, Krackhardt (1990) focuses on the “formal position a person has in the organization” (Krackhardt 1990: 345). In this context he notes that “those with more authority will have more power” (Krackhardt 1990: 345). Hence governmental actors with access to the process, and especially the actor preparing the first proposal, should be perceived as highly influential. However, other authors question this expectation. “[F]ormal authority [...] need not confer real authority, that is, an effective control over decisions, on its holder” (Aghion and Tirole 1997: 2). Nevertheless, many processes inside of national governments, especially in the underlying case of national position taking, are structured by formal rules. Therefore a positive effect from holding formal decision rights on the perceived influence of an actor involved is very likely. The hypothesis also tests whether the

formal setup works in its intended way. It is expected that the formally responsible actors also have control over the decisions. More precisely, the actor is perceived by the other actors as having this control.<sup>30</sup> This relationship is formalized in the first hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1** *The national governmental systems in the European Union are effective in the way that the allocation of formal decision rights lead to actually-perceived influence.*

On the second possible relation, it is expected that a central location in self-organized structures gives an actor the ability to control and/or have access to relevant informal information. Thus the perception of influence should also be related with this position. Many authors found a positive relationship between the position of an actor in informal structures (i.e. friendship, communication) and its perceived influence. With regard to communication and workflow networks, Brass and Burkhardt (1992) for example note that “centrality was positively and significantly related to power in an organization” (Brass and Burkhardt (1992: 210), see also Krackhardt (1990)). This leads to the second hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2** *Controlling for the effect of the formal structure on the actually-perceived influence, the control over the self-organized governmental system also leads to a dedication of actually-perceived influence.*

The important self-organized structure mentioned above is also mutually dependent on the formal structure. Despite the possibility that the informal structure affects the formal structure in the long-term view, this thesis primarily focuses on the extent to which the informal structure is affected by the formal allocation of decision rights. This direction of the relation is more of interest in the case of national position taking than the long-term influence of the informal structure on the formal one. The formal structure is fixed a priori the process, whereas the informal cooperation patterns evolve during the process of position taking. This relation is analyzed by Stevenson (1990) in his hierarchical authority model. The model implies, that “interaction [between units] is on the control [...] through formal rules and hierarchical authority” (Stevenson 1990: 115). Other authors note that “it would not be surprising for an “informal” social network to shadow the formal hierarchy of authority” (Brass et al. 2004: 796). For example, if there is a fixed formal structure, which determines who is allowed to participate in the flow of information we would intuitively expect the actual cooperation and communication efforts focusing around this formal structure. Otherwise the governmental self-organization results in a parallel, unclear, and possibly inefficient governmental structure. On actors controls the formal process whereas another actors controls the informal one. This unclear structure can jeopardize the coordination process and set the goal of taking a distinct national position at risk.

Is the self-organized cooperation inside the member states of the European Union really going alongside the planned channels? Or are there indications of bypassing

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<sup>30</sup>Chapter 7 shows that the perception of the actors is right – actors who were perceived as influential really were influential.

or shortcutting the official formal structures? Zenger et al. (2002) set up two alternative hypotheses with regard to the relationship between formal and informal structures. The informal structure is either a complement to the formal structure, or the informal structure is a substitute to the formal structure. In the first case, the informal structure supports the formal structure, whereas the informal structure undermines the formal one in the second case. Poppo and Zenger (2002) conclude that “contracts and relational governance function as complements” (Poppo and Zenger 2002: 721). They see complementary structures as supporting each other. In their case formal contracts are complemented with relational governance. As their focus is not set on governmental organizations, a transfer to the underlying case is necessary. Following their approach it seems to be reasonable to set up mutually exclusive hypotheses for this new context. The informal structure of self-organization and the formal allocation of decision rights can either shadow each other, they can be independent of each other or they can be contrary (conflicting) to each other. In the case of shadowing, the actor who controls the formal structure through formal decision rights also controls the self-organized structure through its position inside of the cooperation network, respectively through the control of information inside of this structure.

### Hypothesis 3

- (a) *Shadow hypothesis: The informal self-organization of the actors is focused alongside the formal ways. That means the actor, who is formally part of or leading the process is better able to control the informally self-organized structure and thus the structures are shadowing each other.*
- (b) *Independent hypothesis: The informal self-organization is independent of the formal allocation of decision rights.*
- (c) *Contrary Hypothesis: The informal self-organization is built contrary to the formal structure and hence, formally involved or leading actors are less able to control the self-organized environment.*

In this step, Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) do not assert that a specific structure, e.g. a contrary self-organized structure, is per se harmful for the national government. For example, it is possible that the informal structure quickly repairs unknown deficiencies in the formal structure and thus helps the system to be more efficient. However, in the underlying case of national governments and the defined structural features, a contrary self-organized structure is expected to harm and not help the process of national position taking. Very basic responsibilities would be unclear, and, for example, not knowing who leads the process of national position taking certainly leads to a loss of resources during the coordination phase. Under these premises the thesis considers a system as congruent if Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3(a) are confirmed. As the first two hypotheses are less contested in the existing literature, the main focus lies on the third hypothesis. This thesis observes national governmental structures before an international conference takes place. In this setting the government has to solve the task of finding a common policy position in the distinct policy areas under discussion. However, as the later section will show, not all governments are successful in finding positions for all


areas. One reason for not achieving this common goal might be due to structural reasons. Balkundi and Harrison (2006) showed in a meta-analysis using 37 studies on networks and their effects that teams perform better if their formal leader has also a high centrality in the informal (social) networks. This is another reason why a special focus lies on Hypothesis 3.

**Results** The figures 10(a) through 10(c) show a visualization of the data for the national government in Denmark.<sup>31</sup> The data for the following section is based on the described measures in the last section and visualized as two-mode networks. The graphs were drawn using the software package UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) and its implemented visualization software Netdraw. The actors involved are drawn as circles, whereas squares indicate the policy areas. All nodes (actors and policy areas) are located by a so-called Spring Embedding algorithm. “This algorithm uses iterative fitting (i.e. start with a random graph, measure ‘badness’ of fit; move something, measure ‘badness’ and if it’s better keep going in that direction...) to locate the points in such a way as to put those with smallest path lengths to one another closest in the graph” (Hanneman and Riddle 2005: Chapter 4). The network of formal decision rights is presented in Figure 10(a). A one, indicated by thin lines, stands for actors who have formal access to the issue area or some special formal rights as project management, or the fact that the actor is the head of government with constitutional rights to participate. A two, indicated by thick lines, represents the right to prepare the first proposal in the respective issue area. Similarly, Figure 10(b) presents a visualization of the self-organized system. The figure is not the cooperation network itself, which is a one-mode network connecting actors with actors. The presented network is two-mode and measures the relation between an actor and the policy area. This relation is defined by the actors’ betweenness centrality in the overall cooperation network. As argued above this relation is constant over all issue areas, because of the disproportionately high individual costs for issue-specific self-organization. Figure 10(c) presents the network of actually-perceived influence. The relation here is defined as the normalized count of influence perception inside each issue area, and thicker lines indicate a higher perceived influence in the respective area.


Already by visual inspection it is possible to identify some similarities as well as some dissimilarities of these structures. The formal governmental structure of Denmark indicates that most of the time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible to set up a first proposal (IG1, 2, 4 and 5). In some cases, this right was granted to specialized departments. For example, the Ministry of Labor (MLab) was in charge of formulating the first proposal in the area of employment policy (IG61). Overall, the graph shows that the Premier’s Office (PO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Economy (MEco) and the Parliamentary Committee on European relations (EU-C) had at least access to most of the issue areas. Contrary to that, the informally self-organized structure is mostly centered around the MEco with only few other ministries being able to control the self-organization via their position in the network.

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
<sup>31</sup>The figures for the other countries are printed in the Appendix on page i ff.



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights



(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure



(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure

Figure 10: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Example: Denmark)

The PO and the EU-C, for example, are not able to transfer their formal positions into an equivalent position in the self-organized network. They only have formal access to the issue during the preparation phase, but the existing self-organized structure does not include these actors in a significant way. A relatively diverse picture is drawn by the network of perceived influence. There is a center of overall influential ministries consisting of the PO, MFA, MEco, EU-C and MJ. Again most of the other actors are only perceived as influential in their specialized area, as for example the Ministry of Defense (MDef) with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (IG2).

Repeating this kind of visual comparison for all member states would be a superfluous task with the only result of member state specific case studies. The question is how to compare these networks beyond visual inspection and especially across member states? The underlying expectations formulated above are that a strong formal position (H1) and a central position in the self-organized system (H2) lead to a high level of influence perception in the national governmental system. Additionally, in the situation of national position taking with competitive preferences, an open question is whether the formal structure is shadowed or undermined by the self-organized structure (H3). Do some actors try to replace the formal structure by some informal arrangements?

As defined earlier and already visualized above the data matrices are two-mode networks (actor×issue area). Generally, these networks (matrices) have nothing special and most of the time can be dealt like regular networks<sup>32</sup>. Wasserman and Faust (1994) lay down a broad range of applications and methods which can be used for two-mode networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 298). To test the Hypotheses 1-3 an ordinary least square (OLS) regression would be inappropriate. OLS models assume cases, and especially their residuals, to be independent of each other. This assumption is very likely to be violated in the case of network data. Given the dyadic data structure it is likely that the residual of one dyad involving actor A is quite similar to the residuals of the other dyads also involving actor A. Using a permutation procedure, Mantel (1967) proposed a nonparametric solution to this problem and Hubert and collaborators developed it at length (Hubert and Schultz 1976; Hubert 1983, 1985).

With this alternative approach, it is possible to test the significance of the observed correlation between matrices, or in this case, networks (for more details see Hubert 1987; Wasserman and Faust 1994). Krackhardt describes the procedure as follows:

“By generating all correlations that result from permuting the rows and columns of one of the structural matrices, one can determine the distribution of all possible correlations given the structures of the two matrices” (Krackhardt 1988: 362-363).

Because the rows and columns are permuted together, Hubert called this procedure quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) (Hubert 1987: 124).<sup>33</sup> The QAP

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<sup>32</sup>Usually regular networks are assumed to define relations between a set of actors and therefore most of these networks are square matrices. This is obviously not the case for two-mode networks.

<sup>33</sup>Other authors called the procedure quadratic assignment programming.

provides “a permutation- or randomization-based nonparametric test of dependence between two square matrix variables of the same size” (Dekker et al. 2007: 4). The procedure also allows for the combination of relational network data with single measurement data on the actors inside of a network (Kilduff and Krackhardt 1994: 103). Henceforth the procedures fits well to the underlying data.

Formally, the procedure is defined as follows.  $\mathcal{K}$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  are two  $n \times n$  matrices.  $\Gamma_{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{L}}$  is the association of interest between the two matrices (e.g. Pearson Correlation Coefficient). The function  $\psi$  permutes the  $n$  nodes in their ordering and applies this permutation to the rows and columns of the matrix simultaneously. Hence  $\psi(\mathcal{K})$  is an isomorph permutation of the original matrix  $\mathcal{K}$  and returns all structural features of  $\mathcal{K}$  except those referring to the order of the nodes. This way  $\psi(\mathcal{K})$  is a random matrix with equal row-column interdependence of the observations than  $\mathcal{K}$ . Repeating this permutation and every time calculating the association of interest between the two matrices ( $\Gamma_{\psi(\mathcal{K}),\mathcal{L}}$ ) a reference distribution of values of  $\Gamma$  is generated. Overall there are  $n!$  permutations possible and usually a set of 5000 permutations is used to generate the reference distribution. Comparing the originally observed value of  $\Gamma_{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{L}}$  to the reference distribution it is possible to test the null hypothesis that  $\mathcal{K}$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  are independent under the given assumptions (Dekker et al. 2007: 3-4). The software package UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) implemented this procedure in its latest version<sup>34</sup>.

Table 9 summarizes the results of the QAP-correlations by member state. Hypothesis 1 is fully supported by the empirical results. All fourteen member states of the European Union, which were under investigation<sup>35</sup>, have a high significant positive relation between the formal structure (“blue-print”) and the actually-perceived structure of influence. The actual governmental structures are more (Finland: 0.84) or less (Luxembourg: 0.48), but all significantly positive, dependent on the formal setup. In other words, the formally built governmental systems in the European Union work in their intended ways. This result deviates from the expectation of Aghion and Tirole (1997), that formal authority does not necessarily lead to real authority. Instead the opposite is true: formal authority does lead to actually-perceived authority in the underlying case of national position taking. If this actually-perceived authority matches real authority is shown in Chapter 7.

Also as expected, the self-organized cooperation structures additionally determine the perceived influence structures (Hypothesis 2). Only the national governments in Denmark and Luxembourg seem to have no relation between their self-organization (betweenness centrality in the cooperation networks) and the structure of perceived influence. During the process of national position taking, the structures in these two countries were independent of each other. These effects also change to significance when using a multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) (Dekker et al. 2007) and considering both, the self-organized and

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<sup>34</sup>This version can also handle missing data, but still needs square matrices for the quadratic permutation. The two-mode networks are not necessarily square matrices and therefore have to be transformed into bipartite square matrices using the procedure `>TRANSFORM >BIPARTITE` in UCINET. The within-mode ties are coded as missing values.

<sup>35</sup>Portugal was excluded from that analysis because only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was considered as a ministry involved. It does not make much sense comparing networks only consisting of one actor.



formal structure as independent variables in the same model. Overall the correlations between the self-organized and the perceived influence structures are somewhat smaller than the relations between the formal and the perceived influence structures. However, it is not the case that the analysis indicates a generally lower level of determination than by the formal structure. In two member states (Austria and France) the dependency of the actually-perceived structure on the self-organized structure was a little bit larger than its dependence on the formal one. Table 9 displays the QAP (Pearson) correlation coefficients and their level of significance separately for each hypothesis.

As mentioned, the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 also hold or get significant for a multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) test as proposed by Dekker et al. (2007). In that case, the networks of perceived influence were chosen as the dependent variable. Thus the effect of the self-organized structure on the perceived influence structure holds while controlling for the effect of the formal structure and vice versa. The complete results are printed in the Appendix in Table 22. However, using a regression prevents from showing results for the especially interesting relation between the formal and the self-organized structures. Following the approach to display the pairwise QAP correlation coefficients as results is more useful in that case.

For substantive reasons, the most interesting part is the wide range of diverging effect sizes with regard to Hypothesis 3. The effect between the formal allocation of decision rights and the self-organized structure of cooperation clearly seems to be smaller than the first two effects, although not tested statistically. In some cases (Denmark, France, and Luxembourg) it is essentially non-existent. Hypothesis 3a is only supported in eleven of the fourteen member states. The results for Denmark, France, and Luxembourg indicate that the self-organized structure in these member states is independent of the formal one. This finding partially supports Hypothesis 3b. The independence of the structures can be due to unclear structures inside of the government. Comparing the statistical results with the graphical presentation for Denmark in Figure 10, it is possible to gain some more insights. The independence of the formal structure from the self-organized structure and between the self-organized and the perceived structure is clearly a result of the outstanding position of the Danish Ministry of Economy in the self-organized structure. This position is not based on formal decision rights and does not lead to an exceptionally high perceived influence. On the other hand, some of the formal centrally located actors in Denmark (PO and EU-C), which were also perceived as influential, are not at all involved in the self-organized structure. The data is not based on external expert interviews and hence measurement error is unlikely to occur. Again, for example in the case of Denmark, not only some experts need to be mistaken to create such a self-organized structure as displayed in Figure 10, but rather most of the involved actors need to be wrong with their assessment about the cooperation patterns. This is very unlikely and consequently the structures are really independent of each other.

	AUT	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRB	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NL	SPA	SWE
Formal- Actually-Perceived	0.742 (0.000)	0.847 (0.000)	0.781 (0.000)	0.840 (0.000)	0.525 (0.015)	0.665 (0.000)	0.728 (0.000)	0.801 (0.000)	0.659 (0.002)	0.698 (0.000)	0.798 (0.000)	0.763 (0.000)	0.842 (0.000)	0.852 (0.000)
Self-organized- Actually-Perceived	0.747 (0.002)	0.609 (0.005)	0.122 (0.218)	0.347 (0.031)	0.552 (0.037)	0.513 (0.014)	0.492 (0.011)	0.562 (0.024)	0.591 (0.044)	0.659 (0.044)	-0.063 (0.477)	0.373 (0.051)	0.644 (0.002)	0.517 (0.031)
Formal- Self-organized	0.324 (0.045)	0.525 (0.009)	0.025 (0.404)	0.222 (0.081)	-0.068 (0.403)	0.370 (0.015)	0.323 (0.037)	0.467 (0.022)	0.631 (0.039)	0.507 (0.042)	0.198 (0.191)	0.296 (0.055)	0.459 (0.005)	0.389 (0.034)

QAP-correlation coefficients (Pearson) with level of significance in parentheses.

Table 9: QAP-Correlation Coefficients between the Multiplex Governmental Structures by Member States

Even if there is an independence of the multiplex governmental structure in these member states, there is no evidence for Hypothesis 3c (contrary structures). The negative effect in France is not significantly different from zero, and thus hypothesis 3c has to be rejected in all cases. This means in detail that there is evidence for any self-organized structure inside the European governments which is built up in opposition to the formal one.

Shifting back to national position taking prior to an intergovernmental negotiation, the question now arises of what the effects of these structural differences are. As mentioned above, the relations between formal and perceived influence structure as well as the relations between centrality in self-organized cooperation networks and perceived influence structures are less contested in the literature and broadly confirmed in the analysis above. But the consequences of the different correlations between the formal and self-organized structures remain open. Why are some formal leaders not able to transfer their power to the self-organized structure while others are? And what are the consequences thereof? Balkundi and Harrison argue that “[t]eams perform better when their leaders are central in their intrateam network” (Balkundi and Harrison 2006: 63). They go on to highlight that leaders who occupy a central role in informal networks “tend to have access to diverse data that may facilitate a leader’s power or provide the leader with the information resources necessary for successful task completion” (Balkundi and Harrison 2006: 53). Finding a common policy position can be seen as such a task completion, and therefore the congruence of formal and self-organized structure should have a positive impact on the ability to define a national position. Furthermore, a better performance of the complete team (i.e. the government) may lead to more preferable outcomes for all actors involved inside of this team.

### 5.3 Conclusion

Chapter 4 already showed that modeling national governments as multiplex organizations using methods of social network analysis is possible. This chapter laid out the descriptive results based on that definition. It can be seen that by applying an empirically-operable network approach to national governments, many unsolved research questions could be answered. However, this chapter did not attempt to fully analyze the governmental structures in detail. Rather it should give an idea of the possibilities in comparative governmental research given by a network theoretic approach of national governments in the European Union. In combination with a focus on the important factors with regard to national position taking before an international negotiation takes place, this is an important foundation for the model on national position taking derived in the next chapter.

First descriptive analyses indicated that the governmental structures, which were based on sparse (i.e. not unlimited) decision rights or dependent on resources like time, were highly selective. This selectivity is caused by underlying cost-benefit considerations. Maintaining self-organized cooperation relations inside of an organization is costly for the individual actor, and therefore the network structures mirror this fact with low densities. Similarly, it is costly for national governments to formally include too many actors in the process of national position taking. Hence-

forth, each national government needs to restrict the formal decision rights available to avoid rising problems of coordination. This again makes the formal decision rights sparse and, consequently, their possession valuable. Overall, the selectivity inside of the self-organized structure is lower compared to the selectivity of the formal structure of decision rights. This is due to the fact that the first is completely on the individual's decision, and the individual actor has to bear the costs directly. Alternately, the second is more or less a collective decision of the complete government, and the costs for that decision are dispersed among all governmental actors.

Furthermore, the structures are hierarchical. The formal structure is hierarchical by definition, but the self-organized structure is also based on underlying hierarchies. Using the common measure of betweenness centrality, the actors' control over the self-organized structure can be determined. In the case of the perceived influence networks a different approach has to be chosen. The networks of perceived influence are not directly sensitive to resources. However, most of the perceived influence structures were highly asymmetric and thus hierarchically structured. This expectation, based on the asymmetric nature of these structures, was corroborated by more sophisticated analyses (Exponential Random Graph Modeling). Strong hierarchical patterns in the perception of influence can be found in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Spain, whereas the patterns found in Germany, Greece and Sweden are only weakly hierarchical.

The extensive description of national governments as multiplex organizations is costly for researchers and professionals. For such a detailed analysis as is done in this chapter, a lot of data have to be gathered. If one has to choose a single structure to describe a national government ex-post, the actually-perceived influence structure is the best possibility to model a national government with regard to the national position taking process. It stands for an underlying actually existing structure, which is based on formal decision rights as well as on the informally self-organized cooperation structures and consequently best describes the term *core executive*. This structure is not ultimately dependent on the final outcome or the actor's most preferred outcome with regard to the issues (see questions in the Appendix on page xviii). It rather indicates an underlying influence structure based on the shared influence perceptions of actors inside the governmental system.

At this point the temporal sequence of the structures is important. The formal structure of decision rights is relatively stable and definitively fixed prior to the preparation process. Meanwhile, the self-organized structure evolves during the preparation of the national positions, and the perceived influence structure is the ex-post result of the former two. The self-organized cooperation structure and the perceived influence structure are theoretically not completely determined until the end of the process. The formal structure, however, is already present prior to the respective event and therefore the better choice for an ex-ante management of the national position taking process. At this point it remains open if the formal and self-organized structures are constant over time, or whether and why they change from event to event. It is not possible yet to answer the question about the effects of one given structure on the other over time. For example: is there a long-term effect from the self-organized structure on the formal allocation of decision rights? So far the thesis only showed that the two structures are mutually related and that

a measure of the congruence of the two structures can be derived.

Each structure has its own advantages and disadvantages with regard to different research questions. For example, the formal structure can easily be used for planning reasons before the event. The perceived influence structure gives a more complete picture of the government for research done after the event and the self-organized cooperation structure may help to understand informal arrangements inside of the national executives.

Based on the theoretical derivation of the governmental structure inside of a national government, the single parts of the multiplex environment are analyzed and hypotheses about their interplay are tested. In all countries under consideration, the formal allocation of decision rights had a strong impact on the perception of influence during the national position taking process. A slightly less strong, but still overall significant relationship was found between the self-organized structure and the perception of influence. Hence formal empowered governmental actors as well as informally central governmental actors inside of the national executives of the EU are perceived as important in the process of national position taking. These findings support the already widely confirmed hypotheses from the literature. However, some of the hypotheses are tested for the first time on real governmental networks in a comparative perspective. Both results support the definition of core executives using the issue area-specific perceived influence structures. Henceforth an empirically-operable definition of core executives is given in this chapter and can be used for future research. This definition goes clearly beyond the more or less vague definition existing in the literature to date.

A more diffuse relationship exists between the formal allocation of decision rights and the informally self-organized cooperation structure. The correlation is still mostly positive, even though the magnitudes of the effects vary considerably. Hypothesis 3(a), that the self-organized structure shadows the formal one, is most strongly supported. In the case of Denmark, France, and Luxembourg, however, the analysis indicates no significant relationship between the two structures. For the following model on national position taking, the congruence of a governmental system is defined as the degree of similarity between the formal allocation of decision rights and the self-organized structure of cooperation. Congruent systems have formal leaders who also control the flow of information inside of the self-organized governmental systems.

Knowing how to define governments as multiplex networks and knowing more about the structures and their interplay inside the European executives, the next chapter sets up a model of national position taking prior to international negotiations. So far this thesis has found interesting similarities and dissimilarities in the multiplex governmental organizations themselves, and the next chapter will study their effects. The process of national position taking is embedded in these structural features. Are there really significant effects of the multiplex structures on the process of position taking, and how can these effects be modeled?

At this point it is necessary to broaden the view from purely structural aspects as the measure of congruence (i.e. the question if the formal structure works in the intended way) toward a perspective of national governments as collective actors. These collective actors are composed of several rational actors (ministries, depart-

ments, and offices) with their own preferences and distinct resources available. In the next chapter the level of analysis is the national government which has to take a position in the policy areas given, whereas Chapter 7 changes the level to the acting units themselves: the ministries and departments. Both points of view imply a different definition of the goals, but rely both on the multiplex governmental structure derived above.

## 6 Model of National Position Taking

### 6.1 Modeling National Position Taking

The overall goal of a model is to represent reality, and the goal of a model of national position taking is to represent the process of national position taking prior to intergovernmental negotiations. However, reality is very complex, and capturing all possible nuances of the real world an impossible venture.

“There is no hope of capturing reality by trying to replicate it, but there is hope of capturing its essence with a quite limited and parsimonious set of assumptions” (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 67).

A model should “represent only the most basic underlying principles in decision making” (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 67). In the case of national position taking, these underlying principles are slightly more complex than a setting with two players where each has to decide whether to take a certain action or not.<sup>36</sup> Usually international negotiations are complex and multiple issues are under discussion (Linhart 2006). Likewise the formulation of national positions prior to such negotiations is also a complex and jurisdictionally crosscutting task for the national governments.

The traditional structuralist view of states as unitary actors, and the heads of governments or the ministries of foreign affairs forming the foreign policy of a nation, has widely been challenged. Policy positions prior to an intergovernmental conference are complex foreign policy choices made under the participation of numerous actors beside the heads of government and the ministries of foreign affairs. However, the impression of central heads of governments is still existing and even amplified by their exposed position during the process of national position taking and during the conferences themselves. In the European Union, this impression is based to a large degree on the summits at the end of an intergovernmental conference, where the afore mentioned actors meet. In media and public, the heads of government seem to play the major role during and prior such events. It is still often assumed that ministries of foreign affairs, in accordance with their heads of government, steer the whole process of international negotiation. This is especially true for the case of European Integration and the occurrence of Intergovernmental Conferences in the European Union. But is this impression really correct?

Kassim (2000) summarized the findings about the national coordination systems with regard to day to day policy making in the member states of the European Union as follows:

“[H]eads of government have at their disposal specialist expertise and institutional support to enable them to carry out the increasingly routinized role they perform in EU decision making; foreign affairs ministries continue to occupy a central role in national processes, though they face challenges from several directions” (Kassim 2000: 237).

In the underlying case study, the premiers' offices (PO) and the ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) determined only about 50% of the national positions with

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<sup>36</sup>See for such an example the seminal analysis on the Cuban Missile Crisis by Allison (1971).

regard to their own most preferred position (or ideal position). In the other half of the cases, the national position was not equal to the most preferred option of either the PO or the MFA. Table 10 shows that this circumstance is amplified in the case of policy areas with domestic conflict, where not all actors have the same preferences.<sup>37</sup> Henceforth, the heads of government had to advocate for publicly declared domestic positions, which were not their own ideal positions. The total dominance of heads of governments and ministry of foreign affairs in foreign policy seems to belong to the past. A model to explain the choice of foreign policy, and especially national positions prior to intergovernmental conferences of the EU, is required.

	NP = MFA	NP = PO	NP = (MFA or PO)	N
All Issues	243 35.22%	277 40.14%	355 51.45%	690
Issues with Domestic Conflict	104 27.15%	126 32.9%	171 44.65%	383

NP: National Position, PO: Position of the Premier's Office, and MFA: Position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Table 10: Comparison of the National Position with the Ideal Positions of the Premiers' Offices and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs

It is necessary to broaden and deepen the view on national positions away from the idea of centrally planned foreign policy with regard to the *nation's* interest. The national government consists of actors with diverse preferences and varying opportunities to influence the process. Each governmental ministry or department first tries to fulfill its own set of particular objectives. "None is primarily concerned with the national interest as that term is understood by structuralists" (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: 154). Allison (1971) proposed a theoretical model called "governmental (bureaucratic) politics model" (Allison 1971: 144ff.) in which he constitutes the actors as players in positions with goals, interests, stakes, and stands. One of his main result is that

"[t]he governmental actor is neither a unitary agent nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions" (Allison 1971: 164).

These players are characterized by different preferences and varied possibilities of influence during the decision making process. For Allison governmental action is based on negotiations among the national governmental actors involved and "decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants" (Allison 1971: 162). Positions of these players are characterized not only by formal means; rather, he also includes the aspect of informal structures, as access to and control over information are a crucial source of power (Allison 1971: 169). Bueno de Mesquita as

<sup>37</sup>See section 6.3 on page 88 for a formal definition of domestic conflict.



well formulates that following a bureaucratic approach “states are made up of often competing interests; it is the bargains these interests strike that determine foreign policy goals and actions” (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: 220).

Understanding the national position as the outcome of a national political process implies a more precise specification of this process. The stylized chronological sequence in Figure 1 on page 15 already pointed out the abstract underlying sequence from an international perspective. The task of finding a policy position in certain fixed areas is exogenously given and the end of the process is determined by the date of the intergovernmental conference itself. The national coordination between is modeled based on a rational choice approach. The national position is assumed to be the collective choice of individual actors who have distinct goals. However, these actors underlie a bounded rationality as there are “cognitive limits that affect their ability to process all the information available and thus [they] make decisions that are less than fully rational” (Morton 1999: 85). In addition, the underlying process (and consequently the model reflecting it) is sequential. Prominent examples of sequential models are the non-cooperative model for legislative decisions by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) or the international crisis model by Fearon (1994). More recently, Bergman et al. have set up a stylized model for cabinet decision making established upon sequential arguments of delegation and accountability (Figure 4.3 in Bergman et al. 2003: 180).

Based on the multiplex governmental structures developed above and starting from a perspective of sequential choice, this thesis formulates a parsimonious model of governmental decision making in this section. As Bueno de Mesquita put it forward, a model should not be “as realistic as possible, but [...] as simple as possible and as complex as necessary” (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 67). Although there are some models about the governmental within-cabinet decision making (e.g. Bergman et al. 2003) a complete empirically-applicable model is still missing. Before going further into the model specification, some general assumptions should be reiterated. Each of the identified governmental actors has single-peaked and separable preferences over the policy issues under discussion. Euclidean distances are applied and in addition there is a rule of “proposal germaneness” (Shepsle 1979: 35). This implies that each policy dimension is treated separately and combinations of different issues/subjects are not allowed. Likewise, Bueno de Mesquita (1994: 71ff.) treats each issue as separate and one-dimensional in his well-known Expected Utility Model. Consequently there are no such possibilities as package deals or omnibus legislation (Mayhew 1991) and binding agreements between actors are not possible (non-cooperative).

The assumption that position taking takes place in an issue by issue framework might be questioned by other theories in international relations or political science in general. Notwithstanding the contrary assumption that approximately nine actors exchange implicitly or explicitly over 46 policy issues with a minimum of two policy options each is at least also artificial. Scharpf and Mohr (1994) argue that the likelihood of an equilibrium declines enormously, with a growing number of actors involved and/or their possible options of choice (Scharpf and Mohr 1994: 30). In the case of not separating the issues from each other, the need and effort for coordination raises exorbitantly. Hence the assumption can be made that the governmental

actors involved treat the issues separately. As seen in the review of the empirical decision making studies in Chapter 2, models using this assumption perform quite well compared to their counterparts.

Under this assumption the national position taking process is examined closer. In the policy making process it is very unlikely that all policy positions are defined from scratch during cabinet meetings. It is very time-consuming and inefficient to decide all policy issues in the full cabinet. As a consequence we will expect some delegation of tasks to specialized departments for reasons of capacity and competence (Bergman et al. 2003: 109). Bergman et al. discuss the reasons for delegation inside the complete political system; from the citizen over elected officials to the prime minister, who delegates further on to the specialized departments, which delegate to the civil servants (Bergman et al. 2003: 20). Even if they do only partly observe the delegation inside the executive, the model is still useful in the underlying context. Similar problems exist inside of the national governments in the observed process of national position taking. It would be inefficient, if not impossible, to find all national policy position during cabinet meetings (capacity). In addition jurisdictionally crosscutting policies are usually not affecting all policy areas which are represented in a cabinet. Therefore a lack of competence of certain actors, or vice versa a need for especially skilled actors, is obvious. These skilled actors can gather detailed information about the complex policies and later on share this information with the other cabinet members (division of labor).

“When control over an event is divided, as a result of the physical or constitutional constraints under which action takes place, the outcome of the event depends not only upon the power of the actors and their interests in the outcome, but also upon the particular decision rule that the physical environment or constitution imposes” (Coleman 1972: 146).

Hence the focus lies on the decision rules, which the process of national position taking imposes and on the power and interests of the actors with regard to the outcome, i.e. the national position. To what extent does the cabinet grant discretion to the leading ministry or to other powerful actors, and how much of its original responsibility remains with the cabinet?

Figure 11 shows the stylized sequential model of national position taking. In reality and hence also in the model, the first choice made is which actor is allowed or required to gather detailed information and make a first proposal. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) called this step “recognition rule” (Baron and Ferejohn 1989: 1183). Unlike Baron and Ferejohn, where the recognition of actor is randomly assigned, in this model the formal right to make the first proposal is determined by rules of internal procedure of the national governments (see Section 4.4). Even in areas with high conflict over policy decisions a delegation of this formal decision right is still a necessary first step in the process. Someone inside of the executive has to write down a first proposal to start the process. The descriptive section showed that this right is indeed allocated in all cases. The model ignores the question of agenda control because the assumption was made that the policy agenda for the international negotiation is given exogenously. Although there is no way to control the agenda (such as to take an issue off or on the agenda), there is the possibility

of intervening during the process and supporting or hindering the definition and declaration of a national position.




Figure 11: Stylized Model of National Position Taking

The rules of internal procedure which determine the actor responsible for the first proposal are mostly stable over time. In this first phase of the process, the information about the other national actors as well as about the international environment is developed sparsely. The actor has no possibility and no incentive to act strategically, simply because she has no knowledge about the state of the world. The information inside the government is too limited in the beginning of the process to act strategically. Without information about the preferences and interest of the other actors planning of a strategic action is a risky venture. On the other side and even more importantly, the leading ministry is usually the specialized department for the respective policy area. Aside from the policy making *political* officials inside the departments, civil servants see themselves often as professionalists. The literature on this topic is quite old, and Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy presented in the early 20th century is only one well-known example. In a Weberian sense, bureaucrats are expected to choose the best policy position with regard to their knowledge and based on purely objective considerations. They should act and behave without anger and fondness (*sine ira ac studio*) and under certain calculable rules (Weber 1968: 975). Also, Aberbach et al. described in their second "image"<sup>38</sup> that civil servants bring "facts and knowledge" to the policy making process and henceforth "neutral expertise" (Aberbach et al. 1981: 6). Consequently, sparse information about the domestic preference structure in combination with the existence of unbiased professional top officials in this first stage lead to the expectation that the leading ministry formulates a policy proposal which fully reflects its most preferred policy option.

<sup>38</sup>The authors used the expression 'image' instead of 'theory' or 'model' because they do not really test their 'images' (Aberbach et al. 1981: 20).

Afterwards, in phase II, an informal and actual coordination takes place, where the influential actors are trying to change the proposal in their favor. Phase II includes a non-formal component in the model and is maybe the most elusive to describe. This stage can best be described as informal exchange of information about the policy issue in discussion and informal coordination as far as informal coalition building – informal, because there are no formal rules or regulations about the process in that phase. Overall this informal process, together with the formal phase I, leads to a perceived structure of influence during the process of national position taking. If this perceived influence structure goes beyond the allocation of formal decision rights, we could expect separate effects of phase II on the national position taking. Otherwise, the first proposal should be the decisive position to explain the national position. In the underlying case study, data about the perceived influence of the actors is available and the measurement of actors' issue-specific influence is possible. Section 5.1 specified the issue area-specific perceived influence of the actors inside of their national executive. Besides the definition, the comparison of the perceived influence structure and the formal allocation of decision rights showed that they are highly interdependent in all member states of the European Union. However, taking the preferences of the actors into account, it is not necessarily the case that both phases have an equal influence with regard to the declared national position.

The exact preference configuration in phase II is complicated. During the informal process actors try to assert their influence on the process and the first proposal. The actors do this with regard to their own preferences, power, and saliences toward the issue under consideration (see also the model of Bueno de Mesquita 1994). Based on the Median-Voter-Theorem (Black 1948; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997: 88) described in the next paragraph, these different degrees of actors' influence are incorporated by a weighted median position (Thurner and Linhart 2004a: 10). Each actor inside the government affects the collective position in phase II based on her perceived influence in the system (for the formal definition see Section 6.3). Accordingly ministries are not treated equally – rather they have a certain amount of power, which is based on their perceived influence inside of the governmental system. The power of each actor is measured directly through the network of perceived influence instead of defining a proxy measure based on (possibly) underlying concepts of power. Bueno de Mesquita for instance uses the institutionally assigned voting weights in the European Council to define and measure the actual power of the countries in the EU (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 77). The measure of voting weights for example is purely based on formal aspects, whereas the power measure used here is based on the actually-perceived structure and consequently incorporates the formal allocation of decision rights and informal self-organization of the government.

At the end, in the member states of the European Union, it is still the cabinet which is in some form responsible for the result of the policy formulation process. This is the case for policy formulation in general as well as position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference. Even if there is clearly a different degree of jurisdictional or ministerial autonomy (Laver and Hunt 1992: 125) in the member states, Laver and Shepsle (1996) state that “it is the cabinet that symbolizes the apex of po-

litical responsibility” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 28-29). This political responsibility combined with the jurisdictionally crosscutting policy areas lead to the consequence that in the case of remaining dissent between the cabinet members, the last decision is vest upon the cabinet itself. It is possible to think of the cabinet position as a threatening point. The cabinet has the right to review the decision made in earlier steps and it is the resolver of controversial issues (Mackie and Hogwood 1984: 305). In phase III the whole cabinet is involved in the process and some kind of a collective choice has to be made. A very basic concept of aggregating preferences of actors is described in the Median-Voter-Theorem of Black (Black 1948; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997: 88). Having made the assumptions that each actor has an unique preferred position in each policy issue, the issues are separable, and Euclidean distances are applied, there is no majority in the cabinet which could overrule the median proposal by another proposal. Recently Krehbiel (2006) pointed out, that it is still this “simplest pivot model – Black’s median voter theory – that performs best in most circumstances” (Krehbiel 2006: 239). However, the theorem is restricted to decisions made by majority vote. In reality, cabinet members (with minor exception of the head of cabinet) are treated equally during cabinet decisions, but decision rules differ. Bergman et al. (2003: 185ff.) distinguished the decision rules in the European cabinets in three different cases:

1. Formal rule of consensus (Austria, Italy, and Portugal)
2. Formal rule of majority (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands)
3. Formal or informal rule that the Prime Minister summarizes the cabinet consensus (Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Spain, and Sweden)

The second case is obviously compliant with the last assumption of Black’s theory. If the Premier summarizes the cabinet consensus (3) it is also likely that she chooses a position very close to the median of the preference distribution. This position would be accepted by all cabinet members and it could not be defeated with a simple majority by another option. Even if no vote takes place, it is in the interest of the head of government to have no majority in the cabinet opposing the proposed position. The first case (consensus) is different because the cabinet has to figure out such a consensus. Under the rule of unanimity each actor inside the cabinet is able to veto a deviation from the status quo. But, their is, at the same time, often no fixed status quo with regard to the national position. The existing status quo, i.e. the policy remaining in force in the case of no agreement, is defined with regard to the international level and not with regard to the national one. Hence there is no policy position which could be penetrated as official national position by some cabinet member using a veto. However, there is still the need to define a position prior to the intergovernmental conference. Bergman et al. (2003: 185ff.) stated themselves that the actual decision making procedures can vary from these mandated or implicit rules. Modeling the expected position in these three member states also as the median position is a reasonable approach to capture the complex environment. Consequently, if the cabinet members change the position in phase

III, they will try to implement the cabinet median as official national position. In all member states are processes which suggest the median position as collective choice of the cabinet with regard to each issue.

Following this model, fifteen sovereign member states simultaneously take a national position, whereas the ultimate decision about the policy outcome is made at the European level. Is it expected to have significant international influence during the process of national position taking? This model argues that an international influence on the national position taking process is only very limited. In the beginning of the process, the information about the national and international environment is too sparse to make any strategic moves. In addition, specialized ministries often consider their proposed option not only as the most preferred option of the ministry, but also as the objectively best option for the complete government. These are two reasons why it is not likely that the first proposer reacts to the international environment. Similarly, it is not expected that the whole cabinet is able to react strategically. If the position taking process has gone to the full cabinet, with supposedly high national conflict, it is much more likely that each actor cares first about the own claims, without thinking too much about other national and international actors. Only in the informal phase II it might be possible for a smaller amount of influential actors to use their knowledge about the international setting to act strategically. However, not or only partially knowing the preferences of the other fourteen member states makes any strategic moves prior the IGC meetings very hard. Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis (1999) described it that way:

“Government representatives themselves did not interpret informal exchanges of ideas in forums like the Reflection groups as leading to changes in underlying preferences, but as means to get all the information on the table so that governments could identify areas of potential agreement among stable preferences.” (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999: 65)

Following the international activities are mainly focused around information gathering and building coalitions for potential international agreements, while the national preferences remain stable. As the focus here is set on the national positions as outcome and not on the international negotiation result, the exclusion of international influence on the process is tenable. Nevertheless, shifting the focus to the result of the international conference there is of course an effect of transgovernmental structures and relations (Thurner and Linhart 2004a; Thurner 2006; Thurner and Binder 2007a). At this point it is only argued that there is no significant international effect expected on the question of what national position is taken. Later on it is shown that the questions of whether a position is taken depends partly on international circumstances and the expected international conflict.

## 6.2 Hypotheses

Maybe the largest advantage of an empirically operable network approach on national governments and the national position taking process is the testability of the presented models. Hypotheses based on the model of national position taking can be derived and tested. In this stage the three phases and relevant details of the model

are transferred into hypotheses, whereby most of the already clarified concepts are not again repeated at length. The hypotheses and the analysis will combine the question about the pure existence of a position and the question about the exact determination of it. In the context of intergovernmental negotiation in the European Union, many authors focus mainly on the existing national positions and their determination. The question of when a country decides to not formulate a position often remains open. To close this gap, the hypotheses section is structured into two subsections, first focusing on the question of whether a national position is taken at all, and then focusing on the question of what national position is taken. Some hypotheses have the common assumption that the underlying goal of a member state is to declare a national position. The arguments therefore have already been elaborated in Chapter 3. Kassim et al. (2000) briefly argue that the importance of EU policy is growing and national interest can only be secured in the case of a defined national position. Another more general point made by Leventoğlu and Tarar (2005) is based on the audience costs related to the public position taking.<sup>39</sup> For example, Fearon (1994) concludes that leaders who back down from public commitments in foreign policy are less likely to be reelected because the electorate perceives them as incompetent in defending the national interest.<sup>40</sup> Based on that, Leventoğlu and Tarar (2005) infer that commitments related to high audience costs lead to a bargaining leverage for the respective actor. Henceforth national public commitments provide bargaining benefits for subsequent international negotiations. It is consequently in the interest of the member state to publicly commit itself to a certain policy position to maximize its benefits.<sup>41</sup>

**Hypotheses on National Position Taking I** The agenda of international negotiations is usually large, complex, and jurisdictionally crosscutting. In the case of the IGC 1996, the agenda consists of 46 exogenously-given, one-dimensional policy issues. The high number of issues and therefore the high number of positions which have to be formulated leads to the first two hypotheses. All member states in the European Union face the same tasks of finding policy positions in the given areas and the number of issues to be handled is equal for all national governments. However, larger member states in the European Union have in general more resources (such as personnel) available inside their national administrations. Thus, everything else constant, one expects larger member states to declare a national position more often because of their capacity to do so.

**Hypothesis 4** *Larger member states declare more often a distinct national position before international conferences of the European Union compared to smaller member states.*

<sup>39</sup>Generally, a public commitment bears possible costs in the case of backing down from it. These costs are called “audience costs” (Fearon 1994: 581).

<sup>40</sup>For a recent overview of expected effects of audience costs see Leventoğlu and Tarar (2005: 428).

<sup>41</sup>The argument is only valid if the generation of audience cost is roughly comparable across the member states and the receptivity of the national electorates are equal. As all member states are democracies and elect their leaders (directly or indirectly) on a regular basis, it is expected that all leaders can be punished in the same way by their electorate.

The high number of negotiation issues also leads to a raised importance of the different salience of the policies discussed. Not all policy issues are equally important to all actors inside the national government. The higher the interest of an actor with regard to a policy issue (i.e. the salience of the issue to the actor), the higher should be the interest of this actor to define a clear national position in that area. Vice versa, if an actor has no interest in an issue area, she will obviously not care much about the national position taking in that respective area. As Section 5.1 shows, there is a special focus on the temporarily appointed project management during the preparation of an intergovernmental conference. It is responsible for the coordination of the national position taking process. Generally, the project management should be highly interested in finding a common position because a failure in position taking would very likely be seen as a failure of the management. In addition, the temporarily appointed project management is often vested in the ministries of foreign affairs (see Table 4) which are also responsible to assure “the formal link between the capitol and Brussels” (Kassim 2000: 238). Being responsible to act as a representative for the nation without a national position to *represent* is a troublesome task. Consequently, the project management has a especially high interest to define a policy position with regard to a certain issue area based on either individual motivations or national interest. However, if the salience of an issue area to the project management is high, it also has an outstanding position to influence the process. The responsibility to coordinate and hence the possibility to steer the national process gives the management an advantage compared to all other actors involved. Namely it is best able to foster or hinder the position taking.

**Hypothesis 5** *The higher the salience of a policy issue to the temporarily appointed project management is, the more likely the member state defines a position in that area.*

As seen in Table 10, the internal governmental conflict seems to have an impact on the question of who is able to determine the position, and it might have an impact on the question of whether a government defines a national position at all. The costs for reaching an national agreement on a certain policy issue rise, *ceteris paribus*, with the amount of national conflict over that issue (Thurner 2006: 185). A more or less homogeneous group with regard to its members' preferences finds a compromise much easier than a very large group with very diverse preferences. The expected effort for coordinating a common position could exceed the expected gains from this position, and hence no position would be taken. On the other hand, in issue areas with no (or very low) governmental conflict, the national position might be already known nationally and internationally. Following a repeated declaration is considered unnecessary. Another argument for such a non-linear relation is given by De Dreu (2006). He argues that too little and too much conflict over a task hurts an organization and leads to inefficiencies. Some conflict or disagreement over alternative policy choices will lead to discussion and prevents from inefficiencies due to incomplete information and, as argued already above, too much conflict raises the problems of coordination (De Dreu 2006: 104-105).

**Hypothesis 6** *The relationship between domestic conflict over a policy issue and taking a position in this respective issue is curve-linear. Very low and very high*



*amounts of domestic conflict lower the likelihood of taking an explicit position in an issue (inverted u-shaped).*

Although the international level should have no impact on the question of which national position is taken, it could have an impact on the question if a position is taken. The policy issues with a high level of expected disagreement on the international level (international conflict) are prominent in the internal as well as in the public discussion. These issues were mostly connected to further transfers of sovereignty to the European level or to the distribution of powers in the institutions of the European Union (European Parliament and European Commission). The national executives often take a position in such crucial highly sensitive areas because the media and the public expect the national government to do so. In addition, issues discussed extensively during the whole process of the IGC 1996 raises the pressure from the other members on the respective national government to take a stance on these issues. The bargaining leverage already mentioned is even more important in highly contested issues, and as Kassim et al. (2000: 3) formulated, only an existing and publicized national position can be defended at the European level and henceforth during an intergovernmental negotiation process. Therefore it is in general more likely for member states to define and publish a position in cases with expected high international conflict. Some of these issues were even postponed to the end of the negotiations. In addition to these a lot of highly sensitive policy areas were also discussed at the end of the conference. The so called “final game” of the IGC 1996 was composed of these most controversial and sensitive issues. In that case, issues like the objectives and scope of the Justices and Home Affairs pillar or the decision making procedures inside the Council were not solved until the last opportunity – the Amsterdam Summit in June, 1997 (Thurner et al. 2002: 167). Actually, an agreement on some of these issues could not be reached at all and the status quo (SQ) remains the solution. For example, the (re)weighting of votes in the European Council after an enlargement was such an issue.

**Hypothesis 7** *The more controversial an issue is discussed at the international level and the later an agreement is reached, the more likely the member state formulates a national position.*

The rule of unanimity during the negotiations, and especially the required ratification of the resulting treaty by all member states, secures at least theoretically the status quo (SQ) for each national government. Knowing this, governments which are close to the actual SQ do not necessarily need to declare a national position because they can veto each agreement beyond the SQ without any further reason. Therefore, the likelihood of having a national position in a certain issue is somewhat biased by a SQ-inertia.

**Hypothesis 8** *The larger the distance between the status quo and the governmental median, the more likely the government declares a national position.*

Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis define and discuss the multiplex governmental structures inside the member states of the European Union. Initiating and maintaining relationships to other actors inside governmental systems is costly (Burt

1992). As the previous chapter shows, these structures vary in their degree of selectivity and interdependence. One supposition is that doubled, contrary, or unclear relations inside of a government come along with a loss of resources and hence may lead to unintended result. Supposing that the definition of a national position is the goal of the member state, the performance can be measured on this instance. Balkundi and Harrison (2006) argue that teams perform better if the informal structure is equal to the formal one. Their main argument is that

“[i]ndividuals who occupy central nodes in an informal network tend to have access to diverse data that may facilitate a leader’s power or provide the leader with the information resources necessary for successful task completion” (Balkundi and Harrison 2006: 53).

Henceforth, we would expect systems to perform better when their informal structure is equal to their formal one. This fact is defined earlier as congruence of the national governmental system and describes the interdependence between the formal allocation of decision rights and the informally self-organized cooperation structure (see Section 5.2). In congruent systems the loss of resources due to structural uncertainty and resulting problems of coordination is smaller than in governmental systems determined by unclear and parallel structures.

**Hypothesis 9** *Congruent governmental systems more often find a common policy position.*

The effect of unclear and not congruent structures may be more (or only) harmful to the national position taking process in the case of high domestic conflict. In the case of low domestic conflict about the policy issue, i.e. most of the actors involved have the same most preferred policy option, the effect of any structural feature could be diminishing. Contrary in the case of high domestic conflict the effect might be intensified.

**Hypothesis 10** *Higher domestic conflict leads to a stronger effect of not congruent governmental structures on the existence of a national position.*

The hypotheses set up in the previous section suggest a non-random process of issue selection during national position taking. As shown later, the question of whether a national government declares an explicit national position is highly dependent on features of the government and its members. Consequently, the usage of the resulting sub-sample of cases where a national position has been declared can lead to serious specification errors during the analysis (Heckman 1979). This has to be kept in mind, when testing the hypotheses of the next section.

**Hypotheses on National Position Taking II** While the previous section derived hypotheses to explain if a national position is taken, the next hypotheses focus on the national position itself as continuous dependent variable. Explaining national position taking is one goal of this thesis, and therefore the national position itself and not the deviation from that position should be the dependent variable of interest.

Peters et al. (2000) stated that “the increasing sectorization of policy making weakens collective cabinet action and brings more bilateral contacts between the relevant ministers and the head of the executive” (Peters et al. 2000: 9). They argue that, at the same time, the core actors in the national government take some decisions on their own without regard to the other actors. Transferring this claim to the model set up above leads to Hypothesis 11. The bilateral contacts between relevant ministers – or better, between the core actors – can be modeled by the actual informal component in phase II of the model. The collective cabinet decision is the cabinet decision in phase III of the model. Testing the claim of Peters et al. (2000), it is expected that the effect of the actual informal phase on the national position will be larger than the effect of formal cabinet decision phase.

**Hypothesis 11** *The informal phase (II) has a stronger effect on the national position than the collective cabinet decision (phase III).*

In addition to this effect of informal sectorization and centralization on the decision making process, Baron and Ferejohn argue that “[t]he member recognized to make a proposal nevertheless retain some agenda power” (Baron and Ferejohn 1989: 1200). Laver and Shepsle state that ministerial discretion gives the ministers the ability to “affect the substance of specific policy proposals” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 32). In the case of national position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference the formal decision right to prepare the first proposal should give the responsible actor the possibility to have a lasting effect on the national position. Holding everything else constant, the first proposal explains a significant amount of the variance of the national position. This amount cannot be explained by the former effects of the informal phase (II) nor by the effect of the formal cabinet decision phase (III).

**Hypothesis 12** *Keeping everything else constant, the first proposal already explains a significant amount of the national position.*

In general, it is not “easy for a prime minister to ignore an important and strong minority of ministers who sought to have the matter discussed in full cabinet” (Mackie and Hogwood 1984: 306). The more ministries are interested in the policy issue and the higher the diversity of preferences in the national government is, the more likely some dissent remains during the national position taking process. This dissent is most likely resolved in the full cabinet because a relatively small group of ministers is able to push the issue into the cabinet. As already mentioned the cabinet still remains the resolver of controversial issues (Mackie and Hogwood 1984: 305).

**Hypothesis 13** *If there is to some degree a domestic conflict over a policy issue, it is more likely that the cabinet makes the decision itself.*

The descriptive results in Section 5.1 showed that there are significant differences between the self-organized systems in the member states of the European Union. Some member states have highly centralized self-organized systems (Greece, Ireland and Italy), while others have more or less decentralized systems (Finland, France and

the Netherlands). This fact should have an impact on the position taking during the informal phase II. A higher centralization of the self-organized governmental system makes it easier for the influential actors to determine the national position on their own, while a decentralized system does not.

**Hypothesis 14** *The higher the centralization of the self-organized structure, the higher is the effect of the position of the influential actors.*

Testing these hypotheses, we can throw some light on the impact of the three phases of the model and gain some knowledge about the position taking process in the national governments of the European Union.

### 6.3 Operationalization

As defined in Section 4.3, the most preferred position of an actor $_{i,j}$  in issue  $k$  is denoted as  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$  and the issue weighting of the actor $_{i,j}$  with regard to issue  $k$  is denoted as  $s_{i,j,k}$  (salience). Generally  $i$  indicates the member state and  $j$  the kind of jurisdiction. The dependent variables are derived directly from the national position itself ( $\lambda_{i,k}$ ). Either it is a dummy variable  $\lambda_{i,k}^d$  (1 if  $\lambda_{i,k}$  exists, 0 otherwise) or the quasi-continuous variable  $\lambda_{i,k}$  itself. The by population largest member states in the EU (Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy) are considered as large member states. They have a significant higher amount of resources and staff available than the others.

The interest of the project management is defined as  $s_{i,j,k}$ , whereas  $j$  indicates the ministry which is responsible in member state  $i$  for the temporary management of the national position taking with regard to issue  $k$ . The project management itself was appointed for the entire conference and following it does not vary across issues or ministries inside of a member state.

The domestic or national conflict and the international conflict reflect the amount of heterogeneity of positions on the particular level. The domestic conflict ( $dc_{i,k}$ ) is defined as the deviation from the mean over all positions with regard to the issue in the respective member state:

$$dc_{i,k} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{i,k}} (\Theta_{i,j,k} - \bar{\Theta}_{i,k})^2}{n_i}}$$

where  $n_{i,k}$  is the number of actors in member state  $i$  with an ideal position  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$  in issue  $k$  and  $\bar{\Theta}_{i,k}$  is the mean value of the ideal positions  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$  over these actors  $j$ . Analogously, the international conflict is defined as the deviation of the ex-post declared national positions from the mean over all national positions in the respective issue:

$$ic_k = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_k} (\lambda_{i,k} - \bar{\lambda}_k)^2}{n_k}}$$

where  $n_k$  is the number of member states with a national position in issue  $k$  and  $\bar{\lambda}_k$  is the mean value of the national positions  $\lambda_{i,k}$  over these member states  $i$ .<sup>42</sup> The domestic conflict  $dc_{i,k}$  is constant in an issue over all actors inside a member state and the international conflict  $ic_k$  is constant in an issue over all ministries and all member states.

The concept of congruence inside the governments is indicated by the strength of the relation between the formal allocation of decision rights and the self-organized governmental structures. Therefore the QAP results from Table 9 are used. If the effect is not significantly different from zero at a 10% significance level, the variable is coded as zero. Larger values indicate a higher correlation between the two governmental structures under consideration. Hypothesis 10 is tested with a simple interaction term between congruence and domestic conflict.

The operationalization of the perceived influence and the weighted median of the actor needs some more attention. In the questionnaire each national actor was able to denote all the national actors (including self-nomination) as influential in determining the national position. The data was gathered separately for each issue group after the conference (ex-post) and determines the actually-perceived structure of the governmental system. To normalize the counts for the different number of national actors involved and the different overall frequency in the member states, this thesis uses the number of times an actor was denoted as influential in an issue group divided by the number of all assessments in the regarding issue group in a certain member state. This is an issue group-specific and across countries comparable measure of how influential a national actor was in its own governmental system.

The perceived influence of actor  $i_{i,\hat{j}}$  with regard to issue group  $k$  is defined formally as:<sup>43</sup>

$$p_{i,\hat{j},k} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \pi_{i,j,k}(\hat{j})}{\sum_{\tilde{j}=1}^{n_i} \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \pi_{i,j,k}(\tilde{j})}$$

where  $\pi_{i,j,k}(\hat{j}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if actor } j \text{ denotes actor } \hat{j} \text{ as influential in issue group } k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ ,

$p_{i,j,k} \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} p_{i,j,k} = 1$  and  $n_i$  is the number of actors in the government of member state  $i$ .

Based on that variable it is possible to estimate an influence-weighted median to describe the informal phase II of the model. At this point it is important to mention again that each actor affects the median position based on its perceived influence

<sup>42</sup>To avoid possible problems of endogeneity, the international conflict is alternatively also modeled over the median positions of the national executives instead of the ex-post national positions. The results were identical and can be provided by the author.

<sup>43</sup>This formula is identical to the one in Section 5.1. Only the notation has changed again to actor  $i_{i,j}$  because a distinction between different member states is necessary for some variables in this and the following section.

inside of the governmental system (see also Thurner and Linhart 2004a: 10). It still has to be shown if this perception is equal to real influence. The formal definition is:

$$\text{Median}_{i,k}^{\text{Influential Actors}} = \theta_{i,\hat{j},k} \mid \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ \theta_{i,j,k} < \theta_{i,\hat{j},k}}}^{n_i} p_{i,j,k} > 0.5 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ \theta_{i,\hat{j},k} < \theta_{i,j,k}}}^{n_i} p_{i,j,k} > 0.5$$

Similarly, the unweighted median of the full cabinet decision is defined, with the difference that each actor who is member of the cabinet<sup>44</sup> has equal influence:

$$\text{Median}_{i,k}^{\text{Cabinet}} = \theta_{i,\hat{j},k} \mid \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ \theta_{i,j,k} < \theta_{i,\hat{j},k}}}^{n_i} q_{i,j} > 0.5 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ \theta_{i,\hat{j},k} < \theta_{i,j,k}}}^{n_i} q_{i,j} > 0.5$$

where  $q_{i,j} = \frac{1}{n_i}$  and  $n_i$  is the number of actors in the cabinet of government  $i$ .

The unweighted cabinet median, the weighted median of the influential actors and the position of the leading ministry are, despite some exceptions, real options in the policy space and not some arbitrary numerical values between these options. In the cases where the median is not unique, the status quo is chosen as median position if the status quo lies in between the two medians. Otherwise, the position closer to the status quo is chosen. This resembles a slight advantage for the median player closer to the status quo.

Each issue which was discussed at the very end of the conference is indicated by a dummy variable. This “final game” (Thurner et al. 2002: 167) is composed of the most crucial points of disagreement among the negotiators, which were mostly postponed to the last meeting of the heads of governments. The SQ-inertia is operationalized as the absolute difference between the (unweighted) governmental median and the status quo.

$$\text{SQ-inertia}_{i,k} = |\text{Median}_{i,k}^{\text{Cabinet}} - \text{SQ}_k|$$

The position of the leading ministry  $j$  in member state  $i$  which makes the first proposal in issue  $k$  is equal to the ideal position of this ministry ( $\Theta_{i,j,k}$ ).<sup>45</sup> In the case of Hypothesis 13, the governmental median position is interacted with a dummy variable, which is one in the case of more than average governmental conflict ( $dc_{i,k} > \overline{dc}_i$ ) and zero otherwise. The last hypothesis is tested by an interaction of the weighted median position with the betweenness centralization of the self-organized governmental structure (see Table 5).

## 6.4 Results

The following section is divided into two parts. Before testing the hypotheses about the determination of the national position (H11-H14), it is necessary to answer the

<sup>44</sup>This implies that actors who are not member of the cabinet (e.g. the Federal States or the Parliamentary EU Committee) have no impact on the cabinet median position.

<sup>45</sup>In the case with more than one responsible ministry, the mean of the ideal positions of the responsible actors is taken.

question of why a member state defines a national position at all. Focusing only on the cases of existing national positions would neglect the reasons for not signaling a position. However, if this process of selecting an issue to take a position or vice versa the process of deciding not to signal a position is non-random, it may lead to a biased (i.e. non-random) sample in the second stage. Earlier analyses on national position taking conducted with the underlying data (e.g. Stoiber 2003; Binder 2007) are partly restricted to the cases where the national government defined a national position prior to the Intergovernmental Conference 1996. As well other researchers working with national governmental positions did not pay much attention to the question of why such a position exists. Although König et al. state that “[m]issing or incomplete data on actors’ positions can cause significant problems in political analysis” (König et al. 2005: 285) it remains an open question why these positions are missing under specific circumstances. They lay out several methods to impute these values, but only a very basic approach to explain why national positions are missing. This may be partly due to the different research questions under investigation. However, if there is a statistical process at work which selects the issues in which a member states takes a position, it is a serious problem to perform further analyses with a non-random sample. A positive exception is Slapin (2008), who tries to answer the question about the existence of national positions by using a Poisson model to explain the number of missing preferences in the member states prior to the Amsterdam Conference. Afterwards he tests competing bargaining theories (Slapin 2008: 142-144). Nevertheless, the focus of Slapin was to explain the number of missing preferences an actor has. He does not explain the reasons why certain preferences of a national government are missing. But the latter is exactly necessary for the underlying case in this thesis.

It is typical for not every member state to define a national position on each policy issue discussed during an international negotiation. In the case of the IGC 1996, about 27% of the national positions are missing, i.e. the member state did not take a position at all. Table 11 highlights these numbers and their differences by member states. Already at this point, there is a noteworthy difference between Denmark which officially took a position in only about 50% of the 46 policy issues and Spain which published a national position in over 80% of the same set of policy issues. Among others, Hypothesis 9 relates this deviation to the overall congruence of the governmental system and the last two columns give some first evidence therefor. Assuming that the QAP coefficient sizes<sup>46</sup> for the insignificant effects (at the 10%-level) are equal to zero, there is a clear tendency toward fewer national positions in the case of not congruent governmental structures. Denmark, France, and Luxembourg have no significant relationship between formal allocation of decision rights and self-organized governmental cooperation structures. They are also well below the overall mean of 72 % of existing national positions. Conversely, all member states above the mean value have a significant and positive relationship between the formal and the self-organized structure. So far not congruent structures indeed seem to lead to a decreased likelihood of finding a common national position.

To test the formulated hypotheses in more detail, a binary choice model is an

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<sup>46</sup>Portugal had only one involved actor and is therefore treated separately. For the later analyses the maximal observed congruence is imputed.

appropriate method. Binary choice models should be used in a context where the “observed data dictate the special treatment” (Greene 2003: 665). In the case here, the data is based on the question of taking a position or not, which is clearly a binary choice. The dependent variable ( $\lambda_{i,k}^d$ ) is coded one if the member state has a national position in the respective issue and zero otherwise. The results of the logistic regression analysis are reported in Table 12. To control for potential heteroscedasticity across countries, the robust Huber-White sandwich estimator is employed (White 1980).

	Existing national position (max=46)	%	Congruence	$P >  z $
Denmark	24	52.17%	<b>0.025</b>	<b>0.40</b>
Ireland	28	60.87%	0.631	0.04
Sweden	28	60.87%	0.389	0.03
France	30	65.22%	<b>-0.068</b>	<b>0.40</b>
Great Britain	31	67.39%	0.323	0.04
Luxembourg	33	71.74%	<b>0.198</b>	<b>0.19</b>
Portugal	33	71.74%	-	-
<b>Average</b>	<b>33.46</b>	<b>72.75%</b>		
The Netherlands	35	76.09%	0.296	0.06
Finland	36	78.26%	0.222	0.08
Greece	36	78.26%	0.467	0.02
Austria	37	80.43%	0.324	0.05
Italy	37	80.43%	0.507	0.04
Belgium	38	82.61%	0.525	0.01
Germany	38	82.61%	0.370	0.02
Spain	38	82.61%	0.459	0.01

Congruence = QAP-correlation coefficient and the respective level of significance. Insignificant QAP values are printed in *italics*.

Table 11: Existing National Positions by Member States

Overall, most of the hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence. However, it is surprising that the size of the member state does not significantly affect the likelihood of position taking when controlling for the other effects. This leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 4 and the supposition that resources, as number of staff or the budget size, do not affect the likelihood of defining a national position. A possible explanation could be the higher need for internal coordination in larger member states. Small member states with presumably smaller executives may have fewer resources to prepare the national position, but they also have less effort to coordinate internally. Conversely, large member states have to bring dozens of involved bureaucrats and specialist together to prepare the national positions. Consequently the effect of higher resources could be outweighed by the effect of an also higher need for internal coordination.

An indirect indication for the costs of taking a national position is given by the positive effect of the SQ-inertia, i.e. the distance between the governmental median and the status quo. Member states whose internal position (here the governmental median) is closer to the status quo are more reluctant to formulate a distinct national



position than others. The mode of negotiation during intergovernmental conferences at the European level is unanimity, and hence each member state can theoretically veto each policy position beyond the status quo. The member state can persist in not changing the existing status quo without explicitly formulating a new position. This way the national government saves the amount of resources needed for the explicit formulation of an own national position. In highly sensitive issues all member states have a higher probability to take a national position, which is an intuitive result and confirms one part of Hypothesis 7. For the example of the IGC 1996, one would expect each member state to have a distinct opinion on the question about the weighting of votes in the European Council. To have a stance on such important questions is in the interest of the member state itself (bargaining leverage) but also due to some external factors. All these issues were discussed at length in the Reflection Group and later on in the meetings during the conference itself. This makes a distinct position of each member state more likely. Moreover, some controversial issues are already left over from the Maastricht Treaty. Agreements on these issues were reached, if at all, at the end of the conference. All these arguments support the point that member states very likely have stated a clear national position with regard to these issues. In addition, the analysis shows the more diverse the international preference constellation is expected, the more likely a member state defines a national position prior to an international conference. This fact indeed indicates that national governments and the national actors take the other member states and the international setting into consideration when deciding about taking a position on certain issues. This result as well corroborates Hypothesis 7. Only existing national positions can be defended during the negotiations. Therefore, the bargaining leverage obtained by the national position taking is more important in internationally highly disputed policy areas (Leventoğlu and Tarar 2005).

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.
Domestic Conflict	9.173**	(2.463)
Domestic Conflict (squared)	-21.46**	(5.493)
Congruence	1.174	(0.606)
Congruence x Domestic Conflict	-0.255	(3.536)
International Conflict	3.081**	(0.807)
Interest of Project Management	20.70**	(7.544)
Large Member State	0.325	(0.225)
Final Game Issue	1.060**	(0.242)
SQ-Inertia	2.069**	(0.362)
Constant	-1.754**	(0.341)
Observations <i>N</i>	658	
Log Likelihood	-284.4	

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , robust standard errors (Huber/White) in parentheses.

Table 12: Logistic Regression on the Existence of a National Position

Next, the temporarily appointed project management has a deepened interest in finding and defining a national position in her most salient issues. The management

can consider an issue as salient if either the management herself considers it as important or if it is important for the whole member state. In both cases we would expect that the salience the project management attaches to the issue has a positive effect on the existence of a national position. This is also significantly confirmed by the model. However, we are not able to discriminate between the two reasons at the moment. Chapter 7 will give some more details on that question whether the project management gains personally from this situation or not.

Congruent systems are not more decisive in national position taking. The first impressions of Table 11 are misleading compared to this results. However this question has to be reconsidered later on for the more sophisticated models. The interpretation of the domestic conflict effect needs some more attention. Early models which only included the main effect of domestic conflict showed no significant results for this effect. Thurner and Binder (2007a) present empirical evidence that the relationship between domestic conflict and a dependent variable (in their case, effectiveness in goal attainment) is not straightforwardly linear. They find that in the case of domestic consensus and in the case of very high domestic conflict, the effectiveness of an actor is lower compared to the case of medium domestic conflict. Hypothesis 6 already expected a non-linear relationship (inverted u-shape). It is possible to capture such an inverted u-shaped relationship (regression curve) by adding the respective squared independent variable in the model.<sup>47</sup> Following these expectations and the approach mentioned, the independent variables domestic conflict and squared domestic conflict were included. In the case of very high domestic conflict, the multiple governmental actors with their conflicting individual preferences cannot find a common position, and thus the likelihood of having a position decreases. On the other hand, in the case of governmental consensus over a policy it might be not necessary to take an explicit position because the positions of the actors involved are already internationally known. Thus taking an official position would only entail additional costs. The other point made by De Dreu (2006) is that no conflict over tasks lead to inefficiencies inside of groups. These inefficiencies lead to misevaluation of the importance of certain issues and hence to accidentally not signaling a national position. The estimated coefficients affirm this statistically. However, visualization of more complex relationships is often a useful tool. The conditional effect plot in Figure 12 clarifies the concept and perfectly reflects the expectation.<sup>48</sup> At first glance, the already discussed differences between highly sensitive and less sensitive issues can be seen. The probability of an existing national position across all member states is significantly higher when the respective policy issue is highly sensitive (upper curve). The other independent variables are fixed at their mean values, and for better visibility of the u-shape, confidence intervals are not included, although the curves are significantly different. For sensitive issues, most of the probabilities lie above 0.8 and thus member states take a position in over 80% of these, whereas the value for non-sensitive issues is much below that.

The inverted u-shape of the graphs confirms the interpretation of the statistical effects. There is a decreasing likelihood of position taking in the case of very low

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<sup>47</sup>For an elaborate discussion see Hamilton (1992: 148ff.).

<sup>48</sup>The conditional effect plot is drawn using the STATA commands provided by Long and Freese (2005) with their SPost package (Long and Freese 2005: 160-165).

domestic conflict and in the case of very high domestic conflict. The maximum of the likelihood function is located around the x-value of 0.2. Some domestic conflict prevents the discussed inefficiencies during national coordination and raise the probability of a position up to a certain point. Afterward, more conflict leads to a decreasing probability of having a national position because of rising problems of coordination. It can also be seen that especially very high levels of conflict lead to relatively low expected probabilities. For example, the probability of having a position in less sensitive issues decreases below 0.5, whereas the probability in the case of medium conflict is nearly twice as much ( $>0.8$ ). The shape and the coefficient magnitudes also indicate that the effect of domestic conflict on national position taking is stronger between medium to very high conflict as compared to the area between no conflict to medium conflict.




Figure 12: Conditional Effect of Domestic Conflict on National Position Taking

Until now, the model above only explains *why* governments formulate a national position prior to an international negotiation. However it does not explain yet *which* position the government takes. Therefore, Table 13 summarizes some simple possible solutions based on the model set up in Section 6.1. The existing national positions are compared with the position of the first proposal, the influence-weighted median position of the influential actors and the median position of the full cabinet. The positions, except of some cases, are all real policy options in the same underlying policy space than the national position itself and they are not mutually exclusive. For example, the position of the first proposal could be equal to the median of the cabinet and so on. Roughly 33% of the national positions are equal to one of the three positions, and the Pearson correlation coefficients are around 0.65, which is already a relatively good fit.

	Equal to National Position	Pearson Correlation
First Proposal	33.62%	0.6276
Median Influential Actors	34.06%	0.6595
Median Full Cabinet	33.33%	0.5948

The absolute match is based on all cases ( $N=690$ ) and the Pearson Correlation is based on non-missing values ( $N=437$ ).

Table 13: Comparison of the Declared National Position with the First Proposal, the Median of Influential Actors and the Median of the Full Cabinet

To further compare the different effects on the national position, an ordinary least square (OLS) linear regression approach is applied. The dependent and independent variables (National Position, First Proposal, Median Influential Actors and Median Full Cabinet) are at least ordinal in the interval  $[0,1]$  and, as Thurner et al. (2002: 22) argue, “compatible with the concept of Euclidean preferences” (Thurner et al. 2002: 22). A multiple linear regression is an appropriate method and gives the possibility to “identify the independent effects of a set of variables on a dependent variable” (Greene 2003: 9). In the model considered here, we would expect that a larger first proposal leads to a larger national position. In the same manner we would expect effects for the median of the influential actors and the median of the full cabinet. Using a multiple linear regression, we can compare the different effects in their significance and size while controlling for the others. Robust standard errors are used to consider the multiple observations per actor and the possible heteroscedasticity across countries (White 1980). The constant term is omitted that the regression line for each independent variable starts at the origin of the coordinate system. For example, if only the first proposal is included as independent variable, the effect size is very close to one (and the standard error and consequently the level of significance) indicates the deviance of the national position from the position of the first proposal. The same is true for the other independent variables. The multiple regression approach allows to assess this effect under the consideration of the other variables. As the independent variables are quite closely related to each other the problem of multicollinearity may arise. In the case of existing near perfect collinearity between two independent variables the results could be unstable and the standard errors inflated. Hence, significant effects might not be detected because of the too large standard errors. For that reason the data is tested for multicollinearity.<sup>49</sup> All test statistics indicate an only moderately high level of collinearity<sup>50</sup> and as the (in)significances of the effects in Table 14 are all obvious no further attention is given to the problem (Kennedy 2008: 192ff). The following analysis is restricted to the cases with domestic governmental conflict, i.e. differing ideal positions of the national actors. Theoretically at least two of the positions used as independent variables need to be different to assure variation of the independent variables. Therefore the restriction of the sample to these cases is necessary.

<sup>49</sup>This is done using the STATA ado `collin`, which estimates several test statistics.

<sup>50</sup>The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) of an independent variable (10.86) is only slightly above the critical level of 10 and the mean VIF (5.93) is well below 10.

In Table 14, the results of the linear regression are presented. Hypothesis 11 is clearly verified by the data. The influential actors try to assert their influence on the process of national position taking during phase II, and they are quite successful in doing so. The informal phase (II), modeled by the influence-weighted median, explains the national position much better than the formal cabinet median phase (III), modeled by the unweighted median. Although the reported coefficients are unstandardized, the results also hold for standardized OLS coefficients. The standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables are very alike (see Appendix on page xxxi) and hence the standardized coefficients do not only corroborate this finding, but also all the following results entirely.

	OLS		Heckman	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
<b>Main Equation</b>				
Position of Leading Ministry (Phase I)	0.398**	(0.0872)	0.259**	(0.0850)
Position of Influential Actors (Phase II)	0.541**	(0.105)	0.474**	(0.0979)
Position of Cabinet (Phase III)	0.0605	(0.0868)	0.189*	(0.0949)
Position of Cabinet x Large Conflict	0.0137	(0.0442)	-0.0265	(0.0474)
Position of Influential Actors x Centralization	0.102	(0.0692)	0.155*	(0.0700)
<b>Selection Equation</b>				
Domestic Conflict			6.990**	(2.514)
Domestic Conflict (squared)			-12.07*	(5.157)
Congruence			2.473**	(0.958)
Congruence x Domestic Conflict			-6.632	(3.873)
Interest of Project Management			15.52**	(5.960)
International Conflict			4.692**	(0.719)
Large Member State			-0.0569	(0.171)
Final Game Issue			0.0976	(0.182)
SQ-Inertia			1.314**	(0.306)
Constant			-2.189**	(0.450)
$\tanh^{-1}(\rho)$			1.372**	(0.360)
$\rho$			0.879	
Observations ( $N$ )	282		351	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.855			
Log Pseudolikelihood			-120.1723	
Wald test of independent equations: ( $\rho = 0$ ) : $\chi^2(1) = 14.56$ Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.0001$				

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , robust standard errors (Huber/White) in parentheses.

Table 14: OLS Regression and Heckman-type Sample Selection Regression to Explain the National Position

Keeping the rest of the model constant, the formal cabinet decision does not even explain a significant amount of the dependent variable at all looking at the OLS results. For these the national position is independent of the location of the cabinet median. Although this finding is somewhat mitigated by the Heckman model later

on, the effect of the cabinet median is still the smallest. This is somehow astonishing. Consequently it can be stated that the informal cooperation between the influential actors took a lot of power away from the cabinets inside of the European Union. Prior to an intergovernmental conference, the influential actors mostly determine the national positions on their own. Therefore they interfere in the formal process of national position taking. This finding supports the expectation of Peters et al. (2000). The collective cabinet decision is indeed weakened as compared to the bi- or multilateral coordination between the actors involved with each other and with the head of government. These multilateral coordination steered by the influential actors can be seen as the “heart of the machine”, which Rhodes (1995: 12) used to describe the *core executive* of a national government. Together with the modeling capacity already laid out in the previous chapter, the structure of perceived influence is the best indicator of actual existing governmental structure. It does not only unite the structural feature of the formal allocation of decision rights and the informal self-organization, rather it also helps a lot to describe the process of national position taking more accurately.

Contrary to the effect of the formal cabinet decision, the formal aspect of the first proposal still explains a significant amount of the dependent variable while controlling for everything else. Hypothesis 12 can be confirmed because the first proposal significantly explains some variance of the national positions which cannot be explained by the other effects. Although actors certainly try to change the first proposal during the process of national position taking, there remains still a fundamental part of the declared national position explained by this first proposal. Henceforth the first proposal indeed establishes the stage for all later coordination up to the determination of a national position in the end. Before having a closer look at the interaction effects, we can generally infer from the OLS results that the first proposal and the position of the influential actors have highly significant effects on the national positions, whereas the cabinet median has not so far.

Neither the main effect of the cabinet median itself nor the interaction with domestic conflict shows a significant result and hence no further support is given to Hypothesis 13. The cabinet median does not affect the national position significantly. No matter if there is domestic conflict or not. Also based on the OLS regression results the effect of the position of the influential actors is not amplified by the centralization of the self-organized system.

Henceforth, the empirical analysis only partly corroborates the aspect of core executives taking over the full responsibility from the formally responsible actors. Moreover the core executives can widely determine the national position but still relying on the guidelines of the first proposal. For practical reasons we can also infer that if one single structure has to be chosen, the actually-perceived influence structure best describes a governmental system prior to an intergovernmental conference. The formal allocation of decision rights found in organizational charts and the patterns of work related cooperation are less useful as single structures.

Having answered the questions of when a member state takes a position prior international negotiation and what position the member state takes separately, the next step is to combine both questions into one model. Selection models mirror exactly the illustrated processes above. First a policy issue is selected to take a

position and later the position is explained by some other variables. Combining these two models is not only a convenient way to build a more general model, it could also be necessary as Heckman (1979) shows.<sup>51</sup> Declaring a national position, and consequently also restricting the sample to the cases where a national position was declared, is clearly a non-random process (see earlier analysis). Using standard regression techniques in the case of non-random samples may yield inaccurate estimates (Heckman 1979; Sartori 2003). Heckman (1979) proposes a two stage model for sample selection “that enables analysts to use simple regression techniques to estimate behavioral functions free of selection bias in the case of a censored sample” (Heckman 1979: 160).

Following (Sartori 2003: 114) this problem can be formally described as follows. For the outcome, the ordinary least square (OLS) regression for the vector of independent variables ( $x_i$ ) on the dependent variable ( $y_i$ ) is defined in Equation (1):

$$y_i = \beta x_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $\epsilon_i$  is the normally distributed error term with mean zero. However, as already mentioned, this equation ignores the fact that the dependent variable may be based on a restricted sample, i.e. only existing national positions. This could lead to biased estimates. Thus the process of selection is explicitly described as

$$U_i = \gamma w_i + u_i \quad (2)$$

where  $U_i$  is the likelihood of observing the dependent variable and hence defining a national position. This likelihood is dependent on the vector of independent variables  $w_i$ .  $u_i$  is the error term and, jointly with  $\epsilon_i$ , normally distributed. Hence  $y_i$  is observed only if  $U_i$  lies above a certain value.

Achen and others state that in

“a censored sample, dependable coefficients are obtained by OLS if and only if unobserved factors influencing the selection equation are uncorrelated with unobserved factors influencing the outcome equation” (Achen 1986: 80).

These unobserved factors are included in the error terms  $u_i$  and  $\epsilon_i$ , and  $\rho$  denotes the correlation between these two residuals. For example: A hardly measurable variable in this setting is the personal and subjective skepticism of a head of government (PO) toward the EU. An euro-skeptic PO possibly does not care much about the intergovernmental conference at all and hence does not foster any national position taking. The result would be that member states with euro-skeptic POs will have fewer national positions than others, i.e. will be underrepresented in the selected sample. Additionally, this unmeasured variable could also influence the outcome itself. If a position is taken, this position will clearly be smaller (less integrative) than on average, because the PO is skeptical toward the EU. Following the two residuals contain both the omitted variable euro-skeptic PO, they are correlated and the mean

<sup>51</sup>For some more recent application of Heckman-type selection models see Sartori (2003), Plümper et al. (2005), or Puhani (2000).

of  $\epsilon_i$  is not zero (Sartori 2003: 114f). Using a regular OLS regression in that case could lead to biased results.

For the problem formulated in Equations (1) and (2) it can be shown that the “selection bias problem in a simple linear model [as illustrated above] is equivalent to an omitted-variable problem” (Sartori 2003: 115). For observed national positions

$$E(y_i) = \beta x_i + \theta \left[ \frac{\phi(\gamma w_i)}{\Phi(\gamma w_i)} \right] \quad (3)$$

where  $\phi$  is a standard normal distribution and  $\Phi$  is a cumulative standard normal distribution. In the case of only estimating the OLS (Equation (1)), the second term of Equation (3) is an omitted variable because  $\epsilon_i$  in Equation (1) is expected to be random (for the full derivation see Heckman 1979).

Transferring the Heckman-type selection model to the underlying case of national position taking is possible. The first step is the selection of an issue to take a position on – or more precisely, the earlier logistic regression. The regression model discussed afterwards, which tries to explain the national position itself, is obviously restricted to the cases with existing national position. This restriction is now handled by endogenizing the process of selection. This way the Heckman-type selection model provides a consistent estimator for the effects, whereas the ordinary least square (OLS) model may not.

As the variables of the two equations are nearly mutually exclusive, the interpretation of the coefficients for the main equation is equal to an OLS interpretation and for the selection equation it is equal to a Probit model interpretation. The selection process is based on a Probit model, what is also the reason for some less important differences between the logistic regression in Table 12 and the selection equation in Table 14. The Probit model is based on a standard normal distribution, whereas the Logit model is based on a logistic distribution, which is usually more flexible in the areas close to zero and close to one. The exclusiveness of variables used in the two equations also prevent from problems which arise when both equations have exactly the same explanatory variables (see discussion by Sartori 2003). To control for the potential heteroscedasticity across countries, again a robust Huber-White sandwich estimator is employed (White 1980).

First of all, it has to be stated that the effects of the Heckman-type selection model are close to the OLS regression effects and the logistic regression effects. However there are some changes. Using the Heckman-type selection model the effects of the cabinet median and the interaction of the position of the influential actors with the centralization of the self-organized system become significant at the 5%-Level. This is empirical evidence that the cabinets inside of the European Union’s member states keep at least some of their power in the case of national position taking. However, they are not the resolvers of controversial issues during the process as (Mackie and Hogwood 1984: 305f) expected. They do interfere in all cases regardless the internal conflict. The cabinet is not able to push it’s formal rights through the process. Overall the *core executive* consisting of the influential actors and the first proposer, take the decision about the national position away from the cabinet. Further on the more advanced model suggests that the influential actors



are even more able to assert their position if the self-organized system is centralized. The centralization of the governmental self-organized systems does affect the informal phase of the position taking. Influential actors play an more important role during the process of national position taking in centralized as in decentralized self-organized governmental systems.

The effect of the congruence of the system changes its level of significance toward the 1%-Level in the Heckman-type selection model. Despite the results of the Logit model earlier, the analysis confirms that the congruence of the governmental system has a significant positive impact on the existence of a national position. This influence does not depend on the domestic conflict inside of the national government. The congruence itself has a significantly positive effect on the probability to formulate a national position, while the interaction term does not. Governmental conflict does not intensify this effect, and therefore conflicting preferences inside the government do not matter for the effect of congruence. If the formally planned governmental structure is resembled by the informally self-organized cooperation structure, the respective national government more often finds and declares a national position. Unclear structures harm the national position taking process and jeopardize the declaration of a position. This strongly supports Hypothesis 9 and rejects Hypothesis 10. The effect of the final game issues becomes non-significant. This peculiarities is most likely due to the restricted sample in the OLS and Heckman-type selection models<sup>52</sup>.

At this point, the advanced empirical analysis corroborates the aspect of core executives taking over responsibility from the cabinet. The core executives can determine the national position strongly relying on the guidelines of the first proposal. Nevertheless the latest model showed that cabinet still remains some significant power in the process of national position taking.

Interesting is the fact that there is indeed a significant selection process confirmed by the applied Wald test of independent equations. The statistical test rejects the null hypothesis that  $\rho$  is equal to zero<sup>53</sup>, where  $\rho$  is the correlation of the residuals of the two equations and the indicator of the selection process. If the two residuals are correlated, the error term of the main equation has a non-zero mean and may be correlated with the explanatory variables. "Thus, when selection is non-random and error terms are correlated, neglecting to model selection can be a serious mistake" (Sartori 2003: 115).

In the specific underlying case it would be a mistake not modeling the selection process with regard to the main equation. One would miss important significant effects. Furthermore the Heckman-type selection model provides a more general picture of the process of national position taking than only focusing on the existing national positions themselves. As mentioned before, the estimated coefficients change and a statistical selection process is detected. The main effects (First Proposal and Position of Influential actors) remain stable and appear to be very robust. Following this case it is advisable to check for non-random samples before specifying

<sup>52</sup>In the Logit model the full sample without regard to the domestic conflict is used, whereas the later models only use the cases with at least some domestic conflict. See above for the justification.

<sup>53</sup>Actually the inverse hyperbolic tangent of  $\rho$ ,  $\tanh^{-1}(\rho)$ , is estimated and statistically tested (Plümper and Schimmelfennig 2007: 561).

ing the explanatory model on national position taking or start, like above, with the explanation of the selection process itself and include it into the model.

Having a theoretical model to explain the national positions as an intergovernmental conference of the European Union approaches and being able to test this model empirically, the question is raised about the model's accuracy. One evaluation of models is their predictiveness or goodness of fit. How well does a theoretical model fit into the observed reality? The reported adjusted  $R^2$  is only the most common indicator of this predictiveness. It reports the explained variance with regard to the chosen independent variables compared to the total variance in the data and the degrees of freedom, i.e. the number of independent variables. Another possibility is to compare the predicted national positions directly with the actually existing ones. As the declared national positions are known the average deviation between the empirical prediction and the existing position can easily be determined and used as criterion for the model's validity. Formally the average deviation or the mean average error (Achen 2006: 275) is defined as

$$\Delta_{i,k}(\widehat{\lambda}_{i,k}) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^n |\lambda_{i,k} - \widehat{\lambda}_{i,k}|}{\# \text{of existing } \lambda_{i,k} \text{ and } \widehat{\lambda}_{i,k}}$$

with  $\lambda_{i,k}$  is equal to the existing national position of member state  $i$  in issue  $k$ ,  $\widehat{\lambda}_{i,k}$  is the predicted national position for member state  $i$  in issue  $k$  and  $n$  is the number of issues.

Table 15 displays these average deviations by member states. The first column displays the average deviation of the OLS predictions from the existing national positions and the second column the deviation of the main equation part of the Heckman-type selection model from the national positions. Due to the fact that the models do not differ that much, the deviations do also not differ a lot. Across all member states the prediction is clearly better than the random model in the last column. This model is based on a random choice inside the policy space which is in the interval  $[0,1]$ . The random number is drawn from a uniform distribution and hence each option is equally likely. However, this random model can only be the upper bound for the accuracy of the models. Less clear is the comparison with the third column (MFA). Here the deviation from the national position to the ideal position of the ministry of foreign affairs is shown. This model serves as a comparison to the traditional conception of foreign policy making, where the ministries of foreign affairs were the major players. On average the MFA model prediction is less precise as the the Heckman model and the OLS model. Following this, observing only the positions of the ministry of foreign affairs would not be enough for a reasonable prediction of the national position. In addition the Heckman-type selection model and the regular OLS regression model perform extremely inferior in two cases. The prediction using only the ideal position of the MFA in France and Italy is nearly twice as good as the prediction using the models with the much higher amount of information input. The very small difference between the MFA prediction in France and the actual national position might be again due to a special case discussed above. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, became Prime Minister shortly before the conference (Deloche-Gaudez 2002: 140). Hence the position of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not only supported by the ministry itself but most likely also by its former head in its new position as Prime Minister. Some very specific reasons can also be found in Italy. The Italian government was at the beginning of the conference in dissolution and the Prime Minister, Lamberto Dini, held office only as a caretaker. As a consequence, a senior Foreign Affairs official, who was already member of the reflection group, handled most of the issues (Corrado 2002: 231).<sup>54</sup> However, it is nearly impossible to integrate such specific details into a general model of national position taking. Therefore Table 23 in the Appendix shows the deviations without these two cases and it can be seen that the models Median (Infl.), Heckman and OLS perform considerably better than the MFA model.

Member State	OLS	Heckman	MFA	Median(Infl.)	Random
Austria	0.228	0.230	0.261	<b>0.220</b>	0.346
Belgium	0.162	0.133	0.170	<b>0.100</b>	0.346
Denmark	<b>0.103</b>	0.128	0.214	0.122	0.312
Finland	0.134	<b>0.129</b>	0.184	0.168	0.374
France	0.200	0.250	<b>0.160</b>	0.322	0.261
Germany	<b>0.158</b>	0.171	0.235	0.175	0.395
Great Britain	0.166	0.168	<b>0.163</b>	0.182	0.564
Greece	0.174	0.168	0.234	<b>0.158</b>	0.356
Ireland	0.182	0.172	0.174	<b>0.132</b>	0.300
Italy	0.265	0.271	<b>0.142</b>	0.218	0.293
Luxembourg	0.204	0.210	0.248	<b>0.200</b>	0.352
The Netherlands	<b>0.217</b>	0.249	0.275	0.269	0.336
Spain	0.194	0.192	0.166	<b>0.158</b>	0.376
Sweden	0.256	<b>0.253</b>	0.346	0.256	0.399
Total	<b>0.186</b>	0.191	0.216	0.187	0.359
Observations ( <i>N</i> )	282	282	287	313	313

The minimal value in each Member State is printed in *italics*.

Table 15: Average Deviation of the Prediction with regard to the National Position

Recalling the outstanding effect of the influential actors in the process of national position taking, the fourth column indicates the deviation from the influence-weighted median position of these actors. Overall it is again the influence-weighted median position which performs very well in most circumstances. On average the prediction of the position is slightly inferior than the OLS prediction and slightly better than the Heckman and MFA predictions. Although the median of the influential actors still predicts the national positions for France in many instances wrong, the large discrepancy in Italy becomes smaller. Another advantage of the influence-weighted median position is the circumstance that it exists relatively often. There

<sup>54</sup>The senior Foreign Affairs official was Silvio Fagiolo, who was also one interview partner for the researchers gathering the underlying data.

are 313 predictions of the 313 existing national positions<sup>55</sup> possible using this model (100%). Conversely, the OLS/Heckman model only predicts 282 positions (90%) and the MFA model predicts only 287 positions (92%). Both reduced amounts of predicted positions are due to missing independent variables and missing positions of the MFA. To strictly separate the models there is no imputation of data applied in this stage.

Following this, the OLS model would be the best choice looking at the mean average error. Taking other goodness of fit measures into consideration the OLS regression and the Heckman-type selection model is also indicated as superior. The adjusted  $R^2$  for the OLS model including all independent variables is 0.855, whereas the value for the model only including the influence-weighted median is 0.833. Similarly, the log pseudolikelihood of the Heckman-type selection model including all independent variables is -120.12 versus -154.83 in the case of only including the influence-weighted median. These two goodness of fit measures would indicate the more complicated models as preferable. Henceforth, the theoretically derived model has its benefits and especially the detailed explanation of the different phases is an important contribution to the field of research.

## 6.5 Conclusion

This chapter derives a parsimonious model on national position taking before international negotiations take place. The model tests the derived hypotheses using data from the preparation of national positions for the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union 1996. "Models are normally evaluated on the basis of three criteria: Their parsimony, their verisimilitude, and their predictiveness" (Pierce 1994: 3ff.). Modeling national governments as organizations using methods of network analysis, it is possible to describe them parsimoniously and close to reality. Using only the most basic governmental features, an empirically-applicable model can be set up and tested. Based on the unique data and carefully chosen statistical models, the main findings of the chapter are summarized here.

The premiers' offices and the ministries of foreign affairs are widely challenged in their traditional capability to define the nation's interest prior to intergovernmental negotiations. This has crucial implications for all scholars of international relations working with national positions. Assuming a certain position (e.g. the prime minister's ideal position) to be *the* most preferred position of a national government becomes a non-trivial assumption. This chapter shows that the position of the ministry of foreign affairs as well as the position of the head of government often differ from the national position declared. As a consequence the national governments in the European Union have to be understood as multiplex organizations consisting of more actors than the head of government and the ministry of foreign affairs. All these actors can have competing preferences and interests when formulating foreign policy. This has to be taken into account for future research. Henceforth, national positions need to be defined with some caution and data gathering processes with regard to national positions should reflect a valid theory of their formation.

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<sup>55</sup>There are 502 existing national positions in total. Under the restriction of domestic conflict 313 remain.

The model of national position taking derived in this chapter is divided into three sequential phases. At the very beginning the position introduced as the first proposal has a highly significant effect on the national position in the end. Defined by the responsible ministry, this proposal sets up the stage for the subsequent process. It does matter which ministry formulates the first proposal for a policy issue because this proposal remains in discussion for the whole process. Afterward in the second phase, the influential actors try to assert their influence on the position taking process. This elusive phase is not structured by formal rules and consequently difficult to describe. Using a weighted median position this thesis solves this problem. Most of the time the influential governmental actors are successful and hence the influence-weighted median position has the largest effect on the national position in the model. The third phase is described by the formal cabinet decision, which is at least theoretically the (in)formal body responsible for the national declared position. It is shown that this cabinet decision is weakened in favor of the former two phases. An important point made by this chapter is that the influential actors are even better able to assert their position if the self-organized domestic cooperation network is centralized.

Finally, there is a clear selection process at work, which determines for which issues a national position is taken under given circumstances such as domestic conflict and congruence of a governmental system. Vice versa this process also indicates statistically significant reasons why a member state does not define a distinct national position in a certain issue. The domestic conflict over a policy issue has a non-linear effect on the likelihood of taking a position. Very low and especially very high domestic conflict over a certain policy issue lead to a significantly lower probability of having a national position. Furthermore, member states more often take a national position in highly sensitive issues as well as in internationally contested issues. Somewhat surprising is that large member states are not able to use their larger amount of national resources (e.g. staff) to declare more national positions. Of interest for the following chapter is the result that the temporarily appointed project management is able to steer the process. If the project management has a high interest in an issue, the member state does very likely define a national position and contrary if the interest is low the member state will less likely define a position despite of the interest of the other actors involved. With regard to the government as multiplex organization, it can be shown that congruent systems with equal formal and self-organized structures are more decisive in finding a common national position. If the overall goal of a member state is to find a national position, as assumed, there are two practical approaches to foster this. Either the government adjusts the formal structure to the actual self-organized structure, or the government tries to prevent the informally self-organized structure from diverging from the formal one. Both attempts, if successful, would significantly raise the number of national positions a member state is expected to define.

This process of selection is not only an important result by itself, but also for the model of national position taking in general. As theoretically and empirically shown in this chapter, restricting the sample to the existing national positions may lead to biased and incomplete results, and therefore some scrutiny is needed. Using a Heckman-type selection model, it is possible to explicitly model the selection process

and consequently handle the non-random sample.

After having examined the governmental level, the center of the analysis is focused on the actors in the process of national position taking. Instead of focusing on the entire country and the question about the national position of a government, Chapter 7 focuses on the performance of the national actors inside the governments.

## 7 Assertiveness in National Position Taking

### 7.1 Assertiveness of National Governmental Actors

The previous chapters showed that national position taking involves many governmental actors with diverse formal and informal resources, as well as individual preferences about the outcome. Why do some of these governmental actors perform better than others during the process of national position taking? For now, performance can be defined as to be influential in the process of taking a national position in a certain policy area. This means that the actor is able to advance a national position as close as possible to her own ideal position. In a traditional conception of governments, the exclusive right of managing external relations and thus defining national positions is vested upon the ministries of foreign affairs and/or the heads of governments. The previous chapter showed that this is not true anymore, that the heads of governments and the ministries of foreign affairs are widely challenged in their ability to determine the national positions prior to intergovernmental conferences on their own. However, the focus of the last chapter was set on the emergence of the national position and not, as in this chapter, on the role of the multiple governmental actors inside of the national executives. In the case of international negotiations and the preceding national position taking, the ministries act in a complex, jurisdictionally crosscutting environment. As shown in Section 4.3, this environment can be modeled as a multidimensional policy space. Again the analysis makes the assumption of an issue-by-issue perspective, which is already introduced in Section 6.1. Actors need to attain goals in multiple issues at a time, where each of the issues can be valued differently by the actors (salience). The ongoing discussion about how to conceive the performance of, and inside of, organizations is twofold. There is a large difference between the performance of the organization (government) and the performance of an individual actor inside of this organization (ministries). Recently, this topic has been extensively discussed in a special issue of the *Journal of Public Administration Research*<sup>56</sup>, with the conclusion that “[i]n contrast to the work on performance measurement [of organizations], the measurement effort on public management is still in its infancy” (Boyne et al. 2005: 637). As national position taking presupposes public management in the form of national coordination, this chapter helps to close this gap. Krause and Meier also show in their collection that the important focus on the individual level has often been neglected in the literature (Meier and Krause 2003: 294-295).

This chapter analyzes the degree of actors’ goal attainment, defined by the spatial distance between the actors’ ideal policy positions and the declared national position. To avoid confusion, from now on this goal attainment is called assertiveness in the process of national position taking. To what degree was an actor able to assert her own most preferred position as the official national position? Assertiveness is a mix of effectiveness and efficiency. As mentioned above, efficiency usually captures the “ratio between input and output” (Simon 1976: 180), whereas effectiveness measures the accomplishment of goals in a discrete or continuous way (Barnard 1966: 55). The concept of effectiveness would describe the individual performance in the light

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<sup>56</sup>Volume 15, Number 4.

of goal attainment. Is the national position close to the actor's ideal position? However, it leaves aside the input/output ratio aspect. What input of individual resources does an actor need to invest to attain the goal? Some hypotheses will focus on these costs and look at the question of whether concentrating ministerial efforts on few selected issues is related to the actor's assertiveness inside of these issues. Hence the analysis of assertiveness includes not only the degree of goal attainment but also the individual costs which have to be paid for this goal attainment.

The governmental system is described earlier by the formal allocation of decision rights, the informally self-organized cooperation, and the resulting perceived influence structure. Given this simplified multiplex governmental system and the resulting distribution of resources, the question is which actor is most assertive in achieving her goals. Performance inside of organizations is a mostly neglected topic in studies about national executives so far. It remains open

“whether and how individual actors or subdivisions perform as compared to each other in the respective organization, as well as compared to their own management” (Thurner and Binder 2007a: 5).

Modeling governments as multiplex organizations, as done in Chapter 4, gives the possibility of answering these questions within the existing framework of this thesis. It will account for actors' preferences and their respective salience of certain policy issues. The assertiveness of an actor is determined by the formal, the informal resources available to the actor and the overall preference constellation of all actors involved. Methodologically, a multilevel approach is used to account for the data generating process and to explore whether the assertiveness of a ministry is more similar within its governmental context or within its jurisdictional context. The first case would imply that all actors' assertiveness in a specific national government in the European Union are more or less equal, where the second case implies the actors' assertiveness in a certain jurisdiction is approximately equal. Do some member states have significantly smaller deviations between the ideal positions of the actors involved and their national position, or are some kind of ministries closer to the national positions no matter to which member state they belong?

## 7.2 Hypotheses

The question to be answered is, who gains most from the national position of a member state prior to an intergovernmental conference of the European Union. More specifically: how much does a ministry involved gain from the national position and what are the causes thereof? The utility of an actor, and hence her assertiveness, is defined as the ability to determine the national position as close as possible to her most preferred position. Based on a cost-benefit perspective and the fact that individual resources are limited, the ministry should invest its resources in the issue areas it is concerned with, and not in each issue area equally. The dependent variable to test the hypotheses has to take the different valuation of the issue areas into account. Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman use the salience of an issue to model this concern (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 79). Based on that, the dependent variable for the following hypotheses is the interest-weighted utility of the actor in each



issue<sup>57</sup>. Consequently an actor gains not only from a small distance between her ideal position and the national position; it is also relevant for the actor's utility how important the respective policy issue is for the actor. Although some actors need to be involved and hence interested in more policy areas than others (e.g. the ministries of foreign affairs) it is still at the discretion of these actors themselves to narrow down their area of interest to the really important issues under consideration. As will be shown later, there is a wide range of the number of issues formally similar actors are interested in. Additionally an unweighted utility would neglect completely the salience of an issue to an actor and thus ignoring the different valuation of goals an actor can achieve. It does matter for an actor if she is close to the national position in an area she cares about or not.

Keeping in mind that the process of national position taking is described as a model of sequential choices of individual actors and groups of them, the focus is set on the acting ministries inside the relevant phases. At the beginning of the process, there is the formal decision right to prepare and propose the first draft for a national position. Usually, "asymmetric [...] authority in the form of the right to make the first proposal provides gains for those with that right" (Baron 1995: 87). More specifically, in cabinets, the ministry who makes the first proposal and thus establishes the framework in which the later discussion takes place is "in a strong position to influence the final outcome" (Burch 1993: 107). The respective actor should use this formal authority, and therefore the possibility to influence the process, to pull the national position towards her own ideal position. Holding everything else constant, the position of the first proposer should be closer to the national position than the ideal positions of the other actors.

**Hypothesis 15** *The actor with the formal decision right to make the first proposal gains a higher utility from the resulting national position than others.*

In a less rigorous manner, the pure access to an issue provides a ministry with an advantage in achieving the best possible outcome. Access can be understood as the right or possibility to publish a statement to the issue in discussion, and especially to participate formally in the process. This formal participation assures that the actor is included in the flow of information. Access to trustworthy information in a certain issue helps the ministry to better achieve its goals and thus to have a higher gain from the national position.

**Hypothesis 16** *The actors with official access to an issue have a larger benefit from the national position formulated in the end than actors without official access.*

The third measure to describe the governmental organization is the actually-perceived authority structure modeled by mutual self-assessment of influence perceptions. Is the perceived influence related to real influence and consequently to a higher utility for the actor? The previous two chapters showed that the structure captures a lot of the formal allocation of decision rights as well as the informally self-organized aspects of the governmental system. However, it is yet unclear if this

<sup>57</sup>The interest-weighted utility is defined formally in Section 7.3.

perceived influence of an actor also allows this actor to shift the national position toward her ideal policy and thus leads to a higher utility for the respective actor. This hypothesis will test whether the perceived authority can also be seen as real authority, defined as “effective control over decisions” (Aghion and Tirole 1997: 2).

**Hypothesis 17** *Actors who were perceived to be influential during the process of national position taking were indeed powerful. This leads to a higher gain for these actors from the declared national position.*

As mentioned already, the national position taking prior to intergovernmental conferences is a multi-actor and multi-issue system, which is complex and usually crosscutting national jurisdictions. Thus the decision making process for the policy issues is distributed between several actors inside of the national executive. These actors have been identified earlier. In the case of distributed decision making, a management is often necessary to assure an effective and efficient output of the decision making process. Hence Milgrom and Roberts see it as “[t]he key role of management in organizations [...] to ensure coordination” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 114). However, this coordination is not an easy task because the management has to cause all other actors, with their diverse preferences and competencies, to focus “their efforts on carrying out a feasible plan of action that will promote the organization’s goal” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 114). The management is responsible for bringing all actors involved together and to focus on the organization’s goal as a whole. These efforts are related to various costs, and certainly tie up resources of the actors responsible for the management (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 301). This task is time-consuming, and often compromise has to be fostered by the project management. Consequently the management itself has to bear a substantial part of the resulting cost of coordination. Therefore, it is possibly less able to concentrate on its own utility, i.e. defining a national position as close to its ideal position as possible. It is to a great degree concerned with the overall goal of determining a national position at all. At the same time the management in the underlying case study is often vested in the units, which are traditionally responsible for coordinating foreign policy decisions (premiers’ offices and ministries of foreign affairs; see also Table 4). This traditional role should still have a positive impact on the assertiveness of the respective governmental units as compared to the more specialized departments. In the case of the IGC 1996, the “project management had to aggregate information and preferences of political subdivisions” (Thurner et al. 2002: 19) and to make sure that they are all focusing their efforts on the governmental goals. As a result, the national project management during the IGC 1996 should gain less from the national position than other actors. Nevertheless there could be some future rewards for the project managers, such as an extended reputation inside of the national system, which can be used in later decisions, or there could be rewards at another level of the decision making process. For example, it could be possible that the national project managers use their knowledge to obtain their goals on the international level which is not reflected in the declared national positions. Both circumstances are not covered by the model because the main point of interest is not the international outcome, but rather the national position. With regard to the national position, the project managers suffer a loss. To distinguish

between the pure effect of project management during the national position taking and the effect of being one of the traditionally responsible managerial units (PO and MFA) both effects are tested in the model. The managerial units as well as the temporarily project management are expected to be interested in more issues than the other ministries. Hence, these are also control variables to avoid biased results because of unusual many issue an actor is interested in and following lower weighted utilities for that actor.

**Hypothesis 18** *The temporarily appointed project management gains less from the national position than other ministries, whereas the other traditional managerial units (PO and MFA) which are not on duty to manage the project gain more than the other ministries.*

The examination of the self-organized governmental structure already showed that the actors built up their structures selectively, reflecting the cost of entertaining and maintaining such informal coordination structures. Governmental actors have scarce resources and they have limited time to accomplish the task because they are bounded by the time of the international conference. It is impossible for them to gather as much information as they want about the policy issues in discussion. Additionally, cabinet members “are flooded with information and demands on their attention” (Bergman et al. 2003: 179) and they have to figure out the reliability, trustworthiness, and value of the information. Combining these circumstances with the varied interest of the ministries toward different policy areas, it is expected that the ministries concentrate their actions on the issues they are interested in. Concentrating on the most important issues should lead to a higher interest-weighted utility for the ministries. Ministries which focus on a couple of issues should be more successful in achieving their goals than ministries which spread out widely in all issue areas without a focus. However, managerial units are expected to have a larger area of interest than non-managerial units. Henceforth this hypothesis holds only under the control of formal decision rights and managerial units to account for the varied expectations under which the ministries work.

**Hypothesis 19** *The fewer issues a ministry is interested in, or the more a ministry focuses on some special issues, the higher will be the utility for this ministry from the salient issues under consideration.*

The previous chapter corroborated the hypothesis of a curve-linear relationship between the domestic conflict over an policy issue and the likelihood of a national government to take a distinct position in that issue. The goal of taking a position is seen as the overall objective of the national coordination process. However, shifting the focus from the system level to the individual actor level, the literature on conflict and actors’ satisfaction suggests that conflict is negatively and linearly associated with actor’s satisfaction. Despite some authors’ arguments that conflict over a certain task can yield to overall positive effects (such as innovation or effectiveness with regard to the system level; an overview is given in De Dreu and Weingart (2003)), the expectations with regard to the individual level are unambiguous. The meta analysis done by De Dreu and Weingart indicates in all studies negative correlations

between task conflict, defined as disagreements about issues such as appropriate choices of alternative policies, and team member satisfaction (De Dreu and Weingart 2003: 744). In the underlying case, the actors involved are utility-maximizing entities, and consequently their satisfaction with regard to policy option is dependent on the distance between their optimal choice and the respective option. Hence the satisfaction can be measured as the interest-weighted utility (assertiveness), and the expectations about organizational conflict can be transferred and tested in this setting. Higher domestic conflict leads to a utility loss for all actors involved in a national government.

**Hypothesis 20** *The larger the domestic conflict inside a member state with regard to a policy area, the higher the loss in the interest-weighted utility for all the actors involved.*

The effect of domestic conflict on the assertiveness of actors can be partly misunderstood. To be clear, the domestic conflict is defined as the unweighted deviation of the ideal positions with regard to the governmental median (see page 88), while the dependent variable is defined as the interest-weighted utility of an actor with regard to the national position. Consequently, the hypothesis measures to what extent an unweighted conflict situation has an effect on the interest-weighted utility of an actor. Confirming this hypothesis would mean that actors signaling a position in – for them minor important – issues could harm the weighted utility of all other actors if this position raises the level of domestic conflict.

To assess the consequences of the informally self-organized governmental structures, the model applies a standard measures of social network analysis to describe the actors' ability to control the information inside these cooperation structures. Generally, informal communication and cooperation patterns are positively related to the perceived influence of an actor, and likely also to real influence (see Hypothesis 17). The relative position of an actor inside the self-organized structure, i.e. the amount she is able to control the information flow, is considered as an individual resource which allows the actor to be more influential during the process of national position taking.

The betweenness centrality is already discussed in Chapter 5. It views the cooperation network in the light of a communication network. Broker (or betweenness) centrality is based on the possibility of controlling the flow of information inside of the self-organized structures. Therefore “an actor is central if it lies between other actors on their geodesics, implying that to have a large betweenness' centrality, the actor must be between many of the actors via their geodesics” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 189). The central actor is involved in most of the informal communication going on and is possibly able to control the flow of information. This ability can be considered as individual resources for the respective actor and it can be used during the process of national position taking to minimize the distance between the individual's most preferred position and the national position.

**Hypothesis 21** *The more an actor is able to control the flow of information in the self-organized governmental structure, the higher the actor's assertiveness is.*

According to Persson and Tabellini (2000) systems with higher degrees of accountability perform better. Generally, countries perform better if actors are “direct accountable [...] and the dilution of responsibility [...] is not an issue” (Persson and Tabellini 2000: 187). If it is possible to identify the responsible actors inside of national governments, one can use this knowledge for future decisions or actions. For example, the national executives in all democracies are at least indirectly accountable to their voters. Actions taken by the executives could lead to a change in voters’ decisions whom to vote for and consequently jeopardize their reelection. The consequences of certain behavior during the national position taking process can hurt. Actors in systems with a high level of accountability are more concerned to choose carefully national position and they will favor less extreme national positions. An important fact is that the dilution of responsibility lowers the performance of a governmental system because actors have an incentive of personal rent seeking at the cost of the overall governmental goals (Besley and Persson 2008). This individual behavior of personal rent seeking, and hence non-cooperative behavior, will have on average a negative impact for the national governmental actors inside of the respective government. Using the congruence of a system defined in Section 5.2, it is possible to explicitly model the degree of accountability of actors inside of the national governments. In congruent systems, formal and self-organized structure are alike, whereas non-congruent systems are described by unclear and opposite governmental structures. It has already be shown that the congruence of the system has a significant effect on the likelihood of taking a position, and hence on the performance of the national government. Non-congruent systems take significantly fewer positions than congruent, whereas having no distinct position is the worst initial state for a government prior to an intergovernmental negotiation. At the individual level a clear structure of accountability should lead, everything else being held constant, to a higher degree of cooperation between the governmental actors and less personal rent seeking. As a consequence of this cooperation, the chosen national positions are less extreme in congruent systems and the utility for all subunits of the government is higher. Again, the effect of congruence may be amplified in the case of domestic conflict.

**Hypothesis 22** *In congruent systems, all governmental subunits are better off as compared to subunits in non-congruent systems.*

Finally, the analysis has to control for the instance in which a ministry has a most preferred position which is by chance very close to the governmental position. The governmental median, and in this case the influence-weighted governmental median discussed in the previous chapter, can be seen as the simplest expected position during the process of national position taking. It accounts for the positions of the actors involved and their influence during the process.<sup>58</sup> This circumstance is not solely under the control of the actor, but does lead clearly to an advantageous position during the process of national position taking. As a consequence, the distance between the ideal position and the national position should be smaller if the ideal

<sup>58</sup>For the case of expected positions in the legislative decision making see Austen-Smith and Banks (1988: 408).

position of an actor is already close to the influence-weighted governmental median position. Not including this control variable would overestimate the assertiveness for these cases. In the following, this fact is described as *luck* and is specified in the next hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 23** *The closer the most preferred position of a ministry is with regard to the influence-weighted governmental median (expected position), the higher its assertiveness in the process of national position taking will be.*

### 7.3 Operationalization

The dependent variable, i.e. the actors' assertiveness with regard to the national position, is defined by the following salience-weighted von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 79).

$$U_{i,j,k}(\lambda_{i,k}) = (1 - |\Theta_{i,j,k} - \lambda_{i,k}|) * s_{i,j,k}$$

This utility function measures the degree of goal attainment for ministry  $j$  inside the national government  $i$  with regard to the issue  $k$ . As defined earlier,  $\lambda_{i,k}$  is the national position of member state  $i$  in issue  $k$ ,  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$  is the ideal position of jurisdiction  $j$  in government  $i$  and  $s_{i,j,k}$  the respective salience – each with regard to issue  $k$ . The variable is modeled as weighted utility function and hence not only dependent on the distance between the ideal point of the ministry ( $\Theta_{i,j,k}$ ) and the national position ( $\lambda_{i,k}$ ), but also dependent on the actor's individual salience ( $s_{i,j,k}$ ) with regard to the issue under consideration. The salience weightings of each actor sum up to one ( $\sum_{k=1}^{46} s_{i,j,k} = 1$ ), so many are rather small. Henceforth, the dependent variable is skewed to the right. To account for this the analysis was done with the dependent variable itself and the logarithm of the dependent variable. Being the actor responsible for preparing the first proposal, having official access to the position taking process, and having the responsibility to manage the temporary project are formal decision rights of the actors. The competencies are theoretically derived and described in Section 4.4. The perceived influence of an actor with regard to a certain issue ( $p_{i,j,k}$ ) is also already defined on page 89. Likewise the amount of domestic conflict is defined on page 88, and being one of the traditionally responsible actors is indicated by the kind of ministry (PO and MFA).

The interest of an actor in an issue area is operationalized by the fact that she signals a policy position in the issue. The underlying argument is that the existence of a distinct ideal position is common knowledge inside of the national governmental system. On the other hand the internal weighting – used to describe the salience of an issue – is not necessarily common knowledge among all actors involved. All members of the national executive should know what their colleagues want because of discussions and internal statements. However they may not know how much time or resources the other actor is willing and able to invest to implement her ideal position as national position. The overall number of issues an actor is interested in

is the sum of existing ideal positions<sup>59</sup>:

$$\#\text{issues actor}_{i,j} \text{ is interested} = \sum_{k=1}^{46} ip_{i,j,k}$$

where  $ip_{i,j,k}$  is equal one if  $\Theta_{i,j,k}$  exists and zero otherwise.

Having an ideal position which is by chance close to the national position can be controlled for by adding the absolute difference between the actor's most preferred position and the expected governmental position based on the positions of all actors involved (influence-weighted governmental median<sup>60</sup>) to the model:

$$\Delta_{i,j,k}(\text{Median}) = |\text{Median}_{i,k}^{\text{Influential Actors}} - \Theta_{i,j,k}|$$

The betweenness centrality of an actor, which denotes the amount of information control, is already defined in Section 5.1 on page 47.

At last, accountability inside the governmental system is modeled using the developed measure of congruence. Congruence indicates conformity of the informally self-organized structure with the formal planned structure. The exact definition can be found on page 89. The congruence is tested for all cases as well as in interaction with the domestic conflict.

## 7.4 Results

As already mentioned, the analysis changes the point of view to the specific actor inside the governmental system. First of all, some methodological remarks have to be made. There have been no differences in the effects between the original dependent variable and its logarithm. Hence, the skewness of the dependent variable is no problem in this case, and the original variable was used for the reported models. The first column of Table 16 shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This standard technique is simple and often appropriate for continuous variables. But it could also ignore important aspects in comparative research on national position taking in the European Union.

Gill and Meier generally argue that

“public administration has ignored its technical side and that, given the types of problems dealt with by both academics and practitioners, a serious upgrading of methodological skills is needed” (Gill and Meier 2000: 157).

Further on, public management theory argues that the effects of independent variables on performance “cannot be picked up by techniques that specify that the same relationship holds between a resource [...] and performance across all organizations” (Boyne et al. 2005: 637). However, ordinary least squares regression does exactly this, so it is necessary for it to “be supplemented with other techniques that

<sup>59</sup>These are more or less voluntarily taken by the actor. See discussion above.

<sup>60</sup>A definition of the influence-weighted governmental median is on page 90.

allow scholars to see how individual managers and organizations optimize” (Boyne et al. 2005: 637).

One solution to this problem is the use of multilevel models (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal 2008; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Multilevel models try to capture the above mentioned circumstance by giving the ability to model level-specific constants and/or level-specific slopes for the independent variables in a regression model. Using this kind of model for the underlying setting, it is possible to statistically model different intercepts for the different theoretical levels (government, jurisdiction, and individual) and to capture the variability of the regression intercepts. A multilevel model not only tests the hypotheses derived above, but also gives some insights about the variability of the level-specific constants. Is there a significant variability in the constant term between different jurisdictions or governments? Is the assertiveness of an actor determined to a higher degree by its jurisdiction, by its nationality, or by both?

The model in the second column of Table 16 is based on such a random-intercept model. The “*linear random-intercept model* [...] can be viewed as a regression model with [cluster]-specific intercept” (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal 2008: 94). Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal call such a model a two-way error-components model with interaction (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal 2008: 485). It differs from a simple random-intercept model because the different levels – governments and jurisdictions – are crossed instead of nested. It is not clear if the relevant feature of an actor is its jurisdiction, which is secondarily nested in a national government, or if the relevant feature is the actor’s nationality, which is only secondarily assigned to a specific jurisdiction. Further on, the interaction between government and jurisdiction is included to identify the multiple measurements on the individual level. Each individual actor has possibly up to 46 measurements – one for each issue. The remaining residual-level “represents the deviation of an individual [...] response from the mean” (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal 2008: 485) for government  $i$  and jurisdiction  $j$ . The model can be written as

$$y_{ijk} = \beta_1 + \beta_m X_m + \zeta_i + \zeta_j + \zeta_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

where  $\beta_1 + \beta_m X_m + \epsilon_{ijk}$  is the linear regression part and the  $\zeta$ s the respective random error part for each level (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrodal 2008: 485). Furthermore it is assumed that  $\zeta_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$ ,  $\zeta_j \sim N(0, \sigma_j^2)$ ,  $\zeta_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_{ij}^2)$  and  $\epsilon_{ijk} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2)$ .

The second column in Table 16 reports the results of the full multilevel model including all independent variables. The empty model, including only the level-specific random effects, is printed in Table 24 in the Appendix and used later on for the comparison of the models.

After the results of the previous chapter, it is not surprising that the actor formulating the first proposal has a significant advantage, which results in a higher utility from the national position compared to the other actors involved (Hypothesis 15). From this viewpoint, the national position is again highly influenced by the ministry offering the first proposal, and the respective actor can uphold her assertiveness during the national position taking. Even if the institutionalized process afterward could change the position, there is significant evidence that the first proposer sets up the stage for the following process. Having official access to the



process (Hypothesis 16) and thus to trustworthy information leads also to an increase in the personal utility for the relevant actors. Taking another perspective could show that denied formal access to the process presumably leads to a smaller assertiveness in position taking and consequently a lower utility from the national position. Most jurisdictional responsibilities are long term fixed through by-laws and constitutions. Therefore the allocation of the formal decision right of access is quite stable over time. However, there are some changes in the responsibilities and competencies of jurisdictions over time, and the analysis shows that these changes clearly affect the assertiveness of a ministry during the process of national position taking. Therefore these changes of jurisdictional responsibilities should be observed with some attention by the governmental actors.

Fixed Effects	OLS		Multilevel Model	
	Stand. Coefficient	S.E.	Stand. Coefficient	S.E.
First Proposer	0.235**	(0.00522)	0.251**	(0.00485)
Access	0.181**	(0.00359)	0.192**	(0.00444)
Perceived Influence	0.167**	(0.0208)	0.185**	(0.0199)
Project Management	-0.071**	(0.00459)	-0.101	(0.0352)
Managerial Unit	0.062*	(0.00399)	0.102	(0.0513)
# issues interested in	-0.622**	(0.000300)	-0.895**	(0.000844)
Luck	-0.104**	(0.00640)	-0.082**	(0.00602)
Domestic Conflict	-0.047	(0.0303)	-0.086**	(0.0133)
Centrality (Betweenness)	0.005	(0.00682)	0.024	(0.0407)
Congruence	0.094*	(0.0203)		
Congruence x Dom. Conflict	-0.098	(0.0882)		
Random Effects			Variance	S.E.
Government Level ( $\sigma_i^2$ )			0.000039**	(0.0002)
Jurisdictional Level ( $\sigma_j^2$ )			0.002995**	(0.0021)
Individual Level ( $\sigma_{i,j}^2$ )			0.004541**	(0.0008)
Residual ( $\sigma_e^2$ )			0.002117**	(0.0001)
Observations	1402		1402	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.381			
$AIC$	-3777.9		-4209.7	
$BIC$	-3714.9		-4136.2	

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Standardized coefficients are reported for the fixed effects and variances for the random effects.

Table 16: Linear Regression (OLS) and Multilevel Random Intercept Model to Explain the Actor's Utility from the National Position

The coefficients reported for both models are standardized by the overall standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables. Despite that it is possible to standardize over group-specific standard deviations in the multilevel model, Snijders and Bosker (1999) propose a simple method to standardize only by

the overall standard deviations of the dependent variable (S.D.(Y)) and the overall standard deviation of the independent variables (S.D.(X)). They define the standardized multilevel coefficient analogous to the fully standardized OLS regression coefficient by

$$\beta_{std} = \frac{\text{S.D.}(X)}{\text{S.D.}(Y)} * \beta$$

(Snijders and Bosker 1999: 50).

These standardized multilevel coefficients allow us to compare the effects of independent variables regardless of their scale. They show that the effect of official access to the preparation process (0.192) is noticeably smaller than the effect of having the right to prepare the first proposal (0.251). The perceived influence (Hypothesis 17) also has a highly positive effect on the assertiveness of an actor. So actors who were perceived as influential were also truly influential in the process of national position taking. This is not completely trivial, but gives some evidence that the data measurement of influence perception inside the governmental system seems to be valid and reliable. The measure of perceived influence and hence perceived influence as a concept indicates real influence.

Nevertheless, the formal setup (i.e. the distribution of formal decision rights) does determine much more of the actor's assertiveness than her perceived influence. The standardized multilevel regression coefficient for the first proposal (0.251) is considerably larger as the standardized coefficient of the perceived influence (0.185). The perceived influence has roughly the same effect than the circumstance of having official access to the position taking process (0.192). Under this circumstance, the perceived influence structure is not the best choice to predict an actor's assertiveness. Rather, the formal allocation of decision rights explains the assertiveness better.

Until now, there are no substantial differences between the OLS regression model and the multilevel model, aside from slightly different sizes of coefficients. In the case of the effect of project management on the actor's assertiveness, the two models differ significantly. The OLS regression indicates a significantly negative effect, which would confirm Hypothesis 18, whereas the random intercept model indicates a negative but no longer significant effect. Likewise, the positive effect confirming the second part of Hypothesis 18 (managerial units without project management) also changes to an insignificant effect. These extensive differences are due to the multilevel model applied. The project management is very often vested in the ministries of foreign affairs and the managerial units are by definition completely overlapping with the premiers' offices and the ministries of foreign affairs. As seen before, multilevel models can be described as including a random intercept for each level-variable. Hence, including an intercept for the jurisdictional level (i.e. for each kind of ministry) will lead to collinearity between the random-intercepts and the variables which are constant or approximately constant on that level (project management and managerial units). Consequently it is necessary to restrict the interpretation to the OLS results for these two variables to test the hypotheses. Doing so, it is possible to see that holding the assignment of being the manager of the national coordination process (Hypothesis 18) results in a significant loss of assertiveness for

the ministry. The respective ministry gains less from the national position than the other ministries involved in the process. This does confirm the expectation that project managers are more concerned about figuring out a national position at all than they are concerned about accomplishing their own goals. The result is also in accordance to the highly positive effect between the project management's estimation of an issue's salience and the likelihood of the existence of a national position in that issue (see Section 6.4). The project managers are important figures during the process of national position taking, but do not gain personally from it.

Keeping the project management aside (i.e. constant) the managerial units in the European governments (PO and MFA) still gain significantly more of the national position than specialized departments. In the case of managerial units also responsible for the temporary project management, the two effects are nearly balanced. They gain a little bit more from being a managerial unit than they lose by having to organize the project management. However, they all secured a strategic location during national position taking for themselves, which enables them to gain more than the specialized actors inside the governmental system.

Controlling for the managerial units, scarce resources (Hypothesis 19) do matter during the process. The involved ministries, which focus on few (selected) issues, have a higher utility with regard to these issues as ministries with a wide spread interest area. It seems to be possible to keep track of a dozen issues in the national process of position taking, but as the number of issues an actor is interested in grows further, a problem of keeping an eye on each issue arises. There are upcoming problems to gather enough information about all these issues and about all the positions of the other actors involved.<sup>61</sup> The scatter plot of predicted values (OLS) versus the independent variable of interest as well as the linear fit in Figure 13 clearly visualize such a relationship. The negative effect in both models confirm this visualization statistically. The OLS predictions are used because the statistical difference between the managerial units with and without the responsibility for project management can be included into the figure this way.

Increasing the number of issues in which a ideal position is declared, and hence some interest of the actor is given to, up to 30-40 leads to a decreasing utility for the respective actor in each single issue. Governmental actors seem not be able to keep track of so many issues at the same time. For each additional issue an actors is interested in, the average salience weighted utility for this actor decreases by an absolute value of 0.006. This equals 0.07 standard deviations of the dependent variable<sup>62</sup>. However as mentioned above, this decrease in the utility is based on the issue-by-issue perspective and not on the overall utility of an actor. Indicating the managerial units (PO and MFA) inside of the national governments, it can be seen that these actors have on average many more ideal positions compared to the specialized departments. Controlling for the managerial units, as done in the statistical analysis, the effect would be even more visible in the figure. There is a clear distinction between the managerial units with a widespread interest over all issues on one side and the specialized departments with narrow interest on the other.

<sup>61</sup>This is not due to the salience-weighted utility function and the circumstance that the saliences of an actor sum up to one over all issue. The effect remains stable for an unweighted utility function.

<sup>62</sup>The effect is compared to the overall standard deviation of the dependent variable.




Figure 13: Assertiveness of Ministries Compared to the Number of Issue Interested in

The latter are better able to penetrate their positions in the areas in which they have a high interest, whereas the premiers’ offices and the ministries of foreign affairs are involved in almost all issue areas. Consequently, they are less able to focus their efforts on certain issues. However, for both groups the additional interest in a policy area is related to a loss in assertiveness in all other areas.

It is still true, as discussed above, that holding the issues interested in constant, the managerial units are more assertive than others. And it is still true that units with the responsibility of the project management are worse off than the other units. The utility gained by being a managerial unit is partly decreased by the negative project management effect; however, it still lies, everything else constant, above the non-managerial specialized ministries. Figure 13 nicely illustrates this in combination with the number of issues a ministry is interested in. Managerial units lose their assertiveness not because of their jurisdiction or special responsibility, but rather because of their often widespread interest during the national position taking. Heads of government and ministries of foreign affairs are expected to have a distinct position in the policy areas prior to an important international negotiation. There is a higher pressure on them to have an ideal position on most of the issues than it is on the other actors. Evidently there is a relationship between the fact of being a managerial unit and declaring a position, i.e. being interested in an issue. On average, an actor declares 26.28 positions, and Figure 13 shows nearly all managerial units clearly in the range above this value. Managerial units declare on average 36.83 positions, whereas specialized departments declare only 17.81. Despite this fact, there is still a considerable difference between the national managerial units. For example, the

PO in Finland has only 18 ideal positions, while the POs in Austria or Denmark have ideal position in all 46 issues. Therefore it is advisable for managerial as well as specialized (non-managerial) departments to carefully choose the issues in which they signal an ideal position before or during the intergovernmental conference. A too widespread interest deteriorates the individual assertiveness in the issues under discussion.

As expected, domestic conflict has a negative effect on the assertiveness of all actors, but only significant in the multilevel model. Domestic conflict inside a national governments harms everybody inside these governments significantly with regard to the salience-weighted utility of the actors. In issue areas with higher levels of domestic conflict, the actors cannot easily implement a national position, nor can they easily find an agreement. This may be somewhat trivial at first glance, but there is one important point to mention: the governmental conflict is not based on the salience-weighted positions on which the actors' assertiveness is based. Hence ideal positions in areas where an actor has no or very low interest will still harm all other actors with higher interest in these issue areas. This way, the actor herself is not directly affected by the unnecessary position in an unimportant issue because their salience-weighted utility will discount the assertiveness with regard to that issue. But as seen from above, if the actor is interested in too many issues, it also harms the actor herself (Hypothesis 19).




Figure 14: Assertiveness of Ministries Compared to the Amount of Domestic Conflict

Figure 14 visualizes this negative relation between domestic conflict and the actors' assertiveness. The conditional effect plot based on the multilevel estimates displays the dependent variable assertiveness in relation to the independent variable domestic conflict, while fixing the other independent variables at certain levels (Long

and Freese 2005: 160-165). Here the relationship is shown for three different groups, depending on the formal decision rights of the actors. All other variables are fixed at their mean values. The positive effect of the formal decision rights is again clearly visible. The unit preparing the first proposal is best able to achieve its goals, and the units without formal competencies are least able to impose their ideal positions as national position. Actors with the right of official access and participation are somewhere in between these two extremes. These effects themselves are all statistically significant as the analysis above showed and their differences are also tested with the result that the effects can be distinguished significantly.<sup>63</sup>

Surprisingly, the control of the self-organized governmental system has no impact on the assertiveness of an actor. These results were checked also for other centrality measures such as Eigenvector (Wasserman and Faust 1994), PageRank (Page et al. 1999) or authority/hub centrality (Kleinberg 1999) to exclude inappropriate conclusions due to the theoretically based choice of the betweenness centrality measure. As a result none of the centrality measures applied to the self-organized governmental networks yielded a significant effect on the assertiveness of an actor. Another argument brought forward by Mizruchi and Potts (1998) is based on a possibly non-linear relation (i.e. curve-linear) between centrality and power in organizations. They argue that under some circumstances it is possible that the most central actor is not the most powerful, but rather, what they call “semi-peripheral” actors are most powerful. They state that

“semi-peripheral actors with a monopoly on communication with peripheral actors and the ability to surround a central actor can emerge as equally or even more powerful than the most central actor” (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 384).

However, Section 5.2 showed that centrality in terms of information control is highly interdependent with the perception of influence, which again is highly interdependent with having real influence during the process (see earlier this section). Nonetheless, including the squared terms of the betweenness centrality measures, this claim was also tested. A curve-linear relation between the amount of information control in the self-organized systems and the assertiveness of an actor is also rejected by the empirical data. Consequently it can be summarized that self-organized centrality, especially the control of information, does not help the actor to be more assertive!

Furthermore, as shown in Section 6.4, self-organized structures which diverge from the formal structures do harm the overall governmental goal of defining a national position. In addition, the analysis in this chapter shows that not only the governmental goal of taking a position is jeopardized by these non-congruent structures, but also the individual actors themselves are all negatively affected in their personal assertiveness, and hence in the utility they gain from the national position. In the OLS it is empirically shown that non-congruent structures lead to an utility loss for all actors inside of the respective national government<sup>64</sup>. This effect

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<sup>63</sup>The STATA command *lincom*, which tests linear combinations of estimators is used therefor.

<sup>64</sup>Unfortunately the congruence effects can not be estimated in the multilevel model. The multilevel model accounts for member states specific intercepts and the congruence variable is constant

is independent from the amount of domestic conflict. Interestingly, this indicates that non-congruent informally self-organized structures harm all actors while not even the self-organized central actors can benefit from it.

All the discussed results hold for the control of *luck*. The distance between the ideal position of an actor and the interest-weighted governmental median position has a negative effect on assertiveness. Accordingly, ministries which are far away from the expected governmental position have, everything else constant, a lower assertiveness during the process of national position taking.

Beside of the fixed effects discussed above, the random intercepts of the model and especially their variances help to answer the question which level of the model best characterizes the actors. Is which member state they belong to decisive, or which kind of jurisdiction, or is it a mixture of both?

The random effects, printed as variances, indicate the variation of the intercepts with regard to the respective level. For example, the variance of the jurisdiction-specific regression lines ( $\sigma_j^2$ ) is 0.002995 and statistically different from zero. Hence there is some significant variation of the assertiveness of an actor based on its jurisdiction. One common measure of the “degree of resemblance between micro-units belonging to the same macro-unit can be expressed by the *intraclass correlation coefficient*” (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 16). The intraclass correlation coefficients for the governmental level ( $\rho_i$ ), the jurisdictional level ( $\rho_j$ ), and the individual level ( $\rho_{i,j}$ ) are defined as

$$\rho_i = \frac{\sigma_i^2}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2 + \sigma_{i,j}^2 + \sigma_e^2}, \rho_j = \frac{\sigma_j^2}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2 + \sigma_{i,j}^2 + \sigma_e^2}, \rho_{i,j} = \frac{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2 + \sigma_{i,j}^2}{\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_j^2 + \sigma_{i,j}^2 + \sigma_e^2}$$

(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrødal 2008: 485).<sup>65</sup>

A high intraclass correlation is equivalent to the fact that two observations in the same group are highly correlated. In the case of assertiveness, this means that a high intraclass correlation indicates similar levels of assertiveness for the actors inside of the respective group. Groups are defined by the nationality at the governmental level, the kind of jurisdiction at the jurisdictional level and by the nationality and the jurisdiction at the individual level. In addition a high intraclass correlation indicates that the assertiveness between units differ widely at that level.

“Although  $\rho$  is defined in the conventional way, it turns out to represent the ratio of the variance of the random effect [ $\zeta_i$ ] to the total variance and thus can be interpreted as the proportion of variance explained by clustering” (Rodríguez and Elo 2003: 33).

As a consequence, the intraclass correlation indicates the proportion of variance explained by clustering on the respective level. Therefore it is also called the relative

for each member state and consequently perfectly collinear to these.

<sup>65</sup>In the literature, the intraclass correlation coefficient as well as the correlations between the residuals in the Heckman selection model (see Section 6.4 on page 99) are both abbreviated by the letter  $\rho$ . This notation is kept in the thesis because it should be easily distinguishable which  $\rho$  is spoken about.

variance component on that level with regard to the overall variance (Marchenko 2006).

The first column of Table 17 shows the intraclass correlation coefficients for the empty model without further independent variables (see Table 24 in the Appendix) and the second column for the full model with all independent variables as shown in Table 16. In accordance with the expectation, the individual level has with over 90% a very high intraclass correlation in the empty model. Without other explanatory variables, the assertiveness of an individual actor is very much alike, over all issues measured in the sample. Not as clear is the expectation about the intraclass correlation coefficient with regard to the governmental and jurisdictional level. The coefficients in Table 17 show that the assertiveness in national position taking is more dependent on the jurisdictional level (about 50%) and only a very small part is explained by the nationality (about 5%). Consequently the variances in assertiveness between different kinds of ministries differ widely, or vice versa, the kind of ministry explains a reasonable amount of the variance in the dependent variable.<sup>66</sup> Some kind of ministries perform better across all member states than others. Conversely the member state in which a ministry is embedded matters nearly nothing for its assertiveness. This result indicate that member states in the European Union behave in a very similar way during national position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference. On average the salience-weighted distance between the actors' most preferred positions and the national positions are equal in all member states. There are no member states where all actors are, on average, significantly closer to the national position or further away.

Level	Empty	Full
Government ( $\rho_i$ )	0.044	0.005
Jurisdiction ( $\rho_j$ )	0.483	0.327
Individual ( $\rho_{i,j}$ )	0.869	0.785

Table 17: Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for the Governmental, Jurisdictional and Individual Level

By adding the independent variables to the model, the sum of unexplained variances decrease by 51%. The unexplained variances are the residual term as well as the level specific variances of the random effects (see Table 24 in the Appendix). This additionally explained variance is distributed differently over the levels. Using the hypothesized explanatory variables, the variance on the governmental level was reduced by 96%, on the jurisdictional level by 69% and on the individual level by 33%. Along with the results obtained by the multilevel model as the interpretation of the level-specific variances, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) also suggest that we should prefer the multilevel model over the OLS regression model (Greene 2003: 159-160). Hence the multilevel model not only advances the analysis methodologically but also substantially.

<sup>66</sup>This remains even stable when excluding the outstanding actors PO and MFA from the analysis. Results can be provided by the author.



## 7.5 Conclusion

The assertiveness of a governmental actor during the process of national position taking is highly determined by her formal decision rights. Despite the fact that the measure of perceived influence introduced in Section 5.1 is a valid measure of actual influence during the process of national position taking, the effect is not as strong as the effect of the formal decision right of the first proposal. It is approximately equal to the effect of the right of having official access to trustworthy information. Hence the formal allocation of decision rights and especially the right to prepare the first proposal is more accurate in explaining the assertiveness of an actor.

Furthermore, the premiers' offices and the ministries of foreign affairs, as mainly managerial units, are not only important players during the national position taking prior to and during the international conferences, they are also able to extract an individual advantage because of their positions. They personally gain more from the national position determined than other ministries do. However, this advantage is challenged because of two reasons. First, it is common prior to intergovernmental negotiation that a temporary project management is appointed. This management should assure the effectiveness and efficiency of the national position taking process. To do so, it seems to be necessary to disregard one's own interest and possibly give up one's own ideal position to foster compromise. The analysis clearly shows that being in charge of managing the national coordination process is related to a loss in personal utility. This circumstance disproportionately affects managerial units (PO and MFA), and thus offsets some of their advantages. Second and equally important, the number of issues an actor is interested in has a highly negative effect on the actor's assertiveness in each single issue. The wider an actor's interest area is spread, the less the actor is able to concentrate on certain issues and the lower her individual utility in the issues becomes. Focusing the individual efforts on important issues is beneficial for the actor. Of course, the public and internal pressure on the managerial units (PO and MFA) is higher to define distinct positions in most of the policy issues under consideration and consequently they get into trouble. They have to weigh the obligations to have a position as managerial units against the expected loss of utility because of the additional effort with regard to the policy area.

All together, this combination of effects is nicely illustrated in Figure 13 on page 120. Specialized units clearly have fewer issues they are interested in. Hence they are more assertive inside of all their important issues because they can solely focus on these issues. Conversely, the managerial units are – or have to be – interested in more issues, which significantly lowers their assertiveness. But there is still a considerable variance across the managerial units in the number of issues they are interested in and therefore also a variance in their amount of assertiveness. Concentrating on fewer issues raises the assertiveness for the managerial as well as for the specialized governmental actors.

The control of information inside of the informally self-organized governmental system has no significant effect on the actor's assertiveness. Moreover, non-congruent self-organized structures jeopardize not only the overall governmental goal of finding a national position as seen in Chapter 6, they also harm the individual actors in their personal assertiveness.

Finally, the multilevel model applied indicates that all member states of the

European Union behave in a similar way prior to an intergovernmental conference. There are no member states where all actors are better off with regard to the national positions. Conversely, there are clearly some jurisdictions which are on average closer to the national positions than others. All unexplained variances are decreased by the introduction of the above discussed independent variables.

## 8 Conclusions

This thesis develops a empirically-applicable model of national position taking prior to international conferences. Based on very fundamental measures of governmental structures, insights could be extracted in this field which is rarely studied empirically. Overall, this thesis expands the view of national governments as collective and not unitary actors in international relations. The unique empirical data shows that the national processes before international negotiations are complex, and that multiple national actors are involved and influential. The case study examined for the empirical analysis is based on the national position taking prior to the Intergovernmental Conference 1996, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty.

Modeling national governments as networks is not only possible but also beneficial for international relation studies as well as for comparative governmental research. Using this approach, it is possible to explain national position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference of the European Union quantitatively. Networks are used as a method and not as a metaphor, as often done before in political science. This requires the adequate theoretical definition of the actors being involved into the process, the policy issues where a national position has to be taken during the process and the relationships between these. These relationships are the formal allocation of decision rights with regard to certain policy areas, the informally self-organized cooperation structures between the governmental actors, and the actually-perceived influence patterns inside of the national executive.

The governmental structures are – for the first time – extensively examined via their descriptive nature. In addition to the results in terms of content some methodological points could be made. Defining national governments as networks consistent with the standard methods of network analysis, it is possible to apply a wide range of sophisticated analytical tools, such as QAP correlation and Exponential Random Graph Modeling.

The descriptive results can be summarized as follows. Resource-sensitive networks, such as the formal allocation of decision rights and the informally self-organized cooperation structures, are highly selective. Both structures rely on underlying cost-benefit considerations, and hence the decision about allocating formal decision rights or maintaining a cooperation relation is costly for the actors involved. Granting too many formal decision rights makes the national position taking process inefficient, and consequently all governments in the European Union restrict the amount of decision rights available. This restriction makes the possession of formal decision rights valuable. In the case of self-organized cooperation, actors need to invest time and attention to their counterparts to maintain such relations. Time and attention are limited goods, and hence the self-organized cooperation structures are selective because actors carefully choose their partners. Compared to each other, it is possible to see that the allocation of formal decision rights is a more or less collective choice, and hence less selective than the individual choice of informal cooperation. In the latter case, costs for cooperation have to be covered completely by the governmental actor herself and the choice of cooperation is also completely at her disposal. Despite the observed selectivity, all governmental systems in the European Union are formally connected. There are neither disconnected actors nor

disconnected groups inside of the formal governmental structures. The actually-perceived influence structure is not directly sensitive to resources. There are no direct costs related to the naming of another actor as influential. Consequently the structures of perceived influence are not selective. However, by indicating the influential actors inside of a national governments the top officials reveal an informal, actually-existing structure. In these actually-existing structures hierarchical patterns are found in nearly all member states of the European Union.

In a next step, these distinct governmental structures are compared to each other and their mutual dependence is tested. As a main result, the actually-perceived influence structure incorporates the formal allocation of decision rights as well as the informally self-organized cooperation networks. Strong significant dependencies are found in all member states. Henceforth, it is the single best structure to describe a national government prior to international negotiations. It symbolizes and describes at best the heart of the government, or as other authors may call it, the core executive. However, for certain research questions, the other two structures might be more of interest because the perceived influence structure models the government ex-post (i.e. after the event) and is therefore useless for planning and managing during the process. Each structure has its comparative advantage over the other structures and following modeling governments as multiplex networks is necessary. The formal allocation of decision rights can best be used for planning prior to the process, while the informal self-organization can be used to control whether these formal restraints are maintained, and the perceived influence structure gives an overall picture of the government with regard to the specific international negotiation. All three structures together define and describe governments detailed without losing the aspect of comparability across different national governments.

The relationship between the formal allocation of decision rights and the actually-perceived influence as well as the relationship between the informally self-organized cooperation and the actually-perceived influence is not contested in the member states of the European Union. The formal governmental systems in the member states work in their intended way, but the informal self-organization has also an impact on the perception of influence during national position taking. The correlation between the formally planned structure and the informally self-organized structure is more interesting. In most member states the governmental actors self-organize alongside of the formal structure. However, they vary widely in the degree to which the structures resemble each other. In some member states (Denmark, France, and Luxembourg) there is even no significant relation between the planned and self-organized structures at all. This circumstance leads to the development of an index of congruence indicating the degree of equality with regard to the self-organized and formal structures. This index of congruence shows whether the formal allocation of decision rights leads to the intended results, i.e. a self-organized governmental coordination controlled by the formally responsible actor. The governmental congruence is of special interest when looking at the accountability inside of national governments. Clear structures allow the identification of the responsible actors with regard to a certain action, whereas unclear, parallel, or conflicting structures prevent exactly this. Having defined the index, it is possible to empirically test the effects of the congruence of a governmental system on the process of national position taking.

Based on the newly gained knowledge of the governmental structures, a parsimonious model of national position taking prior to intergovernmental conferences is set up. Therefore, the derived basic governmental features are used. Overall, it can be seen that the heads of government and the ministries of foreign affairs are widely challenged in their traditional capability to define a nation's interest prior such events. Modeling national position taking, it is necessary to expand the approach on the other governmental actors involved into the process. Each of these actors has distinct preferences over the policy space discussed and resources available with which to influence the position taking process. Hence the process can be seen as collective action, with the overall goal of defining a national position. This explicitly formulated position is essentially required to defend the nation's interest. It is assumed that national governments without a legitimate national position are not able to affect the international (European) outcome. This international outcome can be, and in the case of the European Union very often is, a far reaching interference into the national domain of legislation. Consequently the national governments have a high interest to influence these decisions and hence have to formulate a distinct national position. Nevertheless, about one fourth of the possible national positions with regard to the fifteen governments and the underlying 46 issues are missing. Due to this circumstance, the model starts with explaining why these positions are missing before explaining what positions are taken by the member states. This is important for two reasons. On the one hand, defining versus not defining a national position can be seen as the first choice made by member states prior to an international negotiation and is therefore itself important for the position taking process. On the other hand ignoring this process and assuming the sample of existing national position to be random can lead to serious theoretical problems with regard to the analytical models. As a consequence, the applied Heckman-type selection model does not ignore the non-existing national positions; it rather tries to explain the reasons for the non-definition of a national position in a separate step.

This first step of selection shows that systems with congruent governmental structures have more national positions than others. Generally, accountability in organizations, especially in governments, is an underlying principle for a higher overall performance of the organization. The actors inside the organization are less likely to seek their personal advantage and disregard the organizational goal. Consequently actors involved in governments with high degrees of accountability, i.e. a high level of congruence, care more about the definition of a national position. In addition, the interest of the temporarily appointed project management has a strong influence on the formation of a national position. If the respective project management holds a certain policy area to be highly salient, it is very likely that the national government declares a position in this area. Finally, it is empirically shown that at the international level highly contested and controversial policy issues raise the likelihood of the declaration of a national position for all governments involved.

For the national position taking process itself, the model highlights three important points. First of all, the proposal introduced at the beginning of the national process is the baseline on which all of the following national coordination takes place. It does influence the national position to a significant degree, even if there is a complex process going on after the introduction of the first proposal. During

that process, the influential actors try to assert their influence on the process in a second phase and succeed in doing so. The declared national position is heavily dependent on the position of the influential actors, modeled as influence-weighted median. It is again the measure of perceived influence, which is very reliable in modeling the informal phase of the process of national position taking. Interestingly the last phase, the cabinet decision, which is more or less the (in)formal rule in most member states of the European Union, has only a minor significant effect on the national position. The cabinet is not able to strongly influence the process of national position taking. The subsequent stages of the process, i.e. the first proposal and the informal coordination of the influential actors, already determine most of the national position.

In the last part of the thesis the focus shifts from the government as level of analysis to the individual actor. The assertiveness of a governmental actor during the national position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference is the matter of interest. Assertiveness is defined as the ability to implement one's own ideal position as national position, while taking the individual salience of the policy issue into account. At the same time, the resources invested to achieve this goal are considered. The analysis of the national position taking does not completely change its direction, although the new level of analysis changes some important aspects. The overall goal of the national government moves aside and the personal utility of the individual actor with regard to each single issue becomes central.

As expected after the derived model of national position taking, the actor preparing the first proposal sets up the stage for the process and personally gains from this aspect. She uses the knowledge gathered during the preparation of the first proposal and the agenda setting power to assert a national position close to her ideal position. Furthermore, perceived influence is also an indicator of real influence. Governmental actors who were perceived as influential during the process of national position taking were indeed able to insert their most preferred positions as official national position. In combination with the modeling capacity of the actually-perceived influence structures discussed earlier, this is another indication that the structures of perceived influence is well suited for modeling national governments in respect to the concept of core executives. However, focusing only on the individual assertiveness, the formal decision rights and less the actually-perceived influence are decisive. Less expected was the negative effect empirically indicated for the project management. Whereas the salience of the project management has a large impact on the decision to take a clear position on an issue, the actors herself is not able to gain something from this position. Moreover, the actor has to bear the cost for the management efforts, and is on average further away from the national position than other governmental actors. This corroborates the expectation that the management gives up her own most preferred position in order to foster compromise between the actors involved. Conversely, managerial units not responsible for the temporary management of the project still retain the possession of their traditional role. They gain more than the specialized departments. However, all managerial units, whether responsible managing the project or not, are affected negatively by their widespread interest areas. Many of the national managerial units in the European Union have positions regarding most of the issues under discussion, and consequently some in-

terest in these issues. This circumstance hinders their ability to assert their ideal position in the issues of special interest to them. Conversely, the specialized departments are able to focus their efforts. On the one hand, this may be due to the nature of the actors – managerial versus specialized – but on the other hand, there are still some considerable differences inside of these groups. Not all specialized departments absolutely focus their efforts on only certain issues, and not all managerial units are interested in all issue areas. Consequently, this result advises the governmental actors to narrow down their areas of interest, and especially to limit the issue areas where they take a position. Too many positions are harmful for the single actor. Additionally, more positions lead, everything else constant, to a higher or at least constant domestic conflict, which is again harmful for the complete national government. The derived concept of governmental congruence has a positive effect on the utility of all actors involved. Clear governmental structures lead to more moderate national positions and consequently, *ceteris paribus*, to a smaller distance between the actor's ideal positions and the national position.


Hence the equality of the formal allocation of decision rights and the informally self-organized cooperation structures has a significant impact on the existence of a national position, i.e. the goal of the government, and it also has a significant impact on the utility of each governmental actor involved. This thesis shows that there is an incentive for all actors to create congruent governmental systems prior to an intergovernmental conference of European Union. Governmental actors have an individual incentive as their own utility is dependent on it as well as a collective incentive as the governmental goal is also dependent on the congruence of these structures.

Finally, a lot of questions remain open and have to be answered in future research. Why do certain informally self-organized structures evolve at all? What are the effects of the interactions between governmental structures over time? Are the derived hypotheses also valid for other case studies? Despite these interesting open questions, this thesis derived an empirically-operable approach of national governments conceptualized as networks. This way it overcomes the assumption of governments as unitary actors, as well as the often metaphorical use of the term networks in political science. This thesis shows that national position taking prior to an intergovernmental conference of the European Union can indeed be modeled using this approach.







## 9 Appendix - A



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 15: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Austria)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 16: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Belgium)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 17: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Denmark)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 18: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Finland)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 19: Multiplex Governmental Structures (France)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 20: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Germany)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure



(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 21: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Great Britain)






(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights

- PO
- MI
- M3
- MF
- MEco
- MDef
- MEnv
- MInd




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure

Figure 22: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Greece)




(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights

- PO
- MJ
- MF
- MLab
- MSoc
- MEnv




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure

Figure 23: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Ireland)




(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights

- PO
- MI
- MJ
- MF
- MDef
- MTrInd




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 24: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Italy)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 25: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Luxembourg)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure


Figure 26: Multiplex Governmental Structures (The Netherlands)



(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights




(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure




(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure

Figure 27: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Spain)




(a) Formal Structure of Decision Rights

- PO
- MJ
- MSoc
- MDef
- MEnv
- MInd
- EU-C



(b) Self-Organized Cooperation Structure



(c) Actually-Perceived Influence Structure

Figure 28: Multiplex Governmental Structures (Sweden)





## 10 Appendix - B

## **Standardized Questionnaire - Selection**

Selected questions of the standardized questionnaire from Thurner et al. (2002):

### **Identification of the most influential actors**

Using the structuring notes as prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, we have classified their 30 issues into six different groups of issues. For each of the groups of issues: would you please indicate those ministries or institutions that stood out as especially / outstanding influential in the process of finding the final negotiation position?

### **Enhanced cooperation between ministries**

During the preparation of the IGC 96: Do you remind one or several ministries, with which you cooperated particularly close in order to elaborate / bring in a joint position into the coordination process already from the beginning. Could you please indicate those ministries or institutions?

### **Position formulation inside the ministry**

As a rule, ministries as political actors always have to bear in mind the legitimate interests of other institutions, organizations and groups, as well as the sensitivity of the electorate. On the other side, ministries are expected to offer proposals by their own. Reconsider the IGC and the preparation of your ministries positions: Could you please give us the relative proportions of taking up external demands versus proposals autonomously elaborated by your ministry for the issues you have been responsible for? Please distribute 100 points according to the relative importance of every category.

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## List of Ministries, Offices and Committees (Abbreviations)

---

Prime minister's office	PO
Ministry of foreign affairs	MFA
Ministry of the interior	MI
Ministry of justice	MJ
Ministry of finance	MF
Ministry of economy	MEco
Ministry of labor	MLab
Ministry of social affairs	MSoc
Ministry of defense	MDef
Ministry of environment	MEnv
Ministry of industry	MInd
Ministry of trade and industry	MTrInd
Ministry of agriculture	MAgr
Ministry for public order	MPubO
Ministry of tourism	MTour
EU secretary	EU-Sec
President's office	PresO
Federal states	FS
Parliamentary EU committee	EU-C

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Table 18: List of Ministries, Offices and Committees (Abbreviations)

The following remarks are only important for transgovernmental comparability of the jurisdictions (Thurner and Binder 2009; Thurner and Pappi 2009): In France, Spain, and Sweden, only one ministry for the jurisdictions Economy and Finance existed (Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEcoF)). This ministry was coded as MEco, as its main responsibility was located to that area. The Irish and Finnish Ministries of Finance have been charged with the functions of an MEco. The British and Italian Ministries of Trade and Industry are functionally equivalent to the MEco in the other EU member states. In Germany, France, and the Netherlands joint Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs existed which have been coded as Ministries of Labor. The Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs was also responsible for Labor policy.

## Note No 4

Brussels, 14 March 1996 (19.03)

SN 1805/96

OR.f  
NOTE No 4

### JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS Decision-making process – Instruments – Implementation

The revision of the procedures introduced under Title VI should be aimed at making Union action in the JHA sector more effective. It should cover preparation of decisions, the scope of the legal instruments, the actual decision-making process and implementation of the Union's action.

#### I. PREPARATION OF DECISIONS

Three options may be considered for the streamlining of preparation structures:

- A. abolition of the "Steering Group" stage (requires no Treaty revision);
- B. abolition of the K.4 Committee;
- C. abolition of both the aforementioned stages (in this case the preparation structure would, therefore, be the "ordinary" structure of working party, Coreper and Council).

#### II. CLASSIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS

Experience points to a low level of use of the new instruments provided for in Title VI (joint actions, joint positions); this may be attributed particularly to the fact that there is no precise definition in the Treaty of the legal scope of these instruments. There is, however, broad recourse to traditional instruments of cooperation (recommendation, resolution).

The classification of JHA instruments could be set out in the following way (see draft text in Annex I):

- (a) Recommendations and Resolutions: acts which are of political significance but which are not legally binding;
- (b) joint positions: acts constituting legal commitments for both the Institutions and the Governments of the Member States;
- (c) joint actions: acts constituting legal commitments for both the Institutions and the Member States (and not just for their Governments);

- (d) "joint measures": this would be a new instrument which – like the Directive (see the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty) – would be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but would leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods;
- (e) conventions.

### III. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

At this stage, the decision-making process is hampered by the general requirement of unanimity. The various ways of facilitating decision-making include the introduction of majority voting and the use of certain forms of flexibility.

#### *Wider use of majority voting*

A. requirement of a qualified majority or augmented majority for the adoption of:

- recommendations and resolutions;
- measures implementing a joint action;
- "joint measures";

B. requirement of a majority of two thirds of the Contracting Parties for the:

- drawing up of conventions;
- adoption within the Council of measures implementing a convention.

#### *Flexibility*

Some flexibility could be introduced by laying down, in cases where unanimity continues to be required, that the Member States which have abstained are not bound by the Council's decision (constructive abstention). If such an approach were adopted, it would be necessary to:

- specify the detailed arrangements for the various JHA instruments;
- set a minimum threshold of participant Member States (for example, two thirds);
- possibly provide for a solidarity clause which would require States not bound by an act to refrain from impeding Union action based on the act in question (see draft text in Annex II).

[For a horizontal approach to flexibility, see Note No 3, point IV: Increased cooperation between certain Member States, option C].

#### *Democratic control*

For areas brought under Community control, there is the question of the degree to which the European Parliament is associated with the decision.

Options:

- A. consultation;
- B. co-decision.

For areas which would continue to be covered by Title VI, the following questions arise:

- the European Parliament's participation  
Options:
  - A. status quo (information and consultation on the main aspects);
  - B. consultation on a case-by-case basis, possibly with a time-limit set for the opinion;
- association of the national parliaments.  
Options:
  - A. observance of a minimum period prior to Council deliberations on the basis of a draft text, so that national parliaments so wishing have time to study the draft and possibly make their views known to their respective governments;
  - B. use of "COSAC" (Conference of bodies concerned with Community affairs in the Parliaments of the European Community) (see Note No 14);
  - C. setting up of an ad hoc advisory body comprising representatives of national parliaments; any draft joint position, draft joint action or draft joint measure would necessarily be referred to this body.

#### IV. IMPLEMENTATION

- A. Strengthening the role of the Presidency in representing the Union
  - revision of Article K.5 so as to confer a representative role on the Presidency in matters coming under Title VI, along the lines of Article J.5;
- B. Strengthening the role of Coreper as the single channel for the preparation of Council discussions (Article K.4).

#### V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

See draft text in Annex III laying down a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with third States and international organizations in the areas coming under Title VI (in two versions, depending on whether or not the European Union has legal personality). The "flexibility" formula referred to in Annex V to Note No 3 could be used in this context.

#### ANNEX I

Article K.3(2):

The Council shall take any measure contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union. To that end, it may, on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission:

- (a) acting by a qualified majority, adopt recommendations and resolutions and, acting by a majority of its members, adopt any procedural decision; recommendations and resolutions shall have no binding force;
- (b) adopt joint positions, whether for the purposes referred to in Article K.5 or for purposes of guidance towards or establishing a joint standpoint; joint positions shall be binding upon the Institutions of the Union and the Governments of the Member States. Joint positions may stipulate that the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to interpret their provisions; [flexibility]<sup>67</sup>
- (c) adopt joint action insofar as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint action than by the Member States acting individually on account of the scale or effects of the action envisaged; any measures implementing a joint action shall be adopted by a qualified majority; joint actions and measures implementing them shall be binding upon the Institutions of the Union and the Member States. Joint actions may stipulate that the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to interpret their provisions; [flexibility]<sup>67</sup>
- (d) adopt joint measures; these measures shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of joint measures; [flexibility]<sup>67</sup>
- (e) draw up conventions which it shall recommend be subject, within a time limit which it shall set, to the procedures applicable, with a view to adoption by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements; such conventions may provide for their entry into force after adoption by a number of Member States which they shall determine. Measures implementing such conventions shall be adopted within the Council by a majority of two thirds of the High Contracting Parties.

Such conventions may stipulate that the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction, upon their entry into force, to interpret their provisions and those of the measures implementing them and to rule on any disputes regarding their application, in accordance with such arrangements as they lay down. In the case of conventions and implementing measures which contain provisions making an explicit or implicit reference to concepts of Community law, it shall be mandatory to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to interpret such provisions by way of preliminary rulings.

## ANNEX II

### Article K.3b

"Where a Member State is not bound by one of the acts adopted by the Council in accordance with Article K.3(2), it shall nevertheless refrain from any action likely to contravene or impede Union action based on the act in question."

<sup>67</sup>Possible provision on flexibility to be adjusted to each of the different instruments.

ANNEX III

Article K.5a

A. If the European Union has legal personality

1. The Council may authorize [the Commission] [the Commission and the Presidency] to open negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement between the Union and one or more States or international organizations in the areas coming under this Title. The negotiations shall be conducted by [the Commission] [the Commission and the Presidency], in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of the directives issued to it by the Council.
2. The agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded by the Council, after consultation of the European Parliament; the European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a period which the Council may fix according to the urgency of the matter; failing an opinion within this period, the Council may act.

B. If the European Union does not have legal personality

1. The Council, acting for the Member States, may authorize [the Commission] [the Commission and the Presidency] to open negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement between all the Member States and one or more States or international organizations in the areas coming under this Title. The negotiations shall be conducted by [the Commission] [the Commission and the Presidency], in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of the directives issued to it by the Council.
2. The agreements thus negotiated shall be drawn up by the Council, which shall recommend their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements within a period which the Council may fix according to the urgency of the matter.
3. The Council, acting for the Member States, shall conclude the agreement with the third State once it has been approved by all the Member States.



## List of Notes

Note	Subject
1	Citizenship of the Union (CONF 3801/96)
2	Fundamental Rights
3	JHA: Objectives Scope Modes of Action
4	JHA: Decision-making Process Instruments -Implementation
5	JHA: Judicial Control
6	Employment
7	Environment
8	Community Policies
9	Subsidiarity
10	Transparency / Opening up the Council's Proceedings
11	EP: Composition Electoral Procedure
12	EP: Legislative Function
13	EP: Non-Legislative Functions
14	Role of National Parliaments
15	QMV and Unanimity
16	QMV-Threshold Weighting of Votes / Dual Threshold
17	Functioning of the Council
18	Commission: Membership Powers
19	Court of Justice
20	Other Institutions and Bodies
21	Enhanced Cooperation Flexibility
22	External Economic Relations
23	CFSP: Objectives Conception Preparation of Decisions
24	CFSP: Decision-making Procedures
25	CFSP: Implementation Operation Solidarity
26	Financing the CFSP and the JHA
27	Legal Personality for the EU
28	Common Defence Policy and Common Defence (Art. J.4 TEU)
29	Relations with the WEU
30	The Armaments Question

Table 19: List of Notes (CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96) as provided by the Council's Secretariat

## List of Issues

IID	Issue	IID	Issue
1.1	Citizenship of the Union	4.4	Decision-making in the Council: QMVThreshold
1.2	Procedure for adding Art. 8 (citizenship) without revision of the Treaty	4.5	Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of votes in the case of enlargement
1.3	Introducing fundamental rights to the Treaty	4.6	Decision-making in the Council: Dual majorities
1.4	Monitoring observance of fundamental rights	4.7	Composition of the Commission
1.5	Principle of subsidiarity	4.8	Enhanced cooperation: Introducing exibility
1.6	Review of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity	4.9	Enhanced cooperation: Conditions for exibility
1.7	Transparency: opening up the Council's proceedings	5.1	European Parliament: Right for drafting proposals
1.8	Legal personality for the European Union	5.2	European Parliament: Procedures
2.1	CFSP: Responsibility for planning	5.3	Scope of the Legislative Procedures
2.2	CFSP: Decision-making procedures	5.4	European Parliament: Election of the President of the Commission
2.3	CFSP: Responsibility for the implementation	5.5	European Parliament: Budget Power
2.4	Financing the CFSP	5.6	Role of the national parliaments
2.5	CFSP: Art. J.4.: common defence policy	5.7	Power of the Commission
2.6	CFSP: The Union's relations with the WEU	5.8	Power of the Court of Justice
2.7	CFSP: The armaments question	5.9	Power of the Committee of the Regions
3.1	JHA: Objectives and scope within JHA	5.10	Power of the Economic and Social Committee
3.2	JHA: Modes of action within JHA	6.1	Employment Chapter
3.3	JHA: Decision-making procedures	6.2	Monitoring Employment Policies
3.4	JHA: Democratic Control	6.3	Environment
3.5	JHA: Judicial control within JHA	6.4	Stricter rules on environmental policy by Member States
3.6	Financing the JHA	6.5	Community policies: new policies (energy, civil protection, tourism)
4.1	Composition of the EP	6.6	External economic relations
4.2	Uniform electoral procedure for the EP		
4.3	Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV		

Table 20: List of One-dimensional Negotiation Issues as Included in the Questionnaire

## Assignment of Notes from the Service Juridique to Issues

Note	Issue	Note	Issue	Note	Issue
1	1.1, 1.2	11	4.1, 4.2	21	4.8, 4.9
2	1.3, 1.4	12	5.1, 5.2, 5.3	22	6.6
3	3.1, 3.2	13	5.4, 5.5	23	2.1
4	3.3, 3.4	14	5.6	24	2.2
5	3.5	15	4.3	25	2.3
6	6.1, 6.2	16	4.4, 4.5, 4.6	26	2.4, 3.6
7	6.3, 6.4	17	-	27	1.8
8	6.5	18	4.7, 5.7	28	2.5
9	1.5, 1.6	19	5.8	29	2.6
10	1.7	20	5.9, 5.10	30	2.7

Table 21: Assignment of Notes from the Service Juridique to Issues

The notes CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96 were assigned to issues. Some notes contained more than one topic (Thurner et al. 2002: 26).

## Results MRQAP

	AUT	BEL	DEN	FIN	FRA	GER	GRB	GRE	IRE	ITA	LUX	NL	SPA	SWE
Formal	0.56 (0.000)	0.73 (0.000)	0.78 (0.000)	0.80 (0.000)	0.56 (0.000)	0.55 (0.000)	0.64 (0.000)	0.69 (0.000)	0.47 (0.000)	0.49 (0.000)	0.84 (0.000)	0.72 (0.000)	0.69 (0.000)	0.77 (0.000)
Self-Organized	0.57 (0.000)	0.23 (0.000)	0.10 (0.050)	0.17 (0.000)	0.59 (0.000)	0.31 (0.000)	0.29 (0.000)	0.24 (0.000)	0.29 (0.018)	0.41 (0.000)	-0.23 (0.000)	0.16 (0.000)	0.33 (0.000)	0.22 (0.000)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.837	0.753	0.620	0.733	0.621	0.524	0.603	0.686	0.483	0.610	0.686	0.604	0.752	0.765

Standardize MRQAP-coefficients and level of significance in parentheses.

Table 22: MRQAP-Regression Results by Member States (Dekker et al. 2007)

The actually-perceived influence structure is the dependent variable, whereas both, the self-organized structure and the formal structure are independent variables. For more details on multiple regression quadratic assignment procedures (MRQAP) via Double Dekker Semi-Partialling; see also Dekker et al. (2007).

### Average Deviation (without France and Italy)

Member State	OLS	Heckman	MFA	Median(Infl.)	Random
Austria	0.228	0.230	0.261	<b>0.220</b>	0.346
Belgium	0.162	0.133	0.170	<b>0.100</b>	0.346
Denmark	<b>0.103</b>	0.128	0.214	0.122	0.312
Finland	0.134	<b>0.129</b>	0.184	0.168	0.374
Germany	<b>0.158</b>	0.171	0.235	0.175	0.395
Great Britain	0.166	0.168	<b>0.163</b>	0.182	0.564
Greece	0.174	0.168	0.234	<b>0.158</b>	0.356
Ireland	0.182	0.172	0.174	<b>0.132</b>	0.300
Luxembourg	0.204	0.210	0.248	<b>0.200</b>	0.352
The Netherlands	<b>0.217</b>	0.249	0.275	0.269	0.336
Spain	0.194	0.192	0.166	<b>0.158</b>	0.376
Sweden	0.256	<b>0.253</b>	0.346	0.256	0.399
Total	0.182	0.184	0.222	<b>0.178</b>	0.368
Observations ( $N$ )	257	257	259	283	283

The minimal value in each Member State is printed in *italics*.

Table 23: Average Deviation of the Prediction with regard to the National Position (without France and Italy)

**Multilevel Models (Full and Empty)**

Fixed Effects	Mixed Model			
	Full	Mixed Model		Empty
	Stand. Coefficient	S.E.	Stand. Coefficient	S.E.
First Proposer	0.251**	(0.00485)		
Access	0.192**	(0.00444)		
Perceived Influence	0.185**	(0.0199)		
Project Management	-0.101	(0.0352)		
Managerial Unit	0.102	(0.0513)		
# issues interested in	-0.895**	(0.000844)		
Luck	-0.082**	(0.00602)		
Domestic Conflict	-0.086**	(0.0133)		
Centrality (Betweenness)	0.024	(0.0407)		
Random Effects	Variance	S.E.	Variance	S.E.
Government Level ( $\sigma_i^2$ )	0.000039**	(0.0002)	0.000867**	(0.0006)
Jurisdictional Level ( $\sigma_j^2$ )	0.002995**	(0.0021)	0.009534**	(0.0046)
Individual Level ( $\sigma_{i,j}^2$ )	0.004541**	(0.0008)	0.006753**	(0.0011)
Residual ( $\sigma_e^2$ )	0.002117**	(0.0001)	0.002582**	(0.0001)
Observations	1402		1402	
<i>AIC</i>	-4209.7		-3904.2	
<i>BIC</i>	-4136.2		-3877.9	

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , standard errors in parentheses.

Note: Standardized coefficients are reported for the fixed effects and variances for the random effects.

Table 24: Multilevel Random Intercept Model (Full and Empty) to Explain the Actor's Utility of the National Position

## Definitions and Descriptive Summary of the Variables

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max	Abbreviation/Definition	Page
<b>Dependent Variable</b>							
Assertiveness	1854	0.050	0.080	0	0.800	$U_{i,j,k}(\lambda_{i,k})$	114
<b>Independent Variables</b>							
First Proposer	6440	0.118	0.322	0	1	Actor responsible to prepare the first proposal	114
Access	6440	0.177	0.382	0	1	Actors with official access to the process	114
Perceived Influence	6440	0.107	0.145	0	1	$p_{i,j,k}$	59 and 89
Project Management	6440	0.129	0.335	0	1	Temporary appointed project management	114
MFA or PO	6440	0.207	0.405	0	1	Managerial units	114
# Issues Interested in	6440	16.557	12.982	1	46	number of issues actor $i,j$ is interested in	115
Luck	2318	0.131	0.231	0	1	$\Delta_{i,j,k}$ (Median)	115
Domestic Conflict	6440	0.141	0.145	0	0.500	$dc_{i,k}$	88
Centrality (Betweenness)	6440	0.107	0.229	0	1	$C_B$	47
Congruence	6440	0.334	0.182	0	0.631	see above	89
Congruence x Conflict	6440	0.198	0.210	0	0.631	Congruence if $dc_{i,k} > 0$	115
<b>Other Variables</b>							
Ideal Position of Actor	2318	0.438	0.369	0	1	$\Theta_{i,j,k}$	88
Issue Salience of Actor	6440	0.022	0.060	0	1	$s_{i,j,k}$	88

Table 25: Descriptive Summary of Variables (Actor Level)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max	Abbreviation/Definition	Page
<b>Dependent Variable</b>							
National Position (Dummy)	690	0.728	0.446	0	1	$\lambda_{i,k}^d$	88
National Position	502	0.564	0.338	0	1	$\lambda_{i,k}$	88
<b>Independent Variables</b>							
Position of Leading Ministry	561	0.444	0.358	0	1	$\Theta_{i,j,k}$ if $a_{i,j}$ is the leading ministry in issue k	90
Position of Influential Actors	661	0.418	0.365	0	1	Median $_{i,k}$ Influential Actors	90
Position of Cabinet	661	0.392	0.354	0	1	Median $_{i,k}$ Cabinet	90
Position of Cabinet x Conflict	661	0.246	0.325	0	1	Median $_{i,k}$ Cabinet if $dc_{i,k} > 0$	90
Position of Influential Actors x Centralization	661	0.278	0.297	0	1.000	Median $_{i,k}$ Influential Actors x Betweenness Centralization of self-organized structures	90
Domestic Conflict	690	0.127	0.144	0	0.500	$dc_{i,k}$	88
Domestic Conflict (squared)	690	0.037	0.057	0	0.250	$dc_{i,k}^2$	88
Congruence	690	0.343	0.205	0	0.631	QAP correlation coefficient between formal and self-organized structure	89
Congruence x Domestic Conflict	690	0.040	0.056	0	0.287	Congruence x $dc_{i,k}$	89
Interest of Project Management	690	0.023	0.023	0	0.205	$s_{i,j,k}$ if $a_{i,j}$ is the project management	88
International Conflict	690	0.238	0.130	0	0.481	$ic_k$	88
Large Member States	690	0.333	0.472	0	1	The by population largest Member States	88
Final Game	690	0.435	0.496	0	1	Final Game issues	90
SQ-Inertia	661	0.355	0.351	0	1	SQ-Inertia $_{i,k}$	90

Table 26: Descriptive Summary of Variables (Member State Level)



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